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This study examines the influence of Rome’s diplomatic management in 
channels apart from official ones and open contacts among states, on her 
expansion and Republic from the 200s to 133 BCE. In this thesis such involvement 
in foreign affairs is called informal diplomacy. This terminology was not used by 
the Romans directly but is useful in showing the following. In the period of Rome’s 
advance into the Greek world, she approached not only foreign states but also 
individuals, while individual Romans also increasingly participated in such 
contacts independently. These acts sometimes took place openly and/or while 
using formal diplomatic exchanges and sometimes informally and secretly. The 
aim of the Romans concerned was to win over the people approached and their 
fellow citizens, and international public opinion, and these approaches were 
developed in parallel to official negotiations among states. This diplomacy enabled 
Rome to manage foreign affairs flexibly and contributed to her increasing the 
dependence of foreign states and individuals on her, in particular those in the 
Greek world. This thesis also argues that informal diplomacy caused struggles 
among the Romans symbolised by the violence that occurred in the tribunate of 
Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. This situation originated from the ill-defined 
relationship between informal diplomacy, legality, and the collective leadership of 
the senators. As informal diplomacy became more common among the Romans, 
the users individually rose among the leading Romans. This tendency 
undermined the dignity of the Senate, but this organ had no method to control it. 
Consideration of legitimacy of using informal diplomacy had been tacitly avoided 
by the Romans because of its ad hoc utility, and the Senate had not necessarily 
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been the sole decision-maker in the Republic. Its leadership could be legitimately 
denied by the users of informal diplomacy if they had some authority and were 
supported by the people in and beyond Rome. All the Senate could do in order to 
maintain its dignity was to attempt to control them with political tactics and 
violence. This was a foretaste of the conflict that was to occur in the final century 
of the Republic. Through demonstrating these advantages and disadvantages of 
informal diplomacy to Rome, I show this diplomatic concept is a valuable and 
fruitful one to employ in the study of Rome during the period of remarkable 
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1. Informal Diplomacy and the Aim of this Study 
 
This thesis examines Roman diplomacy as conducted not only through 
official channels but also through unofficial ones, and considers its influence on 
Roman expansion and the constitution in the period from the 200s to 133 BCE.1 
In these decades Rome established her hegemony over the Mediterranean world, 
but also suffered from a number of internal struggles. I argue that these 
phenomena in part resulted from the following two aspects peculiar to this period, 
and show the validity of the argument while proposing a concept of diplomacy to 
explain the success and failure of Rome comprehensibly. First, the leading 
Romans collectively and individually had contacts with foreign states and 
individuals through channels that were not constrained by the factors in the 
official sphere such as legality, publicity, and legitimacy. I call this practice 
informal diplomacy since it was developed in parallel to diplomacy through formal 
channels. I argue that its appearance enabled Rome to manage foreign affairs 
flexibly and allowed her to establish her leadership of the Greek states and wider 
Mediterranean world swiftly. Second, the development of informal diplomacy 
within the broader context of Roman diplomacy more generally enabled individual 
Romans, especially those with some authority, for example that as a magistrate, 
to participate in international politics independently and to rise among the people 
in and beyond Rome. This was irreconcilable with the constitution of the Roman 
                                                   
1 All dates are assumed to be BCE. 
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Republic practically managed by the magistrates and the Senate consisting of the 
leading Romans legitimately and collectively. This disharmony was spurred by 
the ill-definition of the relationship between informal diplomacy, formal 
procedures, and the collective leadership of the Roman aristocracy in the name of 
the Senate. The senators tended to respect legality and the authority of the Senate, 
but sometimes used informal diplomacy or approved its use by others for ad hoc 
necessities of Rome and the users themselves. This complexity caused tensions 
among the Romans, and the conflict peaked at the violence over the movement of 
Ti. Sempronius Gracchus in 133. 
However, in advance of the main discussion, it is reasonable to explain why 
I propose this diplomatic notion and focus on the informal sphere of foreign affairs 
and its relationship with other factors of Roman diplomacy from the end of the 
third century to 133. The idea of examining informal channels in diplomacy has 
been advanced by E. Badian.2 He argues that Rome developed the notion of the 
private and vertical relation between patronus and cliens and used it in contacts 
with foreign states and individuals as a theoretical framework for controlling 
them, and calls it foreign clientela. His argument demonstrated the significance 
of informal relations in Roman diplomacy and encouraged many scholars, who 
have tended to pay more attention to legal and official aspects in foreign affairs of 
Rome, to follow him.3 I accept the general importance of unofficial channels in 
diplomacy. Furthermore, Rome’s conception of patronage shows that she was 
sensitive to personal and informal relations.4 Such a tendency may well have 
                                                   
2 Badian 1958: esp. 1-11, 68, 82-7, and 155. 
3 E.g. Dahlheim 1968: 1-4; Errington 1972: ix-x. 




influenced her diplomacy. However, I do not agree with the argument of foreign 
clientela as a whole that regards patronage as the basis of Rome’s informal 
contacts with outsiders. The idea that the Romans behaved as the patroni of 
foreign states and individuals does not have sufficient support in the sources.5 
Focusing on patronage in particular is not a profitable way to examine the 
significance of informal channels in Roman diplomacy. 
An alternative approach to Badian’s has recently been proposed by P. J. 
Burton. Instead of patronage he treats amicitia, i.e. friendship, as the basis of 
informal or private contacts of Rome with other states. He examines how and how 
often it appears in the sources about Roman diplomacy from the fourth to the 
second century, and succeeds in confirming the frequent appearance of the term 
amicitia.6 His discussion, at least, strengthens the argument that Rome had 
contacts with outsiders through more informal channels, in addition to formal, 
legal relationships. 
However, Burton’s theory has a problem. He is aware that the notion 
amicitia has multiple meanings and can appear even in contexts apart from 
informal diplomatic contacts, but does not consider sufficiently the possibility that 
this diversity results from the change of this notion in the three centuries 
concerned in some way. For instance, Burton analyses cross-status friendships, 
but his sources are largely from the Late Republic and the meanings of amicitia 
shown there might not be so appropriate in, e.g. diplomatic contacts in the third 
century.7 It is therefore doubtful whether the notion amicitia consistently worked 
                                                   
5 Braund 1984: 5-7, 23, 29-30 n.1, and 185; Gruen 1984: 158-200; Eckstein 2008: 43-
5. 
6  Burton 2011: 3-22, 28-38, 63-9, and 353-6. Cf. Briscoe 2013: 257-60. Recently, 
Snowdon 2014: 422-44 has developed an argument that supports Burton. 
7 Burton 2011: 28-75, esp. 46-53. 
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as a basis of informal contacts of Rome with outsiders even though this term 
frequently appears in the cases concerned. 
Moreover, both Burton and Badian assume that the Romans used some 
Roman notion about personal relations as a model in their contacts with outsiders 
in channels apart from official ones, but this approach itself is not necessarily 
reasonable. It is questionable whether the Romans had a definition of unofficial 
diplomatic actions, and their thoughts about such behaviour could be influenced 
by outsiders and change with the times. At least, the ideas of personal relations 
could be developed even beyond Rome. The Greeks had developed several, such 
as προξενία, the connection between a state and a foreign individual, 8  even 
before the 200s. As Rome increased her power in regions occupied by Greeks, the 
ideas she encountered there may well have influenced her own. 
This thesis deals with these problems by proposing a new concept of foreign 
affairs, informal diplomacy. I propose this idea for the following reason. The 
Romans made a variety of contacts with others through both official and unofficial 
channels. Some of them can be possibly treated as the cases of clientela and 
amicitia. But, in the light of previous studies, it is not fruitful to seek a rigid Latin 
definition of the phenomenon. This may well go too for Greek and other ancient 
notions. Hence, I create a concept that embraces all types of contact that was 
carried on through channels apart from official ones. At least, the Romans used 
such methods in diplomacy as is argued by Badian, Burton, and their supporters. 
It is still useful to consider the significance of such behaviour. Creating the term 
informal diplomacy as a notion corresponding to the actions in question 
                                                   
8 Mack 2015: e.g. 1-4. 
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contributes to analysing them comprehensively. Moreover, proposing such a 
concept enables us easily to examine how the ordinary diplomatic methods 
constrained by legality, publicity, and legitimacy, that is, the elements comprising 
formal diplomacy, were connected to other ways of conducting inter-state relations, 
i.e. with informal diplomacy. This point of view is not discussed in depth by 
scholars, who devote attention to the theories that terminology derived from 
personal relationships was used by Romans in their contacts with foreigners. Yet, 
the increased prominence of ‘informal diplomacy’ did not result in the 
disappearance of formal diplomatic channels. They coexisted, even though there 
was some conflict between the two phenomena. In order to understand the 
significance of unofficial or unorthodox channels in Roman diplomacy, it is 
necessary to consider the relation between both kinds of diplomacy as much as 
how informal methods worked. In contrast to theories based on ancient ideas such 
as clientela and amicitia, informal diplomacy offers a simpler, less complex 
concept that can embrace all diplomatic activity outside formal channels. 
I now explain why my study of informal diplomacy focuses on the period 
from the 200s to 133. Although some scholars choose to emphasise the influence 
of the Second Macedonian War on the Roman advance into Greece,9 I argue that 
it was the First Macedonian War in the late third century that was more 
significant. In my opinion, the contact with the Greeks in this conflict was a 
catalyst for a change in Roman diplomacy, at least from the viewpoint of Rome’s 
active use of the diplomatic methods that this thesis calls informal diplomacy. The 
Greeks themselves had been accustomed to such informal diplomatic actions even 
                                                   
9 E.g. Gruen 1984: 38-9 and 45; Ferrary 1988: 45-58. 
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as far back as the Peloponnesian War (e.g. Thuk. 1.128.3 and 2.67.1). I argue, 
therefore, that it is diplomatic contact with the Greeks in the 200s that made 
Rome aware of the value of approaching outsiders through informal channels and 
start to exploit methods that had not been utilised previously. 133 marks the end 
of my study as it is in this year that informal diplomacy and domestic politics 
collided to produce the violent tribunate of Ti. Gracchus, in the subject of Chapter 
6. I think that the struggle at that time was also a prelude to the rise of prominent 
individuals, such as Sulla and Pompeius, in the first century, a phenomenon 
considered by many scholars to be a major turning point in Roman history.10 
This study aims, therefore, to show the crucial role played by diplomacy, 
especially informal diplomacy, in Roman imperial expansion and the changes that 
this brought about in the Roman state. 
 
2. Diplomacy of Rome and the Hellenistic States 
 
In order to develop the discussion in the main chapters smoothly, it is also 
useful to show the following two aspects as the premise of the arguments. First, 
Roman diplomacy in the decades concerned was generally managed by the senior 
magistrates and the Senate collectively.11 In particular, the latter consisted of the 
leading Romans, and held formal negotiations with foreign diplomats as the 
practical representative of the Roman Republic. The resolution of the Senate was 
generally regarded as the will of the state of Rome by outsiders and this went for 
the senators themselves. The Senate also had responsibility for the appointment 
                                                   
10 E.g. Kallet-Marx 1995: 1-8 and 122; Santangelo 2007: 23-5. Cf. Glew 1997: 793; 
Connerty 1998: 119. 
11 For a general consideration of their power, see Lintott 1999: 65-88 and 94-120. 
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of delegations and the allotment of generals. Official channels of Roman 
diplomacy were thus under the collective leadership of the senators.12 Meanwhile, 
as E. S. Gruen shows, Rome was indifferent to training specialist diplomats and 
did not necessarily respect even the opinion of experts in their fields.13 While the 
Senate constantly managed diplomacy, its diplomatic decisions resulted not from 
specialised knowledge but from ad hoc political games among the senators. The 
Senate was also influenced by the citizen body, i.e. domestic public opinion. This 
resulted from the rule that no diplomatic agreement took effect without the 
approval of the assembly (e.g. Liv. 37.19.2; Polyb. 6.14.11 and 21.10.8). Even for 
each senator, in order to win elections as a magistrate, the support of the citizens 
was necessary.14 This may have been true of other states, but it was particularly 
important in the study of Rome from the 200s to 133. She had conquered the west 
of the Mediterranean world by the end of the third century and in the second 
century would go on to increase her power in the East. The opinion of the citizens 
at Rome influenced the leading Romans and their attitude to outsiders. 
Yet, this does not mean that the Romans, in particular the senators at this 
time, ignored the viewpoint of outsiders in any decision-making that concerned 
diplomacy. Indeed, the Senate and Roman statesmen could have informal and 
private contacts with foreign visitors. As Rome consolidated her control of the 
Mediterranean world, foreign states and individuals who wanted to use her power 
in order to solve their ad hoc problems increasingly visited individual senators at 
Rome or her diplomats and magistrates in the field. The leading Romans also 
                                                   
12 The authority of the Senate in diplomatic management was also noticed by Polybios 
(at 6.13.5-7). Walbank 1957: 679-81; Brennan 2004: 56; Pina Polo 2011: 58-9. 
13 Gruen 1984: 203-49. 
14 For the power of the people in Roman politics in the period concerned, see Polyb. 
6.14, Walbank 1957: 682-8, and Millar 1998: 24-5. 
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liked to have contacts with such visitors in order to manage their ad hoc tasks 
and to increase their influence in and beyond Rome. This was a kind of informal 
diplomacy. As a result not only did the number of practitioners of informal 
diplomacy among the Romans increase in this period, but the collective leadership 
of the Senate gradually decreased, which will be discussed in particular in 
chapters 5 and 6. 
What should also be noticed is the relationship between Greek and Roman 
diplomacy. It is now useful to give its outline in advance of arguing the influence 
of the contact with the Greeks on the beginning of the use of informal diplomacy 
by Rome. Although the Romans used it actively after they began to have regular 
contact with the Greeks in the 200s, it does not mean this diplomatic concept was 
of Greek origin. However, the Greeks had been accustomed to informal diplomacy 
and sensitive to the relationship between the formal and informal aspects of 
diplomatic action since at least fifth century.15 Moreover, just as in Rome, the 
Greek states hardly had any professional diplomats, and foreign policy resulted 
from the political games of amateur leaders engaged in winning over ordinary 
citizens.16  
It is, meanwhile, noticeable that there were significant differences in the 
way that Greeks and Romans conducted their diplomacy at the end of the third 
century, notably in the part played by the individual. In Greek diplomacy 
individuals had been able to play an important role among state relations. A good 
example is the notion of προξενία. While it originally had a variety of connotations, 
from the fifth century onwards the title πρόξενος was given by one state to a 
                                                   
15 Battesti 2013: 39-57; Magnetto 2013: 227-41. 
16 Mosley 1971: 319-20. 
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citizen of another state who acted on its behalf.17 It is important to note that by 
bestowing such a title the relationship between the parties was, in fact, formalised. 
Its holders and their descendants were expected to maintain the connection 
permanently and to speak in front of their fellow citizens for the community that 
had given the title (e.g. Thuk. 5.43.2; Xen. Hell. 6.3.4). The relationship worked 
for the state giving the title as a tool to approach outsiders, and for the conferees 
as a way of participating in foreign affairs independently, in parallel to official 
contacts among states. This kind of custom also existed in Rome. It was called 
hospitium. The relationship was originally formed between a visitor and a private 
host in Italy, and then was used even in the contact between Rome, her 
neighbouring states and individuals of both. 18  It is regarded as a direct 
counterpart of ξενία, i.e. guest-friendship, in the Homeric works, and dates back 
to the legendary period. This custom hospitium was used even in the first century. 
However, there is little evidence in the sources that it had much influence on 
Roman diplomacy. Making a connection between the Romans and individual 
foreigners could also be achieved by the concept amicitia. But considering the 
diversity of this term as was mentioned in the previous section and the practical 
lack of the counterpart(s) of προξενία (and ξενία) in Roman diplomacy, Rome had 
comparatively little interest in developing the methods of approaching outsiders, 
at least before she fully had contacts with the Greeks around the 200s. 
 
 
                                                   
17 Perlman 1958: 185-7; Wallace 1970: 190-1; Adcock and Mosley 1975: 122 and 161-
4; Mack 2015: 1-4 and 90-147. 
18 Nybakken 1946: 248-51; Badian 1958: 11-12 and 154-5. Cf. Cic. Verr. 2.2.96 and 
4.41; Plautus Poenulus 5.954-8 and 1045-53. 
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3. The Sources 
 
It is also necessary to outline my attitude to the sources used in this thesis. 
Literary records are of particular importance for our understanding of Rome’s 
informal diplomatic actions, because they are rich in information about such 
behaviour, but it is not reasonable to accept each reference at face value. The 
authors of the sources in existence could make some mistake in their description. 
This was recognised by ancient authors as well. For example, Polybios, a historian 
of Achaia in the second century, uses Roman epigraphic archives to argue that 
Philinos, a Sicilian writer in the third century, was mistaken in his view of the 
relationship between Rome and Carthage on the eve of the First Punic War 
(3.26.1-6).19 Livius, a historian of the Augustan era, also relates that for the 
achievements of Rome in the Battle of Thermopylai in 191 there is a difference 
among Latin and Greek sources (36.19.11-12).20  
Moreover, as T. J. Cornell indicates, it is very difficult to determine the 
historicity of events in the early centuries of Rome.21 Even for ancient historians 
it was not easy to collect material about a period far from their own (e.g. Liv. 
1.pr.7-9). These are problems that are particularly significant to my discussion 
about informal diplomatic actions of Rome. When considering early periods, 
ancient authors may well have found it more difficult to collect information about 
unofficial or secret contacts than about official diplomatic actions, which were 
necessarily more public. 
                                                   
19 Walbank 1957: 353-5. But Serrati 2006: 120-30 does not completely accept Philinos’ 
mistake here on ground of Livius’ references to the relationship between both states. 
20 Briscoe 1981: 241-50. 
21 Cornell 1995: 4-5. 
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It is also important to recognise the historians’ aims and perspectives. 
These inevitably influenced their selection of information and the manner of 
expression. For instance, the Romans from the second century onwards tended to 
observe Rome’s moral corruption caused by wealth resulting from foreign 
conquest and Greek luxury that spread among the Romans, and so idealise the 
earlier Republic.22 In light of this tendency, authors sometimes could aim to show 
moral lessons, not history, to the readers. This does not mean that their works are 
fiction, but they might select and manipulate historical materials based on their 
views. The patriotism and sympathy or antipathy of the writers to particular 
individuals should be also noticed. The influence of these factors may well vary in 
their works according to the topic. 
Hence, after this consideration of the general character of literary records, 
I shall now briefly enumerate the main sources of this thesis and show how they 
are treated in connection with my primary focus. 
The best known of my sources is Polybios. He was an eyewitness of the 
advance of Rome into the Hellenistic world. His aim was to provide lessons and 
experience for later politicians and to teach general readers how to endure the 
changes of Fortune through πραγματικὴ ἱστορία, that is, political and military 
narrative (1.1.2; cf. 9.1-2).23 His text gives the most important information about 
diplomatic actions of Rome and her rivals not only in the second but also in the 
third century, although part of his text is lost. Yet, as Polybios himself partly 
notices, his historiography is under the influence of the bias of his sources. For 
instance, in the description about the Rhodians on the eve of the Second 
                                                   
22 Lintott 1972: 626-38. 
23 Walbank 1957: 6-8. 
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Macedonian War he uses their records (16.14.2-15.8). Their patriotic attitude in 
them prevents him from analysing their affairs.24 His own view of history and 
morality is also sometimes controversial.25 He behaves as a neutral historian, and 
his account seems based on the general neutrality and morality. But sometimes it 
appears to result from utilitarianism in order to make the readers agree with his 
view of history, or patriotism towards his own state. For example, in his account 
of the conflict between Achaia and Aitolia in the third century, he cannot maintain 
an impartial attitude.26  Although he can be fairer in other cases of Achaia’s 
contact with its neighbours,27 his way of referring to Achaian affairs, the nature 
of his moralistic attitude, and the influence of these on his work will be 
continuously noticed in the main chapters. In addition, it is necessary to consider 
how his quotation of speeches should be treated, although this is controversial 
even in the work of other historians, as Thukydides’ famous observations on his 
own practice demonstrate (at 1.22.1). Polybios seems to try to investigate the 
details of each speech as much as possible (2.56.10, 3.20.1-5, 29.12.2-10, and 36.1; 
cf. 12.25b).28 Yet, modern historians cannot confirm his claim. Hence, unless the 
author of the text has found many witnesses of the speech itself, it is reasonable 
not to focus on each of the phrases used but rather to expect that Polybios informs 
his readers of its general substance in an attempt to make them feel present at 
the meeting.29 
For the quantity and quality of information, next, we should next turn to 
                                                   
24 Wiemer 2001a: 60-5. 
25 Derow 1970: 12-23; 1979: 1-15; 1994: 73-90; Eckstein 1995a: e.g. 16-27. 
26 Champion 2011: 357-61. 
27 Sacks 1975: 92-106. 
28 Marincola 2011a: 120-3. 
29 As regards the general discussion about speeches in Greek historiography, see also 
Walbank 1985: 242-61. 
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Livius’ history of Rome. His books regarding the period after 167 are lost, as are 
Books 11-20, but Books 1-10 treat the early history of Rome and Books 21-45 cover 
the period from the beginning of the Hannibalic War to 167, that is, most of the 
decades focused on by this study. Although for events in the East Polybios was of 
fundamental importance to Livius, the history is largely based on official Roman 
records and various works of Latin, that is, Roman, authors,30 and record many 
names of leading Romans and their behaviour in an annalistic style. His work 
reflects the viewpoint of contemporary Romans of each event and their 
descendants. Yet, his text includes information which may have been distorted by 
his sources, his moralistic agenda, or patriotism, just as Polybios’ work does. 
Livius also seems to regard the role of each Pentad in the whole of his work as 
more important than solving contradictions among his sources.31 Further, his 
historiography is greatly influenced by his ideal of the leading Romans in the 
Early and Middle Republic.32 This attitude and the possibility of his arbitrary or 
ideological selection and shaping of materials should be always noticed. 
It is also necessary to refer to other historians whose works are useful in 
making up for the deficiency of information of Polybios and Livius. For example, 
the summary of Cn. Pompeius Trogus by Justinus is noticeable. Trogus wrote his 
books around the former half of the reign of Augustus. He offers a well-balanced 
                                                   
30  For example, in the second Pentad Livius uses at least six works of Roman 
annalistic historians such as Q. Claudius Quadrigarius. Forsythe 2011: 391. For more 
general discussion about Livius’ sources, see Cornell, Bispham, Rich, and Smith 2013: 
82-8. 
31 For instance, Scafuro 1987: 253-9 shows this tendency in Livius’ reference to the 
matters on the eve of the Roman war against Antiochos III of the Seleucids in the end 
of the seventh and in the beginning of the eighth group of his books, by examining 
some discrepancies of the information about chronology and the development of the 
events between Books 35 and 36. 
32 Kapust 2011: 81-110. 
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description of Rome’s enemies.33 Even though what survives is not his work but 
the summary, the information is useful in analysing some cases examined in this 
thesis more precisely, and considering the bias of pro-Roman historians like Livius 
and the critical views about Rome. The work of Sicilian historian Diodoros must 
also be noted. He was born in the Late Republic and wrote a general history of the 
Mediterranean world.34 Although there are many errors in his calculation of 
chronology and his descriptions, he collects several reliable historical sources 
which are not referred to by other historians, and balances pro- and anti-Roman 
viewpoints. His work also bridges the gap among the main sources in some case 
studies. 
Meanwhile, the tradition of Valerius Maximus is useful in considering the 
viewpoint of the Romans with the analysis of the Livian text. He aims to show the 
importance of morality and the dignity of Rome to the Romans in and after the 
reign of Tiberius (praef.). His work is not necessarily historiography, but he uses 
the texts of Cicero, Livius and Trogus, and also those of several lost authors.35 His 
books, too, make up for the lack of information about several diplomatic cases. 
For more on the subject of diplomacy, two Greek works of the age of Roman 
emperors are added. One of them is that of Appianos. He is said to be one of the 
first Greek historians introducing the history of Rome and her conquests of the 
rivals from a Roman perspective to provincial Greeks. 36  In contrast to him, 
Plutarchos produces considerable number of books, in particular, Parallel Lives of 
famous Greeks and Romans, to demonstrate the dignity of Greece to the Romans. 
                                                   
33 Levene 2011: 287-9. 
34 Marincola 2011b: 176-8. 
35 Wardle 1998: 1-18. 
36 Gowing 1992: 284-6. 
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He is not interested so much in writing history as writing about ways of life from 
an ethical viewpoint (Alex. 1).37 Yet, his works also contribute to the case studies 
of this thesis, in particular those not covered by Polybios and Livius, such as that 
of Ti. Gracchus.  
Last, it is necessary to remember the value of epigraphy. This gives my 
study contemporary Roman records despite sometimes being written in Greek, 
and those of the Greeks approaching the Romans and other contemporaries. For 
instance, the inscriptions of Senatus Consulta collected by R. K. Sherk enables 
this thesis to confirm that the Senate gave pecuniary gifts to foreign diplomats 
individually in the second century, and that many Roman elites were collectively 
connected with the management of Asia Minor after the murder of Gracchus.38 
The resolutions of the investment of the title πρόξενος upon individual Romans 
by some Greek states in the middle of the third century show that Rome had 
observed this Hellenistic practice of making a connection with foreign individuals 
even before Rome herself started to have regular contact with the Greek states in 
the 200s (e.g. IG IX.1².1.17; SEG XXX.1120). Such inscriptions support the 
participation of individuals in international politics alluded by literary sources, 
and enable my study to clarify the actual process more precisely while considering 
the viewpoint of contemporaries (or the close relatives) of the cases concerned. 
The goal of this thesis, the demonstration of the role of informal diplomacy in the 
period of the Roman expansion, is achieved through careful consideration of these 
sources and their specific circumstances. 
 
                                                   
37 Russell 1966: 141-8. 
38 RDGE 9, 10, and 12. 
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4. The Plan of Discussion 
 
      Finally, I show how these discussions are developed. This thesis 
demonstrates the validity of using the concept of informal diplomacy in the study 
of Roman diplomacy and its influence on Rome’s expansion and the Roman 
Republic from the 200s to 133 through the following seven chapters.  
I first explain how informal diplomacy worked through analysing the 
custom of Rome of gift-giving to foreign envoys. Gifts were given by the Senate in 
the course of official contacts with foreign ambassadors. The receivers were 
indebted to Rome individually and were expected to favour Rome before their 
fellow citizens as a result of the idea of reciprocity embedded in the culture of the 
Mediterranean world. Rome made foreign envoys her unofficial channel to their 
states. This is a form of informal diplomacy. It is important to note that our 
earliest reference to this custom occurs in 205, and that it was continuously used 
in the period of her advance into the Greek world. This does not necessarily show 
this custom and informal diplomacy appeared for the first time in the 200s. The 
extant information before the latter part of the third century is often vague, 
although from the beginning of the Second Punic War in 218 it becomes much 
more plentiful. Through these analyses, I will argue that, in order to demonstrate 
the significance of informal diplomacy in Roman history in detail, it is reasonable 
to focus on the contacts with the eastern Greeks from this period onwards, in 
particular around the First Macedonian War above all. These points about the 
mechanism of informal diplomacy and the reason why the contacts with the Greek 
states from the 200s onwards are noticed are shown as the first step of the main 
discussion of the significance of this diplomatic concept. 
17 
 
Chapter 2 treats the diplomatic practices of Rome and the eastern Greeks 
at the end of the third century, and considers to what extent informal diplomacy 
functioned in managing the foreign affairs of each of them. What will be shown is 
the following three aspects. First, the Greeks managed international politics with 
both formal and informal methods of approaching outsiders, i.e. informal 
diplomacy, before and during the First Macedonian War. Second, Rome was 
comparatively indifferent to outsiders and did not appreciate the value of this 
diplomatic concept, although she could accept such approaches by the Greeks. 
Third, this difference caused Rome’s isolation in the middle of the First 
Macedonian War and the decrease of her sphere of influence despite the fact that 
she did not suffer any military failure. That is to say, her defeat was diplomatic 
rather than military. These arguments are demonstrated by the analyses of the 
diplomatic manoeuvres of some leading Greeks such as Aratos of Achaia, 
Philippos V of Macedonia, pro- and anti-Macedonians in Aitolia, the mediators for 
the Macedonian War, and the reactive actions of the Roman generals. These 
results enable this thesis to confirm the significance of informal diplomacy in the 
events concerned and to argue for Rome’s awareness of it in this period. 
Chapter 3 shows the initial use of informal diplomacy among the Romans 
and its contribution to Rome’s advance into the Hellenistic world. This is achieved 
by analysing the manoeuvres of the promoters of the Second Macedonian War 
among the leading Romans on its eve. In this period Philippos and the Seleucid 
king Antiochos III secretly made a pact against the Ptolemies or at least some 
informal partnership. Attalos I of Pergamon and Rhodes matched it with their 
joint campaign and then the alliance with Rome. The hawks against Macedonia 
among the Romans used this situation and approached the people in and beyond 
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Rome to promote Rome’s dispatch of troops to Greece, despite initially lacking the 
support of the majority of their fellow citizens. In the end they succeeded in 
winning over not only other Romans but also many outsiders, while using open 
and sometimes informal approaches to both. These manoeuvres and methods 
were informal diplomacy enacted by a group of individual Romans. Through 
showing these points, I confirm the value of using this concept in understanding 
of Rome’s advance into the Greek world and a sign of the change in her diplomacy.  
Chapter 4 treats the spread of informal diplomacy not only among Rome’s 
factions but also among Roman individuals, and its contribution to the Republic’s 
further rise in the Hellenistic world. It is shown by the analyses of the actions of 
T. Quinctius Flamininus, who defeated Macedonia, and P. Cornelius Scipio 
Africanus, the victor over Carthage, and the political groups around these two 
individuals in Rome’s struggle with Aitolia and the Seleucids from 193 to 189. The 
leading Romans in question competed with one another for position within the 
state. The Greeks also actively had contacts with such Romans, in particular 
Flamininus and Africanus chiefly because of their influence in and beyond Rome, 
although the results of the negotiations with them did not necessarily influence 
Rome’s decision. Such contacts enabled her and the Greeks to manage the 
complicated interests of the people concerned flexibly. Although the legitimacy of 
each negotiation could be questionable, this was never mentioned by either group. 
These results confirm the spread of informal diplomacy in Rome and its 
contribution to her expansion in parallel to military power. 
It is argued in Chapter 5 that informal diplomacy became more common 
among Roman individuals, and that it not only contributed to Rome’s continued 
rise but it also became a factor of struggles in and beyond Rome from 188 to 167. 
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After Rome established her dominance over the Greek states, the Greeks 
approached the state of Rome and her individuals formally and informally in 
order to manage their local problems with Rome’s support. This enabled Roman 
individuals to participate in Greek affairs with their own connections and policy. 
The Roman Senate approved this, at least initially. The increase in informal 
diplomacy in relation to Greek affairs ensured that Greek states managed local 
problems in a way favourable to Rome. But the rivals of such pro-Roman Greeks 
in Greece criticised this tendency with legal arguments. While their essential aim 
was to maintain their independence from Rome, Rome officially respected legality 
despite her favourable attitude to informal diplomacy. The opposition among the 
Greeks was solved when Rome sent troops to Greece in the Third Macedonian War 
and the Greeks generally became obedient to the Romans, but the troubles caused 
by informal diplomacy of individual Romans in the war led the Senate to try to 
control its use. The Senate not only managed the problems brought about by some 
Roman individuals with informal diplomacy but strove to recover its collective 
leadership over diplomacy that had comparatively decreased by the spread of 
informal diplomacy and the rise of its users. It did this by issuing senatorial 
decrees that prevented individual Romans from acting independently. Yet, even 
after this, informal diplomacy continued to be used by them and even to be 
approved by the Senate and outsiders because of its convenience. The relationship 
between the Senate, individual Romans, independent actions or informal 
diplomacy, and legal powers or legitimacy was still ill-defined. These advantages 
and disadvantages of informal diplomacy to Rome in these decades are shown.  
In Chapter 6 the impact of the lack of a satisfactory position for informal 
diplomacy in the Roman Republic from the end of the Third Macedonian War to 
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133 is discussed. This is achieved by analysing the decrease of the leadership of 
the Senate that had, to some extent, controlled this diplomatic concept during the 
Macedonian War and the reaction of the senators who strove to maintain their 
collective leadership against the second rise of individual users of informal 
diplomacy, in the following three steps. First, it is shown that informal diplomacy 
was still used by Rome, while many of the users collectively and anonymously had 
such informal contacts with outsiders. It is important to observe, however, that 
the Senate lacked a way to stop the users legitimately when some of them wanted 
to act for their own interests. Second, it is argued that, in parallel to this tendency, 
the tribuni plebis rose in the management of foreign affairs through taking 
advantage of their tribunician powers, such as the access to the popular assembly. 
This is not directly connected with informal diplomacy. Yet, their rise 
comparatively decreased the legal advantage of the Senate in the management of 
foreign and domestic affairs. Their authorities could hinder the operation of the 
senators if the tribuni were supported by the citizen body and some of leading 
Romans. Third, these two tendencies enabled Ti. Gracchus, the tribunus of 133, 
to manage home and foreign affairs while bypassing the Senate. He had private 
connections with other states and then could access and lead the assembly to 
decide favourably to the results of his contact with outsiders, i.e. informal 
diplomacy, with his authority and the support of the citizens. His independent 
combination between his tribunician power and informal diplomacy brought the 
collective leadership of the Senate and the Republic to a crisis. The violence 
against him happened not because of the opposition of his rivals to each of his 
policies but because many senators regarded the combination as dangerous and 
proceeded to extremities although it could not be justified legally. Through these 
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analyses, I argue that informal diplomacy contributed to Rome’s managing foreign 
affairs flexibly but disrupted the essential factor of the Roman Republic, i.e. the 
collective and legitimate management by the leading Romans. 
Last, I consider whether or not playing an important role in Rome’s foreign 
affairs by informal diplomacy was peculiar to the period from the end of the third 
century onwards in order to enforce my argument that it was an significant factor 
in Rome’s immediate expansion and the change of the Republic from the 200s to 
133. Although its practical novelty has been suggested by Chapter 1 and 2, it is 
difficult to give a complete answer. The extant sources for the earlier period are 
much less detailed than those for the 200s onwards. Yet, the case studies about 
gifts from foreigners to Romans and about Rome’s management of diplomatic 
disputes similarly show the following characters in her diplomatic practice before 
the 200s. First, Rome had been interested in the opinion of her citizens and 
foreigners, and sometimes accepted the approach of outsiders with informal 
diplomacy. Second, Rome, however, did not understand it as a diplomatic concept, 
much less use it. Third, Rome, moreover, justified each diplomatic action mainly 
with official tools of managing foreign affairs such as legal arguments. This was 
effective in convincing the people on her side of her justice but was not so in 
winning over outsiders. Rome did not actively care about the opinion of such 
people through channels apart from such formal ones. At least, the surviving 
sources do not report it. These support an argument for the novelty of informal 
diplomacy for Rome from the 200s onwards and that of its significance in her 
immediate advance into the Hellenistic states, her establishment of the 
leadership over the Mediterranean world, and the change of the Roman Republic 








This chapter discusses how informal diplomacy worked through analysing 
Rome’s custom of giving gifts to foreign envoys, and argues that the analysis with 
this diplomatic concept contributes to understanding Rome in the period of her 
advance into the Greek world from the 200s onwards. As shown in Introduction, 
I use this term for diplomatic contacts with foreign states and individuals that 
were not subject to the constraints of public scrutiny or law, and for participation 
in international politics without the official authority to do so. It is therefore 
distinct from official diplomacy, in which only states and their representatives 
could participate, and decisions were made in public, based on official procedures. 
The act of giving gifts to envoys is an important phenomenon within this complex 
diplomatic context, and demonstrates, furthermore, the value in distinguishing 
between official and unofficial actions in connection with Rome’s foreign affairs. 
One could be forgiven for thinking that gift-giving was, in reality, bribing someone 
for ad hoc necessities. Certainly, gifts could be regarded as bribes.1 Their function 
as a more significant diplomatic tool, however, was noticed in Greece.2 The value 
of gift-giving as an instrument of games with others was also eventually 
recognised by Rome (e.g. Cic. Off. 1.48; Verg. Aen. 2.49).3 Indeed, gift-giving was 
                                                   
1 Perlman 1976: 223-33; Lintott 1990: 1-16. 
2 Herman 1987: 91. 




employed during the Roman expansion, at least from the 200s onwards. By 
analysing the process of Roman gift-giving, I will argue that informal diplomacy 
was a significant factor in Roman success during the period.  
In order to reach the goal, I begin the discussion by arguing that the act of 
gift-giving functioned in Roman diplomacy as a tool of approaching outsiders in 
an unofficial capacity. I will then use case studies to confirm that the act was a 
custom or a tactic continuously used by Rome from the 200s to the 130s, and show 
that it is useful to focus on her contacts with the Greeks in the East around the 
200s in the next chapter in developing the study about the significance of informal 
diplomacy.   
 
Section 1: Gifts and the Mechanism  
 
This section shows what I call informal diplomacy, and that the Roman act 
of gift-giving was a vehicle of it, by analysing a case of the act. What is picked up 
is a senatorial meeting in c. 170, after the beginning of the Third Macedonian War. 
Livius relates (at 43.6.1-10, esp. 10) that Rome received envoys from Athens, 
Miletos, Alabanda, and Lampsakos here.4 Athens and Miletos declared for Rome 
and promised to send supplies to her. Alabanda and Lampsakos also supported 
her. The Senate expressed its thanks to the four states, and decided that ‘each of 
the delegates receive a gift of 2,000 asses (munera omnibus in singulos binum 
milium aeris data).’ 
Regarding the act of gift-giving in this context as a diplomatic tool might 
                                                   
4 Briscoe 2012: 8-26. 
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appear initially to be dubious. Indeed, scholars have assumed that such gifts were 
merely to cover expenses for the stay of the envoys in Rome.5 Recent studies of 
diplomacy do not notice this act, either. Furthermore, that the gifts were given to 
the visiting envoys based on the decision of the Senate seemingly shows that this 
gift-giving was a simple formal action. However, this was effective in more ways 
than the surface, official level. The gifts made the recipients indebted to Rome 
and encouraged them to promote Rome among their home communities. In other 
words, it was a tactic that allowed Rome to interact with foreigners on a more 
personal level, too.  
This is shown by analysing how the gifts functioned in the relationship 
between Rome, the four states, the envoys, and their fellow citizens. The gifts 
appeared to form part of Rome’s return to the four cities, within the wider 
exchange of favour between states. Yet, 2,000 asses were given directly to the 
envoys. The formal exchange between Rome and the four cities was completed 
through reciprocal announcements of support and gratitude, while the gifts 
created another relationship between Rome and the envoys. They were personally 
indebted to Rome. They might have contributed to the decision of their states to 
support her, but they were not responsible for cordial diplomatic relations in an 
official sense; accordingly, in order to repay the obligation, the envoys would 
influence their home states by offering a pro-Roman voice and reporting 
favourably about their interaction with Rome. Since the gifts were given in a 
public session, the envoys must have felt an expectation of contemporaries to 
return favour. It is noteworthy that being indebted to Rome might be felt by the 
                                                   
5 Mommsen 1864: 345; cf. Briscoe 1973: 79. 
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envoys unfavourably, but the gifts were nominally given by the Senate to thank 
their states and it was impossible to decline them. The Senate thus exploited the 
friendly reply to the four states to make the envoys themselves indebted to Rome. 
They became an unofficial channel by which Rome could approach the states and 
citizens in question, one that was quite separate from any formal negotiations or 
pronouncements. There is no direct evidence regarding how far the reports of 
envoys actually affected the policy of their states, but it must be noted that the 
diplomats were clearly men whose views were trusted. It is plausible to imagine 
that these four states would have become more pro-Roman afterwards owing to 
the acts of their envoys.6 
This hypothesis is also supported by considering the fundamental value of 
the gift of 2,000 asses. Although it is difficult to assess its value in real terms,7 a 
clue can be found in the Lex Fannia of 161 (Athen. 6.274c; Gell. 2.24; Macrob. Sat. 
3.17.5). It allowed a maximum of 100 asses per day to be spent on dinner or certain 
festivals by the host. The regulations concerned private rather than public affairs, 
and were not necessarily practical.8 Yet, the evidence suggests that 100 asses was 
sufficient for most customary functions. The gifts in c. 170, thus, sufficiently made 
the envoys personally indebted to Rome, and even functioned as a symbolic 
display of Roman generosity in light of the fact that they were given in public.  
                                                   
6 The significance or pressure of a debt made in public for contemporary elites can be 
further confirmed by a case of Thoas of Aitolia, despite not being connected with gift-
giving (Polyb. 28.4.1-12). During the very Third Macedonian War, Rome regarded 
Nikandros of Aitolia as anti-Roman and restrained him, and Thoas seemed to support 
this measure. His opponents, then, criticised his attitude on ground that he had borne 
considerable responsibility for Aitolia’s acts against Rome from 192 to 189 but had 
been pardoned by her as a result of Nikandros’ negotiations with the Senate. This 
charge of ingratitude led to Thoas’ loss of trust as a politician with his fellow citizens. 
For the careers of the two Aitolians, see Grainger 2000: 245 and 321. 
7 Cf. Bowen 1951: 93-6. 
8 Rosivach 2006: 1-15. 
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A sceptic about my position might argue against this discussion from the 
viewpoint of the situation of the source and the nature of topic. This reference of 
Livius to gifts in c. 170 or similar cases are not covered by Polybios, a 
contemporary historian, at all although he was involved in the Macedonian War 
and then at least devoted quite a few chapters in Book 27 to the detail of the 
negotiations between Rome and the Greek states in the first few years of the 
struggle. It might partly result from the gaps in his records about this period.9 
But Livius’ text here is not supported by any other ancient authors. This, 
seemingly, suggests his references to gift-giving are included in error, or are 
fictionalised. The former seems unlikely, however, since he includes many 
examples of such gifts throughout his text.10 More needs to be said regarding the 
possibility that these gifts are a fictional creation, though. The Romans from the 
second century onwards, including Livius (and Polybios who stayed in Rome), 
tended to observe moral corruption of Rome. 11  This view of history might 
therefore lead Livius unrealistically to give the impression that Rome engaged in 
plutocratic diplomacy. It might have been useful to pick up the act of giving money 
in instilling into his readers with this view if Livius wanted to do so. 
However, inscriptions preserving senatorial decrees demonstrate that gift-
giving was, in fact, employed by Rome in the second century. For example, in c. 
140 the Senate mediated a dispute between Melitaia and Narthakion. It resolved 
that ξένιά τε ἑκατέροις Γάϊ/ος Ὁστίλιος στρατηγὸς τὸν ταμίαν δοῦναι κε/[λ]εύσῃ 
ἀπὸ σηστερτίων νόμων ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι / [πέ]ντ̣ε εἰς ἑκάστην πρεσβείαν (RDGE 
                                                   
9 Walbank 1979: 1-62. 
10 Briscoe 2012: 219. 
11 Lintott 1972: 626-38. 
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9.ll.67-70).12 The envoys of Narthakion were individually given 125 HS after the 
mediation. Similarly, a dispute between Priene and Samos was arbitrated before 
and in c. 135. After a decision was reached, gifts were given to the envoys of Priene 
with decrees stating that ξένιά τε αὐ/[τοῖς … (magistrate’ name) ὕπατος(?) τὸν 
ταμίαν ἀποστεῖλαι κελεύσῃ ἕως ἀπὸ νό]μων σηστερτίων ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι πέντε καθ’ 
ἑκάστην / [πρεσβείαν,] and that τούτοις τε ξένιον εἰς ἑκάστην πρεσβείαν ἕως / 
ἀπὸ σηστερτίων νόμων ἑκατὸν εἴκοσι [πέντε Σέρουιος Φ]όλ[ο]υιος Κοΐντου 
ὕπατος τὸν ταμίαν ἀποστεῖλαι κε[λεύσῃ], … (SEG LVIII.1349.SC I.ll.9-11 and SC 
II.ll.12-13).13 Each of the envoys received 120 HS in the first decree and possibly 
125 HS in the second one. While the monetary amount differs from that of c. 170, 
it is clear that gift-giving was not Livian fiction but a custom of Roman diplomacy. 
Further, it is possible to demonstrate that Livius does not exaggerate or 
manipulate his description of public gift-giving to make any kind of moral point. 
This act could not be used to show Rome’s corruption even by authors conforming 
the view of history. This is confirmed by an episode of P. Cornelius Scipio 
Aemilianus in 133 (Liv. Per. 57). He openly received gifts from the Seleucids 
although ‘it was the habit of other generals to hide (celare aliis imperatoribus … 
mos esset)’ any gifts, and instead gave them to his soldiers. According to Polybios 
(at 31.25-6, esp. 25.4, 8, and 10), he was unlike many of his generation in resisting 
‘Greek dissoluteness (τῶν Ἑλλήνων … εὐχέρειαν),’ hoping instead to show his 
‘greatness of soul and purity in regard to money (περὶ τὰ χρήματα μεγαλοψυχίᾳ 
καὶ καθαρότητι),’ and possessing ‘a general recognition of his goodness and self-
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restraint (πάνδημον … τὴν ἐπ᾽ εὐταξίᾳ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ δόξαν).’14 Polybios does 
not refer to the episode in 133, but, considering Aemilianus’ reputation and his 
receiving and giving the gifts in question in public, it is plausible that this was a 
known and plausible example of his virtue, a phenomenon to which Polybios did 
refer, and then was later picked up specifically by Livius. It is certain here that 
he, and Polybios for his moralising reference to Aemilianus, show the readers 
Rome’s corruption while using monetary topics as a key. In the light of the 
influence and availability of their texts,15 it is likely that this view influenced 
later writers. It is, however, important that Livius thinks here that receiving and 
giving gifts in reasonable manners such as in public and using them as reward to 
soldiers are not indicative of corruption and rather demonstrate the virtue of the 
individual concerned. This does not suggest Livius rather liked to concoct a 
moralising story including gift-giving to praise Aemilianus in 133 (and Rome in c. 
170) unrealistically. The agenda that Livius and Polybios seem to emphasise is 
based on the antipathy to Greek luxury and the ideal of Roman austerity, in which 
monetary generosity does not provoke admiration. Livius, therefore, notices a 
moralistic aspect in the episode of 133, but has no ideological reason to invent a 
story of gift-giving in it. For the matters of public gifts, Livius writes what he 
regards as the case, although this may not go for other ways of gift-giving, for 
example that in private since he indirectly criticises the generals who were 
contemporary with Aemilianus.  
Polybios’ silence on the gifts of c. 170 and similar cases and Livius’ lack of 
support from other authors here can also be explained reasonably. Polybios is not 
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particularly interested in the details of senatorial decrees.16 It is the substance, 
even of the diplomatic exchange, that matters to him, not the gift-giving that 
followed. Nor was the custom an unfamiliar one in the Greek world. For instance, 
in 242 the Koan diplomats were given 20 drachmas by Gonnoi and 10 staters by 
Phaistos following their successful mission to have the cities recognise the ἀσυλία 
of the temple of Asklepios in Kos (SEG LI.1056.B.l.6; LIII.850.l.17).17 In c. 201, 
Arkades similarly awarded gifts to Teos’ envoys after acknowledging the Teian 
ἀσυλία (IC I.v.52.ll.44-5).18 Gift-giving had been a sort of ordinary appendage 
following main negotiations for the Greeks although these two cases also suggest 
that the Greeks had had an idea of indebting foreign envoys to their state through 
pecuniary gifts. In the light of this, it is not strange that Polybios does not refer 
to the gift-giving by the Senate in c. 170 or similar cases and other authors 
followed him, although this suggests that Livius, who does refer to the custom, is 
rather unusual among ancient historians.  
It is also noticeable that the gifts in c. 170, just as in the epigraphic cases, 
were given by the Senate as part of its answer to the states that sent envoys, and 
so resulted in connections being made between the envoys and the Senate, not 
particular senators or magistrates. This means that the Senate collectively and 
legitimately approached foreign individuals and indirectly their fellow citizens 
with a tool apart from official contacts among states, i.e. the method in informal 
diplomacy as I call it. This suggests the significance of the Senate in Roman 
diplomacy. This is supported by Polybios. He relates (at 6.13.6-7, esp. 7) that ‘all 
(πάντα)’ contacts with outsiders are decided by the Senate, and that ‘the people 
                                                   
16 Briscoe 1973: 2-3. 
17 Rigsby 1996: 106-53. 
18 Savalli-Lestrade 2012: 172. 
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have nothing to do with such business (πρὸς δὲ τὸν δῆμον καθάπαξ οὐδέν ἐστι 
τῶν προειρημένων).’ At 6.13.8, he calls the order ‘the perfectly aristocratic 
constitution (τελείως ἀριστοκρατικὴ … ἡ πολιτεία),’ emphasising the collective 
leadership of the senators. These Polybian references have been noticed by 
scholars. 19  Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider the 
senatorial influence in greater detail, in order to show the significance of informal 
diplomacy in Roman diplomacy, I shall, on occasion, refer to the Senate in later 
chapters, noting, in particular, that it collectively managed Roman diplomacy 
while using a combination of both official and unofficial methods. 
These analyses show that the custom of gift-giving clearly functioned as a 
tool of Roman diplomacy, and that the mechanism is just that of informal 
diplomacy. There is generally no reason to doubt the information about gift-giving 
although it is not covered by other ancient historians except Livius. The 
outstanding question is whether the custom was used accidentally in c. 170, 140, 
and before and in c. 135, or continuously, and when the practice worked, if the 
latter is the case, although the epigraphic examples have suggested that it was a 
consistent practice over many years. Analysing these two questions has a direct 
bearing on how far we can identify informal diplomacy in the context of Rome’s 
foreign affairs during the period of expansion in the Greek world. These topics, as 
well as, the role of gift-giving in this diplomatic concept in Rome’s rise, are further 
considered below with case studies. 
 
 
                                                   
19 E.g. Lintott 1999: 196-9; Yakobson 2009: 52-4; Pina Polo 2011: 58; Seager 2013: 250. 
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Section 2: Gift-Giving and the Further Approach to Informal Diplomacy 
 
I shall now argue that the practice of gift-giving occurred repeatedly in 
Roman diplomacy, and actually at least from the 200s to the 130s, and that the 
results suggest that it is fruitful to notice the contacts of Rome with the Greeks 
during the period in the subsequent chapters, in order to demonstrate the 
significance of informal diplomacy to Rome. 
What should be first confirmed is the custom was a diplomatic method of 
Rome under the Senate to approach outsiders in the 200s. This aim is first 
achieved by analysing a case of 200 in which Rome was contacted by the Ptolemies 
just before the Second Macedonian War. The envoys visited the Senate and 
announced that their king would support a Roman advance into Greece (Liv. 
31.9.1-5). 20  It is noteworthy that Livius states (at 31.9.5) that the Senate 
expressed its gratitude to the king, and resolved that ‘each of the envoys be 
presented 5,000 asses as a gift (munera deinde legatis in singulos quinum milium 
aeris … missa).’ Alongside the exchange of favour between Rome and the king, the 
Senate used its reply to his message to make the envoys, who may well have been 
the elites in the dynasty, individually indebted to Rome, just as in the case of c. 
170, and with gifts of even greater value. The envoys had not shown her any 
kindness on the stage of official diplomacy, although they might have contributed 
to the kingdom’s decision to support Rome. In the course of the friendly exchange 
of favour between both states, it was impossible for the envoys to decline the gifts. 
Since the gifts were given in the senatorial session, the envoys were expected to 
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be friendly to Rome afterwards. The Roman state strengthened its relationship 
with the Ptolemies both through official contacts, and with the use of gifts to win 
favour with the Ptolemaic envoys, providing Rome with another avenue through 
which to approach the kingdom. Furthermore, the gifts appeared, in part, as a 
response to the king’s support for Roman intervention against ‘treacherous 
(infida)’ Macedonia (31.1.9). The gifts are not analysed in a moralistic sense of the 
Romans, or with reference to their monetary self-restraint. Livius and his sources, 
possibly different Rome’s annalists,21 do not refer to or invent this episode to 
suggest Rome’s moral decline, but more simply relate the episode in a similar style 
to that of c. 170. 
A similar situation can also be found in the case of 203, when the Senate 
welcomed a deputation from Masinissa of Numidia, i.e. a non-Greek state. It 
approved his kingship and presented splendid gifts, awarding 5,000 asses to each 
of the envoys (Liv. 30.17.6-14). This was near the close of the Second Punic War; 
Masinissa had been made king by P. Cornelius Scipio, later Africanus,22 and was 
in the midst of the campaign against Carthage and its supporters. The Senate 
here strengthened its relationship with Masinissa, and created a new, unofficial, 
one with the envoys through the gifts. While gift-giving as such was an official 
action of Rome and showed her generosity, making the envoys indebted to her in 
public enabled her to use them as a channel for cultivating a closer friendship 
with Masinissa and for approaching other Numidians, outside of formal contacts 
at a state level. It is important that this was also profitable to Rome’s concluding 
the campaign swiftly. Masinissa had not possessed control of Numidia. In fact, in 
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the Battle of Zama, Carthage mobilised many Numidians (App. Pun. 33; Diod. 
27.10; Liv. 30.33.3; Polyb. 15.3.5-7 and 11.3).23 The gifts to the envoys therefore 
were used to increase Rome’s influence in Africa against Carthage soon in parallel 
to the official contact with Masinissa (and the continuing campaign of him and 
Africanus) more than simply making a good impression on outsiders. What should 
be furthermore confirmed is that, considering this context, there is no reason to 
think that Livius and his sources exaggerated the gifts here with any moralising 
agenda just as the cases that have been picked up. 
The earliest recorded example comes from the last years of the Second 
Punic War. In 205, the Senate received envoys from Saguntum in Hispania.24 The 
senators praised the city’s pro-Roman stance shown on the eve of the Punic War, 
and gave 10,000 asses to each of the diplomats (Liv. 28.39.16-19).25 Although the 
precise relationship between Rome and Saguntum before the war is 
controversial,26 in 205 the Senate confirmed its friendship with the city and the 
gift-giving functioned as part of the practice while indebting the envoys to Rome 
and making them a channel to approach their fellow citizens. It is furthermore 
noteworthy that the gifts here also worked as a tool of the wider approach to other 
contemporaries. The envoys were introduced to the Senate when Africanus 
reported the conquest of Hispania. The gratitude expressed by Rome for the 
support of Saguntum, and the gifts of even greater value than those of 203 and 
                                                   
23 Walbank 1967: 444 and 456-8; Eckstein 1987a: 243. 
24 Richardson 1986: 63. 
25  In addition, the Senate here decided that ‘lodgings and hospitality (locus … 
latiaque)’ be provided for the delegates in parallel to the pecuniary gifts (Liv. 28.39.19). 
This suggests that gifts were not necessarily to cover expenses for the stay of envoys 
in Rome. 
26 Scullard 1952: 209-16; Astin 1967b: 577-96; Eckstein 1983: 252-72; 2012: 219-29; 
Hoyos 1998: 154-73; Serrati 2006: 130-4.  
34 
 
200, were part of an attempt to showcase ‘a model to all nations (documentum 
omnibus gentibus)’ of loyalty for Rome (28.39.17), and her generosity and victory. 
This attitude of the contemporary leading Romans might be confirmed by an 
inscription from the city. It informs that P(ublio) Scipioni co(n)s(uli) / imp(eratori) 
ob restitu/tam Saguntum / ex s(enatus) c(onsulto) bello Pu/nico secundo (CIL 
II.3836). This displayed the special relation between Saguntum, Africanus and 
the Senate, Rome’s generous support to the citizens, and her eventual victory. The 
reference of ‘P. Scipio, the consul and the imperator’ favouring the citizens of 
Saguntum around the period of ‘the Second Punic War’ could appear only in the 
context of Africanus’ arrangement of Hispania after his victory over Carthage in 
the region.27 The existence of this inscription suggests that Africanus and other 
contemporary Romans liked to display their friendship with the city and their 
generosity, although the extant inscription seems a renovated one of the Augustan 
era and the original is said to have been erected in the Late Republic.28 In any 
case, the monetary gifts given to the Saguntine envoys functioned as part of these 
various approaches to the diverse outsiders. 
It is important to note, however, that despite such frequent appearance in 
the cases mentioned above, there is no information regarding gifts to foreign 
envoys by Rome before 205 in any of the extant sources.29 Nowhere in Livius’ 
seven preceding books on the Second Punic War and Roman diplomacy during the 
period is there any reference to this custom,30 much less in his first and second 
                                                   
27 Develin 1977: 110. 
28 Badian 1958: 116-9; Richardson 1986: 64 n.10; MacMullen 2000: 75 and 159. 
29 Weissenborn and Müller 1962: 245-6. 
30 For instance, he describes, in detail, the dialogue between Rome and the delegates 
sent by Hieron II of Syracuse about his support for Rome in 216, and the discussions 
among the Romans during the contacts with the envoy of Hannibal after the Battle of 
Cannae, but there is no reference to gifts to the diplomats (22.37 and 58-61). 
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Decade.31 This absence of reference to gift-giving by Rome in the surviving works 
of Livius, much less other authors, suggests that it appeared just in the 200s. Yet, 
this lack of information might also result simply from a loss of literary, epigraphic 
and other material sources. It is furthermore possible that the sources employed 
by Livius in his description of the period before 205 omitted any mention of the 
custom although it was really used. It might be the case that Livius’ sources 
considered Rome’s relative austerity in the pre-205 period to be an ideal, 
consequently exaggerating the later moral decline by emphasising the custom’s 
role and prominence in the later period. Certainly, as was shown, Livius himself 
does not criticise the act of gift-giving as illegitimate, but his sources might have 
opposed it in any way. Considering the situation of source survival and the 
possibilities of trouble of transmission of information expected based on it, it is 
difficult to regard directly the lack of evidence for the gift-giving by Rome before 
205 as a sign that the custom was adopted by her in this decade. Nevertheless, it 
is at least possible to argue that Rome exploited gift-giving, approaching or 
manipulating outsiders through channels apart from official contacts among 
states, continuously from 205 onwards, that is, when Rome increased her 
influence particularly in the East. There is more evidence to support this position. 
In 190, for example, the Senate gave each of the Ptolemaic envoys 4,000 
asses. These gifts were awarded as part of the Roman response to the kingdom’s 
embassy that congratulated Rome on her success in driving Antiochos III out of 
Greece and urged the Romans to continue the war into Asia Minor (Liv. 37.3.9-
11).32 This exchange confirmed the friendship between the Roman and Ptolemaic 
                                                   
31 Yet, unfortunately, the second Decade covering the years 292-219 is no longer 
extant except the epitome of the books. Levene 2010: 5-9. 
32 Grainger 2002: 272-3. 
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regimes. Once again, however, the gifts given to the envoys publicly displayed 
Rome’s generosity, while simultaneously indebting them to Rome on a personal 
level. Furthermore, this example of informal diplomacy would soon work in 
Rome’s favour. The Ptolemies also offered their military support at this time, but 
Rome did not want their intervention and declined it (37.3.11). The Ptolemies 
wanted to exploit her attack on Antiochos as an opportunity to attack him by 
themselves, but could not do it freely. They had made a treaty with him.33 If Rome 
had responded to their offer positively, however, they would have been able to 
treat the answer as a request for support by an ally, thus using it as a pretext for 
attacking him despite the pact. Nevertheless, Rome ignored the proposal and so 
prevented them from intervening in the war. This disregard could be perceived as 
a display of her disrespect towards the Ptolemies despite the friendship between 
both emphasised here and at least in 200.34 However, Rome’s friendly response to 
the Ptolemies’ congratulations would have encouraged the envoys to receive the 
gifts. This would have made it difficult for them to complain about Rome’s reaction 
to the offer of military support, and led them to put in a good word for her in Egypt. 
The gifts functioned as a tool of managing the contacts with outsiders delicately 
just as in the cases in the 200s. 
In 173, envoys from Antiochos IV visited Rome to renew their alliance and 
friendship. The Senate accepted the request and gave Apollonios, the leader of the 
deputation, 100,000 asses (Liv. 42.6.6-11). 35  This was clearly a staggering 
figure.36 He was thus greatly indebted to Rome, becoming a strong supporter as 
                                                   
33 Eckstein 2008: 309-10; Grainger 2010: 276-7. 
34 As regards the formation of the friendship, see Gruen 1984: 62-3. 
35 Mørkholm 1966: 64-5; Warrior 1981: 18-19; Mittag 2006: 99-100. 
36 Gera 1998: 118-9. 
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well as an unofficial method of approaching the Seleucid dynasty, although there 
is no direct evidence regarding his contact with Rome in the following years. This 
gift also functioned as a way of unofficially managing relations with eastern states, 
distinct from the delivery of official messages. Antiochos had just succeeded to the 
throne and needed to prepare for an expected attack by the Ptolemies.37 The 
latter were officially Rome’s ally, but Rome did not overly desire a Ptolemaic 
victory.38 The positive treatment of Apollonios, the Seleucid king’s chief retainer,39 
by granting more luxurious gifts than usual, showed the Ptolemies (and possibly 
other rivals) that Rome supported Antiochos beyond simply recognising his 
kingship. The gift functioned as a method of discouraging any open attack on him. 
This was particularly effective, since it showed Rome’s consideration for Antiochos 
but did not openly antagonise others: gift-giving could hardly be classed as a 
hostile action. 
      There is another example of gift-giving in a senatorial session of 172, when 
some Thracians visited Rome around the time of the latter’s decision to attack 
Macedonia. They were from the Maedi, the Cepnati, and the Asti, and asked the 
Senate to agree to an alliance and friendship. The senators presented 2,000 asses 
to each of the envoys, along with their agreement (Liv. 42.19.6-7, esp. 7).40 It is 
noteworthy that in this case, Rome noticed that the tribes were ‘at the back of 
Macedonia (ab tergo Macedoniae),’ and therefore exploited the alliance to contain 
the Macedonians. This is confirmed by the fact that the meeting was held in open 
session, unlike that with Eumenes II of Pergamon during the same period 
                                                   
37 Briscoe 2012: 173-5. 
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39 For his other actions under this king, see Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 49. 
40 Gruen 1984: 91-2. 
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(42.14.1).41 Rome showed Macedonia and other contemporaries her friendship 
with the tribes and her advantage by gaining new allies in an important place. In 
this political game the gifts functioned as a tool of strengthening Rome’s 
partnership with the Thracians and publicising her generosity to the tribes and 
others beyond, while also indebting the envoys to Rome personally. 
A similar contact is observed in a case of c. 170, in which envoys from 
Carthage and Masinissa visited Rome to bring an offering of grain and troops for 
Rome’s war against Macedonia. The Senate gave 2,000 asses to each of the 
ambassadors along with its declaration of gratitude to their states (Liv. 43.6.11-
14).42 These gifts made the envoys indebted to Rome and made them a vehicle 
through which she could contact local elites and their fellow citizens further. This 
contact also showed others that her friendship with the two African states was 
firmer than a relationship maintained only through official contacts. This, in turn, 
would have highlighted the increasing nature of Roman power to other 
contemporaries, encouraging them to support Rome. Macedonia, by contrast, was 
experiencing difficulties in even influencing its closest neighbours in Greece 
(42.46; Polyb 27.4.1-5.8).43 Indeed, in 169, Pamphylia and a Gallic tribe asked 
Rome to renew and establish a friendship. The Senate gladly agreed to their 
requests and gave each of the envoys of the Pamphylians 2,000 asses, although 
for the Gauls, several luxurious items were given to the chieftain, while there is 
no reference to his envoys (Liv. 44.14.1-4). 44  These gifts involved foreign 
diplomats in Rome’s diplomacy as an unofficial instrument to influence the envoys’ 
                                                   
41 Briscoe 2012: 186-202. 
42 Roth 1999: 146, 228, and 247; Wiemer 2002: 305-6; Charles 2008: 350. 
43 Walbank 1979: 296-9. 
44 Sherwin-White 1976: 1; Briscoe 2012: 507. 
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homelands and other states alongside official diplomacy. 
Up to this point, I have shown how gift-giving functioned as a tool of Roman 
diplomacy in cases where relations between the states in question were already 
cordial. This might still suggest that gifts were given simply as a token of 
friendship, and as a bonus to the messengers of favourable missives without 
ulterior motives. However, the custom was used even in more hostile situations. 
In 170, for example, the envoys from Chalkis visited Rome to complain about the 
actions of Roman generals in the Third Macedonian War. The Senate criticised 
the commanders concerned and resolved that the situation would be rectified, 
giving 2,000 asses to each of the diplomats (Liv. 43.8.7-9).45 In the context of a 
Roman apology, they were obligated to accept the gifts. It ensured that the envoys 
reported the result of the meeting in Rome favourably upon their return to 
Chalkis. They effectively worked as an unofficial tool of Roman diplomacy while 
relaying Rome’s official message to their fellow citizens. Moreover, by treating the 
delegation with kindness and criticising the generals, the Senate declared that 
their behaviour was not a true reflection of Rome. This improved the Senate’s 
standing, while simultaneously shifting any blame wholly onto the generals. The 
gifts here functioned as a tool of manipulating the relationship between Rome or 
the Senate and Chalkis, in parallel to the official negotiations, in an identical 
fashion to those enacted with allied states, considered above. 
A similar case can be observed around the end of the Third Macedonian 
War. Livius relates (44.14.5-15.8, esp. 15.8) that Rhodes tried to arbitrate between 
Rome and Macedonia. The Senate angrily rejected their overtures, ‘but, 2,000 
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asses were given to each of the envoys (munus tamen legatis in singulos binum 
milium aeris missum est),’ although they declined to accept the gift.46 One would 
be forgiven for assuming that this episode derives from nothing more than some 
confusion on the part of Livius or his sources, as suggested by some scholars.47 
Considering the unusual reaction of the Rhodian envoys, however, I would argue 
that the practice of gift-giving did take place. Even if Livius and his sources did 
confuse points of chronology or other detail, they had no reason to invent the story. 
They might have intended to emphasise that the Rhodians behaved ‘arrogantly 
(superbe)’ in the meeting (44.14.8). Referring to their refusal to accept monetary 
gifts, however, does not demonstrate here any such arrogance. It was a natural 
response on this occasion, since the offer of arbitration had been denied, and the 
Senate had also freed Caria and Lykia from Rhodian control (44.15.1-2).48 It is 
significant that, even in this fraught context, the Senate treated the envoys 
favourably by giving gifts. It functioned as a suggestion that the relationship 
between Rhodes and Rome was not completely broken. If Rome had regarded 
Rhodes as an enemy, there would have been no attempt to make the envoys a 
vehicle for approaching Rhodes unofficially. The diplomats would have been 
expelled from Italy at the end of any negotiations, similar to those of Macedonia 
at the beginning of the war (42.36.7; cf. Diod. 30.1; Liv. 42.48.3; Polyb. 27.6.3).49 
The Rhodian envoys thus avoided becoming Roman agents, but may well have 
noticed that Rhodes, as a whole, was not yet regarded as an enemy by Rome. 
Indeed, new diplomats later asked the Senate not to attack Rhodes, and promised 
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their loyalty, blaming its role in the recent arbitration on a number of Rhodians 
favourable to Macedonia. The majority of the senators accepted the petition, albeit 
in a patronising manner (Diod. 31.5.3; Gell. 6.3.5-55; Liv. 44.35.4-5 and 45.10.4-
15; Per. 46; Polyb. 30.4-5 and 31, esp. 30.31.14). The gifts failed to succeed as a 
tool in winning over individual Rhodian envoys but indirectly contributed to 
Rome’s managing the Rhodian negotiations in parallel to official discussions that 
were frequently hostile. 
This trend is also seen in connection with Rome’s negotiations with Kotys 
IV of Thrace in c. 167, and Numantia in Hispania in 136. The former was an 
enemy of Rome in the Third Macedonian War. Shortly after the conflict, however, 
he sent the delegates to account for his conduct during the hostilities. The Senate 
welcomed his envoys and gave 2,000 asses to each of them (Liv. 45.42.6-12). The 
senators did not, in fact, accept Kotys’ account completely, but wanted to secure 
his friendship in order to control Thrace.50 The monetary gifts contributed to 
Rome’s relieving his tension soon through the reports of the envoys favourably to 
Rome in parallel to the Roman state’s official acceptance of his account. In the 
latter case, the delegates from Numantia were given gifts at Rome at a time when 
her troops were forced to make a truce in the difficulties and many Romans were 
unwilling to ratify it (Cassius Dio fr.79.1-3).51 While the pact was eventually 
repudiated, the gifts functioned as a method of maintaining a positive relationship 
with the envoys during the Romans’ internal debate. In these cases gift-giving 
was a lubricant between Rome and the two states in parallel to the official 
negotiations, in an identical fashion to relationships with more receptive parties. 
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Considering these examples offered in this chapter, it is clear that the 
Senate frequently used the custom of gift-giving at least from the 200s to the 130s 
to manipulate outsiders. This result suggests that informal diplomacy was a key 
component in Rome’s diplomatic practice during the period of expansion into the 
East. However, this conclusion so far results only from the analysis of gift-giving. 
In order to achieve the aim of this thesis, i.e. to show the validity of using this 
concept and its significance from the 200s to 133 (and afterwards), it is necessary 
to reveal more actions that can be categorised into informal diplomacy and the 
evidence that they played a more significant role in Rome during the decades than 
gift-giving which could be regarded by contemporaries as a mere appendage after 
the main negotiations.  
I shall therefore end this chapter with considering how this aim is achieved. 
It is reasonable to remember that Rome’s gift-giving first appears in 205 in the 
extant sources. Considering the likely reasons of the lack of its information before 
the year as shown, this does not necessarily demonstrate that the custom was 
adopted by her in 205. But this shows that it is useful to consider if Roman 
diplomacy changed in this period from the viewpoint of approaching outsiders 
through informal channels. If some evidence that such methods apart from gift-
giving played an important role in Roman diplomacy is found, it can also be used 
as a part of that of the significance of informal diplomacy in Rome from the 200s 
to 133.  
So, which event around 205 should be noticed? What should be remembered 
is that Rome waged the Second Punic War and the First Macedonian War in this 
period. It is reasonable to focus on one of them or both, since there may well have 
been many opportunities for the people concerned to make diplomatic actions 
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during the struggle(s). The problem is which war should be picked up or whether 
both of them should be noticed. The cases of gift-giving in the negotiations with 
Saguntum and Masinissa might suggest the Second Punic War has to be picked 
up, at any rate. This might be supported by demographic evidence relating that 
the war carried a heavy human cost. According to the data taken from the census, 
the number of Roman citizens was c. 270,000 or 280,000 in 234/3, while, in 204/3, 
it had dropped to 214,000 (Liv. 29.37.7; Per. 20 and 29).52 Considering the lack of 
any serious defeat of Rome in the Macedonian War, these results of census show 
that for Romans of the period, Carthaginians easily represented the most foreign 
of all outsiders. There is, however, little evidence to suggest that the process of 
informal diplomacy worked between these powers. Hannibal’s ‘liberation’ of 
Italian troops and cities, to win them over to his cause, might initially seem to 
conform to a model of informal diplomacy (Polyb. 3.77.3-7 and 85.3-4). This policy 
might even have been later emulated by Rome during the advance against Greece 
from the 200s onwards. During the Punic War, however, Hannibal’s actions were 
not effective, owing to the lack of a tradition that emphasised autonomy and 
freedom against imperial states among the Italians.53 While Carthage was also 
secretly approached by some of Rome’s allies who wanted to defect (Liv. 23.41.13-
43.5; Polyb. 7.2.1-5.8), these cases resulted from ad hoc necessities of the people 
concerned. It is doubtful whether the case of the Second Punic War demonstrates 
the significance of informal diplomacy to Rome. 
I think that an alternative body of evidence can be found in the Roman 
contact with eastern Greeks in the context of the First Macedonian War. As I have 
                                                   
52 Brunt 1971a: 13, 46, and 62-3. 
53 Erskine 1993: 58-62. 
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shown in the analysis of Polybios’ attitude to gift-giving, the Greeks were already 
comfortable with the practice of approaching outsiders through unorthodox 
channels. It is reasonable to expect that similar ideas and manners are found in 
the analysis of the diplomatic games. Moreover, unlike the Punic War, the 
Macedonian War ended with a peace in which no party was officially treated as a 
loser. In the process diplomacy may well have been as important as, or possibly 
more significant, than military affairs. The experience in the stage could 
encourage Rome to approach outsiders even beyond Greece such as in Hispania 
with informal diplomacy. However, I do not suggest that Roman informal 
diplomacy was only born of Rome’s encountering Greeks in the 200s. In fact, Rome 
had been engaging in some form of this practice since the fourth century, when 
interacting with the Samnites. According to Livius (at 9.20.3), in 318 many 
Samnite states approached Rome to renew a treaty between them. Although the 
Senate rejected the proposal, the Samnite envoys obtained a two year truce by 
appealing to ‘(Roman) individuals (singulos).’54 This was obviously an approach 
through channels detached from the conventional channels and should therefore 
be classed as an example of informal diplomacy. While both Rome and the 
Samnites might not have considered the nature of this diplomatic contact, it 
remains clear that the contact with the Greeks in the 200s was not the encounter 
with informal diplomacy for Rome. However, even if informal diplomatic actions 
and the concept were not necessarily novel to her by the 200s, the appearance of 
gift-giving in 205 in Livius’ source, despite the lack of the information about this 
custom in his books for the first ten years of the Punic War and early centuries of 
                                                   
54 Oakley 2005: 262-6. 
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Rome, suggests that the conflict with the eastern Greeks during this decade acted 
as a catalyst, a time at which Rome realised the value of diplomacy conducted 
through unofficial channels and used them continuously afterwards. This 
hypothesis is supported by the difference between the Romans and the Greeks of 
the extent of using the methods of approaching outsiders individually. The Greeks 
had developed that kind of diplomacy and for example used fully the notion 
προξενία on the stage even before the 200s.55 In contrast, Rome had developed 
the concepts of patrocinium (or clientela), amicitia, and hospitium in connection 
with personal relationships, probably by the Middle Republic.56 Rome had not 
used such ideas in diplomacy frequently, though. In light of these factors, it is 
reasonable to expect that the contacts with such Greeks promoted the use of the 
channels apart from official ones by the Romans, and that the analysis of those in 




From 205 to 136, the custom of gift-giving functioned as a tool of Roman 
diplomacy, turning the recipients into supporters of Rome and creating a more 
personal method of contacting foreign populations. This is informal diplomacy. 
This practice was a key component of Roman diplomacy in the period of her 
advance into the Greek world. The first appearance of the phenomenon, in 205, 
and the conditions of informal diplomatic channels in contemporaries show that 
it is useful to focus on the contacts of Rome with the eastern Greeks in the period 
                                                   
55 Adcock and Mosley 1975: 11 and 161-4; Mitchell 1997: 182. 
56 Nybakken 1946: 248-53; Badian 1958: 1-2; Burton 2011: 1, 49, 64, and 158. 
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of the First Macedonian War next in developing further the discussion of the 
extent to which unofficial diplomatic practice was visible, and the validity of 
inventing the concept of informal diplomacy in the study of Roman imperial 









This chapter aims to show that the concept of informal diplomacy is useful 
in understanding Rome from the 200s onwards, in particular, in the context of her 
connection with the eastern Greeks. Rome failed to control the negotiations with 
them in the First Macedonian War and was consequently forced to withdraw from 
Greece. I argue that this occurred because leading Greeks were skilled in 
balancing the competing interests of the groups concerned, whether those 
interests were explicitly articulated or not, whereas Rome comparatively 
disregarded such concerns and had few methods for dealing with them. The 
Greeks used not only official and legal practices, but also other methods that were 
not in the public eye, and were therefore not constrained by legality or legitimacy, 
in order to win over the people in and beyond their state. A number of individuals 
lacking the official authority to participate in the management of foreign affairs 
could thus be approached, and could themselves intervene in foreign affairs, and 
in pursuit of their own interests, in the process that I have labelled informal 
diplomacy. This supported the Greeks’ winning over their fellow citizens and their 
neighbours. While Roman diplomats were willing to receive such informal 
approaches from foreigners, they did not understand the concept, much less 
employ any methods of informal diplomacy. I argue that this difference led to 
Rome’s isolation at the end of the Macedonian War and her withdrawal from 
Greece despite never suffering a military defeat. 
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This chapter begins by showing the use of informal diplomacy by the 
Greeks and the little interest in outsiders of Rome on the eve of the Macedonian 
War. Next, I argue that in the 210s, in the prelude to the war and at its outset, 
Rome was involved in the diplomatic games of such Greeks, in particular those of 
Philippos V of Macedonia and those pitched against him in Aitolia. Lastly, I will 
demonstrate that it was Rome’s lack of informal diplomacy that contributed to her 
failure in the Macedonian War, an outcome that made Rome aware of its 
significance. The impact of this revelation on her immediate expansion in the East 
shown in these discussions will form the subject of the subsequent chapters. 
 
Section 1: Greece on the Eve of the First Macedonian War 
 
This section shows that eastern Greeks had used not only official but also 
informal channels in their diplomacy just before their full encounter with Rome, 
and that contemporary Romans, in contrast, had little interest in outsiders, much 
less used informal diplomacy, despite their tactical use of the custom of gift-giving 
from the 200s onwards shown by Chapter 1.  
In order to achieve this aim, we begin by noting the actions of Aratos. He 
was an Achaian leader, but influenced the whole of Greece in the immediate 
prelude to the initial encounter between the Romans and eastern Greeks during 
the First Macedonian War. Analysing his diplomacy enables this section to 
consider the diplomatic manners of the Greeks in this period. His actions are 
shown in detail by Plutarchos and Polybios. According to them (Plut. Arat. 16-23; 
Polyb. 2.43.4), Aratos seized Akrokorinthos in 243/2 from Macedonia, and won 
fame in Achaia. In the following decades, he strengthened his leadership by 
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increasing Achaia’s power, attacking the neighbouring tyrants supported by 
Macedonia. In particular, after the death of Demetrios II in 229, he took 
advantage of their unrest and extended Achaia aggressively (2.44.2-6; cf. Plut. 
Arat. 24.3 and 30.4).1 His persuading the Macedonians into abandoning Peiraieus 
in c. 228 also resulted from this campaign (Paus. 2.8.6; Plut. Arat. 34.4-6; Syll³ 
497.ll.10-17).2  
Aratos was later to seek an alliance with Macedonia, though. Achaia began 
a war against Sparta in 229/8, and faced military difficulties. Aratos regarded it 
necessary to take control of the situation, planning to ally with Macedonia (Plut. 
Arat. 11-12 and 41; Polyb. 2.47.1-52.4, esp. 47.7, 48.4, and 50.10). He did not, 
however, have any contact with Macedonia ‘openly (προδήλως).’ The kingdom had 
been an enemy for many Achaians. There was the possibility that they would 
object to any such alliance. Moreover, Sparta and Aitolia, other rivals of Achaia, 
could block the plan in some way. Consequently, Aratos first approached his 
friends in Megalopolis ‘secretly (δι᾽ ἀπορρήτων).’ This city was a member of the 
Achaian Federation, but had friendly relations with Macedonia. With the support 
of the friends Aratos persuaded Megalopolis into sending its envoys, who were the 
friends of Aratos in question, to propose at the meeting of Achaia that military 
support from Antigonos III, the successor of Demetrios, should be sought through 
dispatching the Megalopolitan envoys to Macedonia under the name of Achaia. 
After the motion was approved, the friends of Aratos visited Antigonos, meaning 
that Aratos was able to negotiate informally with Antigonos through them. Aratos 
indicated the danger of Sparta and Aitolia, suggesting that Macedonia offer its 
                                                   
1 Errington 1990: 173-6; Grainger 1999: 160-4. 
2 For a chronology of the inscription, and a supplement, see Habicht 1982: 118-27. 
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support to Achaia, to compete against them. Antigonos agreed with this plan. He 
might have regarded it as a chance to advance into Greece but, in any case, he 
offered Achaia military support. This news was received favourably by some 
Achaians because Sparta was still on the offensive. At the ‘national council (τὸ 
κοινὸν βουλευτήριον)’ i.e. on the official stage of diplomacy, Aratos then dared to 
offer a cautious view about inviting Antigonos’ troops. Aratos wanted that the act 
of summoning Macedonia should be decided in accordance with the general will 
of Achaia without his being regarded as its advocator. He was worried that if he 
took a leading part in inviting Macedonia back into the Peloponnesos despite his 
achievements as an anti-Macedonian politician in previous decades, and moreover 
if the king brought some disadvantage to Achaia later, he would disappoint many 
fellow citizens, in particular Achaian soldiers who had fought for the federation, 
and possibly be criticised by his rivals (2.50.7-9). Aratos thus carefully led the 
great majority of his fellow citizens to agree with inviting Macedonia while 
manipulating his Megalopolitan friends, Antigonos, and the Achaians through a 
network of informal contacts and formal statements. His efforts were rewarded in 
224, with the creation of the Hellenic League, including Thessalia, Epeiros, 
Akarnania, Boiotia, Phokis, Euboia and perhaps Opuntanian Lokris. They were 
led by Antigonos, and defeated Sparta in 222 (Just. 28.4.1-10; Plut. Arat. 46.1; 
Polyb. 2.52.5, 54.1-4, and 66.4-69.11; Syll³ 518).3 One might be tempted to regard 
this manoeuvre as a simple case of political trickery, but I would argue that this 
was an example of informal diplomacy being carried out by an individual: Aratos 
had independently controlled foreign affairs through a combination of methods. 
                                                   
3 Walbank 1940: 15-16; Bringmann, Steuben and Ameling 1995: no.135. 
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E. S. Gruen is sceptical about the historicity of this secret manoeuvre.4 He 
sees it as a story developed by the pro-Spartan historian Phylarchos, one of 
Polybios’ and Plutarchos’ sources. But this view is unacceptable, as P. Paschidis 
argues. 5  Megalopolis approached Macedonia in public under the approval of 
Achaia. If Polybios had drawn the picture unrealistically, his near contemporaries 
would have criticised him. Furthermore, if Aratos had not thought of 
reconciliation with Macedonia, his previously anti-Macedonian pedigree makes it 
likely that he would have attempted to prevent Megalopolis from approaching 
Antigonos, stopping the city from persuading Achaia to dispatch envoys to the 
king. In light of the fact that Aratos succeeded in sending his son as an envoy to 
Macedonia after Antigonos’ offer of support (Polyb. 2.51.5), Aratos’ position in 
Achaia was still strong. Therefore, Achaia’s decision to approach Macedonia was 
decided with Aratos’ private support and advice, and the historicity of his 
manoeuvre, described by Polybios, is reliable. 
It is noteworthy that such individual participation in foreign affairs, 
comprising both formal and informal channels, was an acceptable method of 
diplomacy by Greek contemporaries. Polybios claims that Aratos did not admit to 
his manoeuvres, but the author analyses them while differentiating between the 
official and informal actions, without criticising Aratos (2.47.7-11). A similar 
recognition of the two avenues of public and private, official and informal, and the 
acceptance of the act in both ways can also be observed in several roughly 
contemporary honorific decrees. For example, in the middle of the third century 
Iasos in Caria invested the title of πρόξενος and several privileges upon Heroides 
                                                   
4 Gruen 1972: 609-25. 
5 Paschidis: 2008: 241-4. 
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of Theangela, because he was an ἀνὴρ καλὸς καὶ / ἀγαθὸς περὶ τὴμ πόλιν τὴν 
Ἰασέων / ... , ἰδίαι τε τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τῶν / πολιτῶν χρείας παρεχόμενος καὶ 
κοινῆι / ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως καὶ λέγων καὶ πράσσων / ἀγαθὸν ὅ τι ἂν δύνηται (SEG 
LVII.1067.ll.6-11). Iasos announced that not only had he κοινῆι, i.e. officially, 
participated in the formation of contacts between both states, but also ἰδίαι, 
privately, supported the citizens, considering such actions as praiseworthy. 
Samothrake also honoured a Ptolemaic governor of the Hellespont and Thrace for 
διακείμενος δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον [εὐνό]/ως πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται καὶ 
κοινῆι τῆ[ς πό]/λεως καὶ ἰδίαι τῶμ πρὸς αὐτόν ἀφικνουμένω[ν (Syll³ 502A.ll.14-
16). He was praised for officially taking part in the contacts between Samothrake 
and the Ptolemies, and for privately supporting visitors from the island. 
Considering this evidence, then, there was no difficulty for the honourees and the 
honourers when such informal connections were disclosed. The similarity of the 
phrases with the antithetical terms of ἰδίαι and κοινῆι suggests that they formed 
a set expression, 6  and that such varied participation in diplomacy was an 
accepted practice. Aratos’ case and these other examples reveal the blurring 
between the boundaries of official and informal diplomatic action among the 
Greeks. It supports my hypothesis stressing the crucial nature of informal 
diplomacy as a method of political practice, and confirms the skilful and flexible 
approach to outsiders utilised by states and individuals within the Greek world. 
The act of approaching outsiders was not, in fact, peculiar to the Greeks on 
the eve of the Macedonian War. Rome was also interested, to an extent, in public 
                                                   
6 This is supported by some literary sources such as Aristot. AP 40.2, Thuk. 1.141.3, 
Xen. Hell. 1.2.10 and Mem. 2.1.12. Usual usage of this formula in Greek proxeny 
decrees is also indicated by Mack 2015: 49-51. For the honorary inscription from 
Samothrake, see also IG XII.8.156, Austin 2006: 467-8, and Dmitrova 2008: no.170.  
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opinion when conducting diplomacy. This is observed in her interaction with 
Greeks in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War. In 229, Rome sent troops against 
Teuta, the queen of Ardiaei, who had engaged in piracy around the Adriatic.7 The 
Senate had vowed to take revenge, and the operation was concluded successfully. 
Consequently, Rome obtained several cities and tribes as her subjects. It was in 
this context that the Senate sent envoys to Aitolia, Achaia, Corinth, and Athens, 
to explain its rationale for sending troops (App. Illy. 7-8; Polyb. 2.11-12). 
This was, however, an unusual action. Rome had had a few contacts with 
the Greeks since her war against Pyrrhos of Epeiros, around 280. The contacts 
before the Illyrian War were basically made on the initiative of the Greeks. For 
example, in c. 263 a certain L. Volceius was given the title of πρόξενος by Aitolia 
(IG IX.1².1.17.l.51). In the same period, Eresos of Lesbos bestowed the same 
honorary title on some Romans although this might have occurred in later 
decades (XII.Suppl.127.ll.48 and 62).8  In the latter half of the third century, 
Akarnania approached the Senate when the former was attacked by Aitolia (Just. 
28.1-2), and Apollonia also made contact with Rome, although the purpose of the 
city is unclear (Cassius Dio fr.42.1; Liv. Per. 15; Val.Max. 6.6.5; Zonar. 8.7).9 In 
every case, the Romans were the passive, recipient people. In the light of this 
general tendency, Rome’s interest in opinion of the Greeks in c. 229 seems to be 
an unusual action, although it should be noted that the Illyrian War and the 
dispatch of envoys to Hellenistic states in the aftermath were executed on Roman 
initiative and Rome had sent her envoys to Egypt in 273 and possibly after the 
                                                   
7 De Souza 1999: 76-9. 
8 Mack 2012. 218-23. 
9 Dany 1999: 98-108; Rich 2011: 195-9. For more on Aitolia in the period and the 




First Punic War (Cassius Dio fr.41; Dion.Hal. RA 20.14; Eutrop. 3.1; Just. 18.2.8-
9: Liv. Per. 14; Val.Max. 4.3.9: Zonar. 8.6). At least, Rome was unaccustomed to 
weighing international public opinions into her diplomacy and to using informal 
methods of it, such as those already employed by contemporary Greeks. 
This argument is supported by Rome’s attack on the Illyrians, led by 
Demetrios of Pharos, in 219. This offensive allegedly resulted from his violation 
of a friendship with Rome and allying with Macedonia (Polyb. 3.16 and 18-19). In 
depicting his disloyalty, however, Polybios and his sources, such as Fabius Pictor 
and Aratos, betray their own prejudice.10 Whatever the true nature of Rome’s 
relationship with Demetrios was, her antagonism essentially resulted from his 
success in ‘uniting the Illyrians, disrupting the system of small and thus 
unthreatening political units that the Romans had set up.’11 It is important to 
note that Rome did not seek any input from her Greek neighbours here, although 
Demetrios was an ally of the king of Macedonia, the leader of the Hellenic League. 
H. J. Dell argues, based on some Latin sources (e.g. Eutrop. 3.7; Oros. 4.13.16), 
that Rome’s goal here was to secure a route through which to bring supplies into 
north-eastern Italy.12 His argument partly explains why Rome did not seem to be 
interested in the Greeks at that time. Yet, if Rome had been always mindful of 
outsiders, she would have attempted to convince Demetrios’ neighbours of the 
legitimacy of her campaign here. In addition, sources such as Pictor and Polybios, 
who were interested in the relation between Rome and the Greeks, would have 
referred to it, if any such contact took place. Their silence and the lack of evidence 
for any approach to the Greeks indicates Rome’s meagre interest in outsiders. 
                                                   
10 Eckstein 1994: 46-59. 
11 Petzold 1971: 212. 
12 Dell 1970: 31-8. 
55 
 
This nature of Roman diplomacy can also be observed in an inscription from 
Pharos. Rome restored the independence of the islanders after Demetrios’ defeat. 
It is noteworthy that they immediately managed their diplomacy without her 
intervention (SEG XXIII.489). The reference in line 8 of the fragment A to a 
συμμαχία between Pharos and Rome might appear to count against my argument. 
As P. S. Derow suggests,13 it might be the creation of a formal alliance that 
‘consists of fully reciprocal undertakings by each party.’ There is no sign, however, 
that Pharos was treated as a foedus sociale, practically Rome’s dependant, 
although the inscription was surely produced shortly after the Second Illyrian 
War.14 Moreover, after the brief reference to the συμμαχία, the inscription records, 
in great detail, Pharos’ attempt ‘to rebuild the state (εἰς ἐπανόρθωσιν τῆς 
πόλεως),’ with ‘the support (βοηθῆσαι)’ of Paros and Athens, and to re-establish 
friendships with other Greeks (A.ll.10-41, esp. ll.14-15 and 35-6). There is no 
reference to Rome. This suggests the Republic had little interest in Illyria, 
although Pharos seemed to be regarded as a Roman dependent by contemporaries 
(cf. Polyb. 7.9.13) and N. G. L. Hammond supposes that Rome and Macedonia 
were ‘engaged in a cold war’ for Demetrios’ exclusion.15 Indeed, if Rome had 
regarded Macedonia as an enemy, or if Rome had always considered international 
public opinion, she would have supported Pharos eagerly and displayed it to curry 
favour with contemporaries, when Rome wanted to ensure the security of the 
Adriatic in advance of the coming war against Carthage (3.16.1). Moreover, in this 
period, the balance of power in Greece changed by the establishment of the 
Hellenic League led by Macedonia. 
                                                   
13 Derow 1991: 269. Cf. SEG LVII.563; Bagnall and Derow 2004: no.31. 
14 Eckstein 1999: 398-418. 
15 Hammond 1968: 6-12. 
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It is noticeable that the Greeks were interested in the affairs of Rome, and 
used them in their own diplomatic struggles. This is observed in a speech 
attributed to Agelaos of Naupaktos by Polybios. Agelaos was an Aitolian leader in 
the Social War, fought between Achaia and Aitolia. Philippos V, the successor of 
Antigonos, had supported Achaia in his capacity as the leader of the Hellenic 
League, and Aitolia came close to being defeated.16 According to Polybios (5.104.1-
4), Agelaos presented the following argument in the peace meeting at Naupaktos 
in 217: 
 
… ὃς ἔφη δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε πολεμεῖν τοὺς Ἕλληνας 
ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ μεγάλην χάριν ἔχειν τοῖς θεοῖς, εἰ λέγοντες ἓν καὶ 
ταὐτὸ πάντες καὶ συμπλέκοντες τὰς χεῖρας, καθάπερ οἱ τοὺς 
ποταμοὺς διαβαίνοντες, δύναιντο τὰς τῶν βαρβάρων ἐφόδους 
ἀποτριβόμενοι συσσῴζειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς πόλεις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ 
εἰ τὸ παράπαν τοῦτο μὴ δυνατόν, κατά γε τὸ παρὸν ἠξίου 
συμφρονεῖν καὶ φυλάττεσθαι, προϊδομένους τὸ βάρος τῶν 
στρατοπέδων καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ συνεστῶτος πρὸς ταῖς δύσεσι 
πολέμου. δῆλον γὰρ εἶναι παντὶ τῷ καὶ μετρίως περὶ τὰ κοινὰ 
σπουδάζοντι καὶ νῦν, ὡς ἐάν τε Καρχηδόνιοι Ῥωμαίων ἐάν τε 
Ῥωμαῖοι Καρχηδονίων περιγένωνται τῷ πολέμῳ, διότι κατ᾽ οὐδένα 
τρόπον εἰκός ἐστι τοὺς κρατήσαντας ἐπὶ ταῖς Ἰταλιωτῶν καὶ 
Σικελιωτῶν μεῖναι δυναστείαις, ἥξειν δὲ καὶ διατείνειν τὰς ἐπιβολὰς 
καὶ δυνάμεις αὑτῶν πέρα τοῦ δέοντος. διόπερ ἠξίου πάντας μὲν 
φυλάξασθαι τὸν καιρόν, μάλιστα δὲ Φίλιππον. 
 
Agelaos appealed to his listeners to prevent the Greeks from fighting each other, 
in order to prepare for the advance of the eventual victor of the Second Punic War 
into Greece. He treated Rome and Carthage as βάρβαροι that were to be resisted. 
J. Deininger considers this speech, and the subsequent peace (5.105.2), a sign that 
                                                   
16 Mackil 2013: 117-21. 
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the Greeks regarded Rome as a menace.17 However, Aitolia would break this 
peace in 211, allying with Rome. The distrustful attitude towards Rome did not 
represent Aitolia’s opinion, and was used rhetorically. It is noteworthy that 
although Philippos was impressed by the speech, he also had already decided to 
make peace. He had been persuaded by Demetrios, who had been under his 
protection since 219, to attack Rome while she struggled in the war against 
Hannibal (5.101.7-10 and 105.1-2). The Carthaginians were also treated as 
βάρβαροι in Agelaos’ speech, but Philippos would ally with them and no one 
criticised it even after its being disclosed. The negative attitude towards Rome 
(and Carthage) in 217 thus was ‘shared’ among the Greeks regardless of their real 
thoughts of the non-Greeks concerned.  
It is important to realise that the labelling the Romans as βάρβαροι was, 
nevertheless, not a simple rhetoric but functioned as a tool of maximising 
diplomatic interests for Aitolia and Philippos. The latter found an opportunity to 
rehabilitate Demetrios and to extend Macedonia’s influence in the Adriatic. 
Aitolia’s argument justified Philippos’ concluding the present war, while also 
establishing his leadership in Greece, and helped to persuade the states that 
accepted the peace the legitimacy of his new campaign in Illyria. The speech 
enabled Aitolia to end the Social War officially in an armistice, rather than any 
one side achieving victory. It was finished ostensibly on the behalf of the entirety 
of Greece. This kept up Aitolia’s appearances without accepting defeat, although 
the peace treaty provided that both parties retained what they possessed, and 
forced Aitolia to abandon many of its cities (Polyb. 5.103.7). A hostile image of 
                                                   
17 Deininger 1971: 25. Cf. Marincola 2001: 131-2; Dmitriev 2011a: 145-51. 
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Rome was invoked by both parties to bridge the gap between their positions and 
achieve their aims on an informal level. This is not strictly an example of informal 
diplomacy. The negotiation was developed in an official context by representatives 
of both states. It does, however, bear similarities to the process. Both sides 
managed their diplomacy with legitimate tools, arguing that the defence of Greece 
was a top priority in securing a peace. However, they also informally considered 
that their individual interests that were best served by peacefully concluding the 
war. Aitolia’s reputation would be salvaged and Philippos’ side would gain 
territory. These aspects of the negotiations were politely accepted by the 
participants and others, although no reference was made to them in public.  
One might doubt this conclusion on ground that the speech might be a sort 
of invention as O. Mørkholm thinks. 18  Certainly, it is impossible to confirm 
whether Agelaos spoke as Polybios claims. The majority of scholars, however, 
recognise the veracity of the basic contents.19 This might result partly from the 
fact that Polybios promises to make every effort to inform his readers of precise 
phrases of each speech (cf. 12.25a-b). It is also important to remember that the 
image of Greek unity against βάρβαροι had been continuously and 
opportunistically used by Hellenistic diplomats, including those of Macedonia.20 
Thus for Agelaos and his contemporaries including Philippos, it may well have 
been easy to exploit and accept. Moreover, Polybios and his sources could have 
met people who actually remembered or attended the meeting, and the existence 
of the descendants of such people among his readership might have prevented 
him from embellishing it excessively. 
                                                   
18 Mørkholm 1974: 132. 
19 E.g. Walbank 1940: 66; Champion 1997: 111-4 and 123-6; Dmitriev 2011a: 149.  
20 Wallace 2010: 148. 
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It is noticeable that conduct resembling that of Agelaos and informal 
diplomacy was also performed by Philippos. This is shown by an inscription 
recording letters sent by him to Larisa from 217 to 215, to encourage the citizens 
to reconstruct the city after the Social War. In the messages he referred to Rome 
as follows (Syll³ 543.ll.29-34):21 
 
ὅτι γὰρ πάντων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν ὡς πλείστων μετεχόντων τοῦ 
πολιτεύματος / τήν τε πόλιν ἰσχύειν καὶ τὴν χώραν μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν 
αἰσχρῶς χερσεύεσθαι, … ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς τοὺς ταῖς ὁμοίαις 
πολιτογραφίαις χρωμένους θεωρεῖν ὧν καὶ οἱ Ῥωμαῖ/οί εἰσιν, οἳ καὶ 
τοὺς οἰκέτας ὅταν ἐλευθερώσωσιν, προσδεχόμενοι εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα 
καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων με/[ταδι]δόντες, καὶ διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου οὐ 
μόνον τὴν ἰδίαν πατρίδα ἐπηυξήκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποικίας <σ>χεδὸν 
/ [εἰς ἑβ]δομήκοντα τόπους ἐκπεπόμφασιν. 
 
He refers to Rome’s system of citizenship as an example of how best to increase 
the spread of the franchise. There is no sign of his antipathy towards Rome as a 
non-Greek state, despite his acceptance of Agelaos’ argument at Naupaktos at 
around the same time. It is more important to note that despite what he asserts, 
Roman freedmen were not given the same access to official power as free-born 
citizens. 22  Philippos therefore invoked the image of Rome to show his 
consideration to Larisa, but he and his subjects lacked detailed knowledge even 
about one of Rome’s most distinctive laws. The erection of this inscription means 
that Larisa also had no precise information about this topic, or cared little 
regarding the accuracy of what he claimed. What was important for Philippos and 
                                                   
21 Habicht 1970: 273-9; Bagnal and Derow 2004: no.32. 
22 Liv. Per. 20 reports freedmen were registered in four voting districts, but the 
authenticity of this reference is doubtful. Admission to office was allowed to their sons 
and descendants. Austin 2006: 76. Cf. Habicht 1970: 273; CAH VII.2²:672. 
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Larisa was displaying his favour and goodwill towards the city, although he also 
seems to instruct Larisa to admit more outsiders to citizenship. Rome’s name and 
her misunderstood law were used as a tool for this aim. This use of a factually 
questionable argument to achieve an unspoken agenda bears similarities to the 
meeting at Naupaktos, and to the wider process of informal diplomacy.  
These cases show the difference between the eastern Greeks and Romans 
on the eve of their encounter. The former consciously managed diplomacy while 
interweaving official channels and what were not constrained by matters of 
legality, publicity, and reasonability. These were examples of informal diplomacy 
and similar phenomena in action, and enabled the Greeks to adapt to diplomatic 
difficulties flexibly and cleverly. By contrast, Rome had little interest in the 
viewpoint of such Greeks, much less using the methods that could be categorised 
as informal diplomacy. This difference between both peoples actually would 
influence their full encounter. 
 
Section 2: Philippos and the Aitolian Hawks  
 
The significance of informal diplomacy during the First Macedonian War 
will now be considered. This is achieved by analysing the manoeuvres of the 
groups concerned on the Greek side and modifying the present image of this 
struggle from the viewpoint of their use of this diplomatic concept. Some scholars 
have characterised the conflict as a defensive war of Rome, waged around the 
Adriatic and Greece in order to prevent Philippos from advancing into Italy, where 
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his ally, Hannibal, was still at large.23  Rome allegedly therefore approached 
Aitolia to achieve this goal. Examination of the informal diplomacy employed by 
the eastern Greeks at this time, however, offers a different view of the situation 
that Philippos led not only Rome but also Hannibal around by the nose and that 
some Aitolians manoeuvred to persuade their fellow citizens to attack Philippos 
by using Rome.  
 
1) Philippos’ Relations with Rome and Hannibal  
 
The full encounter between Rome and the eastern Greeks commenced with 
Philippos’ intervention in the Second Punic War. 24  This is confirmed by his 
alliance in 215 with Hannibal, supporting the offensive against Rome in Italy. 
Philippos sent envoys to him while making ‘them avoid (vitantes)’ areas guarded 
by Rome, keeping the visit a secret (Liv. 23.33.1-34.9, esp. 33.4; Polyb. 7.9).25 This 
is an example of informal diplomacy on the part of Philippos, despite his being a 
representative of a state, engaging in clandestine negotiations and failing to 
announce the forming of a treaty, although Rome later intercepted the envoys and 
discovered his deception. It is also noteworthy that the Carthaginians had been 
called βάρβαροι at Naupaktos, and Philippos had officially accepted the label, but 
had secretly contacted them to form an alliance, nevertheless. This secret 
approach might have been designed partly to avoid provoking Rome. Yet, it also 
fitted with his official attitude towards βάρβαροι. The secrecy of his contact with 
Carthage enabled him formally not to contradict the official rationale of the peace 
                                                   
23 Holleaux 1921: 173-305. Cf. Gruen 1984: 377; Rich 1984: 126; Eckstein 2008: 89. 
24 For an outline of the war in this period, see Rawlings 2011: 299-303 and 318-9. 
25 Dillon and Garland 2005: 215-6. 
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in 217, while also allowing him to profit materially from the new alliance.  
It is also significant that, despite his alliance with Carthage, Philippos did 
not attack Rome aggressively (App. Mac. 1; Just. 29.4.1-3; Liv. 23.34.1-9, 38.1-5, 
and 24.40.1-17; Plut. Arat. 51.1-2; Polyb 8.8.1-9, 12.1, and 13.1-14.11; Zonar. 9.4). 
This partly resulted from the weakness of his fleet and the difficulty of 
maintaining communications with Hannibal. Despite Rome’s naval superiority, 
Philippos temporarily occupied Corcyra, a Roman friend,26 but he did not prevent 
Rome from recapturing the island, and in c. 213, captured Lissos, not her ally, 
advancing into Messenia in Greece.27 Regarding this inconsistency, some scholars 
think that Philippos only targeted areas of Illyria outside of Roman control and, 
when he achieved this in 213, he ceased the campaign in the Adriatic.28 However, 
if attacking Roman dependants had not been included in his original plan, it is 
questionable whether he would have allied with Hannibal. The alliance would 
have met with Roman resistance once it was discovered, and would therefore 
increase the difficulty of Philippos’ campaign. Moreover, in 216, he tried to attack 
Apollonia, Rome’s ally since 229 (Polyb. 2.11.8 and 5.109-10). Thus, it is more 
plausible that he allied with Carthage in order to conquer the Illyrians whether 
or not they were Roman dependants, even though he elected not to attack Rome 
openly, for some reason. 
The situation is clarified through analysing Philippos’ actions then more 
closely. According to Livius (23.33.10-12), the treaty with Hannibal stated that 
Philippos should go to ‘Italy with as large a fleet as possible - and it was thought 
                                                   
26 For the relationship between Rome and Corcyra, see Derow 1991: 267-70, Eckstein 
2008: 71, and Dmitriev 2011a: 145 n.4. 
27 Walbank 1967: 79; Eckstein 2008: 86-7 and 147-8. 
28 E.g. Dany 1999: 151; Errington 2008: 188. 
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that he would make it 200 ships - and … the states in Greece and the islands 
around Macedonia belong to him and be a part of his kingdom (quam maxima 
classe - ducentas autem naves videbatur effecturus - in Italiam traiceret et ... quae 
civitates continentis quaeque insulae ad Macedoniam vergunt, eae Philippi 
regnique eius essent).’ Polybios does not describe how Philippos was to support 
Hannibal. M. P. Fronda thinks the reference in Livius’ text is an invention by 
ancient authors after Polybios. 29  Polybios relates at 7.9.13, however, that 
Philippos and Hannibal would make a peace treaty that would ‘not allow the 
Romans to have power over Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnos, Pharos, Dimallum, 
Parthini, and Atitania (μηδ᾽ εἶναι Ῥωμαίους κυρίους Κερκυραίων μηδ᾽ 
Ἀπολλωνιατῶν καὶ Ἐπιδαμνίων μηδὲ Φάρου μηδὲ Διμάλης καὶ Παρθίνων μηδ᾽ 
Ἀτιντανίας).’ Despite the difference regarding the details, both historians agree 
Philippos was permitted to take Rome’s place in the Adriatic,30  but was not 
promised to have any share in Italy, although undoubtedly his support for 
Hannibal there was expected. There is no reference to how Philippos regarded the 
fact that it would not necessarily be to his advantage to advance into Italy. 
Nevertheless, he accepted the conditions. This shows once again that his aim was 
to conquer Illyria and Rome’s dependants there, and also suggests the secret 
contact with Hannibal was an opportunistic manoeuvre. If Philippos had been 
successful in concealing his plan from Rome, he would have been able to launch a 
surprise attack on the Roman allies and the Romans in Illyria. Although he had 
tried to occupy Apollonia in vain, Rome had not noticed the attempt itself. His 
partnership with Hannibal would have been noticed by Rome once Philippos 
                                                   
29 Fronda 2010: 212 n.103. 
30 Walbank 1967: 42-56; Levene 2010: 88.  
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started the campaign, but the presence of Hannibal in Italy would have prevented 
Rome from engaging Philippos actively in Illyria. Even though the pact was 
eventually detected, it was not wholly disastrous for him. Rome prevented him 
and Hannibal from moving jointly around Italy, but could not counter him 
decisively, owing to Hannibal’s presence in Italy once again. In this situation, 
although Philippos could not damage Rome easily, owing to the weakness of the 
fleet, he could wait for an opportunity to attack while also affording himself plenty 
of time, in the expectation that Roman power in Illyria would disintegrate. In the 
210s, it seemed entirely possible that Hannibal would defeat Rome. Philippos thus 
advanced into Messenia at a slow pace, and did not strengthen his fleet to attack 
Rome directly until the 200s (Liv. 28.8.18). Furthermore, the secrecy of his 
alliance enabled him to feign ignorance before other states if he was ever criticised 
by Carthage for not fulfilling his role as an ally. Thus, he used Hannibal to conquer 
the Illyrians as easily as possible, without damaging his image as the defender of 
Greece against βάρβαροι. I argue that this behaviour was founded in the concept 
of informal diplomacy. The Romans (and Hannibal) were thus involved in 
Philippos’ own political machinations. 
 
2) The Aitolian Hawks against Macedonia and Rome 
 
The diplomatic practice of the hawks against Philippos in Aitolia, and their 
use of informal diplomacy, formed a more significant influence on Rome at the 
beginning of the First Macedonian War. It is thought that M. Valerius Laevinus, 
the Roman commander in the Adriatic, visited Aitolia as a petitioner in 212 or 
211, in the midst of the problems being caused by Hannibal and Philippos, and 
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asked the federation to ally with Rome, ‘succeeding’ though only in exchange for 
many concessions.31 The alliance served to reduce the immediate pressure on 
Rome, but an analysis of its clauses and the circumstances of its establishment 
modifies the traditional view, and casts a new light on this treaty. 
    It is useful first to confirm that some factors suggest that the treaty was 
not, in fact, initiated by Rome, but by Aitolia. It was doubtlessly concluded after 
Laevinus successfully curried favour with the Aitolians in their assembly, by 
offering to support their attempt to regain their presence in Greece (Liv. 26.24.1-
15).32 Yet, it does not mean that the negotiation began with a Roman appeal. 
Indeed, the extant sources do not report that she asked Aitolia to make an alliance. 
Furthermore, the war was later seen not as a conflict between Rome and Philippos, 
but instead between him and the Aitolians (Philippum atque Aetolos), by the 
Greeks (e.g. 27.30.4). These suggest that partnership between Rome and Aitolia 
was formed and developed in the war under the initiative not of Rome, but of 
Aitolia. 
It is tempting to view this literary silence as indicative of Rome’s relative 
impotence, at that point in time, the Republic unable to refuse Aitolia’s myriad 
demands. This view is supported by a provision for share of war trophies found in 
an inscription from Thyrrheion in Akarnania (IG IX.1².2.241.ll.3-21). It provides 
that Rome was to cede every occupied city to Aitolia.33  Livius also says (at 
26.24.11) that the alliance stated that, ‘of the cities between Aitolia’s border and 
                                                   
31 E.g. Walbank 1940: 82-3; Dany 1999: 153; Grainger 1999: 306; Eckstein 2008: 88. 
32 Several scholars date the conclusion of the treaty to 212. Cf. Petzold 1940: 14. The 
majority, however, consider that it was in 211, based on Laevinus’ reference in Aitolia 
to the captures of Syracuse and Capua in this year. Cf. Eckstein 2008: 88; Levene 
2010: 46 n.112. 
33 Dreyer 2002a: 33-9; Bagnall and Derow 2004: no.33. 
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Corcyra, the soil, buildings and city walls, with their territory, should belong to 
the Aitolians, and all the rest of the booty should belong to the Romans (urbium 
Corcyrae tenus ab Aetolia incipienti solum tectaque et muri cum agris Aetolorum, 
alia omnis praeda populi Romani esset).’ These are treated as proof that the 
alliance was the result of a Roman initiative.34 Aitolia was to have the occupied 
areas, even those captured by operations in which the federation did not 
participate. Rome also promised not to enlarge her own territory, a feature 
supported by the account of Polybios (at 9.39.3) and several other sources.35 Such 
diplomatic inequality is rarely seen in Aitolia’s treaties, and suggests that Rome 
was considered to be a unique case.36 It confirms neither the validity of W. V. 
Harris’ theory, that Rome’s ambition for territory in Greece was checked by Aitolia 
in exchange for their partnership, nor that of Gruen and A. M. Eckstein, that 
Rome was originally indifferent regarding the annexation of the land and simply 
stated her indifference to it in the treaty.37 Among the extant sources, there is no 
reference to Roman interest in the territory of Greece. However, Rome’s promise 
not to acquire any new territory means that the alliance was unequal, whether 
the provision was important for her or not. The situation of this clause, as such, 
supports the traditional theory that Aitolia accepted Rome’s petition for alliance 
in exchange for many concessions to the federation.38 
                                                   
34 Hammond and Walbank 1988: 400. 
35 StV III Nr.536.  
36 For instance, the Aitolians allied to the Illyrian leader, Skerdilaidas, with the 
provision of spoils in the Social War (Polyb. 4.16.9-10), and pledged to break up 
Akarnania with Epeiros in the 250s or the 240s (2.45.1). There is no unequal division 
in these treaties. For the sources about the two events and their historicity, see StV 
III Nrn.485 and 515; Walbank 1957: 239-45 and 463-4. As to other important treaties 
of Aitolia, see Mackil 2013: nos.48, 53, and 57. 
37 Harris 1979: 207; Gruen 1984: 289; Eckstein 2008: 89. 
38 Cf. Gruen 1984: 19. 
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According to Livius (26.24.6), however, in the Aitolian assembly before the 
conclusion of the alliance, ‘for the Akarnanians whose secession from the 
federation of the Aitolians they resented, Laevinus said that he would restore 
them to the old terms by which the Aitolians’ rights and suzerainty over them 
were guaranteed (Acarnanas, quos aegre ferrent Aetoli a corpore suo diremptos, 
restituturum se in antiquam formulam iurisque ac dicionis eorum).’39  Livius 
relates that the attendees were pleased by this statement, and consequently 
decided to ally with Rome (26.24.8). The unilateral character of this promise 
would appear to support the view of the superiority of Aitolia, in a similar fashion 
to the inscription referring to war trophies. However, there are several 
inconsistencies with this viewpoint. For example, Aitolia conducted a large-scale 
operation against Akarnania in 211. Rome supported it and occupied Oiniadai and 
Nasos, giving them to Aitolia, as per the terms of the treaty (26.24.15; Polyb. 
9.39.2). Yet, Aitolia stopped the campaign when Philippos came to the aid of 
Akarnania (Liv. 26.25.1-17; Polyb. 9.40.4-6).40 Akarnania also seems to have lost 
Phoitiai, Matropolis, Astakos, and Korontai by 208/7, for unknown reasons, 
according to a later inscription recording its approval of inviolability of a festival 
of Artemis Leukophryene at Magnesia-ad-Maiandros (I.Magnesia 31). 41 
Nevertheless, there is no further reference to any damage inflicted upon 
Akarnania in this period. This suggests that the leading Aitolians neither strove 
to conquer Akarnania, nor wanted Rome to do so, despite the supposed influence 
of Laevinus’ promise on the decision of Aitolia’s assembly. As scholars have 
                                                   
39 For the separation of Akarnania, see Dany 1999: 87-95. 
40 Walbank 1967: 182-3; Dany 1999: 153-8. 
41 Habicht 1957: 92-8; Rigsby 1996: no.81; Dany 1999: 165; Grainger 1999: 313; 
Perlman 2000: 116-8. 
68 
 
agreed,42 this does not deny the historicity of the provision, but it suggests that 
the assembly and the leading Aitolians did not act on the same idea, casting doubt 
on the validity of the traditional view that considers Rome to be the suppliant 
party in this negotiation. It seems certain that Laevinus made a speech and 
referred to Akarnania before the Aitolians; on the official stage, Rome asked 
Aitolia to make an alliance while offering a number of concessions and incentives 
as bargaining tools. If the reference to Akarnania resulted completely from a 
Roman initiative, however, its fulfilment would have been one of the most 
important objectives for Rome during the war, since any failure to fulfil her vow 
could be criticised by Aitolia later. Yet, the sources mention no such blame, even 
after Rome and Aitolia had become hostile towards one another, in the 190s, and 
the latter reproached the Republic for its ingratitude (e.g. Liv. 35.48.11-12). This 
inconsistency shows the promise does not necessarily imply the superiority of 
Aitolia to Rome, nor does it guarantee that the negotiations resulted from a 
Roman approach. 
In order to explain this contradiction, I would argue that the treaty was 
initiated not by Rome’s appeal but by that of Aitolia, in particular some Aitolians, 
and was a product of their informal diplomacy. If they unofficially wanted 
Laevinus to make an alliance first and then he made the promise about Akarnania 
in the assembly, it is understandable that its fulfilment was not actively sought 
although the treaty was generally favourable to Aitolia. That Rome’ obligation 
was actually not heavy is also observed in another provision. According to Livius 
(26.24.10), the treaty provides that Aitolia begin the war against Macedonia on 
                                                   
42 Oberhummer 1887: 187; Oost 1954a: 34; Dany 1999: 154-5. 
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land immediately and Rome support it with not less than 25 quinqueremes. It 
appears to impose a definite duty on her and shows Aitolia’s superiority again. 
But this simply set the lower limit of the troops that Rome had to send, and was 
rather advantageous to her. In so far as she sent 25 quinqueremes, Aitolia would 
have to recognise Rome fulfilled her obligation, regardless of how the war 
progressed. It is also significant that, as R. M. Errington indicates,43 the number 
of ships demanded was almost the same as all the ships that could be moved 
across the Adriatic by Laevinus. He had been ordered to protect the Italian coast 
and to prevent Philippos from landing on Italy with 55 ships (23.38.9-10). Since 
Carthage retained a significant naval force, and continued to occupy southern 
Italy, 25 quinqueremes reflected the maximum naval power that Laevinus could 
send to the Adriatic front. This suggests that the clause about these ships resulted 
from Aitolia’s consideration for this situation, or his appeal to the Aitolian 
negotiators. If Rome had asked Aitolia to make an alliance, there is no reason why 
the latter should not have demanded more ships and men from Rome, and yet 
Aitolia made just such a compromise. Their actions support the theory that the 
treaty was initiated by Aitolians, rather than Rome. 
One might dispute this argument with an episode of M. Claudius Marcellus 
in this period (Liv. 25.23.8-9, esp. 9).44 He was sent to Sicily as a Roman general 
and, during the siege of Syracuse, captured Damippos, who had been sent by the 
besieged city to make contact with Philippos. Marcellus, in turn, quickly arranged 
the release of this envoy because he was a Spartan, and ‘the friendship with the 
Aitolians, who were the allies of the Spartans, was desired by the Romans just at 
                                                   
43 Errington 1989: 101. 
44 Eckstein 1987a: 157-65. 
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this time (iam tum Aetolorum, quibus socii Lacedaemonii erant, amicitiam 
adfectantibus Romanis).’ This would appear to suggest Rome took the initiative 
in negotiating with Aitolia. This view is not necessarily correct, though. In the 
case that some Aitolians did visit Laevinus, he would have reported it to other 
leading Romans, and only then would those who were interested in the alliance 
consider the opinion of Aitolia and its allies. 
This notion is supported by another reference to the negotiation between 
Laevinus and the Aitolians. Livius informs us (26.24.1) that ‘M. Valerius Laevinus, 
who had secret interviews with some leading Aitolians and ascertained their ideas, 
came on a swift sailing fleet to the concilium, (i.e. the assembly in this case,)45 of 
the Aitolians that had been appointed for that very purpose (M. Valerius Laevinus, 
temptatis prius per secreta conloquia principum animis, ad indictum ante ad id 
ipsum concilium Aetolorum classe expedita venit).’ This appears to suggest that 
Laevinus secretly approached some Aitolians with the proposed alliance, and 
later made his official address in Aitolia’s assembly with their support. But after 
he ascertained animi principum i.e. what the leading Aitolians thought, through 
colloquii, that is, direct conversations, he went to Aitolia. Interpreting Livius’ 
reference literally implies that some Aitolians had direct contact with Laevinus 
in places where it was unnecessary for him to use ships to visit, before he made 
his speech in Aitolia. It is unlikely, however, that such informal meetings would 
have taken place outside Aitolia, unless the Aitolians had wanted to establish 
contact. One might think this results simply from Livius omitting a reference to 
Laevinus’ visits to the leading Aitolians in Aitolia before that to the assembly. 
                                                   
45 Grainger 1999: 307. 
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However, if he had visited them solely to ask Aitolia as a whole to make an alliance, 
there would have been no reason for him to make contact with some Aitolians 
through secreta conloquia, i.e. secret or private conferences withheld from the 
public. He would not have needed to ascertain their personal views, but to win 
over them and their fellow citizens before the assembly. I argue that some 
Aitolians visited Laevinus with the proposal for alliance, and then he needed to 
ascertain what they thought, such as its conditions like the clause concerning 
Akarnania, and whether there was something underlying the offer, and 
eventually visited the assembly of Aitolia arranged by the visitors. 
It is important, then, to note that this contact is an example of informal 
diplomacy on the part of Aitolia’s negotiators. If Aitolia had decided to ally with 
Rome formally, it would have been unnecessary for Laevinus to persuade Aitolia’s 
assembly to support the alliance. The final treaty was the result of preliminary 
negotiations and his speech, in particular his reference to Akarnania. This shows 
that the Aitolian negotiators visited him independently, and persuaded him to 
encourage their fellow citizens into supporting an official alliance with Rome. 
Their approach might have been supported by the magistrates of that year.46 
Even so, however, it remains an example of informal diplomacy in action. They 
talked with Laevinus without the approval of the assembly, which managed 
decisions of war and peace, and used him to encourage the organ to conclude a 
treaty with a foreign power. They manipulated Aitolian public opinion by winning 
over Laevinus, just as Aratos did in the 220s with his Megalopolitan friends and 
Antigonos. 
                                                   
46 In these decades Aitolia had some sort of inner council apart from the assembly, at 
least (e.g. Liv. 35.35.4 and 36.28.8). For the general situation of its constitution, see 
Larsen 1952: 1-33 and Grainger 1999: 169-87. 
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This assessment derives exclusively from Livius’ text, but it is supported 
when the situation of Aitolia in this period is considered. Based on the terms of 
the alliance, I would argue that the Aitolian negotiators were, in fact, the hawks 
against Macedonia. Analysis of their position and acts helps to explain further the 
nature of the negotiation between Aitolia and Rome. The results of this 
examination also confirms the significance of informal diplomacy in this alliance. 
In order to reach the goal, it is necessary first to confirm the existence of 
the hawks against Macedonia and their nature. This is achieved by analysing 
Aitolian foreign affairs from the time of the Social War to that of the First 
Macedonian War. According to Polybios (4.5.9), the Social War was opened by 
Dorimachos and Skopas ‘without any resolution of the assembly and while 
bypassing the committees about war (οὔτε κοινὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν προσδεξάμενοι 
σύνοδον οὔτε τοῖς ἀποκλήτοις συμμεταδόντες).’ They were delegated the 
authority of Ariston, the στρατηγός of 221/0, because of his physical weakness 
and his blood relation to them (4.5.1). Their target was Messenia, since they 
regarded its intention to make an alliance with Achaia and Macedonia as a sign 
of its hostility (4.5.8).47 They furthermore attacked Epeiros, Achaia, Akarnania, 
and Macedonia (4.5.10), that is, the members of the Hellenic League, and in the 
spring of 220 mobilised large numbers of troops against them (4.6.7). Polybios, 
displaying his pro-Achaian prejudice, 48  severely criticises Aitolia here, in 
particular, Dorimachos (4.3.5-6.3). It is, nonetheless, noteworthy that the two 
Aitolians engaged in informal diplomacy, inasmuch as they commenced a war 
without official procedures, but succeeded in moving troops, and in winning over 
                                                   
47 Walbank 1957: 453. 
48 Scholten 2000: 275-6. 
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their fellow citizens. Skopas further assumed the role of στρατηγός in 220/19 
(4.37.1-2). These show afresh that this kind of informal diplomatic action came 
naturally to the Greeks, and reveal that there were many Aitolians who had an 
antipathy toward the Hellenic League or Macedonia, i.e. the hawks against the 
kingdom and its supporters. The latter point is further supported by the fact that, 
at the close of the 220s, Aitolia strengthened its relations with other populations 
in and beyond Greece, such as the Attalids, by making an alliance against 
Macedonia (4.65.6; CID IV.85), and by granting the title of πρόξενος to foreign 
leaders (e.g. IG IX.1².1.31.ll.48-50).49 The hawks were strong in Aitolia, and, 
Skopas’ assumption of στρατηγός and Polybios’ remarks about Dorimachos 
suggest that the hawks considered the two Aitolians their leaders.  
The hawks were not always in the majority in Aitolia, though. This is 
shown by the election of Agelaos as the στρατηγός in 217/6. When Aitolia faced 
difficulties during the Social War, he was a negotiator at the conference at 
Naupaktos. After his speech noted earlier in this chapter, he was elected to the 
office because of his ‘contribution (συμβεβλῆσθαι)’ to the negotiations, and 
withstood ‘unreasonable opposition and censure (ἀλογίαν καὶ μέμψιν)’ from the 
Aitolians who criticised the terms of the peace (Polyb. 5.107.5-7). The treaty was 
practically an acknowledgment of Aitolia’s defeat, and favoured Achaia, and 
Polybios’ description of Agelaos and the attitude of his opponents cannot be 
accepted completely. His election as the στρατηγός, however, and his success in 
preventing further resistance to the treaty by his opponents or the hawks, show 
that, although many regions were lost as a result of his negotiation, the Aitolians 
                                                   
49 McShane 1964: 101; Scholten 2000: 192-7. 
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generally supported him and possibly his supporters, the moderates, by 
extension.50  
The hawks, however, seemed to regain power in 214/3, to some extent. This 
is suggested by the fact that a network of relationships with other states was 
reformed. For example, Aitolia granted the title πρόξενος to individuals from 
Chalkis, Amphissa, Chios, Corcyra, Antiocheia, Aigion, Histiaia, and Athens (IG 
IX.1².1.31.ll.144-81).51 This suggests that many Aitolians wanted to strengthen 
their connection with states in and beyond Greece again through ties of friendship. 
This is supported by another decree to ensure the safety of Mytilene (XII.2.15.ll.1-
6).52 These measures to establish friendly relations with foreign individuals and 
states were normal in the Greek world, however, so it must be stressed that the 
general policy of Aitolia cannot be observed through this process alone. But these 
were the first approaches to other states after the Social War,53 and suggest a 
change in Aitolian diplomacy. This tendency was continued in the following year, 
in which citizenship was granted to certain Smyrnians (IX.1².1.59B). In light of 
the cities recorded in these inscriptions, Aitolia sought to develop connections 
with states that had not allied with the Hellenic League. Yet, the federation also 
approached Aigion and Chalkis, which had been aligned with Macedonia. 
Considering its relationship with the Attalids in this period as well (Liv. 
26.24.9),54  Aitolia favoured the diplomatic approach of the hawks before the 
outbreak of the Social War. Such renewal of relationships with its neighbours 
would not, in itself, antagonise Macedonia. This approach here, however, was 
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52 Funke 2008: 264. 
53 Grainger 1999: 298-9. 
54 McShane 1964: 106-7. 
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undeniably linked with the revival of the hawks, whose position had suffered, 
following the de facto defeat of Aitolia in the Social War. For instance, Dorimachos 
assumed the office of στρατηγός in 219/8 (Polyb. 4.67.1), but the lack of any 
evidence for his career over the next few years suggests that the peace damaged 
him politically. In 213/2, however, he appeared as the first among the judges 
(δικασταί) in the decree of arbitration between Melitaia and Pereia, in which 
Pantaleon, the ex-στρατηγός of 214/3, worked as one of the προσστάται, the 
sponsors of the decision (IG IX.1².1.188.ll.1-2 and 33-6). Dorimachos was 
recognised as a man worthy of representing Aitolia again in almost the same way 
as the politician who had just led the state. Conceivably, the decree in honour of 
Hagetas, the στρατηγός of 218/7, which is dated between 218 and 212, might also 
have occurred in this context (IX.1².1.59A).55 He similarly led Aitolia in the war 
(Polyb. 5.96.1; IG IX.2.62), and energetically raised the morale of its citizens by 
emphasising a message of Aitolian unity through literary works such as those of 
Aristodama, a woman poet from Smyrna who was honoured for her poems 
commemorating the Aitolians in this period (FD III.3.145; Syll³ 532).56 He failed 
to improve the war situation, though. While there is no information about his 
actions during the Macedonian War, except the honorary decree, he was certainly 
close to the hawks. He assumed the position of στρατηγός again in c. 201/0 (IG 
IX.1².3.614; SGDI 2049), when Philippos’ campaigning provoked Aitolia again.57 
In addition, Skopas was also elected as the στρατηγός of 212/1 and Dorimachos 
later assumed it in 211/0 (Liv. 26.24.7; Polyb. 9.42.1). These politicians, who had 
                                                   
55 While he seemed to make some benefaction to Kallipolis during his term as the 
στρατηγός, the date that the inscription was erected is uncertain. Grainger 2000: 181; 
Scholten 2000: 217-8. 
56 Burstein 1985: no.64; Mackil 2013: 120-1. 
57 Grainger 2000: 181. 
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been blamed for Aitolia’s defeat in the Social War, were gradually rehabilitated. 
This shows that the hawks eventually recovered their power and influence, and 
won over their neighbours again. 
It is important to note that the negotiations with Laevinus were also 
managed by the hawks. Skopas, the στρατηγός, and Dorimachos, princeps 
Aetolorum, supported Laevinus when he visited Aitolia (Liv. 26.24.7). The 
participation of the hawks in the dialogue with Rome is also suggested by the fact 
that a Corcyrean was recognised as a πρόξενος in 214/3 (IG IX.1².1.31.ll.158-9). 
Corcyra was under Roman control, but Philippos had seized it in c. 215. Laevinus 
recaptured in c. 213 (App. Mac. 1; Zonar. 9.4).58 It was in this context that Aitolia 
awarded a Corcyrean the honorific title. J. D. Grainger thinks that Aitolia 
indirectly declared for Rome by this action.59 This conclusion is excessive, but the 
fact that Aitolia made a connection with a Corcyrean suggests that the hawks 
were interested in the western situation, and that they had some contacts with 
the Romans who recaptured Corcyra. Laevinus may well have noticed the 
situation of the island then, even if Rome seems to have been generally indifferent 
to outsiders. His invitation to the assembly and the preliminaries happened in 
this context of the approaches by the hawks to many outsiders. With the increase 
of the hawks in the power, these manoeuvres in and beyond Aitolia, in formal and 
informal spheres, are examples of informal diplomacy by a political group. 
The actions of the hawks, however, resulted partly from their own domestic 
difficulties. Laevinus’ speech in the assembly was effectively their measure to win 
over the fellow citizens through his announcement of terms of alliance that were 
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favourable to Aitolia. This meant, however, that the hawks became indebted to 
Rome. This inevitably made the provisions of the treaty comparatively favourable 
towards the Republic. If the hawks could have encouraged their fellow citizens by 
themselves, this measure would not have been taken. 
This difficulty for the hawks is confirmed by the election in 214/3, when 
honouring foreign individuals with the title of πρόξενος began. Aitolia selected 
Pantaleon as the στρατηγός and Agelaos of Arsinoe as the ἵππαρχος although the 
name of the γραμματεύς cannot be read. (IG IX.1².1.31.ll.144-8). Pantaleon had 
not been connected with the Aitolian leadership during the Social War, and his 
political position was ambiguous in these years. Agelaos assumed the role of 
στρατηγός in 206/5,60 when Aitolia was defeated by Macedonia again and the 
peace treaty was agreed. Considering this career, it is unlikely that Agelaos was 
a member of the hawks, even by 214/3. Anyone connected with them would not 
have been elected when the war went against Aitolia and the citizens may well 
have been distrustful of them. In light of the careers of the two Aitolians, the 
hawks were not overwhelmingly favoured by the fellow citizens in 214/3. 
Considering the approach to Smyrna in 213/2 and Skopas’ election to the 
στρατηγός of 212/1, the influence of the hawks grew steadily. One should not 
underestimate the influence of people outside this circle, though. There is no sign 
that the hawks controlled the magistrates in 213/2 (IX.1².1.59B).61 Moreover, in 
order to compete with Philippos, it was necessary for the hawks to have some 
                                                   
60 His election is supported by SEG XXXVIII.1476. The date is agreed by the editors 
of SEG LIII.1719. Cf. Paschidis 2008: 328-32. On the identification of Agelaos in IG 
IX.1².1.31, see Bousquet 1988: 26-7, Rigsby 1996: no.67, Funke 2000: 516 n.41, and 
Grainger 2000: 82. 
61 Grainger 2000: 71, 205, 310, and 314. 
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strong supporters among other states. Even in the period of the Social War, Aitolia 
failed to defeat him. After the loss of a number of cities, it had become impossible 
to fight alone against him. Therefore, despite the recovery of their power in Aitolia, 
the hawks had faced a quandary regarding how they should meet the expectations 
of voters who were hostile towards Macedonia. Their informal diplomacy in the 
contacts with Laevinus, and the alliance with Rome through his support, solved 
these problems. The outbreak of a new war silenced all but the hawks. The 
partnership with Rome, the western super-power, assisted their campaigns 
significantly, if not fully. The advance of Skopas into Akarnania, shortly after the 
approval of the treaty by the assembly, and Dorimachos’ election as στρατηγός in 
211/0, show that they officially controlled Aitolia. That a few clauses in the treaty 
were actually favourable to Rome was the price of success for the hawks, 
consolidating their position in and beyond Aitolia. 
This argument is strengthened by considering the way that each of the two 
states viewed the treaty, after it had been concluded. Aitolia immediately 
advanced into Akarnania. By contrast, the Senate did not even ratify the alliance 
until 209, some two years later. The Aitolian envoys were detained diutius, for a 
considerable time, in Rome (Liv. 26.24.14-15).62 Although no reason is given, if it 
had been Rome who had asked Aitolia for an alliance, there should have been no 
delay in the ratification. The negotiation, therefore, was developed by the Aitolian 
hawks, who wanted to declare war on Macedonia but lacked official approval from 
the citizens. Laevinus and the Senate accepted their offer, an act of informal 
diplomacy, incorporating some clauses actually favourable to Rome. 
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This situation is confirmed by the clause in the treaty concerning 
prospective allies. According to Livius (26.24.9), both states expected to further 
ally with Elis, Sparta, Pleuratos, Skerdilaidas, and Attalos I of Pergamon. While 
Skerdilaidas and Pleuratos, his son, might have been friends to Rome,63 others 
were unfamiliar to her. It suggests that Aitolia had prepared for the war more 
thoroughly than Rome. Skerdilaidas had been also a friend of Aitolia since the 
Social War (Polyb. 4.16.9-11).64  Once the hawks had recovered the power in 
Aitolia, they rallied the states that were considered to be hostile towards 
Macedonia. Rome was the first to accept a military partnership. The treaty of 211 
therefore resulted from the manoeuvres of the hawks, in and beyond Aitolia, to 
forge a grand alliance against Macedonia while silencing their domestic political 
rivals. 
This would explain why some clauses were actually favourable to Rome, 
despite the difficulties she faced, and why the subject of Akarnania was treated 
lightly after the conclusion of the treaty, despite its importance in persuading the 
Aitolian people to support the union. Once the hawks made an alliance, controlled 
Aitolia, and commenced a new war, the implementation of individual provisions 
was no longer important. If Macedonia was defeated, everything would fall into 
place. Since the new Aitolian government did not worry about carrying out each 
term strictly, Rome also had no reason to execute them vigorously and could not 
be legitimately criticised for failing to complete any of them. 
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At the beginning of the First Macedonian War, Philippos and the Aitolian 
hawks negotiated their respective alliances secretly and unofficially. This was 
informal diplomacy in action. Rome sought to control, to some extent, such 
manoeuvres, since in this period she surely defended her sphere of power. Her 
management of the acts of the eastern Greeks was, however, generally not active, 
as in the prelude to the war, considered in Section 1. Although this might result 
partly from the difficulties of the war against Hannibal, the situation confirms 
that there was a difference in the manner of diplomatic practice between Rome 
and the eastern Greeks, in particular from the viewpoint of the use of informal 
diplomacy. The following section strengthens this, by focusing on the diplomatic 
movement of the Greeks in the period after the alliance between Rome and Aitolia 
had been agreed. What is, in particular, noticed is the games of the diplomats, 
who would attempt to mediate between the states involved in the First 
Macedonian War. The results show the significance of informal diplomacy in 
managing foreign affairs, and Rome’s history, at the end of the third century. 
 
Section 3: The Mediation and Rome’s Failure 
 
I would argue here that in the 200s Rome failed to control foreign affairs in 
Greece, and this was caused by her indifference to influencing outsiders, not only 
in official channels, but also in informal ones. This contrasts with the Greeks, who 
were far more aware of public opinion and used both formal and informal channels 
to influence it. This section will explore this hypothesis by analysing the 
manoeuvres and the interests of the mediators in the Macedonian War, the 
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Aitolians (other than the hawks), and Philippos, confirming the contribution of 
informal diplomacy to the close of the war and the games of the people concerned 
at that time. 
I shall first survey the war situation from 211 onwards and the people 
concerned with this context. Aitolia went to war against Philippos in 211 and, 
through a joint campaign with Rome, occupied Antikyra in 210, and further 
obtained Aigina (Liv. 26.26.2; Polyb. 9.42.5-8).65 By 209, Attalos and Sparta had 
entered the war on Aitolia’s side (Liv. 27.29.9-10). This was a diplomatic victory 
for the hawks, their plan of the grand alliance against Macedonia being realised. 
But their scheme gradually unravelled (27.30.1-3; Polyb. 9.41-2).66 Dorimachos 
failed to rescue Echinos in Thessaly in 210, despite the support of P. Sulpicius 
Galba, Laevinus’ successor. Furthermore, in 209, Aitolia was damaged by 
Philippos at Lamia. It was at this time that a new group of negotiators were to 
appear as a new diplomatic faction. They were the ambassadors of the Ptolemies, 
the small city-states around the Aegean Sea, and Rhodes. According to Livius 
(27.30.4), they came ‘to intervene in the war between Philippos and the Aitolians 
(ad dirimendum inter Philippum atque Aetolos bellum).’67 The diplomacy of the 
mediators influenced the development of the Macedonian War. 
In order to understand the diplomatic influence of the mediators, it is 
useful to consider the character of their intervention and the lack of reference to 
                                                   
65 Rome occupied Aigina and turned it over to Aitolia, adhering to the treaty. The 
latter sold it to Attalos immediately. McShane 1964: 107; Allen 1971: 1. It is confirmed 
by a decree about πρόξενος for a citizen of the island under the name of Pyrrias, the 
στρατηγός of 210/9 (IG IX.1².1.29.ll.7-8). It shows that, in the year, Aigina no longer 
belonged to Aitolia.  
66 Eckstein 2002: 273. 
67 For the sources concerned and the historiography, see Ager 1996: no.57. 
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Aitolia’s allies, in particular Rome, in Livius’ explanation for their aims. For this, 
W. Huß and Eckstein think that the mediating states were concerned about the 
detrimental effect of the war on their business interests around the Aegean Sea, 
mainly caused by the resumption of Aitolian piracy, but were apathetic regarding 
the struggle on land.68 Certainly, the mediators approached Philippos and Aitolia, 
in 209, but ignored Rome. The extant sources, however, do not record that they 
pursued their commercial interests, much less that Rome was left out for that 
reason. Furthermore, as long as Rome and the Attalids were at war, the Aegean 
Sea was unsafe, owing to their naval activity. If business and commerce formed 
the primary concern of the mediators, their manner was ineffective. 
It is, therefore, reasonable to focus on the political aspect of the mediators’ 
actions, as some other scholars do.69 Indeed, Livius claims that (27.30.5) ‘their 
general concern was not so much for the Aitolians, who were more warlike than 
the rest of the Greeks, but for the liberty of Greece, which would be seriously 
endangered if Philippos and his kingdom took an active part in Greek affairs 
(omnium autem non tanta pro Aetolis cura erat, ferociori quam pro ingeniis 
Graecorum gente, quam ne Philippus regnumque eius grave libertati futurum 
rebus Graeciae immisceretur).’ This reference seems to derive from Polybios, 
Livius’ main source for this period.70 It is reasonable to accept its authenticity 
here, even though Achaia supported the mediation then (27.30.4-6). As Livius and 
possibly Polybios suggest here, the more decisively Philippos defeated Aitolia, the 
greater his influence became over not only the conquered Aitolians, but also over 
other Greeks, including his allies. I would, therefore, argue that the apparent 
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69 Cf. Ager 1996: 159-60. 
70 Walbank 1940: 89-90; Eckstein 2002: 274. 
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disregard of the mediators for Aitolia’s allies in 209 did not result from 
indifference or hostility towards them. From the viewpoint of checking the rise of 
Philippos, the support of its friends for Aitolia was favourable to the mediators. 
Although a Polybian fragment reports that a speaker took a hostile attitude 
towards Rome here (10.25.3-5, esp. 5), he seems not to have been a mediator, but 
rather a Macedonian.71 The mediators had to be officially neutral and could not 
characterise the possible victory of Aitolia as something that was ‘forbidden by 
the gods (ὃ μὴ δόξειε τοῖς θεοῖς).’ Moreover, when the mediation started, the forces 
of Rome and Attalos were absent from Greece (Liv. 27.30.11). The mediators could 
not help but begin their process without them. Thus, their absence in 209 does 
not mean that the mediators felt indifferent or hostile towards either party. 
This is further supported by the mediators’ actions in 208. They established 
diplomatic contact with Aitolia and Rome at this time, although the mediation 
ended in failure, because Philippos did not agree to terms (Liv. 28.7.13-14). 
Eckstein thinks that the mediators did not intend to realise a comprehensive 
peace and that the Romans’ participation in the meeting was accidental.72 At this 
time, however, both the Roman and Attalid fleets had commenced operations. 
Skerdilaidas, Pleuratos, Sparta and some Thracian tribes had also attacked 
Philippos and his allies. He was thus compelled to fight difficult battles in a 
number of locations (27.31.9-33.5, 28.5.1-6.12, and 7.1-12; Polyb. 10.41-2). Given 
this situation, it is natural to think the mediators actively approached Aitolia’s 
allies. If some comprehensive treaty could have been made between Aitolia, its 
allies, and Philippos, in the context of his military difficulties, his power could 
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have been tempered far more easily than through a separate peace. Furthermore, 
the mediators visited Herakleia of Aitolia, because they knew that the leading 
Aitolians gathered there in order to consider the immediate steps to be taken (Liv. 
28.7.14). In such a meeting, some participation by representatives of Aitolian 
allies, such as Rome and Attalos, was to be expected (cf. 28.5.15). Thus, in 208 the 
mediators intentionally negotiated with Rome to succeed in their own political 
agenda, to assert some degree of control over Philippos’ rise. 
The attitude of the mediators towards Rome changed, however, in 207, from 
which time they began to display hostility towards the Republic. In particular, 
according to Polybios (11.4-6, esp. 5.6 and 9), a speaker, who is perhaps to be 
identified with Thrasykrates of Rhodes, called Rome’s behaviour in the occupied 
cities ‘barbaric (βαρβαρικόν),’ and argued that Aitolia’s alliance with her was ‘the 
beginning of great miseries for all Greeks (κακῶν ἀρχὴν μεγάλων ἅπασι τοῖς 
Ἕλλησιν).’73 It is impossible to decide conclusively whether he really said so. 
Considering the similarity with Agelaos’ speech emphasising the threat of Rome,74 
the statement of 207 might result from Polybios’ view of history and his 
manipulation of information. Nevertheless, the historicity of the hostility to Rome 
shown by the mediators here is recognised by a number of scholars.75  
Conversely, such an attitude, displayed by the mediators, might not have 
reflected their true opinion regarding Rome, at least that of Rhodes, just as in 209 
                                                   
73 Polybios does not name the speaker, but the speech is tentatively attributed to this 
Rhodian by scholars. Walbank 1967: 274-5. 
74 Deininger 1971: 32. 
75 Walbank 1967: 205; Champion 2000: 434; Eckstein 2002: 290. Considering the fact 
that Polybios does not have to relate the speech, and in detail, here as Champion 
2000: 437 indicates, however, the choice of this statement with the polemical phrase 
against Rome like βαρβαρικός in his description can be regarded as a sort of antipathy 
of him towards her. 
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and 208. Although it is difficult to assess whether Polybios’ reference to 
continuous contact between Rome and Rhodes taking place since the end of the 
fourth century is acceptable (30.5.6),76 as R. M. Berthold argues, Rhodes looked 
favourably upon Rome for her hostility towards the Illyrian pirates, who had 
ravaged the Aegean cities, in the previous decades (4.16.6-8).77 Moreover, while 
the mediators criticised Rome for her treatment of the inhabitants of Aigina and 
Oreos in Euboia (11.5.8), these were captured in 210 and 208 (Liv. 28.6). If Rome’s 
conduct towards them had really been problematic, the mediators would have 
stated so in the mediation of 209 and 208. It is more likely, therefore, that their 
criticism resulted from rhetorical tactics, rather than the reality of the occupation. 
In order to understand the mediators’ diplomacy, it is useful to remember 
Agelaos’ speech. In Naupaktos, he invoked the threat of Rome to end the Social 
War conveniently. The situation of 207 was similar. Philippos’ side was on the 
offensive, in contrast to the situation of 208.78 Attalos could not go to Greece, 
owing to the danger posed to his state from Bithynia, Philippos’ ally (Liv. 
28.7.10).79 Sparta was defeated by Achaia, another of his friends. Other Aitolian 
allies other than Rome, and Aitolia itself were forced to keep a low profile (Polyb. 
11.4.1-6.8, 7.2-3, and 11.1-18.10). The mediators may well have thought that 
Aitolia and Rome should end the war now, to check Philippos’ rise, or that Rome 
should do more to support Aitolia. But Rome was indifferent to the situation, and 
the interests of the mediators. According to Appianos (Mac. 3), in the meeting with 
them before the Aitolians, Galba opposed their offer of peace and observed that ‘it 
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was not in his power to conclude peace, but wrote privately to the Senate that it 
was to the advantage of the Romans that the Aitolians should continue the war 
against Philippos (οὐκ εἶναι κυρίου περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης τι κρῖναι, καὶ ἐς τὴν βουλὴν 
κρύφα ἐπιστέλλοντος ὅτι Ῥωμαίοις συμφέρει πολεμεῖν Αἰτωλοὺς Φιλίππῳ),’80 
prompting the Senate to forbid him officially to conclude any treaty. In light of the 
fact that Laevinus had negotiated with the Aitolian hawks and others in Aitolia’s 
assembly of 211, Galba told a lie here. The mediators and the Aitolians noticed 
the deception, and thought that he had opportunistically cited Roman legality in 
order to hinder the negotiation. Despite Appianos’ additional reference, Rome 
does not seem to have sent troops to support Aitolia, either.81 Considering Galba’s 
suggestion and the decision of the Senate, Rome did not consider the opinion and 
the interests of Aitolia and the mediating states who really wanted to control 
Philippos. Since Rome’s reluctance to support Aitolia had been exposed, it was 
reasonable for the mediators to criticise Rome, despite their genuine hostility 
towards Philippos. In order to prevent him from increasing his power even further, 
ending the war between him and Aitolia, abandoned by Rome, was now the best 
option. The speech attributed to Thrasykrates labelling the Romans βάρβαροι and 
requesting an end to the war for the Greeks created a pretext for formulating a 
peace settlement with Aitolia, similar to Agelaos’ case, earlier. 
This is confirmed by the fact the speech was to arrange a gap between the 
official position and informal interests of Aitolia. Regarding Rome as an enemy of 
Greece enabled Aitolia to make peace and to solve its military difficulty without 
loss of reputation. The Aitolians, however, could not ‘remember’ this logic by 
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81 Rich 1984: 143-4; Eckstein 2002: 285. 
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themselves, since Aitolia had allied with Rome, an initiative that enjoyed the 
support of the majority of the citizens. This argument could not be ‘reminded’ by 
the people on Philippos’ side either. If Aitolia accepted any argument of him or his 
friends, in particular, during a time of military difficulty, it was tantamount to an 
acceptance of justice of his position and Aitolia’s defeat, meaning that the eventual 
peace terms would be more severe. Indeed, when Lykiskos of Akarnania labelled 
Rome as a threat to Greece in c. 210, Aitolia ignored it (Polyb. 9.32-9).82 The 
speech attributed to Thrasykrates, a mediator, solved this problem of using this 
argument, and enabled Aitolia to make a peace with honour. This is not informal 
diplomacy. This game was made in the meeting of mediation, an official stage. Yet, 
in light of the fact that the mediator considered not only Aitolia’s formal interests, 
namely its military difficulties, but also indirectly that the Aitolians could not 
profit from labelling the Romans βάρβαροι by themselves. This manner of the 
mediators can be seen to bear hallmarks of informal diplomacy. 
In this process the mediators also exploited Philippos’ attitude, in order to 
prevent him gaining too much power. He had repeatedly said that ‘if the Aitolians 
chose peace, he would accept it (αἱρουμένων μὲν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τὴν εἰρήνην 
ἑτοίμως δέχεσθαι)’ while continuing his campaigns against Aitolia and its allies 
(Polyb. 11.6.9-10, esp. 10; cf. Liv. 27.30.14, 28.7.15-16, and 8.1-6).83 He officially 
respected the peace of Greece, though it might have been to make a good 
impression on the Greek states. He had to accept the peace if Aitolia was 
                                                   
82 While this speech was made in an open discussion with the Spartans directly, to 
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‘persuaded’ by the mediators and wanted to end the war ‘for Greece.’ The 
mediators thus directed the king, to an extent. Yet, the manoeuvre was actually 
favourable to him because he had been compelled to fight against several of his 
neighbours at the same time. The logic of the mediators enabled him to end the 
war in Greece with a practical victory, yet without taking any more risks. It is 
impossible to decide how he regarded the behaviour of the mediators and their 
real intention, but their statements matched his formal and informal interests 
well. 
The manoeuvres and considerations of the mediators also influenced the 
national politics of Aitolia. According to Appianos (Mac. 3), they assembled in 
Aitolia possibly in 207 again, and ‘said it was very evident that the struggle 
between Philippos and the Aitolians subjected the Greeks to servitude to the 
Romans (πολλὰ φανερῶς ἔλεγον, ὅτι Φίλιππος καὶ Αἰτωλοὶ διαφερόμενοι τοὺς 
Ἕλληνας ἐς δουλείαν Ῥωμαίοις ὑποβάλλουσιν),’ and then ‘when Sulpicius 
(Galba) rose to reply to them, the crowd did not hear him but shouted that the 
envoys had told the truth (ἐφ᾽ οἷς ὁ μὲν Σουλπίκιος ἀντιλέξων ἀνίστατο, τὸ δὲ 
πλῆθος οὐκ ἤκουσεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεκράγεσαν τοὺς πρέσβεις εὖ λέγειν).’ He was 
apparently prevented from speaking by the uncontrollable crowd. The Aitolians 
who were against Galba, the Roman who wanted to continue the war, however, 
were organised by some leaders opposed to the Aitolian hawks at that time. An 
inscription from Thermos, Aitolia’s religious centre, reveals the rise of the 
Aitolians apart from the hawks. If the dating of Aitolia’s magistracies by 
Klaffenbach, the editor of IG IX, is correct, Damokritos assumed the position of 
ἵππαρχος in 208/7 (IX.1².1.31.l.61). His later opposition as the στρατηγός of 
200/199 to Aitolia’s joining the Roman side in the Second Macedonian War 
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suggests that his election at this time reflected Aitolian disillusion with the war 
against Macedonia (Liv. 31.32.1).84 While his action against Rome in 200/199 was 
allegedly prompted by a bribe from Macedonia, this episode, in any case, suggests 
he had originally not sought votes of the people against Macedonia. His hipparchy 
might have been in 209/8, not in 208/7.85 Nevertheless, his appearance suggests 
the people opposed to the hawks gained influence as the war dragged on. In 207/6 
the offices of ἵππαρχος and γραμματεύς were held by Alexandros and Phaineas 
respectively (IG IX.1².1.31.ll.75-6). The former was a rival of Dorimachos and 
Skopas (Polyb. 13.1a), and was elected as the στρατηγός in 204/3, following the 
peace with Macedonia (IG IX.1².1.95 and 192).86 Phaineas would lead Aitolia in 
the Second Macedonian War but was not a zealous warmonger,87 and then did not 
seem to belong to the hawks. It is possible that the offices held by Alexandros and 
Phaineas in 207/6 were not those of the federation, but those of a local district of 
Aitolia. The inscription refers to their names with Dorimachos, who assumed the 
βούλαρχος, a local but prestigious office (IX.1².1.31.ll.74-5).88 In any case, the 
power of the hawks waned in light of Aitolia’s military difficulties. Yet, for the 
Aitolians opposed to the hawks it was still difficult to control the federation. 
Considering his fourth term of the office in 202/1 (IG IX.1².1.30), Dorimachos was 
                                                   
84 Briscoe 1973: 138. 
85 Grainger 2000: 71 and 141. 
86 Walbank 1967: 413; Grainger 2000: 71 and 90; Kotsidou 2000: no.108. 
87 He directed the war against Macedonia as the στρατηγός of 198/7 while negotiating 
with Rome flexibly (Liv. 32.33.11, 33.3.9, and 13.6-13; Polyb. 18.1.4 and 38.3-39.1; 
SGDI 2000-1 and 2073-4). Cf. Grainger 2000: 266. 
88 This office seems to have been selected in each district and constituent city-state 
of the Aitolian federation. The name of the βούλαρχος sometimes appeared in the 
dating formula of the documents just as the στρατηγός (e.g. IG IX.1².1.8). It is said to 
show the importance of the office and that of the βουλά. Sherk 1990: 259; Scholten 
2000: 62-3.  
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elected as the στρατηγός in the middle of the 200s. The hawks were still powerful 
at this time, and the mediation of 207 failed.89 A peace during times of difficulty 
was equated with a defeat for the hawks, and so they may well have stopped the 
mediation. In the approach of the mediators and Philippos’ repeated suggestion 
favourable to peace, however, the Aitolian non-hawks gradually gained power. 
The hostility of the crowd towards Galba resulted from this shift. It is important 
that it was a sort of informal diplomacy by the Aitolians concerned, and practically 
connected with the mediators (and Philippos). They failed to win over the majority 
of the Aitolians at that time. The rejection of Galba could not be considered as an 
official statement by Aitolia, since the assembly had refused to accept mediation. 
Yet, their voice prevented Galba from speaking, and thus influenced the 
development of the negotiations. Above all, their attack on Galba showed to their 
contemporaries that they were strong enough to denounce Rome, and shared the 
rhetorical convention of labelling her as a menace to Greece alongside the 
mediators (and Philippos’ side). It served to practically cement a tacit partnership 
among them. 
Galba and the Senate took no measures against the partnership. When 
Athamania supported Philippos and he attacked Thermos of Aitolia in 207 (Liv. 
36.31.11; Polyb. 11.7.2),90 they ignored its difficulties and the expected decrease 
of the power of the hawks. Even when Agelaos of Arsinoe, who was not a supporter 
of the war, became the στρατηγός in 206/5 (SEG XXXVIII.1476),91 Rome was 
indifferent again. If she had been sensitive to this situation and the interests of 
outsiders, some approach to Aitolia and the mediators would likely have been 
                                                   
89 Eckstein 2002: 291. 
90 Walbank 1967: 278. 
91 Bousquet 1988: 12-53.  
91 
 
made before new Roman troops were dispatched in 205. 
    The separate peace of Aitolia with Philippos in 206 resulted from these 
factors (App. Mac. 4; Liv. 29.12.1-2). There is no information about the negotiation 
and the provisions of the treaty, but the king may well have abstained from 
imposing severe conditions on Aitolia. The federation, no longer led by the hawks, 
may well have officially declared Rome to be a menace to Greece, in a similar way 
to the earlier speech of Agelaos. Philippos and his allies had shown a favourable 
attitude towards a peace on this basis. It may have satisfied the mediators, hoping 
to limit his growing power, and the Aitolians who, by then, were tired of war. It is 
further possible that Philippos was also content to have increased his leadership 
in Greece. It was a diplomatic victory for the mediators, the anti-war Aitolians, 
and Philippos over the Aitolian hawks and Rome. Despite Skopas having 
responsibility for a committee dealing with the problem of debt in 205, his 
influence was in decline and he soon exiled himself to Egypt (Polyb. 13.1-2; IG 
IX.1².1.31.ll.106-8).92 The leadership of Rome’s partners inside Aitolia collapsed, 
and the new Aitolian government now could not be friendly to Rome (Liv. 29.12.4-
16). Other Aitolian allies against Macedonia had also abandoned the war. Rome 
was isolated in Greece. These signalled the failure of Roman diplomacy in Greece.  
The Peace of Phoinike of 205 was made in this context (Liv. 29.12.12-16). It 
is noteworthy that this treaty also resulted from informal diplomacy on the part 
of the Greeks. Rome was forced to defend the Adriatic coasts against Philippos, 
who had established his leadership in Greece, as the Punic War was still waged. 
P. Sempronius Tuditanus, Galba’s successor, barely maintained the status quo, 
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and did little to reverse the situation. And yet it was difficult even for Philippos 
to defeat Rome, whose forces engaged in a tenacious defence. He was also worried 
that Aitolia would change its mind and accept Tuditanus’ offer to fight against 
him again, if the war was prolonged (29.12.5-7). The result was a stalemate.  
At this time, Epeiros mediated between them. Its representatives 
complained about its difficulties caused by the war (Liv. 29.12.8). It gave the 
warring parties a pretext to end their hostilities. Through accepting this request, 
they could make a peace without deciding a victor and loser in the conflict. 
However, this was not a mediation in the manner that Rome might have expected. 
Epeiros was a member of the Hellenic League, and Philippos was better than 
Rome at the management of diplomacy. He visited Phoinike, an important city of 
Epeiros, earlier than Tuditanus and ‘had a preliminary interview (prius 
conlocutus)’ with the Epeirotes, and then, as soon as the official meeting started, 
the Epeirote officers asked Tuditanus to finish the war for them (29.12.11-12, esp. 
11). This is an example of informal diplomacy by Philippos, through the 
preliminary meeting, where he ensured that negotiations took place without 
Rome’s knowledge. When the peace was requested, Tuditanus had no choice but 
to treat it favourably, and show some conciliatory plan. He had accepted the 
mediation, as such. If Epeiros had asked Philippos to make a peace before asking 
Rome, he would have been forced to show his plan with some compromises, and 
Rome would have been able to demand more concessions. By means of the 
preliminary meeting, then, Philippos was able to prevent Rome from gaining the 
initiative in the negotiations. In fact, although Rome was not defeated militarily, 
according to Livius (29.12.13), Tuditanus said ‘that Parthini, Dimallum, 
Bargullum and Eugenium should belong to Rome but Atintania could be annexed 
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by Macedonia, if envoys sent to Rome could prevail on the Senate to agree (ut 
Parthini et Dimallum et Bargullum et Eugenium Romanorum essent, Atintania, 
si missis Romam legatis ab senatu impetrasset, ut Macedoniae accederet).’93 He 
cited the necessity of senatorial approval as a form of forestalling any further 
request of compromise, but was compelled to propose a conciliatory plan. 
Atintania had been occupied by the Romans but subsequently lost (cf. 27.30.12-
13). For its recapture, it would have been necessary for Rome either to continue 
the war or to arrange that Philippos should abandon it by negotiation. Epeiros’ 
entreaty made her commit to a plan of ending the war quickly, and prevented her 
from asking Philippos to withdraw from the region, and from announcing that the 
battle should be resumed if he did not accept her demand. He had tricked Rome 
into accepting his annexation of Atintania. The surrender of this region might 
have been a small loss for Rome, since there is no evidence that an important base 
was built there, or any tax was imposed on the region. Philippos, for his part, 
seems to have abandoned Lissos before 209.94 His menace to Italy practically 
disappeared. Indeed, there was no necessity for Rome to continue the war. The 
annexation of Atintania, however, enabled Philippos to behave as if he had the 
upper hand in the war. Thus, the Peace of Phoinike resulted from his diplomatic 
victory over Rome by using informal diplomacy. 
Again, this argument depends on Livius’ text, alone. Yet, the historicity and 
the authenticity of the source are recognised by scholars. 95  This is further 
confirmed by Livius’ text as follows (29.12.14): 
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in eas condiciones cum pax conueniret, ab rege foederi adscripti 
Prusia Bithyniae rex, Achaei Boeoti Thessali Acarnanes Epirotae: ab 
Romanis Ilienses, Attalus rex, Pleuratus, Nabis Lacedaemoniorum 
tyrannus, Elei Messenii Athenienses. 
 
What should be noted here is the appearance of adscripti, a form of witness. This 
was a feature of Greek diplomatic practice.96 Indeed, there is no comparable case 
in Rome’s contemporary treaties, while the notion was generally expressed as 
συμπεριλαμβάνειν ταῖς συνθήκαις (e.g. Syll³ 591.l.64). The term 
συμπεριλαμβάνειν appears in the negotiation between Rome and Pyrrhos. It was 
used, however, for the people connected with the treaty, not as a witness, but as a 
key figure in the agreement (App. Sam. 10.3). Thus, Livius’ text about this treaty 
derives not from Roman writers, but Greek ones. Polybios is the most reasonable 
candidate, since he was Livius’ main Greek source for events in the East. It was 
easy for him to gather detailed information for this event of 205. This feature 
lends extra credibility to the Livian text. 
It is noticeable that the lists of the adscripti demonstrate before 
contemporaries Philippos’ advantage over Rome. He was supported by the major 
states in Greece, while Rome could not secure any comparable support. She 
seemingly collected as many signatures as Philippos, and established friendship 
with some Greek states,97 but her adscripti were minor powers, nevertheless. No 
permanent relationship seems to be made with them.98 In contrast, those on 
Philippos’ side were connected through the ties of the Hellenic League. 99 
Moreover, some on Rome’s side, such as Ilion and Athens, might be the invention 
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of later pro-Roman authors.100 Certainly, Rome negotiated with the Attalids for 
the transfer of Magna Mater from Asia Minor to Rome at that time. She could 
have asked Ilion and Athens on the way to Pergamon to write their signature as 
adscripti. 101  The fact remains, however, that Rome collected only minor 
supporters. It is also noticeable that Aitolia does not appear in the list, and 
Epeiros, the mediator, was on Philippos’ side. This showed the states concerned 
and contemporaries that Rome had been abandoned by the federation, and that 
Epeiros actually sided with Macedonia. Rome was preparing to advance into 
Africa, and was satisfied with the peace in Greece, rewarding Tuditanus with the 
consulship of 204 (Liv. 29.12.16). The reputation and dignity of the leading 
Romans in and beyond Rome were undermined, though. Rome’s satisfaction might 
have been based upon the assumption that the peace was temporary (App. Mac. 
4; Liv. 29.12.16). Upon observing the members of the adscripti of both sides, and 
the development of the negotiations, the Romans may well have noticed that they 
had been neatly deceived by Epeiros and Philippos with their secret partnership. 
Thus, Rome was isolated by the informal diplomacy of the mediators from the 
Aegean Sea (as well as the Aitolians opposing the hawks, and Philippos himself), 
being labelled the menace to Greece. Rome was then cheated by the informal 
diplomacy between Philippos and Epeiros, the latter siding with Macedonia while 
behaving as a neutral mediator. The result was the loss of part of the Roman 
sphere of influence in Illyria, despite no military defeat being sustained. These 
represented a failure of Rome, caused largely by the Greeks’ considering not only 
official position and interests of the people concerned, but also those that could 
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From the eve of the First Macedonian War to the Peace of Phoinike, Rome 
and the eastern Greeks managed their diplomacy in different ways. The 
differences are crucial to our understanding of whether informal diplomacy 
worked or not. I have argued that it decided the outcome of the Macedonian War. 
Rome’s failure to manage her contacts with eastern Greeks might partly have 
resulted from her difficulties in the Second Punic War. Yet, this should not be 
overestimated. The Greeks too were at odds each other, and had other enemies 
moreover, but succeeded in adapting to the conflicts of interest. In the light of this, 
the giving of gifts to the envoys from Saguntum in 205 shown in Chapter 1 
suggests that it was in these years that Rome had become accustomed to the 
practice, and to the concept of informal diplomacy, in observing its usage by the 
Greeks. There is no direct evidence for Rome’s adoption of Greek methods of 
diplomacy. During the Macedonian War, however, Rome was involved in the 
games of the Greeks using informal diplomacy and was forced to withdraw from 
Greece owing to diplomatic isolation directed by such Greek diplomats, rather 
than military defeat. The significance of informal diplomacy was even more 
apparent for the Romans at the conclusion of the Peace of Phoinike. It is 
reasonable to think that Rome’s experience of the Macedonian War worked as a 
catalyst in changing Roman diplomatic practice. The examples of gift-giving in 




What has been shown, so far, is the failure of Rome in her management of 
the First Macedonian War and the significance of informal diplomacy for 
achieving wider diplomatic success. The influence of this concept on Rome during 
the period of her advance into the Greek world has only been partly confirmed, 
though. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate its significance in her expansion 
more generally. It is important to note that informal diplomacy was gradually 
employed by Rome. This has been suggested by the analysis of gift-giving 
undertaken in Chapter 1. Next, I will strengthen this argument by considering 
the actions of Rome’s diplomatic managers from the end of the Macedonian War, 
in particular her advocates of a second intervention in Greece, and those of her 










This chapter argues for the appearance of informal diplomacy in Rome’s 
diplomatic practice, by analysing Roman promoters of the Second Macedonian 
War, in the prelude to the hostilities. As I demonstrated in Chapter 2, Rome was 
left isolated in Greece, during the first conflict, owing to her failure in matching 
the Greeks’ informal diplomacy. By contrast, Roman advocates of the second war 
managed to win over both domestic and international public opinion, resulting in 
a successful isolation of Macedonia. They achieved this change with a mixture of 
official tools, such as senatorial resolutions and open contacts with other states, 
and informal ones, for example by announcing Rome’s position as the defender of 
her allies in Greece, despite not yet having the approval of the assembly. These 
developments were the result of individual Romans’ participation in international 
politics, advocating war and acting as a group. Highlighting this phenomenon 
allows us to see clearly the value of informal diplomacy to the wider study of 
Roman diplomacy, and to identify Rome’s use of it, during this period, even if 
contemporaries did not use this terminology. It is also important that the 
Macedonian War, beginning in 200, was a turning point in the Roman history. It 
was the beginning of the Republic’s expansion into the Greek world. So, revealing 
the appearance of informal diplomacy in connection with Rome here also allows 
this thesis to develop the discussion later about its influence on her advance into 
the East even in the following decades, since the success against Macedonia may 
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well have led the Romans to use similar diplomatic strategies even after the war. 
This chapter achieves these aims through the following three steps. Firstly, 
the rise of the future promoters of the Second Macedonian War from the end of 
the first struggle in Greece, and their character as hawks against Macedonia and 
as diplomats of considering not only formal but also informal sphere of diplomacy, 
will be shown. Secondly, I argue that, after the First Macedonian War, the power 
relationship among the leading Greek states changed significantly, and their 
informal diplomacy enabled Rome to participate in Greek affairs. Through 
analysing the actions of Rhodes and Attalos I of Pergamon in 201, with regard to 
the campaigns of Philippos V of Macedonia and Antiochos III of the Seleucids, the 
influence of informal actions on international politics in the Greek world and 
Romans will be discussed. The final section demonstrates that Roman hawks 
encouraged their fellow citizens to send troops into Greece while also attempting 
to win the support of the Greeks, and despite lacking the authority even to do this 
at the beginning. They were thus navigating the formal and informal interests of 
the people in and beyond Rome. These actions bear the hallmark of informal 
diplomacy, and its usage by Rome on the eve of the Second Macedonian War. 
 
Section 1: The Roman Hawks against Macedonia 
 
In order to demonstrate the emergence of Roman informal diplomacy, it is 
first necessary to identify the Romans that utilised it. This can be achieved by 
considering the rise of those encouraging the Second Macedonian War, following 
Rome’s first conflict in Greece. This period, after the Peace of Phoinike in 205, also 
encompassed the last phase of the Second Punic War. Rome had thus concentrated 
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the vast majority of her attention on the defeat of Carthage.1 Nevertheless, the 
Senate sent troops into Greece as early as 200, with the support of many Greek 
states, moreover. Even before that, individuals pressing for another war appear 
to have emerged and won over public opinion in Rome and beyond. In this section, 
I show who manoeuvred to achieve them, and that such Romans approached their 
fellow citizens and the Greeks with both formal and informal channels. The 
results of this enquiry enable us to see better the context of the second war and to 
notice the validity of using the concept of informal diplomacy in the analysis of 
the early stages of Rome’s expansion into the Greek world. 
An initial appearance of such Romans that were keen to engage with the 
Greeks and connected with Rome’s new conflict with Macedonia is attested in 
Rome’s summoning of the Magna Mater from Pessinus in Asia Minor.2 This was 
officially designed to solve Rome’s difficulties in Italy caused by the Punic War 
based on a prediction found in the Sibylline Books in 205 (App. Hann. 56a; Liv. 
29.10.4-8 and 11.5-8). This was ostensibly a religious event, and might suggest 
that Rome was concentrating on solely Italian affairs.3 However, these factors 
were not very important for the architects of this project. After the Battle of 
Metaurus in 207, Rome had overwhelmed Carthage in Italy.4 Even without the 
support of the foreign goddess, Roman victory was inevitable. It should be 
acknowledged, then, that some senators were rather interested in affairs beyond 
Italy. Considering the senatorial influence on the interpretation of the mysterious 
messages from the Sibylline Books, it is unlikely that its decree to summon the 
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goddess of Asia Minor, far from Italy, resulted from a simplistic decoding of 
prophecy.5 
In fact, the promoters of this project had ulterior motives, aside from any 
religious rationale. Roman envoys were sent not to Pessinus directly but first to 
Attalos, to ask him to support this project, on ground that Rome had no allies left 
in Asia Minor, aside from him (Liv. 29.11.1-2). For his part, he had only fought 
alongside Rome for a few years in the First Macedonian War. No source relates 
that they made a formal alliance. It is noteworthy that this contact was made 
shortly before the conclusion of peace at Phoinike, and that as I discussed at the 
end of Chapter 2, representatives of Athens and Ilion, on route to Pergamon, 
appeared with Attalos as adscripti for Rome in the treaty (29.12.14). As E. M. 
Orlin argues,6 this suggests that the act of summoning the Magna Mater was not 
only performed to finish the Punic War, but also to gather Roman supporters 
together.  
It should be further noted that the delegates were led by M. Valerius 
Laevinus, who fought around the Adriatic and made the alliance with Aitolia in 
the 210s as shown in Chapter 2 (Liv. 24.40 and 26.24).7 It is possible that his 
appointment simply resulted from his experience and achievements in Greece. As 
E. S. Gruen successfully argues,8 however, Rome did not consider expertise about 
regional and foreign affairs to be of great importance, when appointing officials. 
In this case, his theory is supported by the appearance of Ser. Sulpicius Galba 
among the delegates. He was probably a brother of P. Sulpicius Galba, Laevinus’ 
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successor, who fought against Philippos with Attalos (Polyb. 9.42 and 10.41-2).9 
Servius was apparently selected to manage the negotiation with Attalos smoothly, 
on the basis of the relationship between Publius and Attalos. If such a connection 
was very important, though, Publius himself would have been a better candidate. 
There is no record of his assuming office between 205 and 204. Furthermore, no 
source relates that Servius exploited Publius’ connection during the negotiation 
with Attalos. Servius’ dispatch resulted not from Publius’ connection with Attalos, 
then, but Servius’ relationship with Publius influenced his selection as an envoy. 
Considering Servius’ prior achievement, the Senate had no reason to select him. 
He had not assumed any important office, while other members of the delegation 
were elected to the praetorship around this year.10 His relationship with Publius, 
who had risen to the consulship, is the only plausible reason for Servius’ selection. 
Moreover, even for the other members, there is no sign that they had been 
previously connected with Greek affairs. The envoys sent to Asia Minor were 
selected not owing to their experience but because they were influential senators, 
or had a connection with such politicians, and displayed an interest in making 
contact with the Greeks in light of the character of the errand, and possibly 
hostility towards Macedonia. Considering their actions of 200 as hawks against 
Philippos, mentioned later, Laevinus and P. Galba had an interest in Greek affairs 
and Rome’s conflict with Macedonia, and then in the appointment of Laevinus’ 
junior colleagues their closeness to these interests of the two Romans may well 
have been also important. The summoning of the Magna Mater, thus, largely 
resulted from a rise of such Romans in the Senate.  
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With regard to the type of statesman oriented to participating in Greek 
affairs, several scholars have noticed a particular party that they have termed the 
Claudian group. 11  It can be observed in a number of episodes. M. Claudius 
Marcellus, the Roman commander in Sicily, for example, considered public 
opinion among the Greeks in 212, by treating a captured citizen of Sparta, 
Aitolia’s friend, in a kindly fashion, when the federation negotiated with Rome 
about an alliance against Philippos (Liv. 25.23.8-9). In 196, the consul, possibly 
Marcellus’ son of the same name, wanted to be sent to Greece despite the plan of 
the Senate to defend Italy, and almost succeeded in persuading it to authorise his 
dispatch (33.25.4-6).12 The Claudii (and their friends) were interested in Greek 
affairs. There is no sign, however, that they directed the contacts with the Greeks 
in the 200s. As a consequence, it is not reasonable to use terms such as the 
Claudian group in the discussion of Roman diplomacy in this period. 
Meanwhile, it is possible to confirm further that, from 205 onwards, there 
was a group of senators that was hostile to Macedonia, desired to win recognition 
for Rome within Greece, and became gradually more powerful. Another 
deputation was sent in the same year. The envoys brought booty seized from the 
troops of Hasdrubal, Hannibal’s brother, to Delphoi (Liv. 28.45.12); they were led 
by M. Pomponius Matho, who assumed the praetorship in 204 and then may well 
have exercised considerable influence in 205. Their errand was officially religious 
and Rome had often sent such envoys to Delphoi (e.g. 1.56.4-14, 5.15-16, 5.28.1-5, 
and 23.11.1-6), but the aim of the promoters of this project of 205 was also a 
demonstration to Greece of Roman dominance in Italy. Delphoi was an oracular 
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centre, under the control of Aitolia.13 The dedication of booty, a sign of Roman 
victory, was noticed by many Greeks, in particular the Aitolians, who had been 
hostile towards Macedonia.14 Given the context of the envoys’ dispatch before the 
Peace of Phoinike (cf. 29.10.6 and 11.5), one of the aims of sending envoys was to 
persuade Aitolia into resuming the fight against Philippos, or to collect its 
signature as one of adscripti. In any case, the dispatch of deputations to Delphoi 
and Pergamon shows that a number of senators, not only those selected as the 
envoys, but also those supporting the motions in the Senate, were interested in 
Greek affairs, the conflict with Macedonia, and eager to have further contact with 
states throughout the Greek world. 
One could still assume that these initiatives in 205 were the result of 
nothing more than a Roman desire to end the First Macedonian War in as swift 
and acceptable fashion as possible. However, that there was a group of leading 
Romans interested in Greek affairs and hostile to Macedonia is, furthermore, 
supported by an event following the Peace of Phoinike, namely the visit of ‘the 
envoys from the allies in Greece (legati sociarum urbium ex Graecia)’ to Rome in 
203 (Liv. 30.26.1-4, esp. 2). While no specific Greek states are named by Livius, 
these delegates complained of Philippos’ pressure and reported his military 
support for Carthage, flagrantly disregarding his peace with Rome. The Senate 
sent M. Aurelius to protest about this to him (30.42.1-10). Aurelius, however, not 
only remonstrated with Philippos about his behaviour, but also stirred up ill 
feeling against him among his neighbours. Philippos, in turn, sent envoys to Rome, 
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to protest about Aurelius around the beginning of 201. Aurelius himself 
dispatched a certain M. Furius to argue against Philippos before the Senate. 
While there is no information regarding the result of the dispute, we know that 
Aurelius was not recalled (31.3.4 and 5.5-7). This event suggests that the hawks 
against Philippos rose and participated in Greek affairs with a significant degree 
of independence. Furius’ dispatch by Aurelius shows that his approaches to 
Philippos’ neighbours were not part of his original order; it would not have been 
necessary, otherwise, for him to account for his action before the Senate through 
a messenger. If many senators had not supported Aurelius, it is likely that he 
would have been recalled. While his behaviour is a clear example of informal 
diplomacy, the Senate chose to overlook it. Considering this episode, there were 
many senators, eager to have contact with the Greeks, and who were hostile 
towards Philippos. Aurelius was supported by or acted as an agent of these 
senators. For their part, they did not hesitate to approach outsiders, despite 
lacking the official approval of the Roman state. 
Several scholars doubt the historicity of this event.15 Certainly, no source 
confirms that there really were Roman allies in Greece in 203. Moreover, 
Philippos’ military support for Carthage is not covered by Polybios, a near-
contemporary.16 However, as V. M. Warrior argues, this does not confirm that 
Livius’ text was mistaken.17 Polybios refers to the capture of some Greek cities by 
Philippos around this year (18.1.14). Some of them could have sent their 
diplomats to complain about the situation to Rome, who would warmly receive the 
embassies. Livius or his sources could have casually labelled them as Rome’s allies. 
                                                   
15 E.g. Holleaux 1921: 278 n.1; MRR : 322 n.3; Gruen 1984: 222 n.86. 
16 Walbank 1967: 456. 
17 Warrior 1996a: 101-3. Cf. Walbank 1963: 3. 
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Furthermore, Carthage requested soldiers from foreign states at that time.18 
Some Macedonians could have been employed, whether they were sent by 
Philippos or operated privately as mercenaries. In any case, the appearance of 
such Macedonians could be regarded as an indicator of Philippos’ support for 
Carthage. There is no reason to doubt the visit of the envoys from Greece to Rome, 
Aurelius’ dispatch, and the analysis of hawks within the Senate. 
An interest in Greek affairs among leading Romans after 205 can also be 
observed in contemporary literature. In the Stichus, which was first performed in 
the autumn of 200, Plautus relates that while visitors from Ambrakia were 
treated as ‘the best guests (summi viri),’ Gelasimus, possibly a cliens of a Roman 
notable, was treated like an infimatis infimus, that is, like vermin (454-504, esp. 
492-3). Plautus teased or criticised some leading Romans for warmly welcoming 
the Greeks despite their cold reception to traditional friends, namely fellow 
Roman citizens. We must be careful not to exaggerate any reference to 
contemporary politics in Plautus’ literary works, as he was not a leading Roman 
but a playwright. Furthermore, as Gruen argues, he liked to parody the 
misapprehension of leading Romans about the Greeks and their culture,19 but not 
necessarily to depict accurate social conditions. The appearance of Greeks in the 
Stichus might therefore simply reflect a general interest among the Romans in 
Greek culture and ideas during the third century. However, this is not plausible 
from the viewpoint of Plautus’ manner of making a play interesting. Plautus was 
born in the middle of the third century, and had written his works under the 
influence of Greek writers such as Menandros.20 Furthermore, Roman elites had 
                                                   
18 Dorey 1957: 185-7. 
19 Gruen 1990: 262-3. 
20 Damen 1992: 205-31. 
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nurtured contacts with the Greeks in Italy and Sicily individually, even before the 
200s, demonstrated, for instance, by an early third century inscription from 
Entella concerning the investment of the title of πρόξενος in a certain Ti. 
Claudius (SEG XXX.1120).21 I argue that it is not plausible that, in 200, Plautus 
was concerned simply with relating the interest of some leading Roman in the 
Greeks. Considering the timing of the Stichus’ publication on the eve of sending 
troops to Greece, Plautus’ satirical tendency, and the appearance of the Hellenes 
from Greece itself (rather than southern Italy or Sicily) in his play, he wrote the 
scene mentioned above with an eye on the contemporary situation of leading 
Romans.22 There were many leading senators who were more interested in Greek 
affairs than those of their fellow citizens, and had established a variety of formal 
and private contacts with Greeks themselves. 
The influence of the Romans who were interested in Greek affairs, or of the 
hawks against Philippos, should not be overestimated, though. When Aitolia’s 
diplomats visited Rome to ask the Republic to fight against Macedonia again in c. 
202, the Senate curtly refused the request, owing to Aitolia’s ‘serious defection 
(τῆς οὐ πρὸ πολλοῦ μεταβολῆς)’ in the First Macedonian War (App. Mac. 4.2), i.e. 
its separate peace with him in 206. This visit of this Aitolian embassy suggests 
that the approaches of the hawks to the Greeks from 205, mentioned above, were 
effective, as suggested also by the visit of the envoys ‘from the allies in Greece.’ 
Rome was, now, noticed by the Greeks in contrast to the last phase of the previous 
war. The blunt refusal of the Aitolian offer by the Senate, however, means that 
                                                   
21 Ampolo 2001: 18-19. In addition, Entella was, strictly speaking, not a Greek but a 
hellenised Sicilian city, but the Hellenisation of the populace seems to have completed 
by the end of the fourth century. Berger 1992: 78. 
22 Owens 2000: 386 and 403; Eckstein 2008: 215. 
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the Romans had generally become as apathetic towards Aitolia as they were 
towards Philippos, a tendency that the hawks could not control. One reason for 
this refusal might be that the Punic War had not been concluded. If the hawks 
had controlled Rome, though, they would have persuaded their fellow citizens to 
engage with Aitolia’s appeal in some way, despite their antipathy towards the 
federation. Rome’s intervention in Greece would have enabled the hawks to have 
a chance to render services, and some of them, who had been connected with the 
previous war, to redeem themselves for their failure to defeat Philippos. 
The attitude of Rome towards Aitolia also allows us to estimate when the 
hawks gained control of the Senate. In the fall of 201, after the defeat of Carthage, 
envoys from Rhodes and Pergamon visited Rome to complain about Philippos’ 
campaigns (App. Mac. 4.2; Liv. 31.2.1-2).23 In contrast to its response to Aitolia, 
the Senate treated these two states favourably and sent its deputation to several 
Greek states, including Aitolia, to declare against him and to ask them to support 
Rome’s new war (Polyb. 16.27.2-4). This shows that, after the visit of the Aitolian 
envoys, the Roman hawks controlled the Senate and were publicly hostile towards 
Philippos, using the approach of Rhodes and Pergamon to justify their hostility. 
This hypothesis is not beyond question. The order of Appianos’ description 
mentioned above suggests that Aitolia’s approach to Rome was, in fact, after that 
of Rhodes and Pergamon.24  Rome’s approach to Aitolia after the fall of 201, 
however, shows that the visit of its envoys to Rome was prior to her dispatch of 
those to Greece. 25  Otherwise, this would mean that Rome had decided to 
approach the Greeks after the appeal of Rhodes and Pergamon, but had then 
                                                   
23 Briscoe 1973: 55-6. 
24 Meloni 1955: 45-9; Derow 1979: 7-8; Meadows 1993: 51-2. 
25 Holleaux 1921: 293-7; Eckstein 2008: 213. 
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reproached Aitolia while simultaneously attempting to win over the federation. 
This is implausible. Appianos writes of the situation of Asia Minor after the Peace 
of Phoinike, and the approach of the two states attacked by Philippos to Rome in 
201, describing the situation in Greece, and the action of Aitolia, after 205. It is 
impossible to determine precisely when Aitolia approached Rome.26 Yet, after the 
Senate’s unfriendly contact with Aitolia, the hawks won a majority in the fall of 
201, after the end of the Punic War, at the latest, and exploited the visit of the 
envoys from Rhodes and Pergamon to approach the Greeks, including Aitolia, 
with the notion of attacking Philippos. 
In general, from the time of the Peace of Phoinike, some Romans led Rome 
to approach the Greeks on several pretexts. They were united in their interest in 
Greek affairs and their antipathy towards Macedonia. Considering the results of 
elections during this period, their influence gradually increased. They often 
independently and privately established contacts with the Greeks of the mainland. 
These were partly acts of informal diplomacy. The leading Romans, or the hawks 
against Philippos, thus increased their influence in Rome and her presence in the 
East and, in 201, at last led the Senate to display hostility towards him. 
 
Section 2: Rhodes and Pergamon in 201 and Informal Diplomacy 
 
Section 1 demonstrated the rise of the hawks against Macedonia in Rome; 
nevertheless, as suggested by Plautus’ negative reference to them, Rome’s citizens 
did not necessarily support them, despite their majority in the Senate. This 
                                                   
26 Walbank 1967: 446. 
110 
 
suggests that although the dispatch of troops was made based on the approval of 
the assembly in 200, it was not easy for the jingoists to win over their fellow 
citizens, and that, even in 201, the appeal of Rhodes and Pergamon only barely 
enabled them to lead the Senate to show hostility to Philippos.27 Actually, it is 
useful to consider the relationship between the uneasy situation for the hawks in 
Rome and the opposition to him in the Greek world, in order to demonstrate the 
significance of informal diplomacy in Rome at the close of the third century. In 
this section, I will show it through considering particularly the diplomacy of 
Rhodes and Pergamon in 201. The result will provide an important context of the 
war, and contribute to revealing the influence of informal diplomacy on the Greek 
world at that time here, and that on Rome on the eve of the Second Macedonian 
War in the following section. 
In order to achieve these aims, I shall analyse the context of the appeal of 
Rhodes and Pergamon to Rome in their opposition to Philippos. He had been 
supported by the majority of Greek states when the Peace of Phoinike was 
concluded in 205. Rhodes had been among the states that mediated between the 
king and Aitolia and indirectly supported him (e.g. Polyb. 11.4-6).28 The approach 
of Rhodes to Rome with Pergamon, one of Rome’s adscripti in 205, shows that the 
dynamic between the Greek states, and between them and Rome, had changed.  
This picture is confirmed by noticing that in the latter half of the 200s, the 
power balance among the leading states, in particular the three major royal 
dynasties, in the Hellenistic world changed.29 Firstly, Philippos made a peace 
with Aitolia when his campaign against the federation was going favourably. It 
                                                   
27 Cf. Liv. 31.2.1-2 and 6.1; Briscoe 1973: 42-45 and 55-6. 
28 Walbank 1967: 274-7. 
29 Gruen 1984: 532. 
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consolidated his position in Greece, and enabled him to advance overseas. 
Secondly, Antiochos had recovered many regions across Asia Minor, extending to 
Mesopotamia, by c. 203. Finally, the Ptolemies had faced a revolt of the native 
Egyptians in the midst of domestic unrest caused by the succession of the infant 
king, Ptolemaios V (Porph. (FGH 260) 45). This was an opportunity for Philippos 
and Antiochos to enlarge their kingdoms further. They attacked the Ptolemies in 
Asia Minor and Syria. Modern scholars highlight here a secret pact between the 
two kings, to divide Ptolemaic territory, as an indicator of the dynamic changes in 
international politics during this period. This information appears in several 
sources (e.g. App. Mac. 4; Diod. 28.2.1-4.1; Polyb. 3.2.8 and 15.20.1-8), and its 
contents and historicity have been discussed extensively, owing to their supposed 
impact on contemporaries. 30  I will also notice this pact in analysing the 
manoeuvres of Rhodes and Pergamon, revealing the importance of informal 
diplomacy in the games between the Greeks concerned and Rome or the hawks. 
      On first examination, it might appear unusual that this chapter highlights 
the Hellenistic pact in the context of arguing for the significance of informal 
diplomacy in Rome since, among other things, it was allegedly concluded by the 
two kings, the formal decision-makers in the Greek world. Moreover, although 
many scholars think that the pact encouraged Rome to send troops to Greece in 
order to prevent the kings from increasing their powers,31 a causal link between 
both is not necessarily clear. There is also reason to doubt the historicity of the 
pact.32 However, it was allegedly a pact that was secret from the neighbouring 
                                                   
30 StV III: Nr.547; Eckstein 2008: 129-80. 
31 E.g. Holleaux 1921: 309-22; McDonald and Walbank 1937: 182-90; Eckstein 2008: 
237-41. 
32 Magie 1939a: 34-43; Errington 1971: 336-54; Harris 1979: 212-8.  
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states of the two kings, such as Rhodes and Pergamon, although the information 
did spread among them. These states, and others, accounted for the potential 
Macedonian-Seleucid partnership in their decision-making. The appeal of Rhodes 
and Pergamon to Rome, their attack on Philippos before that, and Rome’s dispatch 
of envoys to the Greek states were made in this context. It is reasonable to discuss 
the alleged pact in this study of informal diplomacy embracing clandestine actions. 
It is useful now to consider the events that led to Rhodes and Pergamon 
sending envoys to Rome and attacking Philippos prior to the former. Philippos 
intervened in Aegean affairs after 205. This disturbed the interests of the two 
states, in particular those of Rhodes. Philippos sent troops to the Cretans, who 
had been at war with the Rhodians since 205.33 Furthermore, Perdikkas, his 
agent, intervened in the decision-making of several Cretan cities, concerning their 
investment of ἀσυλία in Teos around 201 (IC I.v.52, xiv.1, 2, 15, II.i.1, v.17, xii.21, 
and xvi.1),34  demonstrating Philippos’ influence over Crete and neighbouring 
regions. The king also secretly sabotaged Rhodian warships, although Rhodes 
appears not to have noticed this (Diod. 27.3 and 28.1; Polyai. Strat. 5.17.2). Finally, 
Philippos seems to have attempted to annex Iasos and Nisyros, Rhodian 
dependants (I.Iasos 150; IG XII.3.91).35 These were provocative actions. In 202 he 
captured Chalkedon and Kios (Aitolian allies), and took Thasos, despite its 
friendly disposition towards him. The visit of Aitolia’s envoys to Rome mentioned 
above resulted from these actions.36 Rhodes negotiated with Philippos to save 
Kios, and allegedly, after its failure, decided to attack him (Polyb. 15.21-4; cf. Str. 
                                                   
33 Buraselis 2000: 9. 
34 Savalli-Lestrade 2012: 156 and 172. 
35 Magie 1939a: 35-6; Meadows 1996: 257-60; Wiemer 2002: 187-9. 
36 Eckstein 2008: 211-3. 
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12.4.3). Indeed, in 201, Rhodes damaged his fleet in the sea-fight near Chios, 
alongside Pergamon (Polyb. 16.2-9). The allied states failed to stop Philippos’ 
campaign, however, owing to the disparity in their military strengths. 
Consequently, they made contact with Rome in the autumn of 201. 
It is important to note that Rhodes and Pergamon had not been openly 
attacked by Philippos; nevertheless, they attacked him by themselves, despite 
lacking sufficient power to defeat him. The two states only succeeded in damaging 
his fleet in the sea (Polyb. 16.2.9-10), as noted above. On land, however, they 
appeared even more powerless to prevent his sacking of their territory (Liv. 
31.16.7; Polyb. 16.1, 11, 24, and 29-34). Although its failure in saving Kios might 
have been unpleasant for Rhodes (15.22.3-4 and 23.1-9), Rhodes appears to have 
taken reckless and unnecessary risks. It is also noteworthy that Rhodes and 
Attalos had not been friendly neighbours.37 This is confirmed by an episode in 
which Rhodes was hit by an earthquake, in 227, and was supported by many of 
the neighbouring states (Plin. NH 34.41; Polyb. 5.88-90; Str. 14.2.5). Attalos is not 
listed among those that contributed. The extant sources give no sign that their 
relationship changed after that. Thus, in 201 Rhodes and Attalos suddenly joined 
together to attack Philippos, despite their previous discord, their military 
inferiority, and the lack of any direct threat to them being posed by Macedonia. 
So, what provoked Rhodes and Pergamon to undertake such seemingly 
inexplicable actions? This has been discussed by scholars from several viewpoints. 
For instance, Rhodes is said to have regarded commercial interests as its first 
priority in foreign policy, and to have acted based on them in 201.38 According to 
                                                   
37 Gabrielsen 1997: 75-7. 
38 Berthold 1984: 123; Koehn 2007a: 155-6 and 182-3. 
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this theory, Philippos’ advance upon the Aegean states threatened the security of 
Rhodian trade routes, prompting an attack on him to clear the area. Certainly, 
ancient authors refer to Rhodes’ constant interests in commerce (e.g. Diod. 
20.81.2-3; Polyb. 30.5.8; Str. 14.2.5). In 201, Rhodes might have regarded 
Philippos’ campaigns around the Hellespontos, such as the capture of Kios, as a 
menace to its trade.39 This suggestion does not necessarily explain, however, why 
Rhodes took the risk of war against a state that was obviously stronger, militarily. 
Philippos and Prusias I of Bithynia had been related by a marriage of their royal 
families for some years (Polyb. 15.22.1).40 The trade routes of the Hellespontos 
and the northern part of the Aegean Sea were practically under Macedonian 
control, from that point. While the increase of Philippos’ power around the strait 
might be unfavourable to Rhodes, it did not occur suddenly in 201. 
In order to resolve this contradiction, other scholars argue that Rhodes was 
apprehensive about the political impact of Philippos’ advance. 41  Rhodes had 
established its leadership in the Aegean Sea by the 220s (Polyb. 4.47.1). 
Macedonian campaigns in the 200s were regarded as a menace to it, and perhaps 
even to Rhodes’ independence, leading Rhodes to try to solve it at all costs. This 
theory offers an explanation for Rhodes’ hostility towards him in this period. This 
does not sufficiently explain, though, why Rhodes attacked him in 201, a time at 
which the former was significantly weaker diplomatically as well as in military 
strength. Philippos had established a hegemony in Greece by 205. Conflict with 
him might therefore have caused Rhodes’ isolation among the Greek states. In 
addition, he had not attacked the Rhodians officially. In fact, they seem to have 
                                                   
39 McDonald and Walbank 1937: 184; Reger 1994: 69; Gabrielsen 1997: 45-6. 
40 Eckstein 2008: 195 n.48. 
41 Wiemer 2002: 200-1; Eckstein 2008: 194. 
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had a genuine choice not to attack Macedonia, at that time. In order to understand 
Rhodes’ sudden offensive and diplomatic overtures towards Pergamon and Rome, 
it is necessary to consider the reason why Rhodes did not or could not wait for the 
international situation to change, at a time when Philippos was well prepared for 
the advance. 
Concerning Attalos, it is also difficult to discern his rationale for fighting 
alongside Rhodes, against Macedonia in 201. He had reinforced his navy and 
increased his influence in the Aegean Sea since the 220s, and obtained Aigina in 
the First Macedonian War (Liv. 28.5.1; Polyb. 4.65.6-7, 9.42.5, 11.5.8, and 22.8.9-
10). He was traditionally a rival of Rhodes, on the sea.42 The alliance in 201 was 
therefore a remarkable change in his diplomacy. Moreover, he had not been 
threatened by Macedonia but had been attacked by other neighbours. Bithynia 
had captured part of Mysia in the north, following the Macedonian War, and 
Antiochos had taken Teos, in the south, by c. 203. 43  It was seemingly 
inconceivable for Attalos to attack Philippos with Rhodes, then. 
Regarding Attalos’ motive for the partnership with Rhodes, Gruen argues 
that he was afraid of the combination between Philippos and Prusias.44 This is a 
reasonable suggestion, to some extent. Bithynia was Attalos’ enemy, and had 
obtained Kios based on the agreement with Philippos after he took the inhabitants 
and the spoils (Polyb.15.23.10). Attalos might have wanted to check the activities 
                                                   
42 McShane 1964: 100; Eckstein 2008: 195-6. For the Attalid navy, see also Ma 2013: 
61-2. 
43 Mysia seems to have been ruled by Bithynia from the 200s to 188 (Liv. 38.39.15; 
Polyb. 21.46.10). Habicht 2006: 4-6. The Teians were ‘liberated’ from the Attalid 
tribute by Antiochos, when he entered into Teos with his troops and recognised their 
ἀσυλία around 203 (SEG XLI.1003, esp. ll.17-22). For the date of the decree and the 
Teian position, see Errington 1980: 280, Giovannini 1983: 181-3, Gruen 1984: 532, 
Dmitriev 1999: 403, Dreyer 2002b: 129-31, and Ma 2002: 308-11. 
44 Gruen 1984: 533. 
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of the kings. Yet, this does not explain why he decided to make an alliance with 
another rival, Rhodes, and to attack Macedonia in 201. Philippos had not 
supported Prusias’ anti-Attalid actions directly. The attack upon Philippos here 
was more likely to trigger a direct counterattack with the assistance of Bithynia. 
The impact of the relationship between these kings on Attalos’ decision in 201 
should not be overstated, then. 
What should be remembered here is the secret pact, mentioned above, to 
divide Ptolemaic territory between Philippos and Antiochos. Historically, scholars 
have discussed it with reference to the decision of Rome to commence the Second 
Macedonian War. However, as A. M. Eckstein notices,45 the agreement, allegedly 
concluded in 202, is also important for analysing the actions of Rhodes and 
Pergamon in 201. The possibility of cooperation between the two kings was more 
serious for the Greek states nearby, than for Rome. For the Republic, the increase 
of the power of the two dynasties in the East, far from Italy, was not an urgent 
menace. For Rhodes and Pergamon, though, it could transform their already 
strong neighbours into super-powers. This situation explains their attack on 
Philippos in 201, despite the difficulties mentioned above. Blocking the kings’ joint 
manoeuvres was an urgent issue. It is further important to note that for analysing 
the impact of the secret pact on the two states, whether or not it was really 
concluded, is immaterial. The significance would be the same so long as they 
believed that such an alliance had occurred. Thus, it is reasonable to consider the 
pact as a factor behind the decision of Rhodes and Pergamon to attack Philippos; 
this is confirmed not through analysing the pact’s historicity, but through 
                                                   
45 Eckstein 2008: 184-98. 
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analysing whether the secret alliance, informal diplomacy between the kings, was 
assumed by other states or not. If Rhodes and Pergamon perceived the 
partnership of the two kings before their attack upon Philippos, it is reasonable 
to think that the secret pact was a factor encouraging them to open hostilities 
against him, and to approach Rome, owing to the expected impact of the pact on 
them. The result also confirms that informal diplomacy played an important role 
in the Greek world then, just as in the First Macedonian War. 
What should be noted here is how the secret pact was treated by 
contemporaries. A hint can be found in the literary sources. These inform us that 
the Ptolemies, the target of the agreement, had not been attacked by Philippos 
before 201.46 It looks to suggest that Rhodes and Pergamon had not observed the 
two kings’ combined activity when they attacked Philippos. Indeed, in the 
reference to the contact between the Senate and them in the fall of 201, Appianos 
relates that Rhodes informed Rome of the pact simply as a δόξα, a rumour (Mac. 
4).47 Furthermore, other sources, including Polybios, do not show when the pact 
was noticed (3.2.8; cf. Just. 30.2; Liv. 31.14.5). 48  Polybios uses sources from 
contemporary Rhodians (cf. 16.14). The lack of a detailed reference to the pact in 
his text (and those of later authors using his as their source) shows that Rhodes, 
and others, had no precise and official information on any such plan, even in 201. 
But this situation does not mean Rhodes and Pergamon could not have 
known of the pact when they attacked Philippos. In light of Rhodes’ reference to 
the ‘rumour’, the two states had observed several indications of such an alliance. 
                                                   
46 Wörrle 1988: 436; Eckstein 2008: 159-61. 
47 For more on the interpretation of this word, see Schmitt 1964: 243; Eckstein 2008: 
177. 
48 Walbank 1967: 471-3; Wiemer 2001a: 59-64. 
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Furthermore, Polybios relates (at 16.1.8) that Philippos demanded supplies for 
his army from Zeuxis, the Seleucid governor of the west of Tauros ‘according to 
the pact (κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας).’ The historicity of this event is generally 
recognised.49 Although this was during Philippos’ campaign in Caria, after the 
battle off Chios, and Zeuxis did not help him significantly (16.1.9), that there was 
some partnership between the two dynasties seemed beyond question for 
contemporaries. The two kings did not seem to announce it, but did not strive to 
hide it, since supplies could not be transported in secret. 
This candidness is supported by an inscription from Eleutherna on Crete 
(IC II.xii.21), in which Teos was invested with ἀσυλία. This was decided on the 
basis of the Teian request, with the support of Hagesandros, who had been 
dispatched by Antiochos to stop the struggle around Crete, and that of Perdikkas 
mentioned above (ll.13-19). I argur that the appearance of the Seleucid diplomat, 
not that of Attalos, and that of Perdikkas, in the appeal of Teos, shows that this 
event happened after Antiochos ‘liberated’ the city from Pergamon in c. 203, and 
that he intervened in the Cretan War, alongside Philippos. Contemporary 
Rhodians, the enemies of the Cretan cities, may well have noticed the partnership 
of the kings when the people of Eleutherna discussed the topic in the assembly 
and erected the inscription in c. 201. 
This is also suggested by another epigraphic source, inscribed in c. 200 or 
the 180s after the Peace of Apameia, which records as follows (SEG LII.1038.ll.10-
13): 
 
… σ]υνστάντος δὲ πολέμου βασιλεῖ Ἀντιόχωι ποτὶ βασιλῆ 
                                                   
49 E.g. McDonald and Walbank 1937: 182; Eckstein 2008: 169-73. For the position of 
Zeuxis, see Errington 1971: 349-51 and Meadows, Derow, and Ma, 1995: 73. 
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Π[το]λεμ[αῖον / τὸν] νῦν βασιλεύοντα κυριεῦσαι τοὺς παρὰ 
βασιλέως Ἀντι[ό]χο[υ— / Κιλλα]ρῶν καὶ Θωδασων πρὸ τοῦ παρὰ 
βασιλέως Φιλίππου παρα[δ]ο[θήμειν / --] Ἀντι[ό]χωι Θεάγγελα καὶ 
… 
 
This was found at Bargylia in Caria, and was initially published in 2000. Recent 
scholars agree that it is a copy of a Rhodian decree, in light of the dialect and the 
form of the Greek infinitive used.50 The general contents of the resolution are 
uncertain. It is also impossible to decide whether Philippos ceded Theangela to 
Antiochos during or after his advance into Caria, in 201. Yet, the reference quoted 
above suggests that the two kings made a partnership to attack the Ptolemies, 
and that their contemporaries noticed it. The passage refers to Philippos’ 
campaign, and that of Antiochos against Ptolemaios from 202, in the Fifth Syrian 
War (or around 203 in his advance into Asia Minor), by which the erectors show 
the readers when the events picked up by the inscription concerned happened. 
Bargylia and Rhodes seem to have believed that Philippos and Antiochos opposed 
the Ptolemies together in the 200s, although, if the decree was made in the 180s, 
this might be a conclusion they reached some years after the pact itself. 
Another sign that the partnership was ‘noticed’ by Rhodes can be found in 
an event around the Battle of Kynoskephalai (Liv. 33.19.10-20.3 and 10). At that 
time, Antiochos was advancing into southern Asia Minor. Rhodes demanded that 
he not advance west of Cape Chelidonion. Rhodes stopped his advance by force, to 
‘prevent him from meeting Philippos (ne coniungi eum Philippo paterentur),’ even 
though the number of ships of the Seleucid fleet was around 300 (33.20.3). Rhodes 
permitted Antiochos to go through, however, when Philippos’ defeat was known. 
                                                   
50 Blümel 2000: 94-6; Wiemer 2001b: 1-14; Dreyer 2002b: 119-38; Ma 2002: 379-82. 
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Rhodes did not want to fight against Antiochos, but ‘noticed’ the partnership with 
Philippos, deciding to prevent them only from fighting together at all costs.51 
It is plausible that neither Rhodes nor Pergamon had any precise 
information about the contents of the pact between the two kings. Yet, the secret 
partnership, an act of informal diplomacy, was apparent. Despite several scholars’ 
supposition that the two states noticed the pact of the kings after their attack on 
Philippos, and complained about the situation to Rome in panic,52 the decision of 
the two states to attack him was more likely made while considering not only his 
actions around the Aegean Sea, but also his partnership with Antiochos. 
The role of Antiochos also explains why Rhodes and Pergamon attacked 
Philippos in 201, and not later. Antiochos had waged campaigns in Asia Minor 
during the 200s. In 202, however, he turned his troops to Koile-Syria. This might 
have resulted from the pact which stipulated that he obtain Egypt and Cyprus 
(Mac. 4).53 At the very least, his contemporaries ‘expected’ that Antiochos aimed 
to capture Koile-Syria. This situation was favourable to Rhodes and Pergamon, 
having ‘believed’ that the two kings were in partnership. Following the Battle of 
Raphia (Polyb. 5.81-6), once the Seleucids advanced into Syria, the Ptolemies 
defended the region with all their force. Antiochos would not be able to act jointly 
with Philippos in Asia Minor for a considerable time. Although Philippos’ troops 
and supporters there, such as Prusias and Zeuxis, were still strong, it was easier 
for Rhodes and Pergamon to resist Philippos in Antiochos’ absence, rather than to 
fight against both kings at the same time. Meanwhile, the Ptolemies’ power was 
                                                   
51 Concerning context and the historicity of the Livian information, see Briscoe 1973: 
284-8. 
52 E.g. McDonald and Walbank 1937: 187; Berthold 1976: 100. 
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in decline, and Antiochos was expected to achieve victory in Syria and to return 
to Asia Minor, before long. The space of time in which Rhodes and Pergamon could 
respond to the advance of the kings separately was short. In 201, the international 
situation was unfavourable to the two states but, since the kings’ partnership had 
been ‘noticed’, the decision to attack Philippos represented the lesser of two evils. 
This view is supported by the fact that, in 201, Rhodes did not mediate 
between the Ptolemies and the Seleucids to save the former, despite their 
traditional friendship and the commercial contacts emphasised by ancient 
scholars (e.g. Diod. 20.88-99 and 21.81.4; Polyb. 4.51.5 and 5.67.11).54 Rhodes 
hoped that the war between the dynasties would drag on, and decided to remove 
Philippos from the Aegean Sea while Antiochos was in Syria, although, in c. 197, 
Rhodes appeared to mediate between the two dynasties (Porph. (FGH 260) 47). 
This plan of countering the advance of Philippos, in Antiochos’ absence, did, 
in fact, have some hope of success. As the sea-fight off Chios shows, the scale of 
the combined fleet of Rhodes and Pergamon rivalled that of Macedonia. If they 
had defeated Philippos at sea, his campaign would have been frustrated, despite 
his superiority on land. Without the fleet, he could not maintain any occupied 
territory. The Rhodians informed Attalos of what they had observed and what 
they were planning, although he may well have independently discovered some 
signs of the partnership between the kings, winning him over. Thus, the decision 
of the two states to make an alliance against Philippos, despite his military and 
diplomatic dominance in 201, can be understood when their observation of the 
informal diplomacy between the kings is noticed. 
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It is also important to note that Rhodes and Pergamon originally planned 
to finish the war against Philippos without involving other states beyond the 
Aegean Sea. In fact, although they fought against Philippos with small Aegean 
cities in the sea-fight off Chios (Polyb. 16.2.10),55 the two states sent their envoys 
to Rome in the fall of 201, almost after the warring season had passed. It was not 
until after 201 that Attalos tried to ally with Athens and Aitolia (Liv. 31.14-15; 
Polyb. 16.25-6). If Rhodes and Pergamon had wanted to make an alliance with 
states further away from the Aegean Sea from the beginning, at least Aitolia, 
Attalos’ old friend since the 220s (4.65.6-7), would have been asked to fight, before 
the outbreak of war. The extant sources do not explain the reason for this 
relatively late attempt at forging diplomatic ties. Yet, considering the action 
around the Cape Chelidonion, Rhodes and Pergamon seemed very apprehensive 
about joint action between the two kings. In order to stop it, it was sensible not to 
increase the scale of war. If Philippos was attacked on several fronts, it could 
cause Antiochos’ intervention to save the former. Considering Rhodes’ flexible 
attitude to Antiochos before Kynoskephalai as well, Rhodes and Pergamon tried 
to manage the two kings delicately. 
Rhodes and Pergamon failed to stop Philippos around the Aegean Sea in 
the season of campaign in 201, though. They attacked him near Lade, but were 
badly beaten (Polyb. 16.15),56 and tried in vain to impose a blockade on his fleet, 
near Bargylia (Polyai. Strat. 4.18.2; Polyb. 16.24). Meanwhile, Antiochos had 
                                                   
55 Walbank 1967: 505. 
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advanced into Gaza and was on the offensive. While the Ptolemies fought 
tenaciously, from the siege of the city to the Battle of Panion in 200 (16.18.2 and 
22a.1-6),57 Rhodes and Pergamon around the autumn of 201 thought that there 
was little to prevent the two kings from moving jointly. Their appeal to other 
states was a reaction to control the situation. This might not be the most 
favourable choice for the two states. If some state accepted their offer, the war 
against Philippos inevitably dragged on. Since Antiochos seems to have all but 
defeated the Ptolemies, as long as Philippos continued his campaigns, Antiochos 
would want to cooperate with him. Yet, winning over other states would compel 
Philippos to fight on fronts other than around the Aegean Sea, where Rhodes and 
Pergamon were at their most apprehensive of the joint action of the kings. In order 
to avoid a crushing defeat, Rhodes and Pergamon enlarged the scale of war 
against Philippos, while accepting the increased risk of Antiochos’ intervention. 
These analyses demonstrate the influence of the kings’ secret partnership, 
their informal diplomacy, on the Rhodians and Attalos and, moreover, the Romans. 
The pact was not announced, but was not hidden. Rhodes and Pergamon believed 
that the kings had made an informal alliance, attacking Philippos and 
approaching Rome to prevent it from succeeding. Their approach prompted the 
dispatch of Roman envoys to Greece, in the fall of 201, mentioned in Section 1. 
The informal diplomacy of the Macedonian and Seleucid kings therefore caused 
Rhodes and Pergamon to enter into partnership and approach Rome, and thus 
indirectly provoked her action against Philippos, although it has not been 
confirmed, yet, that Rome had understood the nature of the informal diplomacy.  
                                                   
57 Grainger 2010: 255-62. 
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Section 3: The Roman Hawks and Informal Diplomacy 
 
The results of analysis in Section 2 reveal the context of the approach of 
Rhodes and Pergamon to Rome but, meanwhile, seem to make it more difficult to 
understand the situation outlined in Section 1, namely that although the Senate 
showed its hostility to Philippos from the fall of 201 onwards, Roman citizens did 
not necessarily support a new war, and that Rome’s decision to act was, 
nevertheless, triggered by the sudden appeal of Rhodes and Pergamon, that 
resulted from the change of their original strategic plan. It may well have been 
difficult for Rome to accept such an approach, and to send troops in 200. Since the 
210s, Rome had been at war with Carthage. The citizenry was exhausted.58 
Nevertheless, as soon as Rhodes and Pergamon had a contact with the Senate, 
Rome approached the Greeks while showing her hostility to Philippos, even 
though some of them might have held antipathy towards Rome since the previous 
war. It could be argued that the secret pact related by Rhodes and Pergamon 
formed the catalyst in Rome’s decision here.59 While the two kings’ partnership 
was suspected, however, neither of the Greek states could tell Rome of its contents 
precisely. It was of relatively little importance to Rome, if the kings really had 
made an alliance, and there is no sign that Rome noticed the alleged pact. It is 
therefore impossible simply to accept that it prompted her decision to go to war. 
Now, I propose the theory that, despite such difficulties faced by Rome and her 
citizens, the hawks against Philippos pressed for the dispatch of troops, 
convincing other Romans, particularly following the dispatch of envoys to the 
                                                   
58 Cornell 1996: 103-11. 




Greek states. As I showed in Section 1, a group of Romans advocating a new war 
against Macedonia had come into being. The dispatch of envoys was connected 
with this group’s rise. I consider that many of the official decisions in the domestic 
and foreign affairs of the Roman state, from the contact with Rhodes and 
Pergamon to Rome’s dispatch of troops, also resulted from the manoeuvres of such 
Roman hawks, who participated in international politics by controlling the Senate, 
and in the acts that they engaged in informal diplomacy in a similar fashion to 
which the Romans had observed, or been involved in, during the period of the 
First Macedonian War. In this section, I expand this hypothesis by analysing the 
manoeuvres of the warmongers from the fall of 201 onwards. The results enable 
this study to pinpoint the use of informal diplomacy in Rome, and its significance 
at the beginning of her advance into the Greek world. 
The appearance of informal diplomatic practices in Rome can be observed 
by analysing the conduct of those who argued for Rome to go to war against 
Macedonia, again. In advance of the analysis, it is worth noting several points 
about the general situation of Rome when she sent envoys to the Greek states 
after the contact with those of Rhodes and Pergamon. Firstly, the dispatch was to 
demonstrate Rome’s hostility towards Macedonia to the Greeks, while also 
directly responding to the appeal of Rhodes and Pergamon. Rome intervened in 
Greek affairs as their supporter, and actively wanted to garner the support of 
other Greeks. Otherwise, the Roman envoys would have been sent only to the two 
states and Philippos. This situation suggests that Rome had learned a lesson from 
the previous war, in which the Republic had negotiated almost exclusively with 
Aitolia, and had thus been isolated as soon as the federation had made peace with 
Macedonia. Officially, however, the Romans had been excluded from Greece as 
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βάρβαροι. It was therefore not so easy to enter into partnership with other Greeks. 
Secondly, while Rome had defeated Carthage, the frontier of northern Italy was 
still troubled by unrest (Liv. 31.2.5-11, 10.1-4, and 11.4). 60  Indeed, P. Aelius 
Paetus, the consul of 201, had failed to deal with the raids of the Boii. In 200 the 
remnants of the Carthaginian army, having been led either by Hasdrubal or Mago, 
attacked Rome’ colonies with the neighbouring tribes, despite being repulsed soon 
(31.21.1.-22.3). Rome could not afford to focus her undivided attention upon 
Greece. Thirdly, although the hawks succeeded in making the Senate send envoys 
to the East to declare against Philippos, this does not mean that they exerted 
control over Roman diplomatic practice. Many citizens regarded the new war 
negatively, including a number of active politicians, as is shown by the events 
picked up in this section later. Overall, despite their success in making the Senate 
make a friendly response to Rhodes and Pergamon, the hawks had many 
difficulties in ensuring that Rome went to war against Macedonia. 
Nevertheless, Rome dispatched troops in 200, even though it was ‘the late 
fall (autumno ferme exacto),’ an unsuitable season to commence a war (Liv. 
31.22.4).61 The Senate, under the hawks, made every effort to attack as early as 
possible, and secured a majority in the assembly to do so. They also persuaded 
many Greeks to join their cause quickly (31.28.1, 41.1, and 32.19.1-23.13). In the 
winter of 200/199, the Illyrians led by Skerdilaidas, Athamania, and Dardania, 
allied themselves with Rome. By 198, Roman forces were also supported by Aitolia 
and Achaia. As the Battle of Aoi Stena demonstrates (32.14.5-8; Plut. Flam. 4.1),62 
Rome struggled to penetrate Philippos’ defence line in western Greece, since he 
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utilised steep mountain terrain with great skill. When many Greek states 
supported the Roman offensive, however, he was forced to withdraw to his own 
territory despite not being defeated. This shows that Rome under the hawks won 
the support of the Greeks not necessarily through any display of military power, 
but through diplomatic approaches, and succeeded in hunting down Macedonia, 
in contrast to the previous war. This section now analyses how the hawks made 
these two coups in and beyond Rome, and clarifies the significance of informal 
diplomacy by Rome during this period. 
To begin with, I analyse the approach of the hawk-dominated Senate 
towards the Greek world. According to Livius (at 31.2.3-4),63 after the contact 
with Rhodes and Pergamon, Rome sent C. Claudius Nero, M. Aemilius Lepidus, 
and P. Sempronius Tuditanus to Egypt to express her gratitude for the Ptolemaic 
king’s ‘faithful attitude (fide)’ to her during the Second Punic War, and to request 
that the (new) king ‘maintain (conservaret)’ it during the coming struggle with 
Philippos, also labelling his actions ‘an injustice (iniuria).’ The Ptolemies did not 
give their reply immediately, but sent a delegation to Rome around the spring of 
200 (31.9.1-5, esp. 3), and announced that they would support Rome’s dispatch of 
troops to Greece ‘to defend the allies (socios defendere).’ The Ptolemies accepted 
her request of 201,64 and practically promised not to use or accept any rhetoric 
that was hostile towards her, as long as she officially fought in Greece for her 
‘allies.’  
It is noticeable that this Ptolemaic response was a result of a Roman tactic 
of considering the former’s interests. Rome requested that the Ptolemies 
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‘maintain’ their friendly attitude. I would argue that this was a kind of deception. 
In previous years, they had not been friendly towards Rome (cf. Liv. 27.4.10, 30.4, 
and 29.12.14). In the middle of the Second Punic (and the First Macedonian) War, 
Rome had sent envoys to court the Ptolemies, but they had not supported her. 
Instead, they mediated between Aitolia and Philippos without Rome. In 201, 
however, Rome overlooked the events of the past. This new Roman attitude and 
approach were to prove helpful to the Ptolemies. Previously, Athens, their ally, 
had complained of Philippos, and he had also occupied Samos, a Ptolemaic 
dependency, but the Ptolemies could not support them for saving face. Their 
troops had been defeated by Antiochos at Panion (Paus. 1.36.5-6; Polyb. 16.2.9 
and 18.2-19.11). 65  In addition, native Egyptian rebels were still strong. 
Supporting Rome’s struggle with Philippos, and thereby redressing his trespasses 
in Greece, thus enabled the Ptolemies effectively to abandon those areas attacked 
by him, and to turn their attention to combatting Antiochos and the rebellious 
Egyptians. The Ptolemaic decision in 200 to support Rome’s saving ‘allies’ in 
Greece means that the dynasty accepted the scenario proposed by Rome, whether 
she actually possessed such allies.66 The Romans had taken advantage of the 
current weakness of the Ptolemaic kingdom, exploiting it to bring the Ptolemies 
onside. This approach could have provoked their hostility, but Rome also strove to 
make a good impression. 5,000 asses were given to each of Ptolemaic delegates at 
this time (Liv. 31.9.5). As was analysed in Chapter 1, the envoys may well have 
made a favourable report of her in Egypt. Rome considered the interests and 
opinions of the Ptolemies. 
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What is important here is the character of these tactics employed by Rome. 
On initial examination, this might not appear to form an example of informal 
diplomacy, since contact was made only through official negotiations. Yet, the 
consideration of Ptolemaic interests that were unspoken, and the use of gift-giving, 
belong to this concept. Considering these factors, I would argue that Rome did 
engage in informal diplomacy. One might question that this diplomatic action was 
taken under the direction of the hawks. This is confirmed, however, by the 
selection of the envoys. P. Sempronius Tuditanus was a general present at the 
conference at Phoinike. His appointment might have resulted partly from his 
experience in the previous war. In 205, though, he had been cheated by Philippos, 
as I discussed in Chapter 2. Even though the Romans had approved the peace in 
205, it seems unlikely that Tuditanus’ appearance resulted only from his 
achievements. Considering the task of the deputation, he may have aspired to 
avenge himself against Philippos through the trip, a desire that the hawks would 
have supported. C. Claudius Nero had been an advocate of summoning the Magna 
Mater, effectively the initial approach of the hawks towards the Greeks, and 
supported it as the censor of 204 (Liv. 29.37.2). M. Aemilius Lepidus could also 
have been interested in Greek affairs and connected with them. During this trip, 
he seemed to make a connection with the Ptolemies, setting aside the question of 
whether he undertook the guardianship of the young king as several sources 
relate (cf. Just. 30.3.1-4 and 31.1.1-2; Val.Max. 6.6.1).67 The choice of members for 
the delegation suggests that the hawks effectively stage-managed the measure to 
win over the Ptolemies to the Roman side. 
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The hawks’ leadership in foreign affairs is also confirmed by other 
senatorial measures. For example, the Senate appointed M. Valerius Laevinus, 
the first Roman commander in the First Macedonian War, as the admiral of a fleet 
sent to the Adriatic based on the arrangement of Paetus, the consul of 201 (Liv. 
31.3.2 and 5.5-6). Reaching there, Laevinus informed the Senate and his fellow 
citizens of Philippos’ armament and the threat to Italy in a letter, along with the 
report of Aurelius, who was still around Macedonia. They wanted to encourage 
other Romans to declare war.68 Considering his contribution to Laevinus’ dispatch 
and the contents of the letters, I argue that Paetus and the two Romans were 
hawks. Their manoeuvres show furthermore that this group controlled the Senate. 
In addition, the formation of the decemviri agris assignandis, the ten 
senators to distribute land to the veterans who had fought under P. Cornelius 
Scipio Africanus, resulted from this situation (Liv. 31.4.1-3). The committee was 
formed shortly after the dispatch of the envoys to Egypt. It was designed to 
prompt the beneficiaries to support the members (and the supporters of this 
project). Many of the commissioners included the hawks. For instance, the 
hawkish Paetus was a member of the committee. He would also serve on the 
decem legati for T. Quinctius Flamininus, after the Battle of Kynoskephalai. 
Furthermore, P. Villius Tappulus, who was sent to Greece to attack Philippos in 
199, and Flamininus, his successor, were important members of the hawks 
considering their consulship after the beginning of the Macedonian War.69 It is 
noteworthy that the distribution of land to veterans was an unprecedented act, 
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and a privilege for contemporaries.70 The hawks made a good impression on the 
soldiers under Africanus, their families, and on the general himself. For him, the 
privilege was proof that his achievement with the soldiers was exceptional. While 
it might have partly resulted from his request, these examples show that the 
hawks controlled the Senate and approached the people in and beyond Rome, by 
using senatorial measures and considering their interests. These approaches were 
developed on the official stage of home and foreign affairs, and are not, therefore, 
examples of informal diplomacy. However, considering that the hawks made 
preparations in and beyond Rome for a new war against Macedonia before it had 
been approved by the majority of the citizens, their behaviour was an informal 
participation in international politics, and the idea is similar to the concept, in 
practice. 
This tendency is also observed in the approach of Rome to other Greeks. 
According to Polybios (16.27.1-4), in the spring of 200 the Senate, through its 
delegates, admonished Philippos, ordering him ‘to make no war on any Greek 
state (τῶν … Ἑλλήνων μηδενὶ πολεμεῖν),’ and to submit to arbitration for ‘the 
injuries that he had inflicted on Attalos (τῶν … γεγονότων εἰς Ἄτταλον 
ἀδικημάτων)’. They also showed that the peace with Philippos would be annulled 
if he did not follow Rome’s demands. Scholars agree that the messengers are to be 
identified with the envoys sent to Egypt.71 It seems clear, then, that this contact 
with Macedonia was made under the leadership of the hawks. What should be 
furthermore noted is their tactic. Some scholars think this message was simply a 
final note to Philippos in the name of Rome.72 Certainly, it was shown first to 
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Nikanor, Philippos’ general attacking Athens. Yet, if this was a mere ultimatum,73 
it would have been unnecessary to show it ‘to the people of Epeiros, Amynandros 
of Athamania, Aitolia, and Achaia (καὶ πρὸς Ἠπειρώτας …καὶ πρὸς Ἀμύνανδρον 
… εἰς Ἀθαμανίαν …καὶ πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς … καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς)’. Since Rome 
openly warned him not to attack the Greeks, the message was her announcement 
or propaganda towards contemporaries. This seems distinct from the Freedom of 
Greece, the concept that Rome advocated around the end of the war.74 Yet, it, at 
least, concerned the complaint from Rhodes and Pergamon of Philippos’ violence, 
and was intended to criticise the king, while characterising Rome as the defender 
of his victims. The announcement was thus partly a threat to him and his 
supporters, one that also gave the latter (and other Greeks) a pretext to desert 
him, even if they had previously made peace or had friendly connections with him. 
The coming war would involve their territories, if they were on Philippos’ side. 
Labelling him as a menace to the Greeks, meanwhile, justified their estrangement 
from him. Rome’s announcement under the hawks resulted from a consideration 
about good causes for war and also from that about the formal and informal 
interests of the Greeks. It was developed on the official stage of foreign affairs and 
was not informal diplomacy, but the practical participation of the hawks in this 
official contact, and their manner of approaching the Greeks while considering 
the different concerns of the latter, are based on a similar concept. 
It is noteworthy that these measures taken by the hawks were also 
intended to manage a Roman weakness. This is suggested in an exchange between 
Philippos and Lepidus, one of the Republic’s three envoys. For this dialogue 
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Polybios informs us as follows (16.34.3-4 and 7): 
 
ὃς καὶ συμμίξας περὶ τὴν Ἄβυδον διεσάφει τῷ βασιλεῖ διότι δέδοκται 
τῇ συγκλήτῳ παρακαλεῖν αὐτὸν μήτε τῶν Ἑλλήνων μηδενὶ πολεμεῖν 
μήτε τοῖς Πτολεμαίου πράγμασιν ἐπιβάλλειν τὰς χεῖρας, περὶ δὲ τῶν 
εἰς Ἄτταλον καὶ Ῥοδίους ἀδικημάτων δίκας ὑποσχεῖν, καὶ διότι ταῦτα 
μὲν οὕτω πράττοντι τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν ἐξέσται, μὴ βουλομένῳ δὲ 
πειθαρχεῖν ἑτοίμως ὑπάρξειν τὸν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πόλεμον. ... "ἐγὼ 
δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἀξιῶ Ῥωμαίους" ἔφη "μὴ παραβαίνειν τὰς συνθήκας 
μηδὲ πολεμεῖν ἡμῖν: ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ποιῶσιν, ἀμυνούμεθα 
γενναίως, παρακαλέσαντες τοὺς θεούς". 
 
This meeting took place after the summer of 200 in the suburbs of Abydos, which 
had been attacked by Philippos. Lepidus ordered him not to attack any Greek 
state, as in Rome’s previous message. No source relates that the statement was 
brought to other Greek states, but it was announced in the official meeting. The 
populace of this city (and possibly others) could have attended it or found out what 
was spoken there. It is plausible that both sides would have taken to the floor in 
the expectation that their statements would be known to others. It is significant 
that Lepidus here picked up Philippos’ attack on Ptolemaic, Rhodian, and 
Pergamene territories. The increased number of demands from those outlined in 
Athens, resulted from Ptolemaic support for Rome in 200, and possibly also from 
some arrangement between Roman envoys and the Rhodians, forged during the 
stay of the former in Rhodes before this meeting (16.34.2).75 In any case, Lepidus 
at Abydos emphasised Rome’s good reason again, and informed Philippos (and 
other Greeks) of the increase in the number of Rome’s supporters. Meanwhile, the 
king contradicted Lepidus’ statement with legal arguments. He argued that 
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Rome’s attack on him would be a violation of the Peace of Phoinike. It is noticeable 
that Lepidus did not object to this. This means that the hawks recognised the 
difficulty of justifying the war legally, and also suggests that they planned to 
compensate for it by winning over the Greeks, designating Rome as a guardian of 
Greece (and the three states mentioned above). Otherwise, Lepidus would have 
(and ought to have) argued against Philippos’ statement concerning legality in 
some way. The announcements of Abydos and Athens resulted from the hawks’ 
consideration regarding not only how to win over the Greeks but also how to 
manage Rome’s diplomatic difficulties. 
The problem of legality is also confirmed by Appianos’ text. He relates (at 
Mac. 4) that Philippos attacked Attalos, Rhodes, Samos under the Ptolemies, and 
Athens because ‘none of them was connected with the Romans (οὐδὲν τῶνδε 
Ῥωμαίοις προσηκόντων).’76 He took care not to violate the peace with Rome. 
Considering the reference mentioned above, Polybios also appears to have thought 
in the same way. In the text of Livius, who used not only Polybios but also Roman 
writers as his sources for the contacts between Rome and Philippos in 200,77 there 
is no sign that Rome displayed any logic for justifying her from the viewpoint of 
legality. The Romans, or the hawks, were tacitly aware of their lack of any legal 
legitimacy. The demand for Philippos to avoid attacking any Greek state, which 
was different from the usage of legal arguments by P. Sulpicius Galba in the 
previous war (App. Mac. 3), partly reflected this difficulty faced by Rome. 
Rome’s silence regarding her legal quandary, meanwhile, resulted partly 
from the hawks’ choice of how the negotiations should be conducted. Even from a 
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legal viewpoint, Rome could find a pretext for criticising Philippos. As I showed 
in Section 1, he was said to have informally sent troops to support Hannibal. 
Indeed, Rome had taken some Macedonian prisoners at Zama (Liv. 30.42.4). While 
Philippos might have referred to the behaviour of M. Aurelius, mentioned above, 
Rome could have justified her position legally, to a degree, nonetheless. The 
absence of legal argument during the scenes in Athens and Abydos not only shows 
Rome’s relative weakness but also suggests that she intentionally avoided 
introducing the topic, which was unconnected with any party other than Rome 
and Macedonia, and attracted no attention from the Greeks. Indeed, Rome did not 
demand the restoration of Atintania, territory lost in 205. For the hawks, the two 
messages were just to show good cause, to win over the Greeks while considering 
their interests. 
This hypothesis is supported by the Republic’s explanation of the new war 
to Masinissa of Numidia, after the Roman assembly had approved it in the spring 
of 200.78 In the message, Rome justified the war by criticising Philippos’ support 
for Hannibal (Liv. 31.11.7-10).79 Considering Masinissa’s rivalry with Carthage 
and partnership with Rome during the Second Punic War, he would have been 
bound to support the Romans against Philippos, Hannibal’s ally. Rome thus 
altered her rhetoric according to whose support was at stake, while also 
considering the position of the people concerned. This way of citing just cause is 
also a sign of the change in Roman diplomacy from the previous one, which 
emphasised legal legitimacy only. 
This variety of the ways in which the hawks managed their opening the 
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new war, and their practical intervention in Rome’s management of foreign affairs, 
can also be observed in their encouragement of the assembly to approve the plan. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, in opening the Second Macedonian 
War, the hawks’ control of the Senate did not mean that they similarly exercised 
total control over Roman diplomacy. It was caused by an anti-war mood among 
the citizens, and by the influence of some leaders apart from the hawks. Now, I 
shall consider the hawks’ management of home affairs through their controlling 
the Senate. 
The outlook of Romans other than the hawks is confirmed by the events 
surrounding the proposal by P. Sulpicius Galba to the assembly to open hostilities 
against Macedonia, immediately after his assumption of the consulship in 200, 
based on a senatorial order resulting from his own proposal to the Senate (Liv. 
31.5.2-3, 9, and 6.1). He had been one of the Roman commanders during the First 
Macedonian War.80 Considering this career and his approach to the Senate for the 
motion of war, he was a person of considerable influence among the hawks, and 
enacted their aims, although these tasks could have been achieved by C. Aurelius 
Cotta, Galba’s consular colleague. It is possible that he was a member of the 
family of M. Aurelius, the hawks’ agent mentioned above. In any case, for Galba 
and the other hawks, this motion before the assembly was the final step of a 
manoeuvre to ensure the new war in domestic politics. But the plan went wrong. 
The anti-war mood prevailed among the citizens, owing to the exhausting 
conditions experienced during the Punic War. The members of the comitia 
centuriata subsequently rejected the bill (31.6.3). The hawks might have noticed 
                                                   
80 MRR : 280, 287, 292, 296, and 300. 
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that their countrymen were impoverished, but this result would still have been 
unexpected. This was the only case in which a motion for opening war, based upon 
senatorial approval, was voted down in the assembly, as far as the extant sources 
report.81 The hawks may well have thought that, since they had won over the 
Senate and occupied the consulship, their fellow citizens would support the 
motion out of respect for this body and these offices.82 The rejection suggests that 
the citizens did not necessarily respect them. This tendency is confirmed by the 
episode of Tappulus, mentioned above, (32.3.2-7). He faced a mutiny among his 
troops when he was sent to Greece as the successor of Galba, who had succeeded 
in managing the problem of the assembly. It prevented him from waging war.83 
Setting aside the direct causes, this incident and Galba’s failure in the assembly 
show that the officer sent by the Senate, the hawks controlling it for the new war, 
and the Senate itself, by implication, were not respected by the people at large. 
Such a movement can be linked with that of some leading Romans other 
than the hawks. This is shown by an event in which ‘private citizens (privati)’ 
crowded into the Senate House (Liv. 31.13.2-9). This occurred when the senators, 
led by the hawks, decided not to repay a debt that had been incurred in 210 to 
deal with the war against Hannibal,84 in order to prepare for the new Macedonian 
war. The citizens protested this senatorial measure; their argument was 
legitimate, and the Senate could do nothing but permit them to use public lands 
at a low rate, rather than pay, following their request.85 This situation shows that 
‘the citizens’ were creditors, and that the government faced a financial crisis. It is 
                                                   
81 Rich 1993: 55-6. 
82 Eckstein 2010: 235-6; Pina Polo 2011: 102-3. 
83 Briscoe 1973: 172; Eckstein 1976: 127-8. 
84 Buraselis 1996: 156-71. 
85 Briscoe 1973: 91-3. 
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more important to note that many of the creditors were senators or members of 
their extended families (26.36.2-12).86 The petition, then, was an objection to the 
Senate and the hawks by people who were connected with leading Romans and 
could influence the public. 
Furthermore, the Senate under the hawks was attacked, in 200, by Q. 
Baebius, one of the tribuni plebis. He criticised the war-like attitude in the Senate, 
and was apparently supported by many citizens opposing the new war, as well as 
some intellectual and influential Romans (Liv. 31.6.4). It is useful to remember 
that Plautus’ Stichus was published in 200. The contents of this play suggest that 
Roman elites made light of the common people’s lives and, conversely, were highly 
interested in Greek affairs (155-95 and 454-504). His work was a criticism of the 
hawks who hurried to attack Macedonia. It was performed in the Ludi Plebeii in 
the fall of 200, and was directed by Cn. Baebius, one of the two plebeian aediles, 
and a member of the family of Q. Baebius (Liv. 31.50.3).87 His anti-war movement 
was supported by his family. They formed a minority in the Senate, in light of its 
approval of Galba’s motion for war. Their influence was not inconsiderable, though, 
since the Baebii were connected with Africanus. 88  No source relates how he 
considered the conflict with Macedonia, but he had become the engineer of victory 
in the Second Punic War, as a result of a series of military and diplomatic 
successes in 201.89 The hawks could not help noticing his fame, and his influence 
on Roman citizens and politicians connected with his family, whether this 
tribunus was really acting on his suggestions or not. 
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The hawks dealt with these difficulties by dividing their opponents with 
official and informal tools. This has been suggested partly by their compromise 
with the creditors. The loan of public lands by senatorial decree practically led 
them to agree with the use of the money in preparation for a new war. Baebius 
was silenced by threats from a number of senators (Liv. 31.6.4-6), apparently 
advocates of war and others won over by them, and thus through an informal 
channel of politics. They soon encouraged Galba to propose a second motion to the 
assembly, to open hostilities with Philippos, justifying this through treating the 
citizens’ attitude as ‘idleness (segnitia)’ promoted by the tribunus plebis, using 
‘the traditional way (viam antiquam)’ of ‘abusing (criminandi)’ the senators. This 
stalled the anti-war movement and its prospective supporters, in the Senate and 
beyond, but was partly a measure designed to win them over. The hawks silenced 
the agent of the people opposed to them in the Senate, while indirectly making it 
easy for other Romans to change their position by treating only Baebius as an 
unreasonable agitator. 
This kind of management in domestic affairs by the hawks can also be 
observed in their approach to Africanus and his associates, other than Baebius. 
After submitting the second motion to the assembly, the Senate decided that the 
soldiers, after fighting under him in Africa, were not compelled to serve in the 
army sent to Greece, and that the allotment of land not only to the soldiers who 
had served under him in Africa but also to those who had fought in Hispania be 
made (Liv. 31.8.6 and 49.5).90 These measures were designed to appease him and 
the citizens connected with him. In addition, Africanus was elected to the 
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censorship in 199 with Paetus, one of the hawks. According to Livius (32.7.3), they 
worked together ‘in perfect harmony (magna inter se concordia).’ This might not 
have been a political alliance between Africanus and Paetus (and the friends of 
both sides), in light of Paetus’ hostility towards him in the Punic War.91 Their 
cooperation, however, ensured that their respective interests were met. The good 
treatment to Africanus’ soldiers might have been proposed by him, personally. He 
might have made the Senate concede the distribution of land to his soldiers in 201, 
and taken advantage of the hawks’ weakness in 200. In any case, the hawks 
secured the votes of the people connected with Africanus in the assembly by 
advancing his and his soldiers’ private interests, and by involving him in the 
formation of senatorial decrees for the new war with the promise to cater for 
Africanus and his associates after the assembly. 
In 199, Tappulus was to suffer a mutiny among his troops. Approaching 
Africanus, his soldiers and the creditors, then, did not mean that the hawks had 
considered the anti-war people as a whole. The negotiations with the creditors 
took place after the approval of the assembly for the new war and was possibly 
not part of the hawks’ original plan. Galba, however, submitted the motion for war 
to the assembly again, while being encouraged to ‘correct (castigaretque)’ the 
people’s idleness, and reasoned before the attendees that Philippos was a menace 
to Italy. This motion was easily approved, clearly because the people under 
Africanus ‘accepted’ the hawks’ rhetoric, despite their opposition in the previous 
session held only a short time previously (Liv. 31.6.5 and 7.1-8.1).92 Considering 
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the case of Tappulus, the publication of the Stichus around the period of 
dispatching troops to Greece, and the direct petition of the creditors, it is evident 
that antipathy towards the war, Senate, and the hawks still persisted among the 
citizens. Yet, they no longer held the majority, and the number of the people who 
could or wanted to lead them gradually decreased. The decision of Rome regarding 
the new war and her preparation were made through the tactics of the hawks, 
who wanted to minimise the scale of concession to the people beyond them, but 
also to weaken the anti-war movement as effectively as possible. 
It is significant that these acts represented participation in international 
politics and informal diplomacy, by the hawks manipulating the Senate and their 
fellow citizens. The hawks failed in encouraging the majority of the voters to 
approve the plan before the second motion. The diplomatic manoeuvres before 
that were, then, strictly informal actions. These were not illegal. They were 
developed under the senatorial authority. Contact with outsiders was within its 
discretion.93 Yet, a series of active approaches by the hawks towards the people 
in and beyond Rome was a way to achieve their particular aim that was not 
necessarily compatible with the interests of the majority of their fellow citizens. 
The hawks also blurred the boundaries of official and informal spheres of 
diplomatic activity in Rome to achieve their aim. This situation thus differed 
perceptibly from that of the First Macedonian War. 
The sensitive regard for the people beyond the hawks, however, was not 
always shown. Tappulus was frowned upon in Greece for his ruthless attitude 
towards the inhabitants in his campaign (Paus. 7.7.8-9, 8.2, and 10.36.6).94 Galba 
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executed people of full age in Antipatreia, in 200/199 (Liv. 31.27.3-4). 95 
Flamininus, their successor, destroyed several Greek cities for terroristic 
purposes (32.15.2-3, 16.15-17, 17.1, 32.14.6, and 24.6-7; Plut. Flam. 5.1).96 While 
they might have made examples of the people concerned, the hawks’ ideas of 
waging war were similar, in part, to the traditional one symbolised by Galba’s 
brutal behaviour in cities occupied during the previous war (cf. Polyb. 11.5.8). 
Nevertheless, the hawks generally considered the interests of the people in 
and beyond Rome. They secured the support of Rhodes and Pergamon and, around 
the spring or by the summer of 200, at the latest, won over the Ptolemies and the 
Roman assembly.97 This is in contrast to the peace summit at Phoinike, when 
Rome had been isolated in Greece and lacked the methods to solve these 
difficulties. The hawks had realised this by the time of the new struggle that they 
had advocated for, winning public opinion, in and beyond Rome, through informal 
diplomacy. 
It is noteworthy that such manoeuvres also influenced the Greeks. For 
example, Philippos broke off his campaign in the East when he learned the news 
of Rhodes’ and Pergamon’s successful contact with Rome in the winter of 201/0 
(Polyb. 16.24.2-3). This sudden approach suggests that the damage wrought on 
the two states was so serious that they had to ask Rome to assist them.98 He may 
have realised it but, in 200, he set about occupying Abydos in the Hellespontos 
before finishing them off, in order to prevent Rome from using the city as a base 
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in the coming war, although this might also have resulted partly from Philippos’ 
apprehension for Aitolia’s nullification of its peace with him (16.29.1; cf. 24.2). 
Rome’s presence enabled Rhodes and Pergamon to recover their power. 
After Philippos stopped his campaigns against them to combat the Roman 
advance, Rhodes could afford to counterattack against Macedonia in Caria (Syll³ 
586),99 and succeeded in making an alliance with the islands in the Kyklades and 
in establishing the basis of the Second Nesiotic League.100 Attalos had contact 
with the three Roman diplomats in Peiraieus, and, with the results of the 
negotiation, persuaded Athens to declare war against Philippos (Liv. 31.15.6-16.3; 
Polyb. 16.25-6). The indirect support for Attalos’ persuasion of Athens also 
contributed to Rome’s approach towards Greece. 101  The Athenians criticised 
Philippos’ desecration of the sanctuaries around their city before the Aitolians in 
199 (Liv. 31.29-30).102 His envoys treated the Romans as a gang disturbing the 
peace of Greece, and reminded their listeners of the rhetoric presenting them as 
βάρβαροι. Athens’ argument enabled Aitolia (and other Greeks), however, to label 
him as a more barbarous figure, and to ally with Rome. The speech related by 
Livius might partly result from his manipulation of sources to justify Rome’s war 
for his readership. But Philippos’ profanities were not a fiction. They are also 
described by Polybios (at 16.27.1), who would have had many living witnesses to 
the event. It seems irrefutable that Athens condemned Philippos for his 
desecration, and emphasised the good cause of fighting against him before 
contemporaries. This encouraged Aitolia and probably Achaia to support Rome, 
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although the military pressure posed by the Roman and allied forces was also 
important (Liv. 31.40.7-43.7 and 32.19.1-23.13).103 Thus, Roman diplomacy under 
the hawks influenced Greece even before Rome’s dispatch of troops. 
It is significant that such movements in the Greek world were consciously 
engineered by the hawks. This is supported by the fact that they encouraged their 
fellow citizens to send troops even in the late fall of 200, as soon as was humanly 
possible. It appears to have resulted from knowledge of the secret pact between 
Philippos and Antiochos.104 This seems unlikely, though. As I have shown, there 
is no sign that the hawks and other Romans noticed the pact, unlike Rhodes and 
Pergamon. Meanwhile, their eventual observation of such a secret alliance caused 
a war between them and Philippos. It provided a just cause to Rome for promoting 
a new struggle. She would lose this pretext, though, if Philippos defeated the two 
states. His success around the Aegean Sea was apparently a matter of time, since 
his enemies had failed to stop him in 201. The rapid dispatch of troops was to 
secure a just cause for Rome, and shows that the approaches of the advocates of a 
new war to the Greeks, from the fall of 201 or the end of the previous conflict, 
resulted from their recognition of the importance of winning over the Greeks in 
the war in the Greek world. There would have been no necessity, otherwise, to 
send troops in 200, much less in the late fall (an unusual season for war), and to 
provoke Philippos with two messages while declaring Rome’s justice to other 
Greeks. Thus, sending troops within 200 and the approach to the Greeks, before 
and after that, are a sign that Roman diplomatic practice had changed since the 
First Macedonian War, and a new tendency had appeared. 
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What should be noted last is that the Second Macedonian War and informal 
diplomacy were necessary for the hawks and for the Senate to maintain their 
influence within the Roman state, itself. It is useful to remember that creditors 
crowded into the Senate House, that soldiers disobeyed Tappulus’ order, that 
Baebius, a tribunus plebis, openly criticised the Senate and the hawks, and that 
Galba failed to persuade the assembly to agree to his first motion. The Senate and 
members of the hawks were held in contempt by the citizenry. Their leadership 
had been secured in the war against Hannibal. Galba assumed the dictatorship 
in 203. Tuditanus was elected the consul of 204 (Liv. 29.12.16 and 30.26.12). Yet, 
the Punic War had ended. It appears to have been achieved by Africanus, the 
victor in Hispania and Africa. He was not connected with the hawks, and had his 
own supporters such as the veterans. It was necessary for the hawks and the 
Senate to offset their blunder and the comparative decrease of their influence soon. 
The approach of Rhodes and Pergamon answered their informal requirements. It 
is ironic that the support of Africanus and his supporters should have been 
secured to realise the new war. If the hawks had not moved then, however, 
Philippos would have defeated Rhodes and Pergamon before long, regardless of 
whether or not he had a secret pact with Antiochos. The power-balance among the 
Romans would have also changed soon, owing to Africanus’ exclusive rise. The 
outbreak of the Second Macedonian War, the Roman diplomacy on its eve, and the 
hawks’ acts are understood when this situation of Rome’s domestic and 
international politics is considered. The hawks participated in the struggle, 
despite lacking the full authority to do so, at least in the beginning, and achieved 






Considering these analyses, the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War 
immediately after the end of the Second Punic War, and the ascendancy of Rome 
in the new war were not inevitable at all. They resulted from a series of 
manoeuvres of the hawks against Macedonia among the leading Romans, who had 
noticed the importance of winning over not only domestic but also international 
public opinion through considering official and informal interests of the people 
concerned, although an informal diplomacy in the Greek world played a role in 
this diplomatic game. The advocates of the new war in Rome succeeded in 
persuading the Senate, their fellow citizens, and many Greeks, despite lacking 
the official authority to do so, for their own interests. It was informal diplomacy, 
that had been employed by the Greeks and Rome had failed to manage during the 
First Macedonian War owing to a lack of understanding. Such a contrast in Rome’s 
management of foreign affairs, and the political victory of the hawks, in and 
beyond Rome, demonstrate the change of Roman diplomacy with a new factor, 
informal diplomacy.  
What should be considered now is the impact of this on Rome. The 
manoeuvres of the hawks, based on ideas and acts in informal diplomacy, enabled 
Rome to advance into Greece with the support of many Hellenes. The victory of 
Rome over Philippos, a few years later, established Rome as one of the leading 
states of the Greek world, and the success of the hawks may well have encouraged 
not only them but also other Romans to use similar diplomatic methods 
collectively, and possibly individually, in parallel to official ones, even after the 
war. This might have consolidated the role of informal practices in Roman 
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diplomacy. I will explore this matter further, focusing, in particular, on the usage 
of informal diplomacy by Roman individuals in the 190s. The results enable this 
study to show the further spread of this concept in Rome and its significance 
within the foreign and domestic affairs of Rome during the period of her expansion 











This chapter argues that the continuing and expanding use of informal 
diplomacy after the Second Macedonian War was one of the factors that led to the 
growing prominence of the individual within Roman politics. As I showed in 
Chapter 3, Rome’s hawks had used informal diplomacy on the eve of the war, in 
order to commence the hostilities with the support of their fellow citizens and 
many Greeks, besides.1 Even after the war, the Romans developed diplomatic 
practices that operated through channels apart from the formal, official ones, and 
this was also sometimes promoted by the Greeks, who actively accepted and even 
encouraged their use by Rome. I shall demonstrate that this tendency brought 
about the rise of Roman individual users of informal diplomacy, in parallel to 
Rome’s further advance into the Greek world through her defeat of Aitolia and 
Antiochos III of the Seleucids. 
This chapter shows the validity of these views through the analysis of two 
prominent Roman individuals, namely, T. Quinctius Flamininus and P. Cornelius 
Scipio Africanus, from 193 to 189, the period of Rome’s conflict with Aitolia and 
Antiochos. Flamininus had defeated Philippos V of Macedonia in 197, and 
Africanus had overcome Hannibal in 202. Remarkably, they both re-emerged in a 
                                                   
1 For the situation at the beginning of the war, see Hammond 1966: 45-53. As to that 
from 200 to 197, see Eckstein 1976: 126-42 and Hammond 1988: 60-77. 
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diplomatic context after the Macedonian War, despite lacking full authority to do 
so. This study argues that their appearance resulted largely from informal 
diplomacy on their part and that this consequently promoted the spread of this 
practice among other Romans. Consideration of Flamininus and Africanus helps 
to demonstrate the factors that enabled them and potentially other Romans to 
participate in diplomacy and to advance their own personal agenda, even if this 
tendency was at odds with the collective ideology of the Roman nobility and 
legality, as expressed through the Senate and annual magistracies. The results of 
this analysis confirm that the concept informal diplomacy is useful in 
understanding Rome’s expansion and the Republic from the 200s to 133. This 
chapter therefore commences by assessing Flamininus’ participation in diplomacy, 
following his return to Rome in 194. 
 
Section 1: T. Quinctius Flamininus from 193 to 191 
 
Flamininus achieved Roman victory in the Second Macedonian War, 
announcing the Freedom of Greece at the Isthmian Games. This made him a 
notable Roman not only among the Romans but also among the Greeks.2 He 
celebrated a triumph when he returned to Rome with his troops in 194 (Liv. 
34.50.10-52.12). The Romans thus recognised his achievements, but it is worth 
noting that he also won fame in Greece, a factor that is well documented by the 
sources (e.g. App. Mac. 13; IG XII.9.931; SEG XXII.214 and 266.ll.13-14; 
XXIII.412; Syll³ 592 and 616).3 Celebration of a triumph, meanwhile, meant that 
                                                   
2 Dmitriev 2011a: 154-65. 
3 Cf. Sherk 1984: 7-8; Pfeilschifter 2005: 272 n.72; Yarrow 2006: 66; Dmitriev 2011a: 
363; Benoist, Daguet-Gagey, and Cauwenberghe 2011: 210-1. 
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his imperium had expired. He therefore lost the authority to participate in 
diplomacy officially. However, he played a remarkable role in international 
politics even after that. Some of his actions were examples of informal diplomacy, 
although his very participation was partly a result of the machinations and 
struggles between different political groups. As I showed in Chapter 3, the hawks 
against Philippos had risen to prominence on the eve of the Macedonian War. 
Flamininus was among their number. Nevertheless, his appearance in diplomacy 
after 194 was symbolic of a rise of the individual Roman, using informal diplomacy 
reminiscent of the hawks. So, this section considers Flamininus’ actions after 194 
from two perspectives. Firstly, the extent to which he really represented a unique 
presence in diplomacy, and the nature of his diplomatic actions are considered. 
Secondly, the question to what extent the manoeuvres of the political group to 
which he belonged, along with those of other Romans, influenced his participation 
in diplomacy is discussed. These analyses show that his actions and the wider 
Roman advance into the Greek world, during this period, are better understood 
by employing the concept informal diplomacy. 
 
1) Flamininus’ Participation in Diplomacy and its Limitations 
 
To begin with, it is useful to confirm Flamininus’ appearance in diplomacy. 
An example can be found when delegates from the Greek states and Seleucid 
envoys, Menippos and Hegesianax, visited Rome in the spring of 193. In the 
middle of the senatorial session ratifying the arrangement in Greece that 
Flamininus and the ten legati had organised, following his victory over Macedonia, 
he asked the Senate to invite the diplomats to complete the process effectively. 
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According to Livius (at 34.57.5), this was accepted, and he ‘was charged 
(mandatum)’ with listening to the Greek, and moreover, the Seleucid ambassadors 
and responding to them ‘for the dignity and interests of the Roman people (ex 
dignitate atque utilitate populi Romani).’4 He held no office, but was temporarily 
given full power and authority to negotiate as Rome’s representative. 5  C. 
Scribonius, the praetor urbanus in 193, here filled only the role of a guide for the 
visitors into the Senate House (34.57.3). M. Valerius Messala, the praetor 
peregrinus, did not even appear, as far as Livius informs us,6 despite playing a 
remarkable role in another contact with the Seleucids, mentioned later. This 
situation resulted directly from Flamininus’ request to the Senate. Even after the 
consuls had left for their provinces (34.57.1), however, from the viewpoint of the 
ordinary management of the contact with outsiders, there is no reason why it 
should have been Flamininus, rather the praetors, who was entrusted to negotiate 
with the Greek and the Seleucid envoys (34.57.3-59.7). This is undoubtedly an 
irregular type of participation in diplomatic practice, setting aside for now the 
question whether it can be classed as informal diplomacy or not. 
What should be noted here is the impact of Flamininus’ action on the wider 
relationship between Rome and outsiders. He talked with the delegates, in 
particular those of the Seleucids, who visited Rome to want the Republic to make 
an alliance and to approve the Seleucid control over several regions recently 
                                                   
4 As Briscoe 1981: 137 shows, Livius uses here largely Polybios’ lost text as the 
immediate source. This means that the Livian description is credible. The Achaian 
could have derived information about this event from contemporaries, or their 
immediate descendants, in Rome. Furthermore, if the contents had been remarkably 
different from their memory, he would have been criticised by them. Cf. Warrior 
1996b: 357-60; Dmitriev 2011b: 127. 
5 Briscoe 1981: 138. 
6 For these two offices in this period, see Brennan 2000: 98-135. 
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conquered by Antiochos, 7  and after the debate with the latter, Flamininus 
declared before the Greek and the Seleucid envoys that Rome wanted Antiochos 
to quit his territory in Europe and, that if the king did not accept it, Rome would 
liberate the Greeks by force, as the champion of their liberty not only in Greece, 
but also in Asia Minor (Diod. 28.15.3-4; Liv. 34.58.10-12 and 59.4-5). Considering 
the attendance of the Greek envoys and Flamininus’ statements in the formal 
session or more probably sessions, this was not only a message to the Seleucids, 
but also a political demonstration, designed to give the Greeks an impression that 
Antiochos was an enemy of Greek freedom, and that supporting Rome would be 
useful for them. Flamininus played the leading role in this, over the elected 
officers. Since his proposal to the Senate triggered this show of strength, he 
wanted to participate in Roman diplomacy actively, and to distinguish himself in 
such a stage before his contemporaries. His appearance here did not necessarily 
result only from his interests and individuality, though. His statements in the 
dispute with the Seleucids did not derive from his own policy. His declaration 
meant that Rome objected to Antiochos’ supremacy over some of his subjects, and 
promised to enforce Roman will by military action, if necessary. This could have 
been regarded by the Seleucids as an ultimatum, whether Flamininus meant it or 
simply made a defiant and rhetorical threat. If his statements had not been 
arranged with other senators, he would likely have been criticised by them soon. 
Furthermore, the main content of his message, the question of the legitimacy of 
Antiochos’ advance into Europe, was similar to speeches heard in the previous 
meeting between the king and other senators at Lysimacheia in 196 (App. Syr. 3; 
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Diod. 28.12; Liv. 33.39; Polyb. 18.50-2).8 This contact had not been made under 
Flamininus’ control. 9  His statements in 193 were therefore consistent with 
previous Roman policy, rather than indicative of a personal agenda. Indeed, even 
after 193, the negotiation with the Seleucids regarding their spheres of influence 
was continued by the Senate (cf. Liv. 35.13.6-17.3).10 
My argument focuses on the relationship between the Senate and 
Flamininus, an individual, and between regularity and irregularity in diplomacy 
distinctively, in order to demonstrate his unique position in Roman diplomacy 
after 194. This approach, however, would be rejected by some scholars, who argue 
that Rome generally managed the selection of her diplomatic managers, and their 
relative authority, in a flexible manner.11 In particular, L. M. Yarrow urges that 
it is not useful to consider the power of a person appointed to deal with some task 
by distinguishing between the formal or legal sphere and the informal one, since 
it depended on his dignity.12  This is reasonable to some extent. Considering 
Flamininus’ fame in Greece, it looks to have been natural for the senators to 
entrust him, not the praetors, with talking to the envoys. Nevertheless, this 
argument regarding flexibility within Roman diplomacy does not explain why he 
simply followed, or was compelled to follow, the approach to the Seleucids that 
had been developed by other senators. Furthermore, even in this period, Rome 
considered the official position and procedure important. This is supported by 
Flamininus’ letter to the Chyretians, when he was the general in Greece. He first 
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11 Cf. Briscoe 1980: 195; Carawan 1988: 229; Gargola 1995: 34. 
12 Yarrow 2012: 169-84. 
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announced that he was a στρατηγὸς ὕπατος, the proconsul,13 and then assured 
the Chyretians that Rome would return landed property and buildings (IG 
IX.2.338.ll.1-2 and 8-10).14 This respect for the official position is also seen in the 
letter of C. Livius Salinator to Delphoi in 189/8. At the beginning, he introduced 
himself as the consul (RDGE 38.l.1).15 In the senatorial decree to Thisbe in c. 170, 
Q. Maenius, the proposer, appeared as the praetor, first of all (RDGE 2.l.1).16 
Flamininus and his contemporaries considered it important that the message to 
other states was made by people with authority, and that this power was shown 
publicly. The flexibility emphasised by Yarrow does not explain these situations, 
nor does it explain Flamininus’ appearance in place of the state officers in 193. 
Yarrow’s argument, however, does provide a hint to the nature of 
Flamininus’ strange position in 193. He was distinctly different from other 
Romans, having won great fame in Greece by ending the Macedonian War in 197 
and announcing the Freedom of Greece in 196. The Romans were sensitive not 
only to what was said, but also who spoke it. This was embodied in the notion of 
auctoritas, a respect for an extra-legal authority. They regarded it as a means of 
influencing others through moral superiority and confidence.17 Considering this, 
the proposal by Flamininus, and the approval by the Senate of his talking with 
the Greeks and the Seleucids, derived from this very Roman idea. This also means 
                                                   
13 For the translation, the term ἀνθύπατος was used from the latter half of the 
century onwards. In the period of Flamininus, however, this had not been adopted yet, 
as the other instances after his letters also show, and then στρατηγὸς ὕπατος was 
used just as the case of the consul even when the precise position was proconsul (e.g. 
Syll³ 591.l.69 and 592.l.1). Mason 1974: 106 and 165-6. 
14 Cf. RDGE 33; Armstrong and Walsh 1986: 32-46. 
15 Bagnall and Derow 2004: no.41. 
16 Ibid.: no.45. 




that the Senate attempted here to win over international public opinion around 
Greece with an extra-legal power. In light of the fact that Rome’s negotiation with 
the Seleucids had come to a deadlock in 196, it is reasonable to believe that Rome 
used this approach. Winning over neighbours might change the situation 
favourably towards Rome.18 Thus, Flamininus’ appearance in 193 shows that 
Rome had noticed the importance of international public opinion, and had 
developed the idea of using an extra-legal or a channel apart from official contacts 
among states in diplomatic games. 
It is further noteworthy that, in 193, the Senate used such an extra-legal 
power, while at the same time making it compatible with legal procedure and 
senatorial leadership within the Roman diplomatic framework. This is confirmed 
by the term mandatum in the above Livian text at 34.57.5. 19  Flamininus’ 
irregular participation in the negotiation was legitimised by the Senate’s 
permission. The senators noticed and exploited his extra-legal power but also 
respected legality, harmonising both aspects. Moreover, their permission was 
issued in public. It made contemporaries notice that Flamininus was able to talk 
with the envoys only because the Senate approved it, and that the Senate was 
therefore superior to him, despite his seemingly crucial role in the negotiation. 
With this in mind, Flamininus’ appearance in 193 can be now labelled an act of 
informal diplomacy, driven partly by himself, but largely by the Senate. He used 
his extra-legal power to distinguish himself. The Senate employed his personal 
influence while considering its legal position and the views of other 
contemporaries. 
                                                   
18 Badian 1959: 86-92. 
19 For the similarity of this chapter to that of Diodoros, and the historicity inferred 
by their sources, see Briscoe 1981: 137. 
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The leadership of the Senate in conducting negotiations with the Seleucids 
is further confirmed by a letter from Rome to Teos, to invest the Ionian city with 
ἀσυλία and ἀφορολογησία in this year of 193 (RDGE 34.ll.20-1). In lines 1 to 8,20 
these privileges were bestowed by M. Valerius Messala, the praetor peregrinus, 
as well as the tribuni plebis and the Senate, based on Teos’ request. It is 
noteworthy that this was brought by Menippos, one of the Seleucid envoys 
mentioned above, to these Romans. Messala was not mentioned in connection 
with the discussion with the Seleucids before the Greeks. In contrast, this Teian 
case was managed by him with the senators (and the tribuni). There is no sign, in 
this case, that Flamininus was connected with it. Other than matters particularly 
entrusted to him, the remaining negotiations were conducted in the usual manner. 
This letter also shows that the Senate (and ordinary officers) generally managed 
complicated interests of outsiders, those of the Hellenistic states here, while 
showing the pattern to contemporaries just as in the senatorial announcement 
with the term mandatum in Flamininus’ case. This is confirmed by considering 
the significance of Rome’s recognition of ἀφορολογησία for Teos, setting aside that 
of ἀσυλία. The Romans might not have understood the notion ἀσυλία in this 
period. There is no similar case before it. Livius does not mention this investment 
in his description of 193, or in that of Rome’s campaign to Teos in the war against 
Antiochos, a few years later (cf. 37.27-8).21 Yet, for ἀφορολογησία, the exemption 
from tribute, Rome could not have misunderstood its importance in international 
politics. It is significant that Antiochos had invested Teos with ἀσυλία and 
ἀφορολογησία in c. 203, while ‘liberating’ the city from the payment due to 
                                                   
20 Cf. Austin 2006: 358-9. 
21 Rigsby 1996: 286 and 314-6. 
157 
 
Attalos I of Pergamon (SEG XLI.1003.ll.17-22). 22  The Attalids had informed 
Rome about their difficulties in 201, and of the Seleucids’ threat in the 
Macedonian War (Liv. 31.2.1 and 32.8.8-10).23 The Romans had been therefore 
aware of what Antiochos had done in Teos. The announcement of ἀφορολογησία 
in Messala’s letter supported the Seleucids’ action against Attalos. The message 
meant that Rome recognised that Teos was worthy of being privileged as a city 
with tax exemption, just as Antiochos had done and contrary to Attalos. This 
message to Teos certainly resulted from a consideration of the complicated 
situation in international politics. In the negotiations with the Seleucids of 193, 
Flamininus appeared to be the director of Roman diplomacy before the Greek 
envoys. The letter regarding Teos, however, demonstrated that the real leaders in 
this process remained the senators and magistrates. Participation in foreign 
affairs by individuals, through the irregular procedure of informal diplomacy, 
might have been accepted by the Romans, but this development could not 
necessarily influence Roman diplomacy as a whole, yet. 
However, in the field, Flamininus’ celebrity gave him a unique and more 
independent position. This can be observed in 192. During this year, Aitolia 
plotted to start a war against Rome with the Seleucids. Flamininus was sent as 
one of the legati to reduce tensions in Greece, visiting Athens, Chalkis, Thessalia, 
Demetrias, Aitolia, and Achaia (Liv. 35.31-4).24 During these travels, Zenon, a 
pro-Roman leader of Demetrias, mentioned to the assembly that ‘the Magnetes 
(in which the citizens of Demetrias were included) were indebted to T. Quinctius 
and the Romans not only for their liberty but also everything (Magnetas non 
                                                   
22 Cf. n.43 in Chapter 3. 
23 Cf. Badian 1959: 82-4. 
24 Larsen 1952: 1; Grainger 2002: 151. 
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libertatem modo, sed omnia … T. Quinctio et populo Romano debere),’ although 
present in the session was not only Flamininus but some or all of the other Roman 
envoys (35.31.4-16, esp. 15).25 While his colleagues were ignored, his presence 
encouraged the pro-Romans within the city. If Aitolia had not mobilised its troops 
quickly (35.34.1-12), Demetrias would have supported Rome. This tendency is also 
seen in the statements of Rome’s enemies. After Antiochos landed in Greece with 
his troops in the fall of 192,26 Aitolia sent delegates to Achaia’s council, to request 
Achaia to maintain its neutrality. In the course of the appeal, one of the Aitolians 
asserted the just nature of their cause, and ‘then criticised unrestrained abuse of 
the Romans in general and in particular that of Quinctius (provectus deinde est 
intemperantia linguae in maledicta nunc communiter Romanorum, nunc proprie 
ipsius Quinctii),’ while referring to Aitolia’s contribution to Rome’s victory over 
Macedonia and to his ingratitude toward Aitolia’s support during the war 
(35.48.10-13, esp. 11). In fact, Aitolia’s opposition to Rome seemed to result from 
his refusal to hand over Larisa Cremaste, Echinos, and Pharsalos as rewards for 
its supporting Rome, after the war. The validity of Aitolia’s complaints was 
accepted even by contemporaries such as Polybios (3.7.1-3 and 18.38.3-39.2; cf. 
Liv. 33.13.6-13).27 Flamininus was a symbolic figure even for people beyond the 
Romans or Roman sympathisers. 
The strength of Flamininus’ influence in Greece is also evident in his 
dealings with Messenia in 191. After Antiochos’ defeat at Thermopylai, Messenia 
was urged by Achaia to join its federation. In order to avoid further pressure, the 
Messenians ‘sent their message through the envoys to T. Quinctius at Chalkis to 
                                                   
25 Pfeilschifter 2005: 253-8. 
26 Deininger 1971: 74; Grainger 2002: 192-7. 
27 Sacks 1975: 93; Walsh 1993: 35. 
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the effect that he was the author of their liberty and then they would open their 
gates to the Romans and surrender their city to them, but not to the Achaians 
(legatos Chalcidem ad T. Quinctium, auctorem libertatis, miserunt, qui 
nuntiarent Messenios Romanis, non Achaeis, et aperire portas et dedere urbem 
paratos esse).’ Flamininus ‘ordered (imperavit)’ that Achaia not attack Messenia, 
that Messenia should become a member of the Achaian League, and that if 
Messenia wished to voice a concern, then they should complain about it to him at 
Corinth (Liv. 36.31.5-9, esp. 5 and 9). His judgement was accepted by both parties. 
It is noteworthy that Livius uses the term impero here. Using this verb was not 
necessarily restricted to the magistrates with imperium, but its usage suggests 
that Flamininus behaved as if he possessed the power to demand or enjoin 
outsiders, even though he was only a legatus. Polybios also treats his observation 
here as a διάγραμμα (ordinance) at 22.10.6. 28  Contemporaries, such as this 
Polybios, considered Flamininus’ statement to be a form of order to both states, a 
viewpoint that was followed by later historians, such as Livius. These confirm 
that Flamininus’ influence in Greece was much stronger than in Rome, and 
suggest that he conducted informal diplomacy; he lacked any suitable authority, 
but exercised power in a channel apart from official authority, participating 
actively in Roman diplomacy. 
One might argue that Flamininus’ behaviour should be rather explained by 
the flexibility of Roman diplomacy, and that it was not a deviation from the 
traditional authority given to legati. Certainly, similar cases of envoys 
participating in disputes among outsiders can be found. One such example is that 
                                                   
28 Walbank 1979: 193; Briscoe 1981: 268. 
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of the three senators sent to Carthage in 195 (Liv. 33.47.3-9).29 They endeavoured 
to disgrace Hannibal, following the request of his rivals. Such actions, however, 
resulted from a senatorial order issued beforehand. By contrast, Flamininus 
accepted Messenia’s appeal without any specific senatorial order, judged it 
independently, and announced that any further dispute should be brought to him. 
He had been sent to reduce friction between the Romans and the Greeks before 
the war. Settling this dispute between Messenia and Achaia, after its outbreak, 
was beyond the mandate of his original task or the flexible management of it. 
Furthermore, at this time, imperium in Greece was held by M’. Acilius Glabrio, 
the consul, who was assigned to Greece as his provincia and had recently defeated 
Antiochos at Thermopylai. There is no indication that Flamininus had been 
ordered to manage the appeals from Messenia by Glabrio or the Senate. From the 
viewpoint of legality, then, this Messenian case should have been brought by 
Flamininus to the two official decision-makers; nevertheless, Flamininus 
accepted the appeal himself. He exploited the fact that Messenia depended on him, 
as an opportunity to participate in diplomacy, and issued independently a 
message that would be treated as an order by the Greeks. The two Greek states, 
then, followed it. This partly resulted from the fact that Flamininus’ decision was 
favourable to them. In fact, Diophanes, who managed the negotiation as Achaia’s 
στρατηγός of this 192/1, would be praised by the federation later for his 
contribution to the unification of the Peloponnesos (Paus. 8.30.5).30 For Achaia, 
Flamininus’ judgement was acceptable, whether his authority was absolute or not, 
although Achaia was forced by him to cede Zakynthos to Rome (Liv. 36.31.9-32.9; 
                                                   
29 Grainger 2002: 120. 




Plut. Flam. 17.2).31 For Messenia, it was better to follow his decision, and thus to 
secure a channel for negotiation about its future position, than to reject the 
judgement and continue the war, especially since Messenia was inferior in 
strength to Achaia. In any case, Flamininus acted not as an instrument of the 
Senate, but rather as a significant participant in diplomacy, with authority over 
the consul and the Senate. This was informal diplomacy by a powerful Roman 
individual, strengthening his dignity in and beyond Rome. 
However, Flamininus participated in diplomacy here not solely because he 
wanted to do so. This is shown by considering the factors that enabled him to take 
part in this case. In fact, the Messenian case resulted largely from the fact that 
Glabrio had driven Antiochos from Greece, regardless of any influence of 
Flamininus (App. Syr. 17-20; Liv. 36.17-19 and 21).32 Greeks who had sided with 
Antiochos, such as the Messenians, had to make amends with Rome quickly. Even 
for Achaia, Rome’s victory meant Roman dominance. It was sensible to negotiate 
with an influential Roman, whether he was really a representative of the state or 
not. This is an imperfect analysis, though. Certainly, Antiochos’ defeat may well 
have softened the attitude of the Greeks towards Rome. It does not explain, 
however, why Messenia did not make contact with Glabrio, the victor of 
Thermopylai, but rather with Flamininus. Perhaps he was visited by the 
Massenians because he was the physically closest to them, but this is not 
reasonable either. When he was approached by them, he was at Chalkis. Glabrio 
had taken Herakleia and was confronting the Aitolians at Naupaktos (36.27-30). 
The difference of the distances between the two Romans and the Messenians, then, 
                                                   
31 Pfeilschifter 2005: 233-4. 
32 For more detail on the campaign of Antiochos and the Aitolians, from his landing 
on Greece to the Battle of Thermopylai, see Grainger 2002: 192-246. 
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does not explain their decision. Furthermore, they must have understood the 
superiority of the consul to Flamininus, since the former had troops, while the 
latter was without arms. There appears to be little reason for Messenia to request 
Flamininus to act as a judge, instead of Glabrio. It is useful to remember that the 
Messenians announced that they sent envoys to him because he was the auctor 
libertatis (36.31.5). This does not mean Flamininus liberated Messenia,33 but it 
shows that what was important for them was not his military or legal powers, but 
his achievements and reputation. The Messenians expected that if any Greek 
state asked him to defend its position as a free state, he would treat it favourably, 
since he had gained fame partly owing of his declaration of the Freedom of Greece. 
If he had ignored the request, his reputation, and that of Rome, by implication, 
would have been damaged. This approach was therefore an effective one for 
Messenia, when opening negotiations with Achaia. The federation was also 
guaranteed independence, as a Greek state, and benefitted from the 
announcement. So, Achaia could do little but respect the spirit of the proclamation 
and the judgements of its sponsor: Flamininus. Thus, while he behaved as an 
independent decision-maker, his fame as a guarantor of the Freedom of Greece 
was used, in a sense, by Messenia. The Messenian case was not only an informal 
diplomacy by him resulting from his unique power but also that by Messenia 
using it. 
This informal diplomacy of Flamininus, and the imperfect nature thereof, 
are also observed in Livius’ text regarding an event at the end of the war against 
Aitolia at 36.34.4-6: 
 
                                                   
33 Briscoe 1981: 268. 
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T. Quinctius … obambulare muris, ut facile nosceretur ab Aetolis, 
coepit. confestim a primis stationibus cognitus est, vulgatumque per 
omnes ordines, Quinctium esse. itaque concursu facto undique in 
muros manus pro se quisque tendentes consonante clamore 
nominatim Quinctium orare, ut opem ferret ac servaret. et tum 
quidem, quamquam moveretur his vocibus, manu tamen abnuit 
quicquam opis in se esse. 
 
This occurred when Antiochos had withdrawn from Greece and Naupaktos, a city 
of Aitolia abandoned by him, had almost fallen in 191.34 Flamininus approached 
the citizens in front of the Roman soldiers under Glabrio. Upon hearing the 
citizens’ plea for support, Flamininus announced that he could not help them by 
himself, but wanted to mediate between the populace and the consul. This 
behaviour is unquestionably an example of informal diplomacy. He intervened in 
an active campaign, without any order from Rome, and despite lacking full 
authority. Plutarchos relates that Flamininus appeared in front of the citizens, 
but told nothing about mediation, though even in this description, his 
independent mediation between the consul and populace is supported (Flam. 15.3 
and 5). It is, meanwhile, significant that in both texts Flamininus showed the 
citizens that the decision was Glabrio’s to make, whether before or eventually 
during the mediation, in contrast to his conduct in the Messenian case. 
Flamininus approached the citizens while apparently expecting that they would 
ask him to support them by participating in the negotiation. He did not hesitate 
to show his influence in public, but also did not compete with the consul or official 
power. This pattern follows for the case of the negotiations with Achaia in the 
same year. In the meeting, he was still noticed by the Romans and the Greeks. 
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The extant sources relate that he made a speech there, despite Glabrio’s 
attendance (Liv. 36.35.7; Plut. Philop. 17.2-6). 35  Flamininus distinguished 
himself, but it was nonetheless apparent for the Greek attendees that he was 
inferior in authority to Glabrio, a consul with imperium and troops, who acted as 
an ordinary representative of Rome. Flamininus did not dare to show his influence 
before the attendees, except in his speech.  
Overall, Flamininus repeatedly participated in Greek affairs by means of a 
reputation gained in his campaign in Greece, despite lacking full authority to do 
so. His influence over the Greeks was recognised and accepted by the senators. 
The Greeks took note of him, whether he had authority or not. This situation 
sometimes enabled him to behave as an entity distinct from Roman 
representatives, namely the consul and the Senate, in Greece. Considering the 
respect of the Romans toward formal legality in this period, this position of 
Flamininus did not result simply from a flexibility within Roman diplomacy, but 
was a sign of the rising importance of extra-legal powers, and their users, on the 
international stage. This phenomenon would obviously conflict with the 
traditional order at the heart of Roman diplomacy. At least, as I have shown in 
the first three chapters, it had been managed under the collective authority of the 
Senate, even if some individuals played important roles. 
Flamininus, meanwhile, possessed considerable extra-legal power, but 
could not wield it as freely as he desired, and was conscious of this. In the 
negotiation with the Seleucids, his informal influence was generally utilised by 
the Senate, and in the field was regarded as inferior in power to the consular 
                                                   
35  Concerning the political context of the meeting and the discussion about the 
sources, see Eckstein 1995a: 271-89 and Pfeilschifter 2005: 236-7. 
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authority by Flamininus himself. The success of his intervention in other Greek 
affairs partly depended on the Greeks’ interests in addition to Rome’s ascendancy 
there. Nevertheless, he certainly could behave as a distinctive diplomatic player. 
I would argue that there is therefore a grey area in Roman diplomacy in this 
period, in terms of how authority was quantified. There is, actually, a way to 
clarify the mechanism more. It is useful to remember that, as Chapter 3 revealed, 
hawks played an important role in international politics on the eve of the Second 
Macedonian War, despite lacking full authority at the beginning. Flamininus’ 
participation in diplomacy was occurring only shortly after their informal actions. 
He was apparently a supporter of the Macedonian War. This suggests that his 
appearance in diplomacy should also be set in the context of the rise of 
factionalism among leading Romans, and that the degree of Flamininus’ 
independence partly depended on his relationship with the dominant group and 
moreover its rivals, after the war. This chapter now focuses on his political 
position, and the trends observed in connection with leading Romans, during this 
period. This contributes to a better understanding of his informal diplomacy, and 
to finding the underlying factors behind independent diplomatic action. 
 
2) Flamininus and the Political Groups of Rome 
 
It is now necessary to show that the former hawks against Macedonia had 
maintained power in Rome, even after Philippos’ defeat. This is first confirmed by 
the selection of the envoys chosen to negotiate with the Seleucids after 193. Rome 
dispatched P. Sulpicius Galba, P. Villius Tappulus and P. Aelius Paetus (Liv. 
34.59.8). As was shown in Chapter 3, they had assumed high offices, such as the 
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consulship and the censorship, and had been important leaders among the hawks 
against Macedonia. Sending these three senators means that the former 
advocates of the Macedonian War still held sway in Roman diplomacy towards the 
Hellenistic states. This tendency is confirmed by the censorship of Sex. Aelius 
Paetus in 194. He was a younger brother of P. Paetus and had assumed the 
consulship with Flamininus in 198, when the Macedonian War had been directed 
by the hawks.36 Considering the number of such senators who assumed high 
offices, and their close relationship with one another (suggested by their 
participation in the same delegation and ties of blood relations), the influence of 
the former hawks against Macedonia was clearly maintained. 
This may well have been a factor in enabling Flamininus’ success in the 
negotiations with the Greek and the Seleucid envoys in 193. He had belonged to 
the group that encouraged the Macedonian War. With Tappulus and P. Paetus, 
Flamininus had served on a committee, in 201, to assign land to the soldiers who 
had fought in Africa in the Hannibalic War (Liv. 31.4.1-3). This had been a 
measure by the hawks, designed to win over voters in Rome, in order to persuade 
the assembly to support the dispatch of troops to Greece. Flamininus had worked 
as a member of this group on the eve and in the middle of the Macedonian War 
and was, in turn, supported by them, in light of his remarkable assumption of the 
consulship in 198.37 His appearance in 193 resulted from his own influence over 
the Greeks, but also partly from the fact that this group strove to maintain its 
influence on the management of the Greek affairs. 
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It is true that the significance of political groups in the Middle Republic is 
generally controversial.38 Certainly, it is unreasonable to agree with the previous 
theories about them, particularly in connection with the Roman advance into 
Greece. For example, H. H. Scullard thinks that, in the 190s, members of the so-
called Claudian Group restrained the philhellenism of Flamininus and his other 
dogmatic actions, by appointing other senators to the managers of Greek affairs.39 
There is, however, no sign of a disagreement, at least, between him and the envoys 
sent to Asia Minor after his negotiations at Rome in 193. Rather, Galba supported 
Flamininus in those with the Seleucids at Rome (Liv. 34.59.1-2).40 J. P. V. D. 
Balsdon, meanwhile, argues against the theory of the Claudian Group, and 
attempts to show the rise of the group of experts on Greek affairs in several 
negotiations with the Greeks and the Seleucids in the 190s. 41  This is more 
acceptable, to an extent. In this decade, aspects of Rome’s negotiations with the 
eastern Greeks were continuously managed under the leadership of Flamininus, 
who may well have known more about them than other Romans. This pattern 
follows for the three senators mentioned above, because they assumed important 
offices and led the Romans from the middle of the Macedonian War.42 Yet, their 
frequent appearance did not result wholly from their expertise. E. S. Gruen 
successfully shows that Rome did not regard this factor as very important in 
matters of diplomatic management.43 Moreover, the Republic could not find many 
experts on Greece easily in the 190s. Galba, Tappulus and Paetus achieved 
                                                   
38 Cf. Hölkeskamp 2001: 92-105. 
39 Scullard 1951: 107. 
40 For the context, see Dmitriev 2011a: 209-23. 
41 Balsdon 1967: 185-6. 
42 Cf. Bickerman 1932: 47-55; Badian 1959: 82-90; Seager 1981: 109-10. 
43 Gruen 1984: 203-19. 
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nothing great during the Second Macedonian War (cf. 31.2.5-11, 32.1-5, 40.1-6, 
and 32.3.2-7). Therefore, the appearance of Flamininus in 193 is better explained 
by the idea that the former warmongers still maintained an influence on Roman 
diplomacy. Considering this, his absence from the delegation after his 
negotiations in Rome, in 193, might also be understood as an arrangement to 
afford other members of the faction access to opportunities for gaining renown. 
Flamininus is absent from the delegation dispatched to Asia Minor after 
the negotiations at Rome in 193, but was sent to Greece in 192. It is in this 
dispatch that the influence of the former hawks can also be observed. Tappulus 
was a member of the deputation (Liv. 35.23.5). The appointment of Cn. Octavius 
as their colleague may also support this view. He had served on the committee for 
the colonisation at Crotona in 194, with C. Laetorius (34.45.5). Laetorius seemed 
to be identified as the lieutenant of P. Sempronius Tuditanus, one of the lead 
advocates of the Macedonian War (29.12.5 and 31.2.1-4).44 As was shown by the 
distribution of land for the soldiers who had fought in Africa, selection for 
committees resulted primarily from the political position of the candidates 
concerned, at least in this period. Octavius may well have been a friend of 
Laetorius, and one of those who had promoted the Macedonian War, or been their 
ally. Moreover, in 192, L. Quinctius Flamininus, the brother of T. Flamininus, was 
elected as the consul (35.10.10). T. Flamininus and his colleagues were dispatched 
under the influence of the former promoters of the war, their families and friends. 
The influence of the former hawks against Macedonia, to whom Flamininus 
had belonged, however, was not the only factor in his dispatch to Greece in 192. 
                                                   
44 Briscoe 1973: 112. 
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It also resulted from their political struggles with their rivals. There was at least 
one more group determined to participate in directing Greek affairs within the 
Senate, during this period: that of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus. Setting aside 
whether or not it was really led by Africanus, now, the existence of a group 
opposed to that of Flamininus is revealed by considering the management of 
Rome’s military affairs in 192. In this period, Nabis, Sparta’s king and an anti-
Roman leader beyond Aitolia, began the campaign to restore his influence in the 
Peloponnesos, and Aitolia also started to move its troops.45 While the Senate sent 
Flamininus and his colleagues to negotiate with the Greek states, L. Oppius 
Salinator and M. Baebius Tamphilus were simultaneously ordered to protect 
Sicily and southern Italy respectively (Liv. 35.23.5-6). Since, during the election 
for the magistrates of 192, the Romans had expected a conflict with Antiochos and 
Aitolia,46  these were the measures designed to prepare the Republic for the 
coming war against them (and possibly against Nabis). It is noteworthy that 
Oppius had only assumed the plebeian aedilis in 193 and, in 192, took part in the 
operation as a legatus cum imperio. There are actually few recorded cases of this 
kind of legatus.47 When the Senate needed generals, the consul and praetor, and 
sometimes those who had assumed the offices, were normally appointed. 
Salinator’s appointment seemingly suggests that the Senate could not find good 
candidates in the usual way and selected him as an extraordinary measure. Yet, 
there were other senators with sufficient credentials: Flamininus and Tappulus. 
They had assumed the consulship, but the Senate had sent them as its 
                                                   
45 For the position of Sparta and the relation with Rome in the 190s, see Eckstein 
1987c: 213-33, Carawan 1988: 231-5, Cartledge and Spawforth 1989: 68-71, and 
Shipley 2000: 381. 
46 Tatum 2001: 391. 
47 Briscoe 1973: 194. 
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ambassadors to Greece. If the leadership of the former hawks had been still 
definitely strong, they would likely have stopped this plan. In fact, it may well 
have been possible to negotiate with the Greeks from Sicily and southern Italy, 
through letters and envoys, even while defending these regions. In particular, 
considering the difference in celebrity between Tappulus and Flamininus, the 
Senate could have selected the former as its commander. Although there is no 
information about Salinator’s political position, the dispatch of Flamininus and 
Tappulus to Greece suggests that the former advocates of the Macedonian War 
still could participate in Greek affairs, but that someone or some senators 
consciously and tactically prevented them from controlling Roman foreign affairs 
completely, especially in light of Salinator’s irregular selection for the military 
command and of the significance of southern Italy and Sicily when a war with 
eastern states was expected. 
This view is supported by Tamphilus’ eventual dispatch to Greece with 
troops, and Africanus’ influence over the decision. Tamphilus was originally 
assigned to Hispania Citerior by ballot, but the Senate changed the result and 
sent him and his troops to Bruttium (Liv. 35.20.8-9 and 11), before transferring 
both to protect Tarentum and Brundisium, when Flamininus had been sent to 
Greece (35.23.5). Finally, Tamphilus advanced into Apollonia on the eve of 
Seleucid troops’ arriving in Greece (35.24.7). It was not odd that he, as praetor, 
controlled troops, but the region assigned to him was decided by the Senate only 
after the ordinary casting of lots. His appointment as the general was a product 
of senatorial intervention. So, what made the Senate decide to follow this path? It 
is necessary to consider the precise conditions surrounding the rise of a faction 
opposed to that of Flamininus. Tamphilus was apparently a relative of Q. Baebius, 
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the tribunus plebis of 200, and Cn. Baebius Tamphilus, the aedilis of the same 
year (31.6.4-6 and 50.3). They had criticised the hawks against Macedonia, and 
seemed to be tied with Africanus.48 Africanus had compromised with the hawks 
in 200 (cf. 31.8.6 and 49.5),49 but following the withdrawal of the troops with 
Flamininus from Greece in 194, something that was decided against Africanus’ 
wishes (34.43.3-9), he had broken away from them. Indeed, the canvassing for the 
consular election for 192 was ‘keener than had ever been before (magis quam 
umquam alias)’, and resulted in L. Flamininus and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus 
being elected (35.10.1 and 10). The former had served in the Macedonian War as 
a legatus cum imperio, on the order of the Senate, itself under the control of the 
hawks (32.16.2, 33.17.2, and 15),50 and hence he may have been their friend. 
Domitius would serve as a legatus under L. Scipio, Africanus’ brother, in 190, and 
would play an active part in the campaign against Aitolia and Antiochos (cf. App. 
Syr. 30-6).51 Domitius was trusted by the Scipiones. Thus, in 192, Africanus’ 
influence was comparable to that of Flamininus’ group, and both were in 
competition with one another. Considering the familial relationship between 
Africanus and the Baebii, Tamphilus’ dispatch to Apollonia shows that Africanus’ 
side controlled military affairs, possibly along with Salinator. Since P. Cornelius 
Scipio Nasica had failed to be elected in the election for the consulship of 192, 
despite Africanus’ support (Liv. 35.8.1-9, 10.1-11, and 24.4), the latter’s position 
was not completely superior to the supporters of Flamininus. Nevertheless, 
Flamininus’ special position in Greece in 192 resulted not only from his extra-
                                                   
48 Eckstein 2008: 216 and 257-9. 
49 Dorey 1959: 293-5. 
50 Cf. MRR : 332. 
51 Briscoe 1973: 330. 
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legal influence, the tactics of the Greeks, and the influence of his friends, but also 
from the rise of Africanus and his friends in managing Roman foreign affairs. 
The lack of troops, as a result of such political infighting, influenced 
Flamininus’ diplomatic approach in Greece. After Nabis began his campaign to 
recover Lakonia, Achaia planned to counter Sparta. Flamininus wanted Achaia 
to wait until Rome’s troops had arrived. However, Philopoimen, Achaia’s leader, 
urged his fellow citizens not to accept the request, but to open hostilities 
immediately. They followed his advice (Liv. 35.25.5-12; cf. Plut. Philop. 14).52 It is 
a sign of the Achaians’ respect for Flamininus that they listened to the request,53 
but they rejected it. If he had possessed troops, as in the period before 194, I would 
argue that Achaia would likely have accepted his request. In 195, while possessing 
soldiers and imperium, he had wanted to make peace with Nabis, despite the 
desire of Achaia and other Greek states who had sent troops to support 
Flamininus in order to dethrone the king, and they reluctantly withdrew their 
soldiers (Liv. 34.33.4-34.9, 38.3, and 43.1-2). In contrast to 195, in 192 he was only 
a legatus without troops. The Achaians observed his lack of practical power and 
politely ignored his request that, in contrast to the Messenian case, was not 
profitable to them. 
Flamininus, nevertheless, tenaciously participated in Roman diplomacy, 
while tactically using his extra-legal power, and thus increased his influence on 
this stage. Indeed, neither the Senate nor Glabrio tried to stop Flamininus, or 
                                                   
52 Burton 2011: 209-10. 
53 Their attitude towards Flamininus might have partly resulted from the alliance 
between Rome and Achaia, which is said to have concluded in c. 192/1. Badian 1952: 
80; Eckstein 2008: 332-3. Cf. Gruen 1984: 33-8; De Libero 1997: 272. If it had been 
made, it enabled Flamininus to want Achaia to do something and led Achaia to listen 
to it, as well as his reputation in Greece. 
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criticised his attitude towards Messenia. It might have been partly because, for 
the Roman authorities, this case was trivial. Once Messenia lacked any will to 
fight against Rome, whether the former belonged to Achaia was of no consequence 
to Rome’s war against Aitolia and the Seleucids, who had not yet been completely 
defeated. If Glabrio and the Senate had been able to criticise Flamininus, however, 
I would argue that they would have done so. Glabrio had been defeated in the 
consular election of 192 by L. Flamininus and Domitius (Liv. 35.10.3 and 10), and 
had no reason for overlooking Flamininus’ action if it was illegal, even though he 
had obtained Zakynthos. 54  The same can be said for the Senate, in which 
Africanus’ influence had risen. Their silence means that, although Flamininus’ 
behaviour might be irregular, it was not so outrageous that they could criticise 
him. Considering his action at Naupaktos as well, he was sensitive to what could 
be achieved by his extra-legal power, and therefore took part in Roman diplomacy 
as often as possible, to increase his individual influence. 
Even for Flamininus, though, it was impossible to balance decisively the 
relationship between his informal diplomacy, the Senate’s official authority, and 
the political manoeuvres of other senators. This is shown by his failure when he 
supported Aitolia’s peace negotiations with Rome. Through his good offices at 
Naupaktos in 191, an armistice was granted by Glabrio. (Liv. 36.35.6). 55 
Considering the fact that he confiscated the Aitolians’ properties in Delphoi in this 
period (RDGE 37; SEG XXVII.123), 56  Glabrio did not stop his campaign 
completely. Yet, the truce pleased Aitolia, and displayed Flamininus’ influence. 
                                                   
54 Glabrio, meanwhile, may well have been a supporter of Africanus and then a friend 
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African campaign in 201 (Liv. 30.40.9-16 and 43.2-3). Cf. Briscoe 1972: 38. 
55 Eckstein 1995b: 271-88. 
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This should be counted as a triumph of informal diplomacy by Flamininus, since 
it resulted from his independent approach to the citizens of Naupaktos. Yet, his 
further participation in diplomacy was forestalled. After Glabrio permitted Aitolia 
to negotiate with the Senate about peace, Flamininus promised Aitolia that he 
would support the negotiations in Rome, and returned home with its envoys, but 
the attitude of the Senate was hostile. It announced that the Aitolians should 
place themselves unreservedly in the hands of the Romans or to pay a fine of one 
thousand talents, and should hold the same friends and enemies as the Romans. 
The envoys could not help but return home without any result (Liv. 37.1.1-6).57 
Flamininus may have told the envoys how to talk in the Senate, and perhaps 
engaged in negotiations behind the scenes with the senators, but these appear to 
have had no impact on them. This situation might have resulted largely from the 
weakness of his friends within the Senate. During this period, L. Scipio, the 
brother of Africanus, and C. Laelius, his friend, were elected as the consuls of 190 
(36.45.9).58 It was natural, then, that, despite Flamininus’ support, there were 
more senators declaring against Aitolia than those for it, while supporting him 
(37.1.4). Thus, the influence of Flamininus’ rivals, and the collective, official power 
of the Senate here, combined to restrict his informal diplomacy, although his 
independent support for Aitolia was not criticised. 
It is significant that this failure dented Flamininus’ reputation, and might 
have decreased his informal power in the management of Greek affairs. Even 
after the meeting in Rome, negotiations persisted. The peace was concluded in 
189 but, importantly, it was achieved by the mediation of Rhodes, Athens, and 
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other Roman individuals (Liv. 38.10.4-6; Polyb. 21.25.10-11, 21.26.7-19, and 
21.31.5-16).59 Considering his aggressive attitude towards intervening in Greek 
affairs in the Messenian case, and the pose shown at Naupaktos, Flamininus 
might have wanted to participate in the negotiation further, but he could not be 
connected with it. The Senate, under the control of Africanus’ faction, easily and 
legitimately prevented Flamininus’ continued participation in the negotiations. 
In this situation, there was no reason for Aitolia to depend on him. Without any 
approach by other Romans or the Greeks, he could not appear on the stage of 
diplomacy. Analysis of the significance of political factions among the leading 
Romans therefore reveals an aspect of Flamininus’ informal diplomacy in this 
period. It resulted from a extra-legal power, and its relative authority was 
influenced by political machinations among competing senators, as well as the 
changing attitudes of outsiders. 
 
Flamininus obtained the censorship in 189, and was sent to the East as an 
envoy in the same decade (Liv. 37.58.2; Plut. Flam. 18 and 20). His achievements 
during his term as consul and proconsul during the Second Macedonian War and 
those even after that in the 190s were respected by the Romans. He ascended to 
the seat of power in the Republic and, moreover, maintained contact with various 
Greek factions. His informal diplomacy allowed him to advance his career, and 
the expectation that he would direct Greek affairs among the Romans did not 
disappear. Meanwhile, the situation in the final phase of peace negotiation with 
Aitolia shows that the appeal of outsiders was also a factor in enabling individual 
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Romans to participate in foreign affairs, despite their lacking the authority to do 
so. This is suggested by the fact that the Messenians asked Flamininus to support 
them by intervening in their conflict with the Achaians. The success of his 
intervention was also dependent on the competing interests found in Roman 
internal politics and the degree of Roman superiority in international politics. 
Flamininus’ statement was respected when his friends led the Senate and Rome 
defeated her enemies more than when her rivals and those of him were powerful 
and he lacked practical power. His informal diplomacy depended on the 
interaction of these factors but, crucially, he lacked the ability to control them. 
However, these cases demonstrate that Flamininus, as an individual, 
sometimes succeeded in participating in diplomacy over and above the official 
decision-makers, and promoted Rome’s further advance into Greece by his 
personal influence over the Greeks. This resulted partly from the manoeuvres of 
political groups within Roman politics, and that he was given some positions that 
enabled him to talk with outsiders despite not serving as a commander. The fact 
remains, though, that he actively and successfully took part in diplomacy with his 
quasi-legal power, while also managing its relationship with other factors, such 
as written law, in Roman diplomacy. This is an archetypal example of informal 
diplomacy. His success in displaying his influence before contemporaries may well 
have provided them with a remarkable exemplar, although the terminology of 







Section 2: P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus after the Second Punic War 
 
One might, however, argue that Flamininus’ case was a special one, on the 
basis that his extra-legal power came from his great success in the Macedonian 
War, meaning that the Greeks naturally respected him, while other Romans could 
not follow him so easily. This is not reasonable, though. I argue that his case was 
rather symbolic of a new tendency within Roman diplomacy, namely the 
appearance of informal diplomacy by individuals. The factors enabling him to 
participate in diplomacy through unofficial channels, or something similar, could 
actually be held by Romans other than Flamininus. In order to demonstrate this, 
this section analyses the actions by a Roman statesman equal to Flamininus in 
stature: Africanus.  
I shall first confirm that Africanus had informal power, and that it 
influenced the development of Roman domestic and foreign affairs, at the 
beginning of the Roman advance into the Greek world. He had been responsible 
for the final defeat of Carthage (Liv. 30.45), achieving a fame comparable to 
Flamininus. In the period of the Second Macedonian War, however, Africanus did 
not appear in international politics, in public. This is not unusual, since before he 
was elected as the consul of 194, he assumed no diplomatic office (34.43.3). Behind 
the scenes of domestic politics, however, he was noticed by other Romans. This is 
confirmed, for instance, by the fact that the veterans who had fought in Africa 
under him were assigned land and were permitted to avoid serving in the 
Macedonian War (31.4.1-3, 8.6, and 49.5). This was an exceptional and selective 
treatment, in the sense that there were other soldiers involved in the war and 
they did not receive such favourable treatment. Moreover, considering the 
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relationship between Africanus and the Baebii, the critical behaviour of Q. 
Baebius, mentioned above, towards the promoters of the Macedonian War in 200, 
was a sign that Africanus indirectly influenced foreign affairs. This does not 
necessarily mean that he wanted to stop the new conflict, but the special 
treatment of his veterans was decided shortly after the hawks succeeded in 
persuading the Senate and the assembly to commence the war. The veterans who 
had fought in Hispania under Africanus were also assigned land around the 
period in which Plautus’ Stichus was performed, the comedy that was mentioned 
in Section 1 and 3 of Chapter 3 and apparently scathing about Rome’s new war in 
Greece,60 under Cn. Baebius, an aedilis mentioned above (31.2.3-4, 8.1, 49.3, 5, 
and 50.3). The advocates of the campaign could not ignore Africanus and his 
associates, and consequently curried favour with them, in order to advance their 
plans for war (31.49.12). He did not participate, then, in diplomacy directly but, 
despite lacking any diplomatic office, he still influenced Roman diplomacy in an 
informal manner, during the period of the Macedonian War. 
In light of the analysis of Flamininus’ membership of the advocates of the 
Macedonian War, and of their struggle with Africanus’ group (shown in Section 1), 
I would argue that Africanus was interested in Roman diplomacy, and in 
advancing his interests, and those of his friends, on the stage even after the war. 
With this in mind, this chapter further considers how he participated in the 
Roman advance into the Greek world, and whether the notion of informal 
diplomacy is useful for understanding of this development. I will achieve this by 
analysing his political actions at Rome, before the dispatch of L. Cornelius Scipio, 
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his brother, to Greece, as the general against Aitolia and Antiochos, and Africanus’ 
actions during the campaigns.  
 
1) Africanus’ Diplomatic Actions at Rome 
 
Africanus’ direct and remarkable attempt to participate in Roman 
diplomacy is first confirmed after the Second Macedonian War, and it was made 
through an official channel. He ran for the consulate of 194. On gaining the office, 
he argued that one consul should be sent to Macedonia on the basis that a new 
war was impending with Antiochos and the Aitolians (Liv. 34.43.3-5). Africanus 
appears to have wanted to take personal command of the army in the East, in 
order to counterbalance the increase of the influence of Flamininus and his 
friends.61 This suggests that participating in Greek affairs was the most effective 
way of increasing one’s individual influence, especially in light of a similar 
proposal made in 196 by M. Claudius Marcellus, the consul (33.25.4-6). This also 
shows that Africanus opposed the policies of the former hawks against Macedonia. 
In 196, Flamininus had promised to withdraw Rome’s troops and garrisons, an 
act that the Senate, controlled by his friends, had approved (cf. Polyb. 18.44-6).62 
Encouraged by victory in the election, and expecting the support of the majority 
of the Romans, Africanus wanted to change the decision. This was, however, 
unsuccessful. The Senate decided to send both consuls of 194 to northern Italy, 
and the troops in Greece were withdrawn and dismissed. Africanus failed to 
participate in Greek affairs publicly. Nevertheless, he almost succeeded. He was 
                                                   
61 Briscoe 1981: 116-7; Tatum 2001: 390. 
62 For more on the decision-making behind the evacuation, see Eckstein 1990: 45-51. 
180 
 
elected as the princeps senatus in the same year. His suggestion about the 
allocation of consular provinciae was seriously debated by the senators (34.43.6-9 
and 44.4). Meanwhile, this situation suggests that he and a number of other 
senators did not necessarily regard consistency in public announcements, or 
international public opinion, to be important. If Rome had sent a consul to Greece 
in 194, the Greeks would have considered it a breach of Flamininus’ declaration 
in 196. He and his allies had recognised the importance of the viewpoint of 
foreigners as much as that of their fellow Roman citizens, 63  something that 
cannot be said for all of the senators. In any case, considering Africanus’ 
suggestion about the consular allocation, and his indirect intervention in the 
Macedonian War, he depended first and foremost on official diplomatic authority, 
though sometimes upon informal powers in domestic politics. He was 
comparatively indifferent to international public opinion, in contrast to 
Flamininus and his associates. 
This view is supported by Africanus’ second attempt at participating in 
Greek affairs. He intervened in the selection of the general to fight against Aitolia 
and Antiochos, after they were defeated at Thermopylai. In the winter of 191/0 
the Senate decided that L. Cornelius Scipio, the brother of Africanus, was to 
command the army. He was the serving consul and would later be dubbed 
Asiaticus (this chapter refers to him as such henceforth for convenience). It is 
important to note that the decisive factor in persuading the Senate send him to 
Asia Minor was Africanus’ speech on his behalf. According to Livius (at 37.1.8-10, 
esp. 9), Africanus encouraged Asiaticus to leave the decision of the command in 
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the hands of the Senate, and declared before the senators that, if the Greek affairs 
were assigned to Asiaticus, ‘he would serve under the brother as a legatus (se ei 
legatum iturum).’ The senators expected that Africanus would steer Rome to 
victory over Antiochos, who was accompanied by Hannibal who had already lost 
to Africanus in the Second Punic War, deciding to dispatch Asiaticus.64 J. D. 
Grainger doubts that Africanus’ argument directly brought an end to all debate 
regarding the allocation. J. Briscoe also notices the difficulty in clarifying the 
precise process. There are several versions that describe this scene in the extant 
sources (App. Syr. 21; Cic. Mur. 32; Phil. 11.17; Val.Max. 5.5.1).65 However, no 
author denies Africanus’ intervention. Indeed, it is natural that he was connected 
with the selection of a general, both as a consular senator and as Asiaticus’ brother. 
Africanus used blood relationship and his fame as a remarkable general, 
effectively an informal influence, over his countrymen and the official session of 
the Senate, in which it was easy for him to control the discussion because he was 
a princeps senatus, and thus obtained a position as legatus in Asiaticus’ troops. 
It is significant here that these sources show that, while using these official 
and unofficial powers, Africanus practically announced that he would take part 
in the decision-making of his brother, the commander, and yet this was not 
criticised by other Romans. This acquiescence can be equated with their general 
allowance of his participation in foreign affairs alongside or over the consul, a 
form of informal diplomacy. He was not a representative of the Roman 
government. The approval of the senators, however, may also have partly resulted 
from the increasing influence of his friends in the Senate during this period, as 
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was shown in the previous section. This confirms that informal diplomacy was 
connected with political rivalries among the senators. Meanwhile, it is important 
that the tacit approval of Africanus’ informal diplomacy is not the same as that of 
Flamininus. Flamininus’ leadership in the negotiations with the Greeks resulted 
from his celebrity in Greece, and the expectation of Roman and Greek alike that 
he would influence the other side favourably towards them. In contrast, Africanus 
promised to support Asiaticus as a legatus, a staff officer in the expeditionary 
force. The people looking to him were the senators, and they noticed his overtly 
military contribution to Rome. This was also informal diplomacy of an individual, 
but is different from that of Flamininus.  
This different character of Africanus’ participation in diplomacy from that 
of Flamininus might partly result from the difference in the nature of both 
Romans’ reputation. Flamininus achieved fame for military and diplomatic 
success in Greece. His appearance in front of the Greeks was expected to influence 
their behaviour. He also consciously utilised this situation to win them over. 
Meanwhile, Africanus gained fame for his success in the Punic War. While his 
renown might have spread to the Greek world, his fellow citizens could not expect 
that he would win over the Greeks, as Flamininus had done. Africanus could 
certainly not behave as a person who knew the Greeks intimately. 
What should be noticed, nevertheless, is that Africanus participated in the 
selection of the commander in Greece, and practically compelled other senators to 
approve his future participation in the decision-making of the general, despite 
lacking authority equal to the holder of imperium. I would argue that this 
suggests that informal diplomacy gradually spread among the Romans, and there 
were, in fact, several factors enabling an individual Roman to take part in foreign 
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affairs irregularly. Africanus was one of the first people who realised this, just as 
Flamininus had, but their manners were radically different from each other. It is 
important that this diversity also could influence Roman diplomacy. The conflict 
with Aitolia and Antiochos eventually consolidated the Roman ascendancy in the 
Greek world. The actions of both Romans, in the Greek context, provide 
remarkable examples of the manner of how diplomacy was conducted towards the 
people in and beyond Rome. This situation paved the way for other 
contemporaries to follow. The next sub-division confirms these by analysing how 
Africanus’ informal diplomacy was in practice developed, despite the differences 
from that of Flamininus, in Greece and Asia Minor under Asiaticus.  
 
2) Africanus’ Diplomatic Actions in the Campaign of Asiaticus 
 
Africanus was a more active diplomatic participant in the field than at 
Rome, similar to Flamininus. This is first confirmed by the details of the Roman 
negotiation with Aitolia. After Flamininus’ failure in Rome, Africanus arrived in 
Greece with Asiaticus. Athens’ envoys visited their camp to mediate between 
Rome and Aitolia.66 They approached Africanus, and then had a contact with 
Asiaticus. Furthermore, when Aitolia was encouraged by the Athenians to send 
its envoys to the Romans, Aitolia’s diplomats also visited Africanus before his 
brother (Liv. 37.6.4-6). The envoys of Athens and Aitolia regarded him as the 
person to negotiate with. He gladly accepted contacts with them, despite lacking 
any connection with them before that point. Africanus, one of the legati, 
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participated, or was involved by the Greeks, in negotiations before the consul. 
This is a clear example of informal diplomacy in action. Indeed, his behaviour here 
was similar to that of Flamininus, when Messenia was pressed by Achaia. 
It is, however, necessary to analyse the actions of Africanus and, moreover, 
those of Asiaticus, in order to observe the true nature of Africanus’ behaviour in 
connection with Aitolia. Africanus had not been connected with the Greeks, in any 
meaningful way. Asiaticus apparently had no reason to overlook the negotiations 
occurring around him, unlike the cases of Flamininus, whose influence in Greece 
had been expected to support Rome in some way. It is important here to note what 
Africanus did and did not do. He was asked to moderate the terms for peace by 
Aitolia, a request that he treated favourably. Asiaticus’ attitude towards Aitolia, 
however, did not soften (Liv. 37.6.7 and 7.2-4). Scholars suppose that this resulted 
from a conflict between the brothers or Asiaticus’ distaste for Africanus’ arbitrary 
action.67 Yet, there is no sign of the discord between the brothers, except in their 
different attitudes here. It is noticeable that the extant sources do not report 
Africanus’ support for Aitolia in their depictions of the meeting between the 
Aitolian delegates and Asiaticus. This suggests either that Africanus’ influence on 
the formal decision-making process was not remarkable, or he did not intend to 
help Aitolia here, despite his sentiments during the preliminary contacts. In this 
event, the former possibility is impossible. Asiaticus owed his command to 
Africanus. If the latter had publicly ‘advised’ Asiaticus to make peace with Aitolia, 
with favourable conditions to the federation, it would have been impossible for the 
consul to refuse. Aitolia’s failure here shows that Africanus did not help them at 
                                                   
67 E.g. Balsdon 1972: 226; Tatum 2001: 394 and 400; Grainger 2002: 276-7. 
185 
 
this time, although he had made contacts among the Greek envoys, independently 
of Asiaticus. 
This position is supported by considering Africanus’ and Asiaticus’ 
complicated interests. Africanus’ behaviour confirms that he was not interested 
in satisfying Aitolia and potentially other outsiders, as might have been inferred 
by his suggestions regarding the consular allocation in 194. Nonetheless, his 
behaviour here does not simply show his insincere attitude to outsiders. He and 
Asiaticus faced a significant dilemma. They had to finish the war in Greece and 
fight against Antiochos. While Asiaticus’ provincia was Greece and not Asia Minor, 
the Senate had decided that ‘if it seemed to be useful for the state, he should take 
his troops into Asia (si e re publica videretur esse, exercitum in Asiam traiceret)’ 
to attack Antiochos (Liv. 37.2.3).68 The brothers had also been given the power to 
decide whether Philippos was to be excused from the payment of his remaining 
indemnity (App. Syr. 23). It is impossible to discern precisely Rome’s relationship 
with him, at that point,69 but the brothers did obtain his cooperation by proposing 
an exemption from the payment, when their troops advanced into Asia Minor 
through Macedonia and Thrace. The brothers and the Senate had expected the 
campaign in Asia Minor and prepared for it. If the brothers had been slow in 
getting there, they would likely have been criticised by other Romans. But this 
does not mean the war against Aitolia was a supplementary task for the Romans, 
despite Briscoe’s supposition.70 Asiaticus’ provincia was Greece. His basic task 
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was to direct the war against Aitolia. The brothers could not easily compromise 
with the Aitolians and, moreover, this situation could not be allowed to become 
noticed by other Greek states. Otherwise, Aitolia would have actively demanded 
the brothers to make concessions towards the federation. At this time, however, 
the Romans could not ratify any agreement with more favourable terms to Aitolia 
than those that had been shown when Flamininus failed to support Aitolia in 
Rome (Liv. 37.1.5). In military terms, Rome was superior to Aitolia. The brothers 
therefore had to go to Asia Minor, but settle these Greek affairs in a way that 
would win over their fellow countrymen. 
Considering the common interests of the brothers, the friendly contacts of 
Africanus with the Aitolian and Athenian diplomats, contrasted with Asiaticus’ 
blunt attitude to Aitolia, actually resulted from the brothers’ dividing their roles 
in order to solve their dilemma. I would argue that they attempted to settle the 
Greek affair by making a truce, based on Aitolia’s request. In this case, it was not 
necessary for the brothers to negotiate over peace terms or to make any concession, 
and the brothers could go to Asia Minor sooner. Indeed, their seemingly conflicting 
attitudes towards the Greek envoys worked as a tool of encouraging the latter to 
ask the brothers for a truce. Africanus informally suggested to the Greek envoys 
that there was still scope for negotiating, while Asiaticus officially showed that he 
could not compromise on the peace terms. The brothers thus led the Greeks not 
to give up any negotiation, but to change their request. While this kind of 
approach might have been too complicated to be used effectively by the brothers, 
the Aitolians and other Greeks had recently observed that Glabrio had made a 
truce and allowed Aitolia to send its envoys to Rome. The brothers could therefore 
expect that Aitolia or Athens would realise that there was still scope for further 
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negotiation. The execution of this plan by the brothers is confirmed by their 
attitude towards the Greeks who approached them again (Liv. 37.7.4-7). Asiaticus 
announced afresh that the terms of peace could not be changed without reason. 
After that, Echedemos, an Athenian envoy, led the Aitolians to ask Asiaticus to 
make a truce, in order to continue the negotiation at Rome. This Athenian might 
have been led to do so by Africanus.71 In any case, Aitolia approached Africanus 
again with the changed request. He immediately introduced the envoys to 
Asiaticus. Subsequently, the consul permitted Aitolia to negotiate with the Senate, 
and advanced into Asia Minor. The brothers therefore divided the diplomatic 
management of the Greek theatre, in order to fight against Antiochos without any 
compromise with Aitolia on peace terms. Africanus’ participation in negotiation, 
another example of informal diplomacy, was actually a tool used by the brothers 
to satisfy their practical, political requirements. 
It is necessary here to refer to the fact that Africanus was also interested 
in approaching other states, as was suggested by his tactical treatment of the 
Athenian and Aitolian envoys, although he tended (and arguably needed) to 
regard the viewpoint of his countrymen as more important than that of outsiders. 
Inscriptions from Delos confirm that he strove to increase his publicity among the 
Greeks by supporting the inhabitants of the island, one of the Greek religious 
centres (e.g. I.Délos 442B.l.102, 1429A.l.26, and 1450A.l.68; IG XI.4.712). 72 
Considering the lack of the reference to his office in some of them, he appears to 
have been interested in announcing his name beyond Rome, even when he was 
only a consular senator. Moreover, it is important that it had not necessarily been 
                                                   
71 Grainger 2002: 276. 
72 Cf. Gruen 1984: 168; Sherk 1984: 10. 
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remarkable for Roman elites to increase their publicity, among their neighbours, 
through private contacts. The decrees about the investment of the title of 
πρόξενος in Aitolia and Entella, and the scenes of Plautus’ play Stichus, show 
that individual Romans had connections with the Greek states and their citizens, 
even in the third century (e.g. IG IX.1².1.17; SEG XXX.1120; Stichus 454-504). 
These do not necessarily mean that every influential Roman possessed an idea of 
winning over international public opinion. Private contacts with outsiders, 
however, with the Greeks, in particular, had gradually become popular among 
Roman elites. Africanus operated within this context. For the consideration and 
exploitation of international public opinion, Flamininus and his friends were 
ahead of their contemporaries, and this contributed to his independent 
participation in diplomacy, but Africanus and other Romans were not very 
backward in this field.73 
Indeed, to a point, Africanus participated in diplomacy more actively than 
his predecessors, including Flamininus, during this period. After the negotiation 
with Aitolia, Africanus sent a letter to Prusias I of Bithynia. In order to win him 
over, Africanus explained how Rome and he had been generous to the monarchs 
of many regions. This relieved Prusias’ anxiety, and led him to take a neutral 
attitude towards Rome’s war against Antiochos (Liv. 37.25.7-12; Polyb. 21.11.3-
10). Unlike the approaches from Athens and Aitolia, here Africanus approached a 
foreign king despite lacking the position of Rome’s representative, and in parallel 
                                                   
73 At least, SEG XXX.1073 informs us that in the period of Rome’s war against 
Antiochos when Romans other than Flamininus and his friends had influenced 
Roman diplomacy, a Chian leader had contacts with the Romans and instituted the 
rituals of the goddess Roma and some Roman heroes at his own expense through the 
contacts with the Romans sent to the East and Chios itself. Cf. Derow and Forrest 
1982: 79-92; Salvo 2012: 125-37. 
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to the approach of Asiaticus.74 This action had not been undertaken before, even 
by Flamininus, who had made contact with the Greeks in Naupaktos and Aigion 
before Glabrio, but did not meddle in the consul’s approach towards them. Prusias 
might have thought that the brothers were almost equal, or worked as one body, 
even if he did notice that Africanus was legally inferior to Asiaticus. 75 
Considering the political necessity shared between the brothers, not to mention 
other Romans, the contents of Africanus’ letter did not result solely from his own 
policy.76 Nevertheless, Africanus approached Prusias with Asiaticus, and took 
part in diplomacy by himself, using the informal influence gained from his 
previous achievements out of Greece. Although it is difficult to decide whether 
this can be undoubtedly called informal diplomacy, since Asiaticus may well have 
approved Africanus’ sending the letter, his behaviour was similar, at least, to the 
concept, and he participated in diplomacy more actively than Flamininus. 
This position is supported by several inscriptions. For instance, in a 
fragment of a letter of the brothers to Kolophon in Ionia, there is a phrase of 
Λ]εύκιος Κ̣[ορνήλιος Πο/πλίου στρατηγὸ]ς ὕπατος Ῥωμαίων καὶ [Πό/πλιος 
Κορνήλιος] ἀδελφὸς Κολοφονίων τῆ[ι / βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δή]μωι χαίρειν (RDGE 
36.ll.1-4). It is impossible to know the contents of this letter precisely, although 
the recognition of the ἀσυλία of the temple of Apollon seems to be related. In any 
case, the brothers jointly made contact with Kolophon, in the middle of the war 
against Antiochos.77  Africanus here appears as the ἀδελφός of the consul, a 
                                                   
74 Prusias’ neutrality was officially promised in his contact with C. Livius Salinator, 
a legatus, after the approach of the brothers (Liv. 37.25.13-14; Polyb. 21.11.12). 
Habicht 2006: 1-2. 
75 Walbank 1979: 102-5; Briscoe 1981: 327-8. 
76 Balsdon 1972: 226-7. Cf. McDonald 1938: 159. 
77 Ibid.: 160; Bengtson 1943: 503. 
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person without any official position. This signals the informal character in his 
appearance in the official letter. A similar situation can be seen in a letter to 
Herakleia ad Latmos in Caria, in 190. In this letter, confirming some rights of the 
citizens, there is a phrase of [Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Σκιπίων] στρατηγὸς ὕπατος 
Ῥωναίων / [καὶ Πόπλιος Σκιπίων ἀδελ]φὸς Ἡρακλεωτῶν τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι 
δή/[μωι χαίρειν˙] (RDGE 35.ll.1-3).78  If the restoration is accepted, Africanus 
participated in diplomacy alongside Asiaticus, despite lacking the authority to do 
so, again.79 This kind of participation in the official contacts with the Asian cities 
might be observed further in a letter to Herakleia Pontike. Memnon relates that 
Africanus sent a communication to this city in order to win over the citizens to 
Asiaticus’ campaign (FGH 434 F18.6-8). In this source, Africanus is erroneously 
treated as a proconsul, owing to the lack of any similar case, and scholars have 
not decided whether the contact was made before or after the Battle of Magnesia.80 
The historicity of the event is recognised, however, and this letter also seems to 
show that, despite lacking any official power, Africanus openly behaved like a 
person with the full authority of the state, in parallel to a serving consul. What 
                                                   
78 Ma 2002: 366-7. 
79 Wörrle 1988: 428-9 reports that the last nu of [Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Σκιπίων] is 
clearly visible and ἀδελ]φὸς in line 2 should be read. This situation means that this 
letter could not be sent by other Roman consuls, such as Cn. Manlius Vulso, who was 
dispatched to Asia Minor in 189. There is no information about any remarkable 
brother who could behave as a joint sender with the consul except Africanus. This is 
supported by the lines 10 to 12 and 16 to 17. They relate that the senders 
acknowledged that the citizens maintained their freedom, possessions, and own laws, 
and dispatched a certain L. Orbius to defend the city-state. These show that the 
Roman consul and his brother were in the middle of a war, and suggests that 
Herakleia surrendered to the brothers and Rome here for the first time. If a city 
submitted to Rome after the first submission, the Republic had to treat that city more 
severely. Considering these factors, this letter was sent by Asiaticus and Africanus 
when Rome sent troops to Asia Minor, for the first time, to attack Antiochos. Cf. SEG 
I.440; Ma 2002: 368-9; Bagnal and Derow 2004: 76-7. 
80 Bittner 1998: 96; Dmitriev 2007: 134. 
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should be noticed here again is that these actions were made with Asiaticus’ 
support. He could have prevented Africanus from appearing in the letters legally, 
if he intended so. Africanus thus participated in diplomacy more actively than 
Flamininus, owing largely to his relationship to the consul. 
This pattern can also be observed in approaches made by the Greeks, 
during the same period. For instance, Aptera in Crete invested Λεύκιον 
Κορνή]/λ̣ιον Πο̣πλίου Σκιπίωνα̣ [στραταγὸν ὕπατον Ῥωμαί]/ων καὶ Πόπλιον 
Κορνήλ[ιον Ποπλίου Σκιπίωνα with the title of προξένος (IC II.iii.5A.ll.2-4).81 If 
the supplements are correct, this inscription suggests that Africanus was noticed 
by the Cretans on a level with Asiaticus, even if they realised that he did not have 
any official title and authority, and that his presence in diplomacy depended on 
the presence of the consul. This tendency had been observed during the 
negotiations with the Aitolian and Athenian envoys. They visited Africanus, and 
then negotiated with Asiaticus. They recognised that Africanus was not a formal 
decision-maker, but dared to involve him in their affairs, nonetheless. His 
participation in diplomacy without any definite authority largely resulted from 
Asiaticus’ support which was acknowledged and, indeed, expected by outsiders. 
Africanus’ own presence, however, certainly heightened the Greeks’ 
expectations for him, in negotiations. He had been responsible for Rome’s victory 
in the Second Punic War, and they expected that his suggestions influenced other 
Romans, Asiaticus in particular, even regarding the war in the East. The presence 
of 5,000 volunteers in Asiaticus’ camp who had fought under Africanus might also 
have made outsiders feel his influence during the campaign (cf. Liv. 37.4.3). If he 
                                                   
81 For this inscription see also Chaniotis 1996: 42 n.212 and 280 n.1516. 
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had been a hitherto unknown brother of the consul, the Greeks would not have 
thought of visiting him before Asiaticus, and Prusias would not have received 
Africanus’ letter. 
One might think, here, that the respect of the Greeks for Africanus resulted, 
instead, from their recognition of him as a practical commander. This, however, is 
an argument that is difficult to sustain, as a passage of Livius about contact 
between Africanus and Antiochos helps demonstrate (37.34.3-4):  
 
in eo maximam spem habebat, praeterquam quod et magnitudo 
animi et satietas gloriae placabilem eum maxime faciebat, notumque 
erat gentibus, qui victor ille in Hispania, qui deinde in Africa fuisset 
 
This is Antiochos’ order to Herakleides, his envoy, when Roman troops under 
Asiaticus reached Asia Minor. He wanted to make peace through negotiations 
with Africanus.82 This reference is not in Polybios’ text (cf. 21.13-15),83 but he 
also relates that Antiochos expected Africanus to be active, despite lacking the 
command, while sending Herakleides (21.13.2-3 and 9). Livius seems to use the 
same or similar sources as Polybios, a contemporary, or perhaps even his lost text, 
a factor that renders the Livian explanation believable. It is important that 
Africanus was considered to have given so remarkable services to Rome that he 
could generously receive negotiators. Although the Seleucids considered him an 
influential Roman, his military leadership in this campaign was apparently not 
noticed. One might still argue, on grounds that Polybios relates at 21.13.9, ‘the 
matters principally depended on how he (Africanus) thought (τὴν πλείστην ῥοπὴν 
                                                   
82 For the military situation from the conclusion of the truce with Aitolia to the 
landing of Asiaticus’ troops on Asia Minor, see Wiemer 2001a: 111-26 and Grainger 
2002: 278-317. 
83 Briscoe 1981: 338-9. 
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κεῖσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν τῇ ̓ κείνου προαιρέσει),’ that contemporaries regarded 
him as a practical leader of Asiaticus’ troops. But Antiochos did not regard 
Africanus’ absence and illness when Asiaticus’ troops reached Asia Minor, before 
the Battle of Magnesia, as an opportunity to attack the Romans, although the 
Seleucids were fully aware of it (App. Syr. 30; Liv. 37.33.7-34.8 and 37.6-9; Polyb. 
21.13.9). If Africanus had been considered the practical commander, Antiochos 
would likely have attacked the Roman troops immediately. Moreover, even after 
the defeat of Magnesia, Antiochos still wanted to have contact with Africanus 
earlier than Asiaticus, who had vanquished the Seleucids without Africanus, and 
certainly increased his leading position among the Romans (Liv. 37.45.4-6). 
Antiochos respected and regarded Africanus as the main person to negotiate with, 
not for what he would accomplish as a commander in Asia Minor, but for what he 
had done in other regions and for the expected sincerity resulting from it. This 
pattern is also observed in Antiochos’ relation with Cn. Manlius Vulso, the consul 
of 189 and Asiaticus’ successor. Antiochos avoided meeting with Vulso. He wanted 
to upset the pact for peace made in the negotiation with Asiaticus, through 
Africanus’ good offices in the winter of 190/89, in order to forge his own 
achievement (38.45.1-2; cf. 37.45.4-21; Polyb. 21.16-17). 84  Vulso and possibly 
Asiaticus appear to have thirsted for military conquest. Africanus was expected 
by Antiochos, and possibly other Greeks, to lack this ambition, owing to his fame 
already being established among the Romans, and possibly his lack of the 
authority to direct military operations. 
Meanwhile, this episode shows that the people concerned, and Polybios and 
                                                   
84 For more regarding Vulso’s attitude to the Seleucids and the inhabitants of Asia 
Minor, and his necessity in the field, see Grainger 1995b: 23-41. 
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Livius, noticed the difference between the formal and informal spheres of 
diplomacy, at least in this case, and the contacts between Africanus and Antiochos 
were most assuredly informal in nature. Herakleides made contact with Africanus 
‘privately (privatim),’ based on Antiochos’ instructions, in parallel to the contact 
with Asiaticus in the official consilium (Liv. 37.34.3, 35.1, and 36.1). Polybios also 
relates at 21.13.6 that this envoy showed Asiaticus Antiochos’ offer regarding 
conditions of peace κατὰ κοινὸν, in the public audience with the consul, and sent 
a message to Africanus ‘ἰδίᾳ (privately),’ while offering the restoration of his son, 
who had been taken prisoner, without ransom, and the payment of money to him 
(cf. Liv. 37.36.2). He is said to have replied that the topic should be brought οὐ 
μόνον κατὰ τὴν πρὸς αὑτὸν … ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ συνέδριον, not to him 
privately, but to the place of the public negotiation (Polyb. 21.15.1-6).85  The 
Seleucids recognised that the negotiation with Africanus was informal. He did not 
regard the meeting as a place to make a formal agreement, but did not avoid 
having contacts with the dynasty. Both sides, contemporaries such as Polybios, 
and later historians like Livius, clearly distinguished between official and 
unofficial fields of negotiation. This means that the contacts made through 
informal channels were consciously made, even though this vocabulary was not 
employed. 
Overall, Africanus participated in diplomacy in the field, despite lacking 
authority, and his actions were therefore examples of informal diplomacy. 
Meanwhile, he did not consider the viewpoint of the Greeks, as Flamininus had 
done, but took part in the Roman advance among the Greeks by using his fame, a 
                                                   
85 For a discussion about sources concerned with this negotiation, see Walbank 1979: 
105-8, Briscoe 1981: 338-43, and Grainger 2002: 312-3. 
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extra-legal power, more actively than Flamininus. Africanus’ actions were, 
however, closely connected with those of Asiaticus, and often constituted ad hoc 
political necessities of the brothers, in the Roman context. The Greeks expected 
much of Africanus, because he had gained fame and would influence the consul 
by means of his reputation and blood relationship, not because he could manage 
complicated disagreements between the Greeks and Romans, as Flamininus had 
done. This emphasises the different nature and factors comprising informal 
diplomacy. 
Africanus did not appear on the stage of diplomacy following his brother’s 
magistracy. This confirms the significance of his connection with Asiaticus, the 
legitimate holder of official diplomatic power. Yet, even before the dispatch of 
Asiaticus as the general, Africanus could influence Roman diplomacy as an 
important senator. A connection with official power was an important factor of 
informal diplomacy, then, but I argue that it was not prerequisite for it. It is also 
noteworthy that his appearance in international politics, despite lacking authority, 
was not criticised by his contemporaries. This partly resulted from Rome’s 
ascendancy in the Hellenistic world, and the strength of his allies in political 
power games taking place in Rome. The Greeks may have been indifferent to 
whether the contacts with Africanus was illegal or not. It was nearly impossible, 
after all, for other Romans to stop him participating in diplomatic actions. 
Asiaticus could have done so, but had no reason since his own interests were 
shared with Africanus. Yet, even in the trial of 187, his participation in diplomacy 
was not directly criticised, although he was suspected of bribery during his contact 
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with Antiochos (Liv. 38.51.1-6). 86  Since the difference between official and 
unofficial sphere had been noticed, informal diplomacy was now being tacitly 
approved by contemporary Romans, even though it had the potential to influence 




Flamininus and Africanus, two elite Roman individuals participated in 
diplomacy during Rome’s advance into the Greek world, following the Second 
Macedonian War, despite their lacking any authority to do so. Their successes 
largely resulted from their exploitation of their remarkable fame, a extra-legal 
power. Yet, these men did not operate in a vacuum. The informal diplomacy 
undertaken by these two Romans followed the manoeuvres of the former hawks 
against Macedonia, and the rise of increasingly competitive political groups. The 
approval, tacit or otherwise, of contemporary Romans for Flamininus and 
Africanus partly resulted from this tendency in which unofficial channels could 
be employed to win over the people in and beyond Rome. The influence of the two 
Romans on Roman diplomacy certainly depended on the machinations of their 
political groups. Furthermore, the appearance of Flamininus and Africanus in 
diplomacy also resulted from the fact that the Greeks already possessed an idea 
of making informal contacts with individual Romans with some extra-legal power. 
If the Greeks had not approached or accepted the intervention of the two Romans 
in diplomacy, it would have been difficult for them to influence people. This is 
                                                   
86 As for his downfall after Asiaticus’ campaign, see Briscoe 1981: 170-9; Lintott 1999: 
127; Kelly 2006: 27-8; Gabriel 2008: 203-34 and 275-9. 
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natural in light of the fact that since informal diplomacy had been used by Rome’s 
hawks against Macedonia and the Greeks in order to manage ad hoc affairs, and 
functioned effectively when people accepted the approach of its users for their own 
interests. The informal diplomacy of Flamininus and Africanus, thus, continued 
the actions of their predecessors, and worked as a part of the pre-existing network 
of contacts between Rome and Greece while, at the same time, it supported Rome’s 
expansion and increased the personal influence of the two Romans discussed. 
It is also important to note the differences in the manner of participating 
in diplomacy, and the nature of the extra-legal power, between Flamininus and 
Africanus. Flamininus’ fame derived from his victory over Macedonia in Greece. 
He was thus expected by the Romans and the Greeks to address the troubles 
between both peoples. He largely considered the opinions of the Greeks, although 
he certainly used the contacts with them to further advance his personal agenda. 
Africanus, by contrast, was not expected by other Romans to win over the Greeks 
with his fame, and was comparatively uninterested in trying to impress them. 
Flamininus was careful not to intrude upon the actions of the Senate and the 
official power of the consul, despite his general interest in participating actively. 
Africanus, however, was closely connected with the approach of the consul 
towards the Greeks. These situations resulted largely from the peculiar 
circumstances of the two Romans, but also show that the relationship of informal 
diplomacy with state law was ambiguous. This suggests that, although 
remarkable reputation was generally important in the cases of Flamininus and 
Africanus, even other Romans without the same extra-legal power could follow 
their example. Indeed, the advocates of the Macedonian War had lacked any 
heroic leader, at least internationally, on its eve, but had influenced the people in 
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and beyond Rome. This example in the Macedonian War, in addition to those of 
Flamininus and Africanus, may well have encouraged other Romans to do the 
same thing. Considering these factors, the appearance of the two individuals in 
diplomacy during Rome’s expansion into the Greek world from 193 to 189, 
resulted from the wider spread of informal diplomacy in Rome’s international 
politics, and worked as a factor of advancing it further, even though 
contemporaries did not refer to the phenomenon in these terms. 
Meanwhile, this thesis notices that the diversity of aspect of informal 
diplomacy, in particular, its ambiguous or conflicting relationship with the 
collectivity of the leading Romans and formal diplomacy, has begun to appear. 
This difference between official and unofficial sphere was noticed by 
contemporaries, but did not become tangible as a problem during this period, 
largely because of tactical manoeuvres by the users of informal diplomacy. Its 
spread among the Romans, however, meant an increased possibility that this 
conflict could become problematic. It would certainly play an important role in the 
development of the Republic after 189. In Chapter 5, I will consider this more 
along with the further spread of informal diplomacy among the Romans, and 
demonstrate their impact upon Roman diplomacy while, at the same time, 
confirming the significance of informal diplomacy to the study of Roman history 









This chapter argues that informal diplomacy became increasingly 
important to the Romans, but also led to conflict and tensions arising both in and 
beyond Rome, from 188 to 167, that is to say from the Peace of Apameia to the 
aftermath of the Macedonian defeat at Pydna. We have already observed how the 
Romans used this diplomatic concept during the period between the Second 
Macedonian War and the struggle against Aitolia and the Seleucids. It enabled 
those who urged the wars to participate in international politics, and contributed 
to Rome’s flexible management of foreign affairs and establishment of her 
dominion over the Greeks under the Peace of Apameia in 188.1 This chapter 
argues that, after its conclusion, the use of informal diplomacy by the Romans 
further increased, particularly in their contacts with the Greeks. Such cases are 
frequently observed partly because Polybios, a contemporary, presents much of 
the information about negotiations between Rome and Greece based on his own 
interests. Yet, in the new political order after the peace, the Greeks certainly 
negotiated actively with Rome, as the actions of Pergamon and Rhodes in the 
negotiations for the peace suggest.2 Given this tendency, individual Romans and 
Greeks could participate in the contact between their states and advance their 
own interests. Consequently, it is reasonable to consider the contacts between 
                                                   
1 For the terms of the Peace, see Baronowski 1991: 450-63, Dmitriev 2003: 39-62, and 
Acimovic 2007: 115-22. 
2 Koehn 2007b: 263-85. 
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Rome and Greece after 188, in order to develop the study of informal diplomacy. 
With these ideas in mind, I will demonstrate its further spread in Rome and its 
contribution to her consolidating the leadership in the Greek and the 
Mediterranean world. 
This chapter also argues that it was in this period that opposition to 
informal diplomacy emerged, most strikingly among the Achaians in the 180s and 
the Roman Senate during the Third Macedonian War. Its opponents questioned 
the legitimacy of informal diplomacy and insisted on the importance of law or 
justice as the basis for any action. This partly resulted from a conflict among 
contemporaries regarding the relationship between informal diplomacy and 
formal legality or legitimacy. In order to understand the dispute, though, it is also 
necessary to consider the aims of the people concerned in each case. This is 
demonstrated by focusing on Polybios. Not only did he have an enormous 
influence on those ancient writers who subsequently wrote about the second 
century, he was also involved in the events as an Achaian politician and a member 
of the group that was trying to maintain an equal relationship between Achaia 
and Rome.3 His attitude towards Rome, in particular her dominant behaviour, 
mingles admiration and antipathy, while he openly considered that informal 
diplomacy had a negative impact on contacts between Rome and the Greeks at 
that time. Analysing the character of his description and his influence on other 
authors, while also considering the interests of contemporaries and the 
significance of informal diplomacy in the cases concerned, exposes an image of the 
tensions within Roman diplomacy from 188 to the end of the Third Macedonian 
                                                   
3 Baronowski 2012: 61; Hau 2014: 2-3. 
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War, when the Roman hegemony was further established. The results will reveal 
the advantages and disadvantages of informal diplomacy for Rome. 
These aims are achieved through the following steps. First, it is argued that 
there was an increase in informal diplomacy by the Romans in their contacts with 
Greeks during the 180s. From this, it is shown that many contemporaries 
approved of these practices, but that some Greeks opposed them by means of legal 
arguments. Secondly, it will become evident that the Greeks also generally 
employed informal methods, as well as more official diplomacy, in their 
approaches to Rome in her advance into the Greek world, although the former 
could be regarded negatively, analysing the image of informal diplomacy further. 
Thirdly, it will be argued that the Senate sought to establish greater control over 
independent actions and informal diplomacy from the middle of the Third 
Macedonian War onwards, and that this consequently generated tensions 
between the Senate and individual Romans. 
 
Section 1: Informal Diplomacy by Roman Individuals 
 
I shall now demonstrate the spread of informal diplomacy among the 
Romans after Apameia, particularly in contact with the Greeks, during the 180s. 
In this discussion, I argue that the Greeks noticed the Roman practice, some of 
them taking advantage of it, while some leaders in Greece opposed it with legal 
arguments. The aim of this opposition was primarily to prevent Rome and her 
supporters in Greece from increasing their influence in the region, but the ill-
defined relationship between informal diplomacy and legality or legitimacy was 
to be exposed in the games of those concerned. This is best seen by considering a 
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series of examples of informal diplomacy undertaken by the Romans after 188, 
and the nature of the sources referring to them, in particular that of Polybios. 
The spread of informal diplomacy among the Romans after the Peace of 
Apameia is first seen in the case of M. Aemilius Lepidus. During his consulship of 
187, envoys from Ambrakia visited the Senate. This city belonged to Aitolia and 
had been attacked by M. Fulvius Nobilior, the consul in 189, in the final phase of 
Rome’s war against Aitolia. As a result of a long siege and negotiations, Ambrakia 
surrendered to Nobilior (Liv. 38.3.8-7.13; Polyb. 21.26.1-28.18 and 29.6-15).4 It is 
important to note that, although the original errand is unclear, in 187 Lepidus 
seems to have encouraged the envoys of the city to bring a charge against Nobilior, 
during some kind of informal meeting with them before their official contact with 
the Senate, in light of the text of Livius as follows (38.43.2-3):  
 
Itaque ad invidiam ei faciendam legatos Ambraciensis in senatum 
subornatos criminibus introduxit, qui sibi, cum in pace essent 
imperataque prioribus consulibus fecissent et eadem oboedienter 
praestare M. Fulvio parati essent, bellum illatum questi, agros 
primum depopulatos, terrorem direptionis et caedis urbi iniectum, ut 
eo metu claudere cogerentur portas. 
 
The envoys were ‘instructed (subornatos)’ by Lepidus to criticise Nobilior, and 
were introduced into the Senate. They followed his instruction, and complained 
that Ambrakia had been unfairly treated by Nobilior. Their speech moved the 
senators to resolve to investigate his alleged misdeeds (38.43-4 and 39.4-5). To 
date, scholars have tended to discuss this incident in the context of conflicts 
among influential politicians or their families and factions, rather than in 
                                                   
4 Warrior 1988: 325-56. 
203 
 
connection with diplomatic actions.5 Certainly, the senators thought that the 
complaint by the delegates resulted from ‘inimicitia (hostility)’ between Nobilior 
and Lepidus, who had been defeated by the former in the consular election, two 
years previously (38.43.1). But it is also noticeable that this episode can be treated 
as a sign of the spread of informal diplomacy. The envoys accepted Lepidus’ 
private suggestion and decided to complain about Nobilior; their speech led the 
Senate to doubt him and thus influenced the decision-making of the Roman state. 
This is clearly an intervention by Lepidus (and the envoys) in the contact between 
Rome and Ambrakia and is, therefore, an example of informal diplomacy, 
although Lepidus was a consul and could have contacts with foreign envoys to 
introduce them to the Senate.6 It is further noteworthy that Lepidus’ approach to 
the envoys was not criticised by the senators. Since his attack on Nobilior followed 
the speech of the envoys (38.44.1), the senators were assured of some partnership 
between Lepidus and the envoys. Nobilior’s supporters, such as C. Flaminius, 
another consul, are said to have claimed that the complaint of the envoys was 
prompted by Lepidus’ private hostility towards Nobilior. Lepidus was thought to 
have used his consular role for his own interest. As J. Briscoe argues, Livius’ use 
of the term suborno in this context suggests that Lepidus was regarded negatively 
by many senators (and their descendants).7 Nevertheless, his contemporaries did 
not criticise him directly (cf. 34.43.7-13). This might have resulted partly from a 
lack of evidence regarding his intervention. It might have been also important 
that the envoys actively criticised Nobilior, owing to their resentment against him. 
It was difficult for the senators to avoid investigating the actual conditions of the 
                                                   
5 E.g. Scullard 2003: 336; Briscoe 2008: 151-6. 
6 Pina Polo 2011: 58. 
7 Briscoe 2008: 153. 
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siege. It is still remarkable, however, that, although Lepidus was thought to have 
intervened in the contact between Rome and Ambrakia independently, the Senate 
did not investigate it and under the influence of Lepidus largely granted the 
Ambrakian requests, including the restoration of property (38.44.4). His informal 
diplomacy was practically overlooked. 
This situation is also seen in other cases connected to Lepidus. For instance, 
in the same year, the Spartans visited Rome to complain about Achaia’s treatment 
of Sparta in 188. They obtained a letter from Lepidus to Achaia, in which he 
criticised its attitude towards Sparta (Polyb. 22.3.1-3).8 Yet, Lepidus’ statements 
were not founded on any senatorial decision. This is shown by a subsequent 
contact between the Senate and envoys from Achaia who had heard Lepidus’ 
announcement. The Senate showed here its opposition to the attitude of Achaia 
towards Sparta, but observed that an invalidation of Achaia’s decisions would not 
be requested (22.7.5-6). This means that Lepidus had intervened in the dispute 
independently. Nevertheless, he did not seem to be criticised by other Romans for 
this. In fact, contemporaries overlooked his action. In addition, he seems to have 
made contact with Delphoi. He was honoured with the title of πρόξενος in the 
early 180s at a time when he is not known to have held any office (FD 
III.4.427B.I). 9  This suggests that he supported the city in some negotiation, 
despite lacking official authority. This was a private intervention in the formal 
contacts between states. Meanwhile, the erection of the inscription shows that his 
actions were taken in public and were not criticised by others, at the time. 
                                                   
8 For the sources concerned, and the political context of the conflict between Achaia 
and Sparta (which was annexed to Achaia by Philopoimen), from the 180s onwards, 
see Aymard 1967: 23-4, Walbank 1979: 177-8, and Gray 2013: 346-53.  
9 Cf. Syll³ 585; Briscoe 2008: 155. 
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Lepidus had contacts not only with Ambrakia’s envoys, but also with other 
Greeks privately, and continued to participate in the foreign affairs of Rome and 
several Greek states. The absence of criticism of this by the Greeks might have 
resulted partly from Rome’s defeat of her rivals in Greece, meaning that the 
Greeks could not ignore him even though his behaviour was not founded on the 
will of the Roman state. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that such independent 
participation in international politics, a stark example of informal diplomacy, was 
overlooked by Rome, just as it had been in the cases of Flamininus and Africanus 
in the 190s. 
This kind of independent action can be observed on another occasion in 
Roman dealings with Achaia. In 185, Q. Caecilius Metellus visited the League 
(Liv. 39.24.13-14 and 26.1-29.3; Polyb. 22.6.4-6 and 10.1-15).10 His original task 
concerned Macedonia but, after completing his mission, he made a detour to 
Achaia on his way home. While there, he complained about Achaia’s policy 
regarding Sparta before the leaders of the League,11 causing disagreement among 
them. Polybios’ account is as follows (22.10.3-5 and 10-14): 
 
ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀρίσταινος εἶχε τὴν ἡσυχίαν, δῆλος ὢν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ 
σιωπᾶν ὅτι δυσαρεστεῖται τοῖς ᾠκονομημένοις καὶ συνευδοκεῖ τοῖς 
ὑπὸ Καικιλίου λεγομένοις: ὁ δὲ Διοφάνης ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης, 
ἄνθρωπος στρατιωτικώτερος ἢ πολιτικώτερος, ἀναστὰς οὐχ οἷον 
ἀπελογήθη τι περὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσυπέδειξε τῷ Καικιλίῳ 
διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν Φιλοποίμενα παρατριβὴν ἕτερον ἔγκλημα κατὰ τῶν 
Ἀχαιῶν. ἔφη γὰρ οὐ μόνον τὰ κατὰ Λακεδαίμονα κεχειρίσθαι κακῶς, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κατὰ Μεσσήνην ... ὁ δὲ Καικίλιος ὁρῶν τὴν τούτων 
προαίρεσιν, ἠξίου τοὺς πολλοὺς αὑτῷ συναγαγεῖν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν. οἱ 
δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἄρχοντες ἐκέλευον αὐτὸν δεῖξαι τὰς ἐντολάς, ἃς εἶχε 
                                                   
10 Walbank 1979: 184-6; Briscoe 2008: 301-22. 
11 For the character of the meeting of Achaia, see Walbank 1979: 192. 
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παρὰ τῆς συγκλήτου περὶ τούτων. τοῦ δὲ παρασιωπῶντος, οὐκ 
ἔφασαν αὐτῷ συνάξειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν: τοὺς γὰρ νόμους οὐκ ἐᾶν, ἐὰν 
μὴ φέρῃ τις ἔγγραπτα παρὰ τῆς συγκλήτου, περὶ ὧν οἴεται δεῖν 
συνάγειν. ὁ δὲ Καικίλιος ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὠργίσθη διὰ τὸ μηθὲν αὐτῷ 
συγχωρεῖσθαι τῶν ἀξιουμένων, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἠβουλήθη 
δέξασθαι παρὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναπόκριτος ἀπῆλθενοἱ δ᾽ 
Ἀχαιοὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνέφερον καὶ τῆς πρότερον παρουσίας ἅμα τῆς 
Μάρκου τοῦ Φολουίου καὶ τῆς τότε τῶν περὶ τὸν Καικίλιον ἐπὶ τὸν 
Ἀρίσταινον καὶ τὸν Διοφάνην, ὡς τούτους ἀντισπασαμένους διὰ τὴν 
ἀντιπολιτείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸν Φιλοποίμενα 
 
Initially, it looked as if Metellus’ demands would be accepted. Aristainos, the 
στρατηγός, did not argue against him. The Achaian wanted tacitly to criticise 
Philopoimen, who led the strict policy against Sparta. Moreover, Diophanes, 
another rival of Philopoimen, drew Metellus’ attention to problems in Messenia, 
criticising Philopoimen’s measures there. Consequently, Metellus demanded that 
the ἐκκλησία be summoned, attempting to change Achaia’s attitude towards 
Sparta (and Messenia). However, other leading Achaians thought that the two 
Hellenes aimed to attack Philopoimen in collusion with Metellus, and observed 
that unless a man brought ‘a written request from the Senate (ἔγγραπτα παρὰ 
τῆς συγκλήτου)’ stating the subject on which the Achaians were to summon the 
assembly, ‘their laws (οἱ νόμοι)’ forbade them to do so, and thus refused Metellus’ 
request (Polyb. 22.10.12). 12  Metellus did not argue that he was ordered to 
intervene in the affairs by the Senate, but instead returned home in anger. Hence, 
he independently pressured Achaia to change its policies, despite lacking 
authority. This is an example of informal diplomacy, even though his request was 
not accepted by the Achaians. 
                                                   
12 Deininger 1971: 121-2 and 138; Gruen 1984: 485-6. 
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In this case, moreover, there are three notable points for further 
understanding Rome’s informal diplomacy with the Greeks. Firstly, Achaia 
thought that Rome had made informal contacts in diplomacy. Secondly, Polybios, 
the most important contemporary author, sometimes depicts the events 
negatively and unrealistically. I will consider these two points together. These are 
shown by analysing his texts for the case. He relates at 22.10.14 that ‘the 
Achaians (οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ)’ thought that Aristainos and Diophanes had made private 
contacts with Rome because of their hostility to Philopoimen, and observes at 
22.10.4 that the two Achaians did not plead with Metellus ‘for the Achaians (περὶ 
τῶν Ἀχαιῶν).’ Polybios leads the readers to regard the two Achaians as traitors, 
of a sort, whose actions resulted from their ‘political opposition (ἀντιπολιτεία)’ to 
Philopoimen and, furthermore, to think that other Achaians opposed them, as a 
whole. Aristainos was the στρατηγός, though. Diophanes had assumed the office 
in 192/1 and succeeded in annexing Messenia (cf. Liv. 36.31.1-9). They could not 
be isolated from other Achaians. Moreover, Polybios was favourable to 
Philopoimen since Lykortas, the author’s father, supported him (Polyb. 22.10.8 
and 23.12.8). Polybios’ references to Aristainos and Diophanes tend to be 
unfavourable. However, this does not deny the historicity of this event, as 
presented by Polybios. If he had blatantly faked an event of open diplomatic 
contacts in his period, he would likely have been criticised by contemporaries. 
Thus, considering Achaia’s negative reaction to Metellus as well, I would argue 
that many Achaians thought that there was some partnership between him and 
the two Achaians, and many contemporaries believed Rome’s use of informal 
diplomacy and the two politicians’ using the tendency. 
That the Achaians, and possibly other contemporaries, thought that Rome 
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had nurtured informal contacts with outsiders, and that it was regarded 
negatively by Polybios, moreover, are supported by a case of Aigion in 188. This 
city had long been the regular meeting place of Achaia until, in that year, 
Philopoimen abandoned the practice of a single meeting place in favour of holding 
a rotating assembly. The people of Aigion opposed his decision and asked Nobilior, 
mentioned above, to support them, an appeal that he accepted. This is another 
example of informal diplomacy. Aigion, while a member of the Achaian League, 
went into partnership with a Roman general independently. This also suggests 
that the city had expected that the Romans could have accepted this kind of 
approach, exploiting the informal tendency. It is furthermore important that 
Nobilior’s request for the city is said to have been refused by ‘almost all (omnes 
ferme)’ of the Achaians and, owing to the strength of opposition, he was forced to 
concede (Liv. 38.30.1-5, esp. 5).13 Polybios’ text for this case is lost, but scholars 
have shown that Livius uses it in his work.14 The outline in Livius’ text is credible, 
while the method of description is influenced by Polybios. This suggests that many 
contemporaries recognised a partnership between Aigion and Nobilior, that is, 
Rome’s acceptance of informal diplomatic approach, and that if Livius follows 
Polybios’ description faithfully, the latter depicted it negatively to his readers, in 
light of Livius’ using the emphatic phrase omnes ferme, whether or not ‘almost all’ 
Achaians had really opposed it. 
Third, Achaia refused the informal approach of Metellus, acting as a 
Roman envoy, by indicating his lack of any senatorial decree, using legal 
arguments to force him to withdraw his requests. The demand for him to show a 
                                                   
13 Badian and Errington 1965: 13-17. 
14 Walbank 1979: 194-5; Briscoe 2008: 1-2 and 109-11. 
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resolution might not mean that Achaia’s assembly was held whenever it was 
proposed,15 but instead shows Achaia’s prudence in dealing with the contact with 
Rome. Achaia did not refuse Metellus’ request bluntly. This might be due, in part, 
to the apparent alliance between Achaia and Rome.16 Yet, their relationship was 
literally equal (Liv. 39.37.9-17). The treaty could not allow Rome’s envoys to 
interfere in the Achaian affairs independently. So, Achaia’s careful refusal largely 
resulted from its recognition of Rome’s ascendancy in Greece. Metellus must have 
taken advantage of this and tried to intervene in Achaia, otherwise Achaia would 
have paid no attention to him. Thus, Achaia’s legalistic response might have 
resulted partly from its attention to law, but largely from its consideration of 
power relations with Rome. It is noteworthy that such legal arguments from 
Achaia succeeded in silencing Metellus. He did not want to ignore the law openly, 
even if he had not hesitated to intervene in Achaia on his own initiative. It is 
difficult to know whether the Achaians had expected this double-standard from 
him. As E. S. Gruen points out,17 the Romans rarely referred to legal relations, 
such as foedera, in their contacts with the Greeks. It might also be possible that 
Metellus never even imagined that any law should be relevant in this case. 
Nevertheless, Achaia’s reaction politely stopped him and revealed to 
contemporaries that Rome had used informal diplomacy but its relationship with 
formal law was ill-defined among the Romans. 
One might think that the picture of Metellus’ defeat by legal arguments 
resulted from Polybios’ manipulation of information, in order to emphasise 
Achaia’s legitimacy. Such doubt is cleared up, though, by considering a senatorial 
                                                   
15 Walbank 1979: 194. 
16 Badian 1952: 76-80; Walbank 1979: 219-20. 
17 Gruen 1984: 34-8. 
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session in which Metellus reported the incident in Achaia and its envoys 
explained why Achaia’s assembly had not been held. Listening to both sides, the 
Senate resolved that the situation about Sparta should be investigated by a new 
deputation, and then, according to Polybios (at 22.12.8), observed that ‘the 
Achaians should pay attention to the envoys from the Romans from time to time 
and show them proper respect as the Romans did to theirs (τοῖς δὲ πρεσβευταῖς 
τοῖς αἰεὶ παρ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ἐκπεμπομένοις παρῄνει προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ καταδοχὴν 
ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἁρμόζουσαν, καθάπερ καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι ποιοῦνται τῶν παραγινομένων 
πρὸς αὐτοὺς πρεσβευτῶν).’ The Senate avoided referring to Achaia’s legal 
arguments, but wanted Achaia to accept the request of Rome’s envoys in the 
future without complaint. Considering the fact that the dialogue was held before 
many senators and Achaians, and possibly other foreigners, the Senate surely 
made this kind of statement, which suggests afresh that the Senate had approved 
of informal diplomacy. This is further supported by a text from Rome’s perspective. 
Livius informs us (at 39.33.8) that ‘the Senate pointed out to Achaia’s envoys that 
Rome’s envoys should have at all times an opportunity of approaching Achaia’s 
concilium, the assembly in this case, just as the senatorial audience was granted 
to the Achaian envoys whenever they wanted it (ostendit senatus curae iis esse 
debere, ut legatis Romanis semper adeundi concilium gentis potestas fieret, quem 
ad modum et illis quotiens vellent senatus daretur).’ Livius re-arranges Polybios’ 
text by comparing Achaia’s meeting with the senatorial session, even though these 
were different.18 He seems to justify Metellus’ request by suggesting that the 
Senate generously permitted Achaia’s envoys to explain the legitimacy of its 
                                                   
18 Briscoe 2008: 336. 
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position in this case. In any event, Livius and his other sources appear not to deny 
the Polybian picture, generally. Thus, Metellus and other Romans did not and 
could not realistically criticise Achaia’s legal arguments and refusal of the envoy’s 
request, based on them. 
Meanwhile, considering the question of the reliability of Polybios’ text, it is 
also important to note that the Senate hoped that intervention by its envoys would 
be permitted by Achaia (and potentially other outsiders) regardless of their legal 
standing. This might have resulted partly from the flexible character of Roman 
diplomacy and, in addition, Rome’s vague attitude to Achaia in the 180s, recently 
debated by scholars.19 Certainly, the senatorial messages written by Polybios and 
Livius suggest that the Senate wanted to control the contact between Rome and 
Achaia, and others by implication, without adhering to legal rules, but hesitated 
to show this to outsiders too openly. Nevertheless, the Senate clearly meant that 
Roman delegates should be able to attempt to affect the policy of other states, 
even in cases where the Senate had given no such instruction. This is not a case 
of flexible diplomacy on the part of the Romans, but rather senatorial 
acquiescence to the independent and informal diplomatic initiatives of individuals. 
Furthermore, the Senate was clearly displeased with Achaia’s legal defence, but 
avoided criticising it directly, which means that the senators were aware of the 
conflict between informal diplomacy and legal arguments, something that 
Polybios leads his readers to see this too. Rome tried here to reconcile Achaia’s 
respect for law with the independent actions of Roman envoys by encouraging 
Achaia to remain silent regarding questions of legality. Thus, this case of informal 
                                                   
19 Yarrow 2012: 171; Luraghi and Magnetto 2012: 517. 
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diplomacy demonstrates its spread among the Romans and their opportunistic, or 
imperialistic, tendencies during Rome’s ascendancy over the Greeks and other 
outsiders. These features are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin. 
This situation is observed in a case of T. Quinctius Flamininus, the victor 
of the Second Macedonian War. In 187/6, he tried to rehabilitate Zeuxippos of 
Boiotia. He was Flamininus’ friend and an exile (Polyb. 22.4). 20  Flamininus 
persuaded the Senate to instruct Boiotia to allow Zeuxippos’ return from exile, 
apparently owing solely to Zeuxippos’ personal appeal to Flamininus. At this time 
Flamininus held no office. This was, in effect, an informal intervention in Boiotia 
based on his private connection, while tacitly exploiting the political reality of 
Roman ascendancy in Greece. Boiotia, however, refused the request, on the 
grounds that its treatment of Zeuxippos had been decided by its courts in an 
entirely legal way. Although the Senate did not cancel its resolution, this case was 
not pursued. This shows that it was difficult for Rome to make the Greeks follow 
her requests, even in the 180s.21 However, what is significant here is that the 
senators accepted Flamininus’ proposal, even though his private connection with 
Zeuxippos may well have been noticed, and tried to interfere in the Boiotian 
affairs, but the attempt was easily abandoned when Boiotia opposed it with legal 
arguments. This might have resulted partly from Rome’s consideration for the 
tense internal situation in Boiotia (22.4.11-17). But this case also shows that 
Rome looked favourably upon the participation of individual Romans in 
international politics in this kind of opportunistic or imperialistic fashion, but was 
not prepared to deny formal legal systems openly. 
                                                   
20 Walbank 1979: 179-81; cf. Briscoe 1972: 33-4. 
21 Ferrary 2009: 133-4. 
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This kind of diplomatic manoeuvre in the contacts between Rome and 
Greece, during Rome’s ascendancy in the region, can further be observed in the 
case of Ap. Claudius Pulcher in 184. He visited Achaia following a mission in 
Macedonia, and intervened in Achaia’s conflict with Sparta (Liv. 39.35.5-37.21).22 
He had been ordered by the Senate to investigate it (39.35.5; Polyb. 22.12.4). This 
intervention could not be not refused by Achaia. Lykortas, the στρατηγός, 
however, tried to prevent Rome’s intervention through legal arguments just as 
Achaia had done in the previous cases.23 According to Livius (at 39.36.9 and 
37.10), Lykortas referred to the violation by Sparta of a treaty with Achaia that 
had been made under Flamininus’ direction, which prohibited Sparta from 
interfering with the ex-Spartan coastal area, and also to the unreasonableness of 
Rome’s intervening in the affairs of a region conquered by Achaia, despite an 
alliance between Achaia and Rome being in effect. Furthermore, Pausanias 
relates at 7.9.4 that Lykortas also referred to the contravention of the pact 
between Rome and Achaia that forbade any city of the Achaian League to 
negotiate with Rome individually. Polybios’ text for Lykortas’ speech is lost, but 
scholars agree that both Livius and Pausanias use it in their descriptions here.24 
Moreover, Lykortas’ legal arguments in the two texts are compatible with the 
previous cases regarding the Achaians’ protests against Roman intervention, 
written by Polybios. It is safe to conclude that Lykortas probably did develop his 
argument here based on legal precedent.25 
                                                   
22 Briscoe 1967: 12-13. 
23 Deininger 1971: 123. 
24 Gruen 1973: 126; Briscoe 2008: 341. As regards Pausanias’ use of Polybios’ text, see 
also Cherry 2001: 249-50 and 318 n.17. 
25 This is supported by the general use of legal precedent by the Hellenistic civic 
states in diplomacy as the case of Eresos’ negotiations with the Macedonian kings for 
the treatment of the exiled relatives of the tyrants of the city at the end of the fourth 
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What should be noticed is how this manoeuvre was developed by the 
individuals concerned, and is a new phenomenon. As a response to Lykortas, 
Pulcher is said (at Liv. 39.37.19) to have observed that ‘they (the Achaians) should 
court the favour (of the Romans) while they could do so of their own free-will lest 
they should soon be compelled to do so against their will (dum liceret voluntate 
sua facere, gratiam inirent, ne mox inviti et coacti facerent).’ This went beyond 
his original task, namely to investigate the Spartan case, and was tantamount to 
a blatant act of intimidation. It is impossible to know to what extent this attitude 
was supported by other Romans and how far this sentence reflects his real 
statement. Yet, considering the reliance of Livius on Polybios for this period, 
Pulcher’s alleged observation may well have derived from Polybios’ text. 
Furthermore, in light of the fact that this was delivered in an open discussion in 
Achaia, the information about Pulcher here is fundamentally believable. Thus, 
the following three points should be noted. Firstly, from the viewpoint of his 
deviating from the formal task, Pulcher acted independently in the meeting. This 
was informal diplomacy in action. Secondly, in light of Pulcher’s silence on 
Lykortas’ legal arguments and the former’s observation that went beyond the 
sphere of investigation, Lykortas and his supporters may well have noticed 
Pulcher’s informal diplomacy and thus the vulnerability of his argument. Thirdly, 
however, unlike the previous cases, the Achaians were afraid of what might 
happen if they refused his intervention, making a concession and cancelling the 
sentence against some Spartans (Liv. 39.37.20-1). The Achaian League had no 
method with which to manage the interference of Rome’s envoys if they did not 
                                                   
century shows. Cf. Ellis-Evans 2012: 183-212. 
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withdraw, despite their legal weakness, and when the possibility that Rome would 
take strong measures was inferred. These factors show an increase in the 
significance of informal diplomacy in the contacts between Rome and Greece, and 
confirm its ill-defined relationship with law on the international stage. Rome 
oscillated between depicting herself as a mild friend and firm superior while 
worrying about the two factors, and yet the Greeks could not have any firm 
attitude to her, considering her general ascendancy in the area. 
This situation is also seen in the case of Flamininus, in 184/3. In this year 
he was asked by Deinokrates, his Messenian friend, to support Messenia in a 
conflict with Achaia over membership of the League, when he was sent to Asia 
Minor as an envoy (Polyb. 23.5).26 He accepted the request and made contact with 
Achaia despite lacking any order to do so. He (and Deinokrates) must have 
expected that now Achaia would compromise with Rome. Flamininus sent a 
document requesting the Achaians to hold the ἐκκλησία without constraint. They 
did not meet his expectation, though. At this time, the Senate had not announced 
any deputation to negotiate regarding Messenian affairs. Achaia, under the 
leadership of Philopoimen, welcomed Flamininus, but ‘calmly (τὴν ἡσυχίαν εἶχον)’ 
wanted him to provide the details of the dispute through a formal senatorial letter, 
withdrawing him (23.5.15-18). When Rome did not seem to want to intervene 
strongly, Achaia could persevere with legal arguments and prevent individual 
Romans, and Greeks connected with Rome, from acting in such an informal 
manner. Nevertheless, independent actions were still not directly criticised by 
contemporaries. Even Polybios only emphasises the reasonability of Achaia’s 
                                                   
26 For more on his connection with Deinokrates and the Messenian affairs at that 
time, see Gruen 1984: 494 and Pfeilschifter 2005: 352-4. 
216 
 
arguments, or praises its attitude towards the Romans involved, while referring 
to their lack of legal legitimacy. The appearance, then, of informal diplomacy 
practically was noticed by contemporaries, including Polybios, but its relationship 
with written law was still ambiguous. 
These cases in the 180s demonstrate that informal diplomacy had spread 
among the Romans, and that the Greeks noticed and sometimes utilised it by 
accepting their approaches and approaching them, in turn. Although 
contemporaries were not conversant in the exact terminology, the mention of 
Lepidus’ private hostility toward Nobilior, and the frequent references to the lack 
of legitimate reasons for Roman intervention in Greek affairs, in the extant 
sources show that they recognised the notion of intervening in diplomacy through 
channels aside from official ones. There was also a conflict over the relationship 
between informal diplomacy and law or legitimacy. The use of informal diplomacy 
was not directly criticised, although this partly resulted from their recognition of 
Rome’s imperial ascendancy in Greece. Legal arguments, however, were also 
respected, and prevented Roman individuals from using informal diplomacy, 
whether or not they admitted their lack of legal basis or illegitimacy, in light of 
the anger of Metellus in 185. Furthermore, considering Polybios’ influence on the 
extant texts concerned, this picture might partly come from his personal 
perspective or political agenda. As an Achaian, he is clearly favourable to his 
compatriots who tried to prevent Rome from intervening in the Achaian affairs 
with legal arguments. His picture of the conflict between legality and informal 
intervention, that lacked legal substance, functioned as a tool for justifying 
Achaian actions to his readers. Nevertheless, these diplomatic manoeuvres were 
developed in open sessions and other contemporaries could check the historicity 
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of his claims easily. In this situation, based on the analysis of the surviving 
sources, the general contents of Polybios’ text, and the picture of informal 
diplomacy and opposition thereto, are generally believable.  
 
Section 2: Informal Diplomacy and Greek Individuals 
 
This chapter has so far mainly analysed Roman actions, that is to say the 
way that the Romans made use of informal diplomacy in their dealings with 
Greeks, in the 180s. As was shown, it is reasonable to notice the cases in Greece 
where Rome’s ascendancy was in the process of being established and her contacts 
with outsiders may well have been the most actively made, in order to show the 
general situation over informal diplomacy in Rome. It is still necessary, however, 
to consider the approach of the Greeks to Rome during the same period, to achieve 
this aim. It is also important to note the fact that informal diplomacy caused 
conflicts in the contacts between the Romans and the Greeks in the cases of 
Section1. As I have shown, the latter had long made use of this concept. It appears 
odd that the appearance of informal diplomacy by the Romans could have been an 
issue in the contacts between both peoples. This section, therefore, will focus on 
several examples that bring out both the use of informal diplomacy by Greeks and 
the conflicting attitudes towards it among Greeks in Rome’s advance into the East. 
I will begin by showing that informal diplomacy occurred in the contact 
between Rome and the Greeks, even when initiated by the Greeks, by analysing 
an event of 184/3. In this year, a huge number of Greek petitioners visited Rome 
to complain about Philippos V of Macedonia. According to Polybios (23.1-3, esp. 
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1.3; cf. Liv. 39.46.6-47.11, esp. 46.7-8),27 ‘some of them privately, some of them as 
envoys of their cities, and some of them as representatives of national groups (οἱ 
μὲν κατ᾽ ἰδίαν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πόλιν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐθνικὰς συστάσεις)’ made contact 
with the Senate. 28  The act of visiting Rome κατ᾽ ἰδίαν was one of informal 
diplomacy by the individual Greeks. Their visit to Rome also shows that they 
expected the Senate’s acceptance of this approach. Indeed, Rome did listen to their 
appeal. The Greeks thus confirmed the spread of this diplomatic idea to the 
Roman state. Their recognition was strengthened by the fact that, after the debate, 
Rome expressed her confidence in Demetrios, despite her favourable attitude 
towards the complainants.29 He was Philippos’ prince who had spent time in 
Rome as a hostage, and was one of the delegates here. Rome respected Demetrios 
as if he was the Macedonian leader, over his father. Moreover, Flamininus 
flattered this prince openly and sent a letter to Philippos, despite lacking any 
office, praising Demetrios (23.3.7-8). He was more respected than might be 
expected of his official position as a prince and diplomat. Polybios thinks that 
Flamininus and other Romans tried to divide the Macedonians, while Livius who, 
by contrast, is favourable to Flamininus, regards this picture as too unfavourable 
to Rome.30 In any case, these contacts represent the involvement of Demetrios in 
the official dialogue between Rome and Macedonia, something technically beyond 
his formal position, or a measure by Rome in using this prince as an unofficial 
                                                   
27 As Briscoe 2008: 374-5 indicates, Livius’ text for this event clearly derives from 
Polybios. 
28 For the phrase κατ᾽ ἰδίαν, Polybios uses it with the context of taking aside a person 
at 4.84.8. But in this scene of 184/3, it does not make sense. As Livius interprets it as 
‘private individuals (singuli … privatim)’ at 39.46.8, it is reasonable to think that 
some Greeks privately and individually visited Rome.  
29 For the trouble of Philippos with his neighbours and Rome in the 180s and the 
position of Demetrios, see Gruen 1974: 227-39 and Newey 2009: 73-9. 
30 Briscoe 2008: 378-82. 
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tool of approaching Macedonia, indebting him through hospitality reminiscent of 
the custom of gift-giving. These contacts were made before the Greek petitioners, 
although Flamininus’ letter might not have been opened before them. It is safe to 
conclude that approaches to outsiders, outside of the formal diplomatic framework 
between states, informal diplomacy, had become established as a tool of Roman 
and Greek diplomacy, and its use by Rome is here confirmed by the Greeks. 
I will now note the conflicting views of the Greeks regarding informal 
diplomacy. Section 1 showed that it could be treated negatively, although this 
image partly derived specifically from Polybios’ interests and, moreover, its use 
was not necessarily criticised directly, even by him. Nevertheless, as shown in 
184/3 (Polyb. 23.1-3), many Greeks also used informal diplomacy. A good case to 
investigate this inconsistency is Kallikrates’ action in 181/0. According to Polybios 
(24.8-10), he was sent by Achaia to Rome, to defend his state’s policy against some 
Spartan exiles. Yet, this was not what he spoke about in Rome; instead, he asked 
the Senate to give its support to those Greeks who respected Roman requests. The 
Senate responded positively, and observed that the Greek states needed more men 
like him, helping him control Achaia and restore the rights of the Spartans, based 
on his personal policy and senatorial suggestions (24.8.1-9, 10.6-7, and 15).31 The 
obvious deviation from his official task is an example of informal diplomacy by a 
Greek diplomat, while the Senate’s reaction shows that Rome was quite willing to 
receive this kind of approach. Yet, Kallikrates’ intervention here was controversial, 
and much criticised by Polybios. It therefore offers a valuable opportunity to 
examine the way that such informal diplomacy might be viewed by the Greeks. 
                                                   




It is useful, here, to notice how Polybios describes this event. He relates at 
24.9.2-3 that Kallikrates told the Senate that ‘in all the current democratic states 
there were two parties: one recommending obedience to the requests by the 
Romans, and holding neither law nor stelai nor anything else to be superior to the 
will of the Romans; the other always quoting laws, oaths and stelai, and exhorting 
the people to be careful about breaking them (δυεῖν γὰρ οὐσῶν αἱρέσεων κατὰ τὸ 
παρὸν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς πολιτείαις, καὶ τῶν μὲν φασκόντων δεῖν 
ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς γραφομένοις ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων καὶ μήτε νόμον μήτε στήλην μήτ᾽ 
ἄλλο μηθὲν προυργιαίτερον νομίζειν τῆς Ῥωμαίων προαιρέσεως, τῶν δὲ τοὺς 
νόμους προφερομένων καὶ τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ στήλας καὶ παρακαλούντων τὰ 
πλήθη μὴ ῥᾳδίως ταῦτα παραβαίνειν).’ It is impossible to know whether 
Kallikrates really said the things that Polybios attributes to him, but the author 
leads his readers to imagine a conflict between the people accepting Rome’s 
requests regardless of their legality i.e. making an act of informal diplomacy, and 
the opponents to it through legal arguments. Moreover, considering the open 
debate in Achaia between the group led by Kallikrates and the στρατηγός, 
Hyperbatos, which advocated the acceptance of Rome’s request favouring Sparta, 
and that led by Polybios’ father Lykortas, which argued for opposing it based on 
the laws (24.8.2-6), it is clear that this contrast was noticed by contemporaries, 
meaning that Polybios’ text is, therefore, generally believable. It is further 
noteworthy that he treats the behaviour of Kallikrates negatively, and with 
moralising terms.32 This situation is confirmed by the following. Polybios relates 
at 24.10.4 that, after Kallikrates’ speech, Rome started to weaken the power of 
                                                   
32 Eckstein 1995a: 204-6; Derow 2003: 67; Champion 2004: 155-6. 
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the people working for ‘the best (τὸ βέλτιστον)’ in their states, and began to 
support those appealing to her ‘whether it was right or wrong (καὶ δικαίως καὶ 
ἀδίκως).’ What he considered ‘the best’ was that Achaia maintained the privilege 
of having contacts with Rome ‘on something like equal terms (κατὰ ποσὸν 
ἰσολογίαν)’ based on their partnership in the previous wars against Philippos and 
the Seleucids (24.10.9). Polybios therefore treats Kallikrates’ action at 24.10.12-
13 as ‘that of the opposite (κατὰ τοὐναντίον)’ of reminding Rome of the claims ‘of 
justice (τῶν δικαίων),’ and argues to his readers that what had to be achieved was 
not to increase the number of ‘flatters (κολάχων)’ but to maintain that of ‘true 
friends (φίλων ἀληθινῶν),’ like the Achaians trying to keep equal relations with 
Rome (24.10.5). Kallikrates’ success encouraged others to behave in a similarly 
informal fashion, regardless of legality, and prevented men like Polybios and his 
circles from halting it, from the viewpoint of this historian. 
It is noticeable that Polybios, however, does not criticise Kallikrates’ 
deviation itself from the task imposed on him through the legal procedures of the 
Achaian state. As P. S. Derow and A. M. Eckstein indicate, Polybios does not call 
the speech betrayal.33 As he puts it at 24.10.8, ‘Kallikrates had unconsciously 
become the author of the great evils for the Greeks, particularly the Achaians (οὐκ 
εἰδὼς ὅτι μεγάλων κακῶν ἀρχηγὸς γέγονε πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησι, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς 
Ἀχαιοῖς).’ What bothered Polybios was that the consequences of the speech made 
it impossible for Achaia to maintain an equal relationship with Rome, not 
necessarily that Kallikrates’ action was of questionable legality. This is supported 
by Polybios’ use of the phrase καὶ δικαίως καὶ ἀδίκως at 24.10.9, mentioned above. 
                                                   
33 Derow 1970: 20; Eckstein 1995b: 205. 
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Approaching Rome privately or exceeding the authority as a delegate was not 
always unjust. He tacitly admits that such unofficial diplomatic acts, i.e. informal 
diplomacy, could be used reasonably, or ‘for the Greeks, particularly the Achaians,’ 
although he praises Achaia in the 180s for trying to halt the use of it by Rome, 
and some of the Achaians connected with her, for defending Achaia’s interests 
through legal arguments, and criticises Kallikrates’ speech here. 
One may argue against this utilitarian view of Polybios, on the grounds 
that he generally seems to respect those who regarded legitimacy and ethics as 
important. But his moralising attitude is closely connected with his political ideal, 
namely the prosperity of Achaia. For instance, he praises the Megalopolitans at 
2.61.8, because in 223 they maintained their faith with an ally, foregoing their 
own immediate interests, despite losing their city. He calls their behaviour ‘the 
most respectable and the best (τὴν σεμνοτάτην καὶ βελτίστην).’ This seems to 
reflect Polybios’ distinctive moral vision.34 However, his praise for Megalopolis 
does not necessarily result from his general ethics. Megalopolis had preserved its 
relationship with Achaia. Polybios’ respect for the city-state largely derives from 
its contribution to the federation. This is confirmed by an event during the Second 
Macedonian War (Liv. 32.25; cf. Polyb. 18.15.3). 35  The author regards the 
surrender of Argos, a member of Achaia, by the Argive leaders to Philippos as an 
act of treachery, even though their decision was based on the support of the 
majority of the citizens, owing to Argos’ traditional friendship with Macedonia 
(Liv. 32.22.11). Polybios’ criteria for good and bad acts, then, are closely connected 
with the interests of Achaia. This is also suggested by his reference to Aratos’ 
                                                   
34 Cf. Gray 2013: 327-8 and 350. 
35 Walbank 1967: 565. Scholars agree that Livius’ description for this event is derived 
from Polybios’ lost text. Cf. Briscoe 1973: 1-2 and 214; Eckstein 1987c: 217.   
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informal diplomatic actions. As shown in Section 1 of Chapter 2, in the war 
against Sparta in the 220s, Aratos secretly negotiated with Macedonia, a 
traditional enemy of Achaia, regarding an alliance in response to its contemporary 
difficulties (Polyb. 2.47.1-54.4). This was informal diplomacy. The reason why he 
hid the negotiation was to prevent the obstruction of Sparta and Aitolia and his 
rivals in Achaia, and the demoralisation of Achaia’s soldiers (2.47.7-9). These 
manoeuvres are not criticised by Polybios. Although he did not praise this 
behaviour, he does not abandon his respect for Aratos as ‘the originator (ἀρχηγός)’ 
and ‘the guide (καθηγεμών)’ of ‘the most glorious achievement (τὸ κάλλιστον 
ἔργον)’ of Achaia, ‘the unification of the Peloponnesos (Πελοποννησίων ὁμόνοια),’ 
as he puts it (2.40.1-2). Overall, independent diplomatic action, as such, was not 
blameworthy for Polybios. Actions against Achaia were not praiseworthy, even 
though the people concerned had some reason. Considering these tendencies, his 
way of describing Kallikrates’ action results from its negative impact on Achaia, 
from the perspective of Polybios’ ideal and sense of patriotism, not from the 
general ethics or unconditional opposition to informal diplomacy against legality. 
Meanwhile, these results, in particular those concerning Aratos, suggest 
that Polybios, his circles and other contemporaries, did really consider informal 
diplomacy to contrast with formal legality. Otherwise, his political associates 
would not have proposed distinctively legal arguments to the users of informal 
diplomacy in the 180s and Polybios would not have do so before his readers. This 
is further supported by several epigraphic sources, quite independent of his 
description of the diplomatic contacts with the Romans. For instance, it is useful 
to note a decree of Araxa in Lykia (SEG XVIII.570). In this document, Orthagoras, 
a citizen of the city, is praised for several services. Among his merits, the contacts 
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with certain Appius and Publius, Rome’s diplomats, are referred to in lines 62 to 
68. While this inscription seems to have been erected sometime after 167, this 
part concerns the negotiations around the Peace of Apameia.36 The envoys appear 
to be Ap. Claudius Nero and P. Cornelius Lentulus or P. Aelius Tubero, the 
members of the ten legati of Cn. Manlius Vulso, their general.37 The Lykians 
faced a crisis following the defeat of the Seleucids, and tried to maintain their 
rights against Rhodes by winning over Rome (Polyb. 22.5.1-4).38 The reference 
concerned shows that the connection with the Romans at that time was far from 
problematic, being remembered as one of Orthagoras’ merits by the erectors of the 
inscription and the contemporaries of his contacts with the envoys. According to 
the lines 69 to 77, furthermore, he twice joined the Lykian festival of the goddess 
Roma as Araxa’s θεωρός. He was respected as a leading citizen after making 
contact with the Romans, and was expected to manage the formal affairs of Araxa 
concerning Rome by using this connection, possibly from the 180s to the 160s. 
Similarly, a fragmentary decree from Chios, probably around the time of Apameia, 
informs us that an anonymous politician of the island was honoured for his 
support for Rome during the war against the Seleucids, his introduction of the 
rituals of the goddess Roma and the Roman heroes among his fellow citizens, and 
his favourable treatment of the Romans visiting Chios (SEG XXX.1073).39 If the 
consideration by scholars about the historical context is correct, the honouree led 
                                                   
36 Larsen 1956: 151-69; Zimmermann 1993: 125-9. 
37  Errington 1987: 114-8 supposes that the two Romans might be Ap. Claudius 
Centho and P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, who visited Asia Minor in the 150s and 
the 140s respectively. Bresson 1999: 114-6 also supports this theory. However, many 
scholars think that Orthagoras was honoured shortly after 167 because there is no 
sign of Rhodes’ control over Lykia in the decree, and proof that the decree was made 
much later than the year. Cf. Ager 1996: no.130. 
38 Berthold 1984: 167-9. 
39 Derow and Forrest 1982: 79-92; Canali De Rossi 1999: no.152; Salvo 2012: 125-37. 
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Chios to support Rome when the latter defeated the Seleucids. 40  His fellow 
citizens recognised it as a personal achievement on his part, balancing direct and 
semi-private contacts. The actions recorded in these epigraphic cases were not 
completely informal diplomacy. The honourees did approach the leading Romans 
formally, at least at the beginning. However, their fellow citizens praised them, 
not only for the approach with personal contacts, and thus managing ad hoc 
problems, but also for their maintaining and exploiting the connection with the 
Romans afterwards. This idea should be in informal diplomacy. Furthermore, the 
positive attitude of those concerned towards it was shown to others through 
erection of the inscriptions.41 The Greeks thus recognised a connection between 
personal relationships and legal tasks distinctively, as Polybios does in the cases 
of the 180s. The former, however, could be a nice tool of diplomacy just as the 
latter, despite the negative picture sometimes proposed by his ethical phrases. 
Considering this situation, Kallikrates’ success really encouraged his 
                                                   
40 Derow and Forrest 1982: 82 and 88-90, meanwhile, propose the possibility that the 
honorand was an Attalid king because of the appearance of the term ἀναγκαῖοι 
(kinsmen) in line 2, or Hermokles, the Chian ἱερομνήμων at Delphoi, around 190 
because of the reference to the interests of the honouree to wine, Muses, Rome, and 
international activity. But these are pure supposition. Other scholars abstain from 
identifying the honorand in the study of this decree. 
41 This situation is also seen in the case of Philippides of Athens, who approached 
Lysimachos individually and was praised by the Athenians for the private connection 
and the contribution to the city with it, although it was in the 280s (Syll³ 374). Cf. 
Austin 2006: no.54. Furthermore, a Delphic honorary decree of 182/1 for Eumenes II 
of Pergamon seems to be understood in this context. According to this inscription 
(Syll³ 630.ll.1-4 and 17-18), one of the reasons why he deserved praise was his 
‘friendship (φιλíα)’ with the Romans, depicted as ‘οἱ κοινοὶ εὐεργέται (the common 
benefactors),’ if the supplement is correct. He was a king, and the contact with Rome 
was not completely a private one, but Delphoi emphasised favourably that he was 
connected with the Romans by friendship, i.e. a direct human relation, unlike Polybios 
(and his circles) in the cases mentioned above, although this might partly result from 
the fact that Delphoi owed its independence from Aitolia around 190 to Rome. Cf. CID 
IV.107; FD III.3.261; Erskine 1994: 70-5; Grainger 1999: 502; Austin 2006: no.237. As 
regards the common benefactors in the Greek world, see Herrmann 1965: 33-6, 
Habicht 1989: 333-4, and Ma 2002: no.17. 
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contemporaries to use these manners in informal diplomacy further, as Polybios 
tells, but without any conflict between justice and injustice, especially among 
those who did not consider the prevention of Roman intervention as profitable. 
The erection of the Lykian decree, shortly after 167, seems to have occurred in 
this context. 
Overall, these case studies show the following points. Informal diplomacy 
or the approach in channels apart from official ones actively functioned in the 
Greeks’ contacts with Rome, owing to her increasing acceptance of it. Polybios 
criticises this tendency with legal and sometimes ethical arguments. They could 
be supported by many Greeks in light of the cases considered in Section 1, and in 
the attitude of Achaia before Kallikrates’ speech, but the criticism arises from the 
political interests of the people concerned. Even then, informal diplomacy was not 
always denied. However, the distinction between the two channels drawn by 
Polybios is not a fiction, since the Greeks treated informal or private contacts and 
ordinary or impersonal ones differently. This means that the relationship between 
both tools of diplomacy was not defined in the 180s even among the Greeks, who 
had long used informal diplomacy, much less among the Romans and other 
contemporaries. Indeed, its users in Rome and Greece gained an advantage over 
their opponents by making use of Rome’s domination in Greece, and with ad hoc 
political tactics. This spread and yet ill-definition of informal diplomacy was thus 
an aspect of Roman international politics in the 180s, one that further developed 






Section 3: Informal Diplomacy and Tensions among the Romans 
 
I will finally argue that the spread of informal diplomacy among the 
Romans, and the poorly defined nature of its role (shown in the previous two 
sections), caused tensions among the Romans. This can be seen by analysing 
Rome’s management of foreign affairs during the Third Macedonian War. To do 
this it is necessary to examine the relationship between individual Romans, 
foreign states, and the Senate in particular. The senators, the Roman elite, had 
managed state diplomacy collectively, while the spread of informal diplomacy 
resulted in the senators themselves making increasing use of it, and accepting (or 
overlooking) its use by their colleagues. This increased the influence of individual 
users of it over Roman diplomacy, and decreased the collective leadership of the 
Senate. I will show here that it was this tendency that caused troubles for the 
Romans, as a whole.  
In order to achieve this aim, it must first be noted that informal diplomacy 
was actively used by the Romans after the 180s as well. This is confirmed by a 
case of 173 (Liv. 42.6.1-2). In this year, M. Claudius Marcellus visited Achaia and 
called conventus, a meeting of the league. During this session, he praised Achaia 
for having maintained a decree forbidding Macedonia’s kings from entering its 
territory. This was practically a display of Rome’s hostility towards Perseus, 
Philippos’ successor. Yet, Marcellus’ task was settling the troubles in Aitolia 
(42.5.10-12).42 The Achaian affair was not included in his mission. His request 
was therefore an independent action, and an example of informal diplomacy. It is 
                                                   
42 Walsh 2000: 302. 
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noticeable that, although he seemed to show no legitimate reason, Achaia did not 
insist on its laws or a senatorial order.43 One may think this simply results from 
the state of the evidence. Polybios’ text for this case is lost, and Livius only briefly 
refers to Marcellus’ visit of Achaia. But this does not deny Marcellus’ independent 
approach to Achaia. Furthermore, considering Marcellus’ reference to the decree 
of Achaia against Macedonia during the meeting, he could easily make Achaia 
hold it. He had to explain to the Achaians beforehand what he wanted to announce. 
It is too difficult to identify when Rome determined to attack Perseus,44 but 
Achaia may well have thought here that Rome had intended to do so in the near 
future, and that if Achaia were to reject Marcellus’ request, he would report it to 
the Senate as a sign of its support for Macedonia. Thus, his demand for holding 
the meeting was practically to compel Achaia to regard Macedonia as its enemy, 
and possibly to check the increase of Perseus’ influence within Greece. Macedonia 
had regained its seat in the Delphic Amphiktyonia after the death of Philippos 
(CID IV.108.ll.5-7),45 and had been able to have contacts with the Greeks easily. 
It made no sense here for Achaia to propose legal objections, unless it was ready 
to compete against a Rome which had substantially increased her influence in 
Greece. Marcellus successfully conducted informal diplomacy while exploiting 
this political situation and, moreover, secured Achaia’s support in the coming war 
for Rome. 
A similar case is observed at the beginning of the Third Macedonian War. 
In the consular year of 172, Rome sent seven senators, as her delegates, to Greece 
to survey the situation of the Greeks and win them over, with some 2,000 soldiers. 
                                                   
43 Briscoe 2012: 171-2. 
44 Harris 1979: 227-33; Briscoe 2012: 13-15. 
45 Habicht 1987: 60. 
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The legitimacy of sending troops under the command of the envoys was 
questionable, since it was shortly before the declaration of war. Indeed, Perseus 
challenged the Romans about it. According to Livius (at 42.37, esp. 6), the 
diplomats decided that ‘no written reply be sent, but the bearer of the dispatch 
(from Perseus) be told that the Romans were doing it for the protection of the 
(Greek) cities (cui rescribi non placuit, nuntio ipsius qui litteras attulerat dici, 
praesidii causa ipsarum urbium Romanos facere).’ 46  Rome’s envoys had no 
senatorial order regarding how to explain their task, and had to manage the 
question by themselves. Consequently, their statements and method of answering 
were examples of informal diplomacy. The Senate apparently expected that they 
would deal with such a situation by acting independently. Just as in Marcellus’ 
case, the informal diplomacy here followed closely the interests of Rome and the 
Senate that had sent the envoys. 
This tendency is also seen in the case of Q. Marcius Philippus, one of the 
seven envoys. When Rome’s hostility to Perseus was apparent,47 the king tried to 
persuade Rome not to attack him. Philippus insincerely encouraged him to send 
his envoys to Rome, although this envoy knew that the Senate had resolutely 
decided to attack Macedonia, the Romans thus making use of Perseus’ attempt to 
gain time to start the war favourably (Liv. 42.38.8-43.3; Polyb. 27.4.1-2). This was 
made independently by Philippus, and should consequently be classed as informal 
diplomacy. Some senators in Rome regarded it as a treacherous action, far from 
Rome’s traditional fairness, calling such sharpness nova sapientia negatively (Liv. 
                                                   
46 Walbank 1941: 82-93; Briscoe 2012: 270-4. For the chronology of the beginning of 
the war, see Wiemer 2004: 22-37. 
47 Golan 1989: 124. 
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42.47.9).48 Yet, Philippus was still elected as the consul of 169 (43.11.5). His 
playing for time was regarded as a merit by many Romans. These cases show that 
informal diplomacy was actively used by Roman individuals after the 180s as well, 
and was approved, possibly even expected, by many Romans for its contribution 
to the state or the Senate. 
      But these successes of informal diplomacy partly resulted from the Greeks 
accepting Roman demands, even when made informally. They expected Rome’s 
military superiority to Perseus.49 It was thus hopeless for them to argue with 
Rome about the legitimacy of each of the Romans’ actions. This is confirmed by 
the decision of Rhodes, in its contact with C. Lucretius Gallus, the praetor of the 
fleet, in 171. He wanted the Rhodians to send their ships through Sokrates, an 
ordinary citizen. This irregular procedure caused some to suspect that the request 
was counterfeit, although Rhodes did dispatch the fleet, eventually. Lucretius 
announced, however, that there would be no naval battle, and sent it back (Liv. 
42.56.1-7; Polyb. 27.7.1-16). 50  Considering the irregularity of the approach 
towards Rhodes, and the arbitrariness of the treatment of its troops, apparently 
without any order from Rome, his actions are clearly informal diplomacy, although 
they were not necessarily illegal because of his authority as a general. Yet, Rhodes 
did not complain about him, officially. Polybios, a contemporary Achaian leader, 
also treats Rhodes’ attitude here favourably, despite his negative references to the 
actions of Roman envoys that had behaved independently in the cases of the 180s. 
Instead, he regards (at 27.7.12) Deinon and Polyaratos, the Rhodian leaders 
criticising Lucretius’ method of request here, as ‘avaricious and bold (φιλάργυρον 
                                                   
48 Briscoe 1964: 66-77; Petzold 1999: 61-93; Brizzi 2001: 121-31; Dmitriev 2011a: 155. 
49 Wiemer 2002: 298-9; Burton 2011: 214-5. 
50 Wiemer 2001a: 166. 
231 
 
ὄντα καὶ θρασύν).’ From the viewpoint of contemporary Rhodians and Polybios, 
showing hostility to Rome was imprudent, regardless of the questionable 
legitimacy of the Romans’ actions. This situation might partly result from the 
tendency of Polybios’ source from Rhodes, which would be criticised by Rome after 
the Macedonian War and fix the two leaders with the liability. 51  However, 
Polybios also shows a similar attitude in his description of the disruption in 
Boiotia during this period (27.1-2). Boiotia had longstanding connections with 
Macedonia. The citizens had plunged into civil strife over whether Perseus should 
be supported or not.52 Considering Polybios’ moral vision shown in several cases, 
such as that of the contribution of Megalopolis to Achaia in the 220s, some 
Boiotians’ maintaining loyalty to Macedonia could be considered praiseworthy, 
even if their actions courted disaster. But there is no praise for the Boiotians who 
supported Perseus (at 27.2.10); in taking the side of Macedonia, they are behaving 
‘irrationally (ἀλογίστως)’ and ‘childishly (παιδαριωδῶς).’ Moreover, in Achaia, 
Polybios and many Achaians during this period supported Rome under the 
leadership of Archon, rather than advocating neutrality, like Lykortas (28.3.7-8 
and 6.1-9). 53  Polybios and a number of Greeks seem to have pragmatically 
regarded supporting Rome, regardless of the legality of her actions, as reasonable. 
He even justifies it by criticising his opponents with moralistic phrases. 
Considering the fact that Polybios was writing in Rome under detention, partly 
for his actions in this very war, his behaviour at the time might have been 
different from his later description. Nevertheless, his picture of the general 
situation is believable, since he would have been criticised by many eyewitnesses 
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of the events concerned if he had manipulated information in his text excessively. 
This situation confirms that the opposition of Polybios and many Greeks to 
informal diplomacy in the previous cases resulted from ad hoc decisions to 
navigate their relationship with a Roman state that was becoming more 
imperialistic, rather than from any genuine sense of morality.54 
This also means that informal diplomacy here depended on the military 
situation. This is suggested by the fact that when the war went against Rome, 
people in and beyond Rome tended to criticise the individual Romans in the field. 
It is important to note that, after Perseus defeated Roman troops at Kallinikos,55 
the Chalkidians complained of the plunder and violence by Lucretius and L. 
Hortensius, the praetor in 170, despite their obedience to Rome (Liv. 43.7.5-
8.10). 56  Rome accepted this complaint and recalled Lucretius. Moreover, M’. 
Juventius Thalna and Cn. Aufidius, the tribuni plebis, put him on a trial. He was 
fined 100,000 asses. Hortensius was also reproached by the Senate (43.8.7 and 9). 
While this Livian reference seems to be derived from Polybios’ lost text,57 the 
actions of the Senate and the tribuni were made openly, meaning that the 
information is believable. 
I argue that this is also a sign of a new senatorial attempt to strengthen its 
power, and of a change in the situation of Rome’s informal diplomacy, even though 
the actions of Lucretius and Hortensius do not necessarily represent examples of 
it. This is suggested by the senatorial message in managing the complaint of the 
two generals. According to Livius at 43.8.5-6, the Senate issued a decree to the 
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effect that the war against Perseus was ‘for the liberty of Greece (libertas 
Graeciae),’ that ‘Roman friends and allies should not suffer at the hands of the 
magistrates (non ut ea a magistratibus suis socii atque amici paterentur),’ and 
that ‘such acts could not be done in accordance with the wish or the concurrence 
of the Senate (ea neque facta neque fieri voluntate senatus quem non posse 
existimare).’ The Senate treated the actions in question as ‘misdeeds’ made by the 
two generals ‘arbitrarily,’ and promised to impose a check on such ‘deviation from 
Rome’s real intention.’ This resulted directly from the unfavourable military 
situation facing Rome. Indeed, the Senate gave pecuniary gifts to each of the 
complainants, currying their favour (43.8.8-9). Yet, it is noteworthy that the 
Senate referred to its respect for its good cause, the Freedom of Greece. This was 
also shown in its letter to Delphoi during this period (RDGE 40B.ll.20-1).58 In the 
message to the Delphians (and other Greeks), the Senate criticises Perseus for his 
attempt ‘to break the freedom given to you by our generals through throwing the 
whole Greek nation into disorders (τὸ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν διὰ τῶ[ν ἡμετέρων 
στρατηγῶν δοθεῖσαν ἀφανί/ζε]ιν τῶι ὅλον τὸ ἔθνος εἰς ταρα[χὰς).’ It is difficult 
to decide whether this letter was sent before or after the message to the 
Chalkidians. In any case, considering the reference to this good cause, and also 
the criticism of the generals, the Senate aimed not only to win over international 
public opinion afresh, but to show to contemporaries that no-one but the Senate 
would fulfil the pledge as a manager of Roman diplomacy. This suggests that the 
Senate decided to condemn any independent action, including informal diplomacy, 
as arbitrary actions, if it seemed necessary. 
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I would also argue that the Senate strengthened its control over Roman 
individuals, but not necessarily with legal legitimacy. For instance, in the case of 
170, it criticised the ‘arbitrary’ actions of Lucretius and Hortensius, who had 
imperium, disgracing them with moral arguments. In the criticism, its resolution, 
i.e. official power was exercised, but the Senate did not punish them directly, since 
the authority to punish generals was held by the assembly, not the Senate (cf. 
Polyb. 6.14.6).59 Yet, by criticising the actions concerned as misdeeds, the Senate 
encouraged the tribuni, who could impeach generals, and their fellow citizens to 
attack Lucretius in court, while also reproaching Hortensius, and thus behaved 
as the arbiter of Roman diplomacy before its contemporaries. This approach was 
also used in the cancellation of a measure taken by P. Licinius Crassus, the consul 
of 171, during this period. According to Livius’ Periochae 43, he sacked several 
towns in Greece. Legally, this was within his discretion. The Senate, nevertheless, 
observed that it was done ‘cruelly (crudeliter)’ and that the captives should be 
released, pushing the announcement like an ‘order’ before contemporaries. 60 
There is a similar situation in a case of C. Cassius Longinus, the consul of 171 
(43.1.4-12).61 He had been assigned to the defence of northern Italy but left his 
province and began marching through Illyria with a view to gaining fame by 
attacking Perseus. This was an independent action. According to Livius (at 43.1.5), 
the inhabitants in his provincia reported it to the Senate for ‘their unsatisfactory 
defence among the hostile nations (infirmam necdum satis munitam inter infestas 
nationes).’ The Senate accepted the petition and made a decree to the effect that 
‘he should wage any war against no nation without the authorisation of the Senate 
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(ne bellum cum ulla gente moveat, nisi cum qua senatus gerendum),’ forcing him 
to withdraw his troops (43.1.11). The intervention of the Senate with a resolution 
against the actions of serving generals was unexpected. They were independent 
acts in international politics but, crucially, were not illegal. The Senate, however, 
publicised its decree as superior to individual Romans and their actions. This 
manner worked well; the Senate won over the people in and beyond Rome by 
criticising individuals with moral arguments, and thereby strengthened its 
leadership, decreasing the scope for independent actions or informal diplomacy by 
individual Romans, although the Senate did not necessarily possess the legal 
basis to control them. 
It is tempting to think that this negative attitude to independent action, 
which may well have included informal diplomacy, within the Senate resulted 
from a literary manipulation by Polybios, the main source of Livius for this period, 
on analogy of his utilitarian attitude in the previous cases. Yet, this is denied by 
analysing a senatorial decree of 169. Livius relates (at 43.17.2-10, esp. 2-3) that, 
in this year, the Senate announced to the Greeks that ‘no one should make any 
contribution to Rome’s officers for the war other than what the Senate had fixed 
(ne quis ullam rem in bellum magistratibus Romanis conferret praeterquam quod 
senatus censuisset),’ and that ‘this order created confidence for the future (among 
the Greeks) because they were relieved from the incessant drain of the burdens 
and expenses which had been imposed on them (hoc fiduciam in posterum quoque 
praebuerat levatos se oneribusque impensisque quibus, alia aliis imperantibus, 
exhauriebantur).’ From the perspective of directing the war, this decree was 
designed to win over the Greeks further, while Perseus still fought well, and many 
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Greeks secretly supported him. 62  Meanwhile, in the context of managing 
diplomacy, this was a prohibition by the Senate of independent requests by 
individual Roman commanders to the Greek populace, i.e. informal diplomacy. It 
is also important that the Livian text (at 43.17.3) treats this decree with the 
phrase ‘they were released from the burdens and expenses (levatos se oneribusque 
impensisque),’ in a positive and moralistic tone. Livius’ reference to this senatorial 
resolution derives from Polybios’ text at 28.3-5, and some of his lost work referring 
to it.63 These terms and tones seemingly result from some image given by Polybios, 
similar to the previous cases of informal diplomacy, regardless of the views offered 
by other contemporaries. Certainly, he and his political friends were favourable 
towards Rome during this period. He may well treat her attitude to the Greeks 
favourably here, to show his readers the validity of his and his circles’ policy, in 
contrast to his way of describing the cases of the 180s. But his main topic, at 28.3-
5, was the contemporary practices of the Greeks, not the decree.64 He had no 
reason to propose moralistic references unrealistically here, or in the section now 
lost, regarding the approval of the resolution in Rome. In light of the fact that 
Livius’ description regarding the announcement of the decree before the Greeks 
is much briefer than that of Polybios,65 Livius does not seem to manipulate his 
sources, that is, Polybios’ text and possibly other ones, regardless of their manner 
of description. Considering, furthermore, that the decree was shown to many 
contemporaries, it would have been difficult for Polybios and other contemporary 
authors to manipulate the information. Thus, the Senate probably did use moral 
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arguments to exert control over Roman individuals and, without defining the legal 
basis of senatorial power, the authority of the individual Romans, and thereby 
informal diplomacy. 
I argue that this senatorial attitude influenced individual Romans 
immediately. This is supported by a case of C. Popillius Laenas and Cn. Octavius 
when they showed the decree of 169, mentioned above, to the Greeks (Polyb. 28.3-
5; SEG XVI.255.ll.5-6).66 They seemed to want to attack some Greeks that they 
regarded as anti-Roman (Polyb. 28.3.4-9).67 Some of the leading Greeks hoped to 
use it for themselves, moreover. This was partly because, after Kallinikos, Rome 
had held a number of Aitolians. They had been blamed for the defeat (Liv. 42.60.8-
9), but the Greeks had thought that Rome was actually removing potential 
enemies (Polyb. 27.15.14 and 28.4.6).68 Therefore, when the two Romans visited 
the Greeks, some of them assumed, owing to the attitude of the envoys, that they 
would do the same thing, and such Greeks hoped to show their own loyalty to 
Rome while labelling their rivals as pro-Macedonians (28.4.5-11 and 5.1-5). 
However, while the envoys were interested in their private appeal or slander, they 
took no measure against the people concerned independently. This might result 
from the fact that there was no evidence, and the majority of other Greeks did not 
support such behaviour. Yet, the main reason was that the envoys regarded only 
‘following the senatorial intention (τῇ τῆς συγκλήτου προθέσει)’ shown in the 
decree concerned as reasonable action (28.3.9 and 5.6-7, esp. 7). The new 
senatorial attitude thus prevented an independent action or informal diplomacy 
by the two Romans.  
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However, although this senatorial attitude made it difficult for individual 
Romans to act independently, it did not completely restrain them. This is 
suggested by a case concerning Q. Marcius Philippus, mentioned above. In 169, 
he, as the general against Perseus, suggested κατ̉ ἰδίαν, namely privately, to a 
Rhodian envoy Agepolis that Rhodes begin mediation. This was informal 
diplomacy. It is noteworthy that Philippus did not refer to which war he wanted 
to stop. This embarrassed Rhodes. During this period, there was the war between 
the Seleucids and the Ptolemies and that between Rome and Perseus (Polyb. 28.17, 
esp. 4). This contact is therefore regarded as a model of nova sapientia of some 
Romans.69 It seemed to be a stratagem designed to lead Rhodes to intervene in 
the Macedonian War, and to give Rome a pretext to criticise Rhodes later. This is, 
however, unreasonable, although the discussion of scholars about the historicity 
of this case is understandable.70 I would argue that Philippus did not want to 
confuse Rhodes about which dispute he referred to. For him, Rhodes could not be 
asked informally to mediate between the two dynasties. The Ptolemies had asked 
Rome to support them. The Senate had ordered Philippus to manage the dispute. 
He had officially requested Achaia to mediate between the dynasties (28.1.9 and 
29.25.2-4; cf. 28.1.1-2 and 16.5).71 He had no reason to ask Rhodes secretly to 
negotiate with them. He certainly wanted Rhodes to mediate between Rome and 
Macedonia, although Rhodes was embarrassed to do so. It is significant that this 
was informal diplomacy on the part of a general, but his method of suggestion 
resulted from military necessity in his campaign against Macedonia, and from the 
senatorial attitude regarding independent actions on the part of individual 
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Romans. Any peace without defeating Perseus despite Rome’s having attacked 
him was equated with her practical defeat. Naturally, the Senate had not 
considered it. If Philippus had openly asked Rhodes to mediate between Rome and 
Macedonia in this situation, the Senate would have criticised his action because 
it would have meant disgrace for Rome, regardless of the legal legitimacy of his 
suggestion and of its value to his campaign. His manner here thus enabled him 
to defend himself. If his request had been reported to the Senate by Rhodes, he 
would have been able to challenge it by indicating a lack of evidence. The 
mediation by Rhodes, meanwhile, would shake Perseus, something that could be 
useful for Philippus’ campaign. The king had wanted to stop the war even after 
Kallinikos (e.g. App. Mac. 12; Polyb. 28.8.1-10.5), and Philippus had bought time 
before the outbreak of hostilities, by making use of Perseus’ hope for peace (Liv. 
42.38.8-43.3; Polyb. 27.4.1-2). The strict moralistic attitude of the Senate towards 
individual Romans did not completely prevent Philippus from behaving 
independently, although he had to be very careful, even while directing the war 
favourably. 
I also notice that these two cases demonstrate that there was still a demand 
for informal diplomacy among individual Romans, to advance the interests of 
Rome and their own, that the Greeks could accept such actions, and that this 
caused tensions between the Senate and individual Romans. These elements are 
confirmed by a case of Laenas, mentioned above, in 168, following the Battle of 
Pydna. In Egypt, Laenas showed a senatorial decree that ordered Antiochos IV of 
the Seleucids to cease the war, there (Polyb. 29.27.1-8). Although both were old 
friends when Antiochos was a hostage in Rome (cf. Just. 34.3.2), Laenas drew a 
circle round him with a vine stick and told him to give the answer to the Senate’s 
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demand before stepping out from it. Antiochos was embarrassed with this attitude, 
but accepted Rome’s demand. For this dramatic event, many ancients and modern 
scholars focus on Laenas’ haughty attitude following Rome’s defeat of Perseus and 
establishment of hegemony in the Mediterranean world.72 While Roman victory 
in Greece might be felt lightly by contemporaries in other regions,73  for the 
Greeks this event in Egypt generally symbolised the relationship between Rome 
and Greece at this time. This also partly resulted from the fact that theatricality 
had become an important concept in their political life.74  Consequently, they 
tended to notice the symbolic aspect of incidents. Indeed, Polybios (at 29.27.12), 
the main source for other ancient writers regarding this case,75 treats Perseus’ 
defeat and Antiochos’ withdrawal from Egypt, as the result of ‘the fate (τῆς τύχης)’, 
with admiration. This largely results from the significance that Polybios places 
on it in his view of history. 76  However, in the context of a study of Roman 
diplomacy, what should be noted here is the description of Laenas. Polybios (at 
29.27.4) describes his attitude towards Antiochos as ‘offensive (βαρὺ)’ and 
‘exceedingly arrogant (τελέως ὑπερήφανον).’ Indeed, this behaviour could hardly 
be written down in the decree. Hence, this was an independent action on his part, 
a sort of informal diplomacy. It is significant that this actually arose as a result of 
the Senate beginning to control independent actions by Roman individuals. 
It is tempting simply to ascribe Laenas’ behaviour to his seeming arrogant 
character.77 Yet, he had held the consulship in 172, and had suitable experience 
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as a statesman.78 Moreover, he announced the senatorial decree in Greece in 169, 
and understood the strict attitude of the Senate regarding independent actions. 
Considering these points, as O. Mørkholm and P. F. Mittag suggest,79 Laenas 
behaved tactically in Egypt, for some reason. In fact, he, as an envoy, faced some 
difficulties. He was sent around the end of the Macedonian War with C. Decimius 
and C. Hostilius, after the Ptolemies complained to Rome of Antiochos’ attack on 
them (Liv. 44.19.6-14). According to Livius at 44.19.14, the Senate issued a decree 
that ‘(the two dynasties) should conclude the war, and if either of the sides refused 
it, the party would not be considered a (Roman) friend or ally (ni absistatur bello, 
per utrum stetisset, eum non pro amico nec pro socio habituros esse).’80 The 
severe contents of this declaration suggest that the Senate really wanted to stop 
the struggle. However, the three Romans did not go to Egypt directly. On the one 
hand, this might have been prompted, to an extent, by Antiochos’ temporary 
return to Syria.81 On the other hand, they neither approached him with peace 
terms nor made contact with the Ptolemies but, instead, participated in a naval 
campaign against Macedonia, as if to kill time, until the Battle of Pydna (44.29.1-
4). Meantime, Antiochos took Ptolemaios VI into custody and ascended to the 
Egyptian throne (Diod. 30.18.1-2; Joseph. AJ 12.243; Polyb. 28.1; Porph. (FGH 
260) 49a).82 The Roman envoys seem to have entirely disregarded their mission. 
It is noteworthy, however, that there was little prospect that Antiochos would 
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accept Rome’s request when they were dispatched. Rome was in the middle of 
waging the Macedonian War. She could not put a lot of pressure on him; 
nevertheless, Laenas and his colleagues had to conclude the war in Egypt at all 
cost. Their dispatch was not the first attempt that Rome had made. She had 
previously sent T. Numisius Tarquiniensis (Polyb. 29.25.3-4). 83  While it is 
impossible to decide when he was sent, the fact remains that the negotiation 
ended in failure. Considering his lack of any office, one would be forgiven for 
thinking that Rome had made no real effort to succeed.84  He had, however, 
participated in the negotiations with the pro-Romans in Thisbe of Boiotia in 170, 
and would join in the committee for L. Aemilius Paullus, the victor over Perseus, 
after Pydna (RDGE 2.l.5; Liv. 45.17.3).85 The evidence therefore suggests that 
Rome seriously wanted to solve the problem in Egypt, by sending a senator 
expected to manage complicated matters among the Greeks. Laenas and his 
colleagues were sent after the failure of this theoretically influential person. If the 
mediation had failed again, Rome’s dignity would have been damaged. Yet, the 
international situation was unchanged after Numisius’ dispatch. This explains 
why the new envoys did not go to Egypt directly. They waited for a change in the 
situation, such as Perseus’ defeat. 
I also argue that considering these tactics of Laenas, his apparent 
arrogance in Egypt resulted from the fact that even the victory at Pydna was not 
a definite factor in conducting the negotiations, otherwise he would have avoided 
showing arrogance that could be criticised later from the moralistic viewpoint by 
the Senate. Indeed, Antiochos had the option of procrastinating the negotiation. 
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He controlled many regions of Egypt.86 There was therefore room to defeat the 
Ptolemies, or make a favourable pact with them, although he might have had 
trouble with capturing Alexandreia. If he had realised one of these two scenarios 
before the decision of Rome’s assembly to attack him, Rome would have lost her 
pretext to intervene in the Egyptian affair. This would have been viewed as a 
diplomatic defeat for Rome, and Laenas’ failure. He needed to prevent Antiochos 
from delaying the negotiations, while leading or misleading the king into 
assuming that Rome regarded him in a more hostile fashion, beyond the reference 
in the senatorial decree to a suspension of friendship. Laenas’ haughty and 
independent action before Antiochos resulted from these necessities, and can thus 
be labelled as informal diplomacy. 
It is furthermore significant that Laenas considered the interests of 
Antiochos and the Ptolemies and forestalled any complaint against himself later. 
After Antiochos reluctantly stopped the war, Laenas went to Cyprus and made 
Antiochos’ troops withdraw for the Ptolemies. Antiochos was, however, permitted 
to bring any booty seized to Syria (Polyb. 29.27.9-10 and 30.26.9). Koile-Syria, the 
flashpoint of the war between the two dynasties, remained under his control.87 
These terms seem to have been made on Laenas’ authority. He saved Antiochos’ 
reputation, to some extent. The Ptolemies, however, escaped from a crisis, thanks 
to Laenas, and could not complain to the Senate. He settled the Egyptian affair 
while managing their difficulties delicately. These points, regarding Laenas’ 
behaviour in his mission, suggest that it was difficult for the Senate to control 
Roman individuals. If their task was safely managed, and outsiders did not 
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complain about the manner, it was difficult for the Senate to intervene in the 
affair concerned, since the organ had criticised individual Romans based on moral 
arguments, not on legal superiority. 
This situation can also be observed in Laenas’ contact with Rhodes. While 
on the way to Egypt, after Pydna, the Rhodians asked his deputation to visit 
Rhodes (Liv. 45.10.5). At the close of the Macedonian War, they had tried to 
mediate between Rome and Macedonia. This had resulted from Philippus’ 
suggestion, but Rome regarded it as a practical support for Macedonia and had 
criticised the Rhodians. Thereafter, the latter made every effort to be pardoned.88 
The invitation of Laenas’ deputation was part of the attempt. The envoys refused 
it at first but, following a repeated appeal, went to Rhodes’ general meeting. In 
this session, Laenas made a fierce speech and led the Rhodians to believe that he 
represented the feelings of the Senate, as a whole (45.10.7-9). Meanwhile, 
Decimius, his colleague, ‘more modestly (moderatior)’ declared that the blame did 
not rest with the people, but with a few agitators (45.10.10). This was applauded. 
Rhodes immediately resolved that anyone convicted of saying or doing anything 
against Rome, on behalf of Perseus, should be put to death (45.10.10-13). 
Considering the reluctant nature of their visit, the envoys consciously showed that 
they did not speak as representatives of Rome, regarding Rhodes’ mediation. 
Laenas and Decimius did not conceal the fact that they lacked a unified opinion. 
This might have been a trick of some kind, to make Rhodes oppress the anti-
Romans, although Rome herself seemed indifferent towards them.89 In any case, 
the envoys independently participated in Rhodian affairs, and this was clearly an 
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example of informal diplomacy. The Roman individuals concerned undertook this 
action while also considering the senatorial desire for control over independent 
actions in light of their refusal of visit to Rhodes at the beginning, while the 
outsiders in question entertained them, nevertheless. Informal diplomacy was 
thus still considered to be a necessity by many people in and beyond Rome. 
Considering Laenas’ obtaining the second consulship in 158,90 around ten years 
after his visit to Rhodes and Egypt, his informal diplomacy was not necessarily 
considered favourably by other Romans, or senators. However, they could not 
maintain their complete control over its use by individual Romans. 
Just as in previous cases, Livius’ text here derives from Polybios.91 Some 
Rhodian authors used by him might have also influenced it through Livius’ use of 
the Polybian text. The picture of Laenas, then, as ‘a man of fierce temper (vir 
asper ingenio)’ with ‘severity (asperitas)’, appears to result from the criticism of 
him by Livius’ sources (45.10.8 and 15). Livius himself, however, does not criticise 
the intervention of Laenas (and Decimius) in the Rhodian affair. Instead, Livius 
notices that the envoys refused to visit Rhodes at the beginning, practically 
showed their lack of authority to intervene in Rhodian affairs, and that the envoys 
went to its assembly and made their speeches only after repeated invitation by 
Rhodes, equating to a tacit recognition of their informal character. Thus, the 
surviving evidence is generally neither very critical nor favourable to the envoys, 
and does not seem to draw any unrealistic or exaggerated conclusions. 
The Senate, however, still strove to control the actions of Roman 
individuals. In 167, after the Macedonian War, it appointed fifteen legati for 
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Paullus, mentioned above, and L. Anicius Gallus, the victor over Perseus’ ally in 
Illyria, Gentios. According to Livius (at 45.17.6-7), the Senate stated here that 
‘although they (the fifteen) were men of such standing that it could reasonably be 
hoped that the generals acted on their advice and formed no decision unworthy of 
the Roman people’s clemency or honour, the main principles of the settlement 
were discussed in the Senate in order that the (fifteen) legati might carry them in 
outline to the generals (ceterum quamquam tales viri mitterentur, quorum de 
consilio sperari posset imperatores nihil indignum nec clementia nec gravitate 
populi Romani decreturos esse, tamen in senatu quoque agitata sunt summa 
consiliorum, ut inchoata omnia legati ab domo ferre ad imperatores possent).’92 
What occurred in Macedonia and Illyria was to be decided not by the generals and 
the legati, but by the Senate. The generals were only to execute its order, after 
being informed by the legati, who were senior senators with auctoritas derived 
from their careers,93 and were to supervise the generals. This was a different 
situation from that experienced by previous commanders. For instance, Cn. 
Manlius Vulso attacked the inhabitants in Asia Minor after the war against the 
Seleucids. His legati tried to stop it owing to the absence of any declaration of war, 
but failed. He was criticised for this independent action, but his triumph was 
granted (38.16.1-23.11, 25.1-27.9, and 44.9-50.3; Polyb. 21.37 and 39).94 While 
Vulso had been assertive, the discretion of officers in the field had been respected 
by the Senate. In contrast to this, Paullus and Anicius (and the legati) were 
ordered in advance that they were not to act upon their own authority, but to 
follow the senatorial order, on the pretext of maintaining Rome’s clemency and 
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honour. This was a restriction of their independent actions and scope for engaging 
in informal diplomacy. 
This decree was clearly announced, and its historicity is credible. The 
contents confirm that the Senate strove to control these individual Romans. 
Indeed, the generals seemed to be there, simply to execute its orders during the 
plunder in Epeiros, and in the detainment of leading politicians in many Greek 
states (Polyb. 30.13 and 15; cf. App. Ill. 9; Liv. 45.31.1 and 33.8-34.9; Plut. Aem. 
29.1-30.1).95 Polybios might relate that Paullus reluctantly followed the orders, 
owing to a prejudice in favour of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, the son of Paullus, 
and Polybios’ friend.96 Paullus, certainly, behaved as a representative of Rome 
before the Greeks, as is shown by the inscriptions from Delphoi and Maroneia 
(CIL 1.622; SEG LIII.658). 97  Overall, however, he, Anicius, and the legati 
experienced senatorial pressure much more strongly than Vulso. 
Nevertheless, it is significant that the tensions between the Senate and 
individual Romans persisted. The position of informal diplomacy within wider 
Roman state diplomacy and of the senatorial leadership was still ill-defined. This 
is suggested by a case of Thalna, mentioned above, in 167 (Liv. 45.21; Polyb. 
30.4.4). He was the praetor in this year and, in the assembly, proposed a motion 
that war should be declared against Rhodes, following its attempt to mediate 
between Rome and Perseus, apparently on behalf of the latter. The attendees were 
favourable but, according to Livius (at 45.21.4), it was stopped by the veto of the 
tribuni plebis because ‘he acted in defiance of precedent and made the proposal 
on his own initiative without consulting the Senate or informing the consuls of 
                                                   
95 Scullard 1945: 60; Walbank 1979: 434-9; Ziolkowski 1986: 69. 
96 Walbank 1979: 437; cf. Briscoe 2012: 712-4. 
97 As for the latter inscription, see also I.Thrac.Aeg. 168. 
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the question that he was going to put (novo maloque exemplo rem ingressus erat, 
quod non ante consulto senatu, non consulibus certioribus factis de sua unius 
sententia rogationem ferret).’ 98  The Senate had controlled Roman diplomacy 
through its decrees and its officers. Considering the reason for the veto shown 
before the citizens, the tribuni stopped Thalna here based on the suggestion of the 
Senate (or the consuls, at least). 99  However, he almost succeeded in an 
independent participation in Roman diplomacy, and was criticised, not owing to 
the illegality of his actions, but for defiance of ‘precedent (exemplo).’ I argue, then, 
that senatorial leadership could, therefore, be legally denied by individuals 
possessing some other authority. 
Overall, the ascendancy of the Senate with its decrees and use of official 
power over individual Romans, and their informal diplomacy, by implication, was 
clearly shown to contemporaries. Its collective leadership worked well, since 
Roman individuals were certainly put under a lot of pressure. A series of decrees 
to establish this situation resulted directly from difficulties experienced during 
the Macedonian War, but also, essentially, from the Senate’s feeling a sense of 
crisis at the increasing influence of Roman individuals, who acted independently 
in matters of diplomacy, in light of the preventive measures by the Senate to 
control its officers in the field, and its emphasising the significance of decrees 
resulting from the discussion of many senators. The Senate, however, had to be 
content with the relative revival of its collective leadership. Informal diplomacy 
could be still necessary and useful for the people in and beyond Rome, and 
individual Romans could make independent actions or informal diplomacy even 
                                                   
98 Millar 1984: 5; Kunkel 1995: 214. 
99 Walbank 1979: 420. 
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in conflict with the Senate, providing they held the support of outsiders. Above all, 
the Senate lacked any definite authority to control the situation, or any measure 





From the Peace of Apameia, acts of informal diplomacy increased within 
the wider Roman diplomatic framework. This tendency influenced Rome’s further 
advance into the Greek world, following the defeat of her rivals. Meanwhile, 
informal diplomacy caused tensions, particularly in some Greek states and in 
Rome herself. Those in Greece essentially resulted from the resistance of the 
Greeks to Roman power but, importantly, there remained basic distinction, and 
sometimes a conflict arising from a poorly defined relationship between informal 
diplomacy and legality, as noted by opponents to the Roman advance. It was not 
addressed in the contacts between Rome and Greece in the 180s, and the 
settlement depended on ad hoc diplomatic manoeuvres taking place, against the 
backdrop of Roman imperial ascendancy. Informal diplomacy also caused internal 
tensions among the Romans, and the difficult position of this concept within their 
state diplomacy did influence the development after the 180s. The Senate 
regarded independent actions of individual Romans as an obstacle to its collective 
leadership from around the middle of the Third Macedonian War, and informal 
diplomacy was clearly a primary target for its attempt to regain control. However, 
the attempt by the Senate to strengthen its leadership, in a sense, displayed its 
own lack of legal legitimacy to control individual Romans completely, especially 
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in light of the fact that senators always depended on ad hoc moral arguments and 
the support of people in and beyond Rome. Indeed, there was still room for Roman 
individuals to take some independent action in the diplomatic context, all with 
the support of outsiders. At the end of the Macedonian War, the Senate increased 
its collective leadership with a series of decrees, but the fundamental tension in 
Roman diplomacy, caused by the rise of the individuals engaging in informal 
diplomacy, not to mention the very poorly defined nature of the relationship 
between the Senate and individual Romans, legal power and informal diplomatic 
initiatives, persisted. Informal diplomacy still functioned as a factor to support 
Roman expansion from 188 to 167, but also became a seed of discord in 










This chapter is designed to show that informal diplomacy caused tensions 
among the Romans after Pydna, and ultimately brought about the violence that 
occurred during the tribunate of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. During the Third 
Macedonian War, the Roman Senate attempted to restrict activities associated 
with informal diplomacy and thereby to strengthen its collective leadership. But 
the relationship between informal diplomacy, legality and the collectivity of the 
leading Romans was poorly defined. Owing to this lack of definition, informal 
diplomacy spread among the Romans once again, and undermined the political 
order which many senators attempted to sustain by emphasising the anonymity 
and plurality of the leaders. This situation would eventually bring armed conflict 
to Rome. 
To examine the problem fully, this chapter will therefore be split into three 
sections. In Section 1, I will argue that, since the Third Macedonian War, the 
Senate controlled foreign affairs, but that participation by individual Romans and 
foreigners was often accepted and sometimes even expected, to address ad hoc 
necessities. Such intervention in diplomacy was, meanwhile, mainly made 
anonymously and collectively. This manner was compatible with the desire of 
many senators to maintain their collective leadership, but there was no definitive 
way to control such individuals if they participated in diplomacy for their own 
interests, especially if they held some kind of personal authority. 
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In the second section, the rise of the tribuni plebis in foreign affairs during 
the same period will be noted. This will show that this phenomenon decreased the 
collective leadership of the senators, in parallel to informal diplomacy. The tribuni 
presided over the popular assembly, Rome’s supreme organisation, and had the 
power to influence the Senate and other officers for the defence of the ordinary 
people. The latter role had been all but forgotten for centuries,1 but from the 
period of the Macedonian War onwards, the tribuni increased their influence, not 
only in domestic, but also in foreign affairs. The Senate had no legitimate method 
to control them. Wielding tribunician power itself was not informal diplomacy, but 
the analysis of the tribuni confirms the uncertainty regarding formal legality and 
the collective leadership of the senators, and gives hints to consider its influence, 
with informal diplomacy, on the violence in 133. 
In Section 3, I will argue that, in 133, these two factors, i.e. the continued 
use of informal diplomacy among the Romans and the increase of the influence of 
the tribuni, combined to accelerate Gracchus’ rise. He had private connections 
with the Attalids and other outsiders. He was also a tribunus and could control 
the assembly and frustrate the working of the Senate. Informal diplomacy and 
the tribunician power enabled him to manage independently national and foreign 
affairs at the same time. His opponents, by contrast, had no legitimate method to 
stop him. Gracchus’ advantage was, furthermore, almost prolonged by his 
repeated assumption of the tribunate. These elements threatened the collective 
leadership of the Senate. Those who wanted to maintain the current political 
order were effectively compelled, therefore, to take extreme counter-measures. 
                                                   
1 Badian 1996: 195-6 and 204-6; Ward 2004: 112-3 and 119. 
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This incident revealed the lack of definition in the relationship between informal 
diplomacy, legality, and the collective leadership of the senators afresh. Even after 
the fall of Gracchus, leading Romans struggled to find a solution. Thus, the 
conflict of 133 heralded the final century of the Republic, in which violence could 
be a tool in the political struggles between Romans. 
By means of these three discussions, this chapter demonstrates the 
complicated relationship between individuals and state in Rome, and, with the 
results of the previous chapters, the significance of informal diplomacy in Rome 
from the 200s to 133, and even afterwards.  
 
Section 1: Informal Diplomacy, the Senate, and Roman Individuals 
 
We must now consider that acts of informal diplomacy were often permitted 
or expected, even following the senatorial pronouncements during the Third 
Macedonian War designed to control the phenomenon, discussed in the previous 
chapter. This analysis proves that informal diplomacy was still a convenient tool 
of the Roman state. It also demonstrates that the senators strove to maintain 
their collective leadership, and nevertheless, suffered the tension arising from 
informal diplomacy among them.  
The use of informal diplomacy after the Macedonian War, to begin with, can 
be confirmed in the visit of Attalos, the younger brother of Eumenes II of 
Pergamon, to Rome in 167 (Liv. 45.19.1-20.3; Polyb. 30.1-3). He congratulated the 
Senate on Rome’s victory over Macedonia, but the Senate remained distrustful of 
Eumenes. It had previously thought that the king had secretly wanted to support 
Macedonia. But there was no evidence to substantiate such an accusation. He had 
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rather supported Rome militarily. As a consequence, the senators received Attalos’ 
congratulations warmly. However, this cordiality also appears to have been 
prompted by an ulterior motive. The Senate had formed a good impression of 
Attalos and, subsequently, according to Polybios (30.1.7), ‘some men of high rank 
got Attalos under their influence, and urged him to lay aside the role of 
ambassador and to speak in his own right (ἔνιοι τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἀνδρῶν 
λαμβάνοντες εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τὸν Ἄτταλον παρεκάλουν τὴν μὲν ὑπὲρ τἀδελφοῦ 
πρεσβείαν ἀποθέσθαι, περὶ δ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους).’ Out of session, 
Attalos was approached by some senators who encouraged him to petition the 
Senate to approve his own claim to the throne. In effect, they wanted to weaken 
the Pergamene kingdom by dividing it into two. Clearly tempted by the senators’ 
charm or cajoling, Attalos almost expressed such a desire, during the formal 
meeting. The historicity of this episode is supported by Livius (45.19.4-5), and 
modern scholars also generally follow him.2 In light of the fact that Polybios was 
in Rome under detention from 167 onward, this is reasonable. However, 
considering Polybios’ favourable attitude towards Eumenes, emphasising his 
‘great confidence (μεγίστην … πίστιν)’ in Stratios, who was ‘a man of great sense 
and powers of persuasion (τι νουνεχὲς καὶ πειστικόν)’ and persuaded Attalos not 
to follow any offer of Rome (30.2.2-3), 3  we must exercise caution not to 
overestimate the malice shown by the senators in question. Nevertheless, this is 
a clear case of informal diplomacy. It is also noteworthy that the extant sources 
offer no details of the individuals who approached Attalos. The senators concerned 
had a contact with him informally, in the context of a foreign diplomat making an 
                                                   
2 Dmitriev 2010: 106-7 and 114; Baronowski 2012: 78-9; Briscoe 2012: 662-8. 
3 Coșkun 2011: 94-112. 
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official speech before the Senate. It was an independent and unsanctioned 
participation in diplomacy, but they did not otherwise make their presence felt. 
This could be interpreted to mean that the approach was a trick concocted not by 
them, but by the Senate collectively. The anonymous senators promised to support 
Attalos if he asked the Senate to give him the throne. It is possible that they had 
obtained the approval of other senators, and planned to act informally here but 
openly with them afterwards. In any case, this approach remains an example of 
informal diplomacy made anonymously. 
One could argue that the anonymous nature of the senators concerned was 
accidental. There are similar cases, however, in Roman contacts with Rhodes. 
Before Pydna, in 172 Rhodian envoys visited patroni and hospites in Rome, to 
mitigate the negative image of Rhodes created by Eumenes (Liv. 42.14.7).4 This 
passage does not necessarily prove that Rhodes regarded specific Romans as its 
patroni, despite Livius’ terminology. There is no evidence, for example, that 
contemporary Rhodians used the term patronus or πάτρων in their texts.5 Yet, it 
is important to note that Rhodes here established private contacts with unnamed 
Romans. In 168/7, moreover, when the Senate regarded Rhodes’ attempt at 
mediating between Rome and Macedonia as an action designed to assist the latter, 
and became enraged with the Rhodians, Rhodes sent its envoys to Rome and 
assessed the situation ἐκ τῶν ἐντεύξεων καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν, by formal and 
informal meetings, with anonymous Roman statesmen (Polyb. 30.4.3).6 In these 
                                                   
4 For the relations between Rhodes, Rome, and Eumenes, see Gruen 1975: 68 and 
Briscoe 2012: 186-202. 
5 Eilers 2002: 109. 
6 Wiemer 2001a: 175-9; Dillon and Garland 2005: 263-4. As regards the term ἔντευξις, 
Bevan 1927: 160-1 emphasises in his study of the Ptolemies that it was used in formal 
petitions to seniors, such as the contacts between subjects and the kings, while in 
Polybios’ text, vertical relation and formality are not necessarily emphasised, whether 
256 
 
cases, Rhodes used obviously unofficial tools of negotiation, and thus engaged in 
informal diplomacy. Rome appears not to have objected to this practice, even if the 
Senate had endeavoured to control its use by individual Romans. It is important 
that, in a similar fashion to the case of Attalos, none of the Romans connected 
with Rhodes in this period are named directly. They accepted Rhodes’ approach 
but avoided engaging with it, in order to exaggerate the individual nature of their 
success. In 167, M. Porcius Cato the Elder defended Rhodes in a famous speech 
(Gell. 6.3.5-55; Liv. 45.25.3-4), but did not even refer to the private friendship that 
existed with the Rhodians, much less cite it as a reason to support them. This does 
not contradict the possibility that he was previously asked to help Rhodes or that 
he was, in fact, its patronus, as D. Bloy has argued.7 Whatever the reality, Cato 
and the other Romans concerned downplayed their private connection to increase 
their own fame. 
This pattern of the contact between the Romans and outsiders is also 
suggested by the Teian action to save Abdera, sometime in the middle of the 160s, 
when Kotys IV of Thrace asked the Senate to give him Abdera’s territory. Teos 
interceded for Abdera, on account of the kinship between the two city-states 
                                                   
this term appears in the singular or plural forms. This is, for instance, confirmed by 
a contact between Antiochos III of the Seleucids and Sosibios, a Ptolemaic politician, 
on the eve of the Battle of Raphia (5.67.2). In their ἐντεύξεις, no vertical relation is 
seen. In the case of the contacts of Rhodes with its neighbours after the earthquake 
in 227 (5.88.1-4, esp. 4), the term ἐντεύξεις is used as formal negotiations in parallel 
to ὁμιλίαι clearly used as informal ones, but Rhodes’ inferiority is not emphasised at 
all, since Rhodes’ tactical approach to its neighbouring states, allegedly, rather made 
them feel obliged for Rhodes’ acceptance of the aid by them. Polybios also uses the 
term ἔντευξις at 8.24.6-7, in the singular form, in the context of having an informal 
contact with the phrase κατ᾽ ἰδίαν. Considering these, I would suggest that, in 168, 
Rhodes’ envoys did not necessarily entreat the senators concerned to support Rhodes, 
in the manner of Roman clientes, for example, but had private contacts with them in 
parallel to official meetings. 
7 Bloy 2012: 175-6. 
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(I.Thrac.Aeg. 5).8 According to the Abderan decree (ll.21-2), Teos’ delegates ‘met 
with the leading men of the Romans and won them over by their daily patience 
(ἐντυγχάνοντες μὲν τοῖ[ς ἡγουμένοι]ς Ῥωμαίων καὶ ἐξομηρευ/όμενοι διὰ τῆς καθ’ 
ἡμέρα[ν καρ]τερήσεως)’.9 While the erection of this inscription suggests that Teos’ 
intercession was successful, it resulted partly from the informal diplomacy of the 
delegates and the Roman individuals concerned. They established contacts 
privately, and influenced the decision reached by Rome. Once again, no individual 
Roman was spotlighted in this inscription. Although this was an honorary decree 
for Teos’ ambassadors, the anonymity of the Romans involved suggests that they 
accepted the envoys’ informal petitions, but did not actively show their personal 
influence in public, similar to the cases of Attalos and Rhodes.10 The evidence 
suggests, then, that some Roman individuals felt it comfortable to use informal 
diplomacy in this period, albeit collectively and anonymously. 
This rejection of notoriety and otherwise passive attitude in the contacts 
with outsiders is also observed in the case of Charops, who had dominated Epeiros. 
                                                   
8 Cf. Herrmann 1971: 72-7; Graham 1992: 48-59. For the close relationship between 
the two cities, see Youni 2007: 725 and Fragoulaki 2013: 266. As to the significance of 
kinship in Greek diplomacy, see Jones 1999: e.g. 1-17 and Patterson 2010: e.g. 1-44. 
9 Although the term ἐξομηρεύω is normally interpreted as ‘bind by taking hostages’, 
for this Abderan inscription ‘win over’ has become the preferred translation among 
scholars. E.g. Sherk 1984: no.26; Eilers 2002: 238-9. 
10  There is disagreement regarding the chronology of this inscription. Several 
scholars think the decree was not made in the 160s. Kotys IV allied with Macedonia 
during the Third Macedonian War. It seemed difficult for him to ask Rome to give him 
any territory. Chiranky 1982: 461-70 and 473; Marek 1997: 169-77; Eilers 2002: 114-
32; Camia 2009: 160-3. But many scholars do not support this theory, owing to the 
compatibility of the decree with the political situation in the 160s. E.g. Magie 1939b: 
177; Jehne 2009: 159 n.75; Bloy 2012: 168-201. Moreover, during this period, Prusias 
II of Bithynia had attempted to mediate between Macedonia and Rome in the war, as 
Rhodes had done, and seemed to arouse the senatorial hostility; nevertheless, after 
he apologised for his mediation and Rome treated him favourably, he asked the Senate 
to give a territory in Asia Minor (Liv. 42.12.3 and 45.44.3-8; Polyb. 30.18). It is not 
strange that Kotys tried to gain Abdera’s territory in the 160s. 
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(Polyb. 32.6.1-8; cf. App. Illy. 9; Liv. 45.34; Plut. Aem. 29; Polyb. 30.16; Str. 7.322; 
Plin. NH 4.39).11 In 160/59, he visited M. Aemilius Lepidus, the pontifex maximus 
and the princeps senatus, and L. Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Macedonia, 
to ask them to support his appeal to the Senate, requesting recognition of his 
control over Epeiros. The two Romans refused his visit ‘to their homes (εἰς τὰς 
οἰκίας αὑτῶν)’ owing to his brutality towards the Epeirotes (Polyb. 32.6.5). 
Polybios’ report for this episode confirms that the Greeks and Romans had become 
accustomed to having private contacts before senatorial sessions, thus engaging 
in informal diplomacy. Lepidus and Paullus refused to meet Charops not because 
they did not want to meet a foreigner privately, but because they were aware of 
his conduct in Epeiros, and apparently loathed him for his acts. At the same time, 
though, the Romans were passive throughout this episode. Their refusal of his 
visit was viewed favourably by other Greeks opposed to him (32.6.6). Both Romans 
would likely have increased their personal fame if they had publicly shown such 
Greeks their ‘antipathy to knaves (τὸ μισοπόνηρον),’ but, instead, they took no 
action at all. This expression of informal diplomacy bears considerable similarities 
to that of the cases mentioned above. 
The pattern is also observed in the case of Herakleides, a courtier of 
Antiochos IV (Polyb. 33.15.1-2 and 18.5-14).12 After the death of the king and the 
usurpation of throne by Demetrios I,13 he visited Rome in 153 with Alexandros 
Balas, Antiochos’ alleged heir, asking the Senate to support Balas’ claim to the 
throne. Polybios claims that Herakleides won over the senators ‘through idle talks 
and corruption (μετὰ τερατείας ἅμα καὶ κακουργίας),’ a rather negative way of 
                                                   
11 Scullard 1945: 59-62; Ryan 1998: 309. 
12 Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 56-7 and 76. 
13 Van der Spek 1997/8: 167-8; Psoma 2013: 276. 
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referring to private approaches (33.15.2), and succeeded in securing an official 
meeting with the Senate and in persuading it to grant Balas the authority to 
regain the throne. Some ‘moderate people (τοῖς ... μετρίοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων)’, 
though, the author claims, regarded Herakleides’ manner negatively (33.18.10). 
Herakleides, and the senators who supported him, conducted informal diplomacy. 
Meanwhile, considering the fact that Polybios had supported Demetrios on the 
occasion of the latter’s return home to succeed to the throne (31.12.8),14 Polybios’ 
moralistic references to Herakleides and some senators opposing his manner of 
approaching other leading Romans cannot be accepted at face value. They work 
as a tool of emphasising the legitimacy of Demetrios’ throne and the support for 
him by the author himself. The senators might have easily accepted Herakleides’ 
approach, owing to their enmity with the Seleucids.15 His proposal, if successful, 
would cause internal trouble to the dynasty and decrease its power. In any case, 
the majority of the senators accepted his unofficial approach. It is significant that, 
even in this case, the senators did not get into the limelight, whether they were 
positively disposed towards Herakleides or not, similar to the other cases, 
mentioned above. This might partly result, here, from Polybios’ indifference to 
making it clear who supported Herakleides, or his unwillingness to do so. The 
senators in question were Polybios’ contemporaries. Considering his favourable 
attitude towards Demetrios, however, it was safer and more reasonable for 
Polybios to make it clear who the moderate people were, if it was possible. I would 
argue, then, that the lack of any reference to such senators realistically reflects 
the situation in which Romans accepted the use of informal diplomacy, but tended 
                                                   
14 Cf. Walbank 1979: 561. 
15 Briscoe 1969: 51-3. 
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to engage in it anonymously. 
A similar pattern may further be seen in the case of Demetrios, a priest of 
the Sarapieion at Delos, under Athens. He apparently bypassed the Athenian 
assembly and asked the Roman Senate to order Athens to cancel a decision 
concerning the shrine, which was unfavourable to him, in c. 164. His request was 
accepted (RDGE 5).16 Although this decree might have been passed in the mid-
first century,17 if the traditional date is correct, this episode also represents an 
example of informal diplomacy occurring in the 160s. It is further noteworthy that, 
as J. -L. Ferrary explains,18 the Senate sent neither a letter nor an envoy to 
present its decree regarding this case to Athens. Demetrios brought it, instead, to 
the Athenians himself (ll.4-7). Rome had thereby tacitly approved his private 
intervention in international politics. Several senators supported him and 
consequently proposed the motion on his behalf (ll.15-23). However, their support 
remained collective and passive. They did not actively try to garner personal fame 
by sending someone, or a public letter, to Athens. This management of informal 
diplomacy contrasted with the way that the Romans had utilised it during the 
period before the Third Macedonian War, considered in the previous chapter. 
This attitude was not shared by all leading Romans, however, as proved by 
an event surrounding Rome’s arbitration of a dispute in 149, between Attalos II 
and Prusias II, based on the request of the latter. The Senate instructed the 
praetor of the year to select members for the delegation.19 According to Appianos 
                                                   
16 For more on the relation between Athens and Delos in this decade, see Tracy 1979: 
214. 
17 Canali de Rossi 2000: 72-82. While Ferrary 2009: 127-8 still dates this event to the 
160s, Chaniotis 2009: 5-6 reserves the decision. 
18 Ferrary 2009: 127-8 and 132-5. 
19 As for the war between the Attalids and Bithynia, see Hopp 1977: 86-92. 
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(Mithr. 6; cf. Diod. 32.20.1; Liv. Per. 50; Plut. Cato Mai. 9; Polyb. 36.14), this 
unnamed officer delayed the deliberation and, ‘through favour towards Attalos 
(χαριζόμενος Ἀττάλῳ)’, chose three senators who apparently lacked the ability to 
deal with the dispute. Attalos enjoyed an advantageous position compared to 
Prusias, and the failure of negotiations would enable the former to dictate the 
affair even more favourably. Thus, this was a case of the result of informal 
diplomacy, since the praetor had intervened in Roman state diplomacy on his 
behalf. It is noteworthy that his action was observed by other Romans, in light of 
Cato’s comment upon the lack of ability of the selected senators, with irony, in 
Polybios’ text (36.14.4-5); nevertheless, the selection was not corrected. Based on 
this evidence, I would argue that Romans were still interested in advancing their 
own agenda in diplomacy, during this period, and it could either be overlooked or 
tacitly approved by others. Ironically, in this case, however, the authors of the 
extant sources highlight the unsuitability of the delegates, rather than the name 
of the praetor. 
This attempt to decrease anonymity in Roman diplomacy in the face of 
many senators’ efforts to maintain it was more conspicuous in the field. In 164/3, 
for example, the Senate doubted Eumenes’ loyalty, and sent C. Sulpicius Galus to 
investigate the situation.20 He visited Sardeis and declared that anyone who 
wished to bring an accusation against Eumenes could meet with him (Diod. 31.7.2; 
Polyb. 31.1.6-8 and 6.1-6). It is tempting to explain this overtly rude action by 
citing Galus’ reproachful character, as Polybios does (31.6.4-5), or to the generally 
                                                   
20 Ancient authors, except Valerius Maximus, tend to report his cognomen as Gallus, 
but Fasti Capitolini 66 and Fasti Triumphales 105 spell it as Galus, as the Roman 
writer does (at 6.3.10, 8.1.absol.2, and 11.1). Cf. Briscoe 2008: 478. 
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negative image of Eumenes among the Romans, at that point.21 Galus, however, 
appears to have been a sensible and rational character. It was he, for example, 
that had predicted the lunar eclipse shortly before the Battle of Pydna, and 
advised Paullus to settle the nerves of his soldiers (Frontin. Strat. 1.12.8; Liv. 
44.37.5-9; Plin. NH 2.53).22 Yet, his mission was to investigate the situation of 
Asia Minor, not to encourage the inhabitants to abuse Eumenes (Polyb. 31.1.8). 
Galus therefore collected unfavourable rumours relating to him independently, 
but in a rational manner. This is an example of informal diplomacy while 
exceeding his position as a diplomat. For this, however, he was not criticised by 
the Senate, and thereby expressed his individuality within the political 
framework successfully. Regardless of whether there was tacit expectation or 
approval for his additional actions, one point that clearly emerges from this 
episode is that diplomatic anonymity was not observed in the field as clearly as it 
was in Rome. 
The diplomatic situation is further complicated, however, by the fact that 
many leading Romans still strove to prevent individuals from winning fame 
independently, despite also overlooking other examples of informal diplomacy in 
action. This is suggested by the arbitration between the warring Attalos and 
Prusias in 155/4. The Senate sent ten diplomats to persuade Prusias to accept its 
resolution to end the hostilities. While it is possible that this resulted from the 
idea that the collective influence of ten senators would be stronger than that of 
one, 23  the plurality also served to prevent any from being distinguished 
themselves. This is confirmed by their actions after Prusias rejected the senatorial 
                                                   
21 Hansen 1971: 119-24; Walbank 1979: 464-5; Habicht 2006: 183-4. 
22 Briscoe 2012: 584-6. 
23 The role of collectivity has been indicated by Yarrow 2012: 169. 
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decree. The envoys renounced the friendship and alliance between Rome and him 
and, significantly, visited his neighbours to encourage them to desert him. Then, 
when the war situation became advantageous to the Attalids owing to the support 
of the envoys, in 154, Prusias accepted the peace, based on the senatorial decree 
(Polyb. 33.7 and 12-13).24 It is significant, here, that the senators’ approach to 
Prusias’ neighbours, had little formal basis (33.12.8-9). This does not mean, 
however, they deviated from the Senate’s original order. They had compelled 
Prusias to accept its demand, but had also acted on their own authority and 
engaged in informal diplomacy. It is further noteworthy that Polybios does not 
relate that they gained fame. Only the names of the three leaders of the 
deputation are known. The senatorial delegation thus managed their task with 
informal diplomacy but did not or could not make others take notice of them 
individually. This might partly result from the fact that Polybios devotes more 
attention here to Rome’s imperialistic attitude to the Greeks, than to the 
individual Romans involved. According to the author, the strict attitude of the 
envoys derived from ‘the antipathy of the Senate to (Prusias’) disregard of its 
orders (καταφρόνησιν τῶν τῆς συγκλήτου παραγγελμάτων)’, despite the equal 
partnership between Rome and Prusias inferred by the alliance referred to by the 
delegates (33.7.1). If this arbitration, however, had been made by a small number 
of senators, and the envoys had been interested in emphasising their influence, 
they would likely have attracted attention of contemporaries easily, owing to the 
sheer number of Prusias’ neighbours that were approached by the Roman 
deputation. I would argue, instead, that the anonymity of the envoys in Polybios’ 
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text suggests that the senators sending them, and the envoys themselves, 
consciously maintained collective diplomatic control of the situation, despite 
engaging in elements of informal diplomacy. 
This method of managing foreign affairs could not work in the military 
sphere, though. The generals had sole authority, and punishment for them was 
decided in the assembly, as shown by Lucretius’ case in Chapter 5. The Senate 
could not therefore prevent them completely from acting in their own interests. 
This is confirmed by some episodes during the war in Hispania. In 151, L. Licinius 
Lucullus, the consul, attacked the Vaccaei without any resolution. In the following 
year, Ser. Sulpicius Galba, the propraetor, joined the campaign on his own 
authority (App. Hisp. 51-5 and 59). These are examples of informal diplomacy 
inasmuch as they represent independent participation in foreign affairs, even 
though their official power as a general was cited. Interestingly, Lucullus was not 
criticised for this action, while Galba was later prosecuted. Even Galba, however, 
was not reprimanded for his impetuous campaign, despite lacking order of the 
Senate or the assembly, but rather for the offences against his misdeed in the 
campaigns, primarily from a moral perspective. Moreover, he was eventually 
cleared even of these charges (Liv. Per. 49). This situation resulted from the 
military achievements of both commanders, and Galba’s individual conduct in the 
popular court under the name of the assembly. He tactically invoked the people’s 
mercy by referring to his children and others in his family, and the audience was 
moved with sympathy (Cic. Brut. 80 and 89-90; Or. 1.227-8; Val.Max. 8.1.2).25 He 
later failed to obtain the consulship until 144; it is possible that the accusations 
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might have had a lingering, negative effect upon his reputation.26 Discounting his 
subsequent misfortune, however, these cases suggest that generals in the field 
actively managed foreign affairs to advance their own agenda and interests. 
Possessing authority (and troops), they could not be controlled completely, even 
by the collective leadership of the Senate. 
This pattern can also be observed in the case of Hispania in 137. The Senate 
had made a resolution to end the war against the Vaccaei when M. Aemilius 
Lepidus engaged them, since this tribe had not violated its treaty with Rome. 
However, the general refused to follow the decree, nonetheless. D. Iunius Brutus, 
his colleague in Hispania, also supported his operation. Lepidus argued that since 
his troops, and those of Brutus, had commenced their operations, it had become 
too dangerous simply to cease, even though they began without a decree from the 
Senate or the assembly. He was consequently deprived of his command and later 
fined, but Brutus was still able to celebrate a triumph for the engagement.27 
Furthermore, Lepidus’ punishment was not for his independent action, but for 
military failure (App. Hisp. 80-3; Eutrop. 4.19; Plut. TGrac. 21).28 The Senate 
could not seem to control the generals, unless some pretext outside the remit of 
their military power was discovered to criticise them. This situation may have 
resulted from a senatorial hesitation to reprimand the generals excessively; 
affairs in Hispania had become fraught, and Rome had a genuine requirement for 
able generals.29 Nevertheless, it is incontrovertible that there was no legitimate 
method to forestall such individuals who possessed any real authority, and whose 
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achievements in the field made them appear even more accomplished. 
Another similar case can also be found in Italy. Ap. Claudius Pulcher, the 
consul, attacked the Salassi without any resolution of the Senate or the assembly 
in 143 (Cassius Dio fr.74.1-2). He allegedly obtained no victory, but tried to 
celebrate a triumph. It was forbidden by the Senate, but he held it privately, 
regardless. Considering the fact that Livius’ Periochae (53) reports on his 
subduing the Salassi, Dio’s report might be based on other sources’ unrealistic 
criticism of Pulcher.30 It is difficult to clarify the results of his campaign. In any 
case, his unauthorised triumph was reported by several authors (Cic. Cael. 34; 
Oros. 5.4.7; Suet. Tib. 2.4), and seems credible. In effect, then, Pulcher appears to 
have conducted two kinds of informal diplomacy: independently attacking a tribe, 
and then awarding himself a triumph as a victor over Rome’s enemies. Despite 
such blatant behaviour, he appears to have escaped punishment, and possibly 
even increased his fame. He was not elected as the censor in 142, but assumed it 
in 136 (Liv. Per. 56; Plut. Aem. 38.3-6; Mor. 200.C-D; TGrac. 4.2). The citizens 
appear not to have noticed his engaging in foreign affairs independently. The 
Senate prevented him from holding a triumph, but could not control his image 
wholly, nor the attitude of the people towards him. 
I also would argue that envoys could participate in foreign affairs 
independently, even if they lacked the support of many senators. Evidence for this 
can be found out around the outbreak of the Achaian War. From c. 149, Rome 
mediated between Achaia and Sparta, but neither party sought to end the dispute. 
In this situation, L. Aurelius Orestes, one of the delegates sent to the 
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Peloponnesos, reported to Rome that he was threatened by the Achaians, ‘while 
exaggerating the truth and exercising invention (μετ᾽ αὐξήσεως καὶ 
καινολογίας),’ stirring up ill feeling against Achaia among the senators 
independently (Polyb. 38.9.1-3, esp. 2). These remarks caused Rome to display 
antipathy towards Achaia, and subsequently provoked a war between the 
federation and Rome (Liv. Per. 51; Paus. 7.12-15; Polyb. 38.10-13). Yet, Pausanias 
relates that Orestes showed a senatorial decree requesting Achaia to make not 
only Sparta independent, but several other cities too, and that this enraged the 
Achaians (7.14.1-3). Polybios claims that Rome, nevertheless, did not originally 
want to dissolve Achaia, and that some demagogues in Achaia prevented the 
Roman negotiators and the ‘moderate’ Achaians from managing the dispute 
(38.9.6 and 10.1-13.8). These references are often accepted by scholars, 31 
although Polybios’ antipathy towards the Achaian hawks against Rome also 
appears to have influenced his method of description. The significance of Orestes’ 
report, thus, should not be overestimated. Indeed, Rome continued with the 
negotiations following his return, and Achaia did not expect the eventual attack 
of Q. Caecilius Metellus, who had been originally sent to pacify Macedonia (Oros. 
5.3.2-3; Paus. 7.14.3-4 and 15.1-4; Polyb. 38.10.1-12.9; cf. Liv. Per. 50; Zonar. 9.28). 
Nevertheless, Orestes’ report increased the Romans’ ill feeling towards Achaia. 
This suggests that envoys wanted to and could intervene in Rome’s decision-
making process while distinguishing themselves, although the Senate continued 
in its attempt to maintain collective management of diplomatic activity. 
It is noteworthy that such persistent use of informal diplomacy gradually 
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enabled some individual Romans to influence the people in and beyond Rome 
continuously. This is shown by the actions of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus the Elder. 
He was the father of the tribunus plebis in 133, and was sent to Asia Minor in the 
160s to inspect the situation (Polyb. 30.27.1). The Senate distrusted both 
Eumenes II and Antiochos IV. According to Polybios (30.30.8), however, ‘the kings 
succeeded in relaxing the vigour of the deputation (led by Gracchus) by the 
warmth of their reception (οὕτως αὐτοὺς οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐξετέμοντο τῇ κατὰ τὴν 
ἀπάντησιν φιλανθρωπίᾳ).’ Polybios thinks Gracchus was naively corrupted.32 
Whether Polybios’ view was correct or not,33 Gracchus established friendly and 
private dialogues with both kings, and arranged their contacts with Rome 
(30.30.7). This was independent participation in Rome’s decision-making. During 
the same period, he also reported favourably on Ariarathes V, the Cappadocian 
king, and on Demetrios I, who had fled from Rome, despite being a hostage, and 
usurped the throne of Antiochos V. Gracchus persuaded the Senate to recognise 
their kingship (App. Syr. 46; Diod. 31.17; Polyb. 31.2-3, 11-15, and 32-3; Zonar. 
9.25). The kings had taken their thrones and desired Roman recognition,34 and 
Gracchus favoured the two monarchs, as well as Eumenes and Antiochos IV. 
These do not necessarily mean he extended beneficia or vertical relationships to 
them, despite D. C. Earl’s supposition. 35  They might simply have won over 
Gracchus and thereby established a friendship with Rome commencing with his 
support, as Polybios thinks. In any case, these connections with the kings made 
other Romans regard ‘Tiberius (Gracchus) as a person familiar with all (eastern) 
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affairs (τὸν Τεβέριον … πάντων αὐτόπτην γεγονέναι),’ and his opinions about 
them were relied upon (Polyb. 31.2.6-11 and 15.9-11, esp. 11). Consequently, he 
influenced Roman diplomacy continuously thereafter, until his death in c. 154 (cf. 
Cic. Div. 1.36 and 2.62; Plin. NH 7.122 and 34.24; Plut. TGrac. 1.4-7). His 
leadership was exercised for less than ten years. In fact, the mediation between 
the Attalids and Bithynia in 155/4, mentioned above, was conducted by other 
envoys collectively. According to Plutarchos (TGrac. 1.3), though, his wife Cornelia 
received an offer of marriage from Ptolemaios VIII of Egypt after Gracchus’ death. 
This suggests that his influence was still substantial, although, it might also be 
significant that she was a daughter of P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, and the 
proposal itself might be a fiction designed to increase her dignity and that of the 
Gracchi by their supporters.36 Gracchus’ connection with the kings enabled him 
to occupy a special position in Roman diplomatic affairs, and influenced the 
attitude of others towards his family. 
This continuous influence over diplomacy can also be observed in the 
actions of P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, the son of L. Aemilius Paullus. For 
instance, he was invited by the Macedonians to solve their disputes in 151, as the 
successor of his family. This was regarded by other Romans as a reasonable 
rationale, and he was conscious of it. He said before the Senate that ‘personally 
(the task) was suitable for him (κατ᾽ ἰδίαν … οἰκειοτέραν),’ even though his 
political experience, at the time, was limited to the quaestorship, at best (Polyb. 
35.4.9-11, esp. 10).37 This pattern is also observed when he declined the offer from 
Macedonia and volunteered instead to serve as a staff officer for the war in 
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Hispania. Since he was Africanus’ grandson by adoption, he was eventually sent 
to Masinissa, Numidia’s king and Africanus’ friend,38 by Lucullus, the general 
dispatched to Hispania at that time. Lucullus used him specifically to ask the king 
to send elephants (Val.Max. 2.10.4). Indeed, according to Appianos (Pun. 72a), 
when Aemilianus visited Numidia, Masinissa treated him graciously ‘for the 
friendship with the ancestor (οἷα φίλον ἐκ πάππου).’ Moreover, Carthage observed 
his visit to Africa and petitioned him to mediate in its trouble with Numidia.39 He 
accepted this invitation, even though it had not been ordered by Lucullus. 
Aemilianus was expected by his seniors and outsiders to support them, to 
participate in foreign affairs. He consciously used longstanding family 
connections, engaged in informal diplomacy, and thereby increased his own 
personal fame. 
It is, however, noteworthy that others were even more active in exploiting 
Aemilianus’ influence than he was. This can be confirmed, for example, by a case 
dating to the middle of the Third Punic War.40 In 148, Masinissa asked the Senate 
to send Aemilianus to intervene in his sons’ succession to his throne (App. Pun. 
105; Val.Max. 5.2.ext.4). The king considered the connection with Africanus’ 
descendants important, and wanted, moreover, to extend this association to his 
sons. This request may well have displayed afresh Aemilianus’ private influence. 
However, this was also a sign of Masinissa’s disagreement with Roman policy to 
Rome. He was angry with her declaration of war on Carthage. Hostilities had been 
commenced without any notice and without an offer to divide the military results 
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with him, thus denying his territorial ambitions in the region (App. Pun. 94).41 It 
is in this context that he dared to name the young Roman, who had previously not 
been connected with decision-making in Rome, as his preferred mediator. 
Aemilianus was therefore used as a tool to subtly voice the king’s ill feeling. 
In addition, Aemilianus was approached by the Achaians, and contributed 
to the release of their hostages in 150. They had been taken to Italy during the 
Third Macedonian War (Plut. Cato Mai. 9.2-3; Polyb. 35.6).42 Yet, this decision of 
Rome was achieved relatively simply through the direct support of senior 
statesmen, such as Cato. Aemilianus merely liaised between them and the 
Achaians. He also had contacts with eastern dynasties, such as the Attalids, 
during the 140s and the 130s (Cic. Deiot. 19; Diod. 33.18.1-4; Just. 38.8.8-11; Str. 
14.5.2),43 but he did not seem to participate independently in any of the contacts 
between these states and Rome. Looking at the evidence as a whole, he appears 
to have used his influence in foreign affairs to advance his position infrequently, 
whereas others seem to have been keener to exploit it in championing their ad hoc 
interests. However, we should avoid viewing Aemilianus as a passive participant. 
Indeed, this situation could only have resulted from the fact that he was willing 
to lend his influence to the people approaching him. While leading Romans and 
outsiders used him and his continued influence in diplomacy, they lacked any 
method to control him if he behaved independently. 
Overall, we can observe that informal diplomacy was used by the Romans 
even after the Third Macedonian War. During the period, it is clear that outsiders 
also expected to experience such instances of personal influence in their contacts 
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with Rome. Meanwhile, many Romans were also committed to maintaining and 
developing collective and anonymous diplomacy, preventing the rise of individual 
Romans. However, Rome had no method of completely controlling them in 
diplomacy, even when advancing their own interests. The leading Romans could 
not invent any way to achieve it. This can be explained, to some extent, by the 
fact that most cases of informal diplomacy did not threaten their collective 
leadership, and many Romans felt no necessity of solving the problem drastically. 
However, the demand for informal diplomacy among the Romans, and outsiders, 
not to mention the lack of an effective method to control the phenomenon, could 
cause conflict between those who advocated maintaining collective, anonymous 
diplomacy, and those who would continuously express their individuality if the 
opportunity presented itself. The cases of Gracchus the Elder and Aemilianus only 
avoided provoking internal conflict among the Romans because the former was 
old, and the latter never confronted the collective leadership of the senators. 
Within this potentially volatile context, it is important to remember that Rome’s 
constitution could actually promote the exclusive rise of individuals and the 
decrease of the collective leadership of the leading Romans or the Senate. This is 
key to understanding better the violence of 133, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of informal diplomacy in Rome. The following section prepares this 
important discussion, by analysing the rise of the tribuni plebis from the period 
of the Macedonian War onwards that occurred in parallel to that of informal 






Section 2: The Tribuni Plebis in Foreign Affairs 
 
      Before examining the increasing importance of the tribunate in Roman 
diplomacy from the period of the Third Macedonian War, it is useful to consider 
its general condition prior to the 160s. Some scholars think that the tribuni plebis 
were under the influence of the Senate from the approval of the Lex Hortensia in 
287, until the dispute caused by Gracchus in 133.44 Indeed, their actions after 287 
mainly resulted from arrangements with the Senate, and were basically for home 
affairs (e.g. Liv. 32.29.3-4, 34.53.1-2, and 35.7.1-6; Macrob. Sat. 3.17.2). The 
plebiscite in 192 for allocation of the officers was exceptional, but was made under 
the senatorial advice (Liv. 35.20.9). Furthermore, the tribuni originally looked to 
personify Rome’s democratic aspect, but from the viewpoint of many 
contemporary Greeks and monarchs (6.13.8-9), Rome’s constitution in Polybios’ 
period was a de facto aristocracy controlled by the senators. This appearance 
might have been prompted by inequalities in the voting system,45 and by the 
increasing ascendancy of elite elements, senators and their relations. This does 
not mean that Rome’s popular sovereignty had been lost completely, though. As F. 
Millar argues, the citizens’ assembly was still Rome’s legitimate legislative 
chamber, and so the political elites simply could not ignore them.46 However, 
Polybios refers to a tribunician power that could hinder the operation of the 
Senate and reflected the wishes of the people (6.16.4-5), but also emphasises the 
senatorial leadership (cf. 6.15.3-8 and 17.1-8). Many tribuni were incorporated 
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into the order embodied by the senators, with familial relations to other leaders, 
wealth and dignity.47 
Even if the tribuni were generally under the Senate, though, they were still 
treated as an independent group in official letters, during the first quarter of the 
second century (e.g. RDGE 34.ll.2-3; CID IV.105.ll.1-2).48 Moreover, Rome’s legal 
framework enabled the tribuni to show their influence in home affairs. C. 
Flaminius, the tribunus of 231, and C. Valerius Tappo, that of 188, carried their 
bills to the popular assembly while bypassing the Senate, and legislated them 
based on the Lex Hortensia (Liv. 38.76.7-9; Polyb. 2.21.7-9). 49  Moreover, the 
tribuni sometimes showed their influence by accusing senators and generals of 
misdeeds,50 and maintained special powers such as the sacred inviolability, the 
veto, and the authority to incarcerate any officer.51 The evidence suggests, then, 
that the tribuni remained a potential rival to the Senate, during this period. What 
should be noticed now is that they increasingly participated even in foreign affairs 
through these influences, particularly from the period of the Third Macedonian 
War. This does not necessarily mean they conducted informal diplomacy. They 
succeeded in directing some policy by using their official powers, and were 
supported by senators, initially, at least. But the rise of the tribuni in diplomacy 
eventually decreased the collective leadership of the Senate. Analysis of this 
situation contributes to demonstrating the significance of the relationship 
between informal diplomacy and other factors in Rome’s foreign and home affairs, 
such as the Senate and legality, in the incident of 133 and in wider Roman history 
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during the second century, and afterwards. 
The rise of the tribuni in foreign affairs can first be observed when Rhodes 
tried to mediate between Rome and Macedonia during the Third Macedonian War. 
The Senate openly expressed its fury regarding the situation, after Pydna. At this 
time, M’. Iuventius Thalna, the praetor, appealed to the citizens to attack Rhodes, 
and to select him as the general, without senatorial consent. Against this action, 
M. Antonius and possibly M. Pomponius, the tribuni, exercised the veto, and 
introduced Rhodes’ envoys to the Senate, thus giving them an opportunity to sue 
for a pardon (Liv. 45.21.1-8; Polyb. 30.4.4-6).52 The tribuni helped Rhodes and 
supported the senatorial leadership by stopping Thalna, and participated in 
diplomacy by themselves. The Senate listened to the envoys and managed the 
affair peacefully. This participation of the tribuni in diplomacy was not 
necessarily independent, though, much less informal. The envoys may well have 
been introduced on the wishes of many senators, despite P. J. Burton’s argument 
that Rome regarded Rhodes as a traitor and wanted to wreak reprisals for this 
moral reason.53 If many senators had planned to attack Rhodes, it would have 
been impossible to introduce the envoys to the Senate. It is also worth noting that 
the veto was used although it had rarely been required, previously. 54  These 
factors make it highly likely that the tribuni played a role in Roman diplomacy 
here, and suggest that their authority, and their relationship with the Senate 
were the contributing factors. 
This pattern can also be observed in some other cases connected to the 
Macedonian War. In 170, for example, the tribuni, including Thalna, accused C. 
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Lucretius Gallus, one of the Roman commanders, after many Greeks complained 
about his misdeeds in his campaign (Liv. 43.7.5-8.2). The Senate approved the 
prosecution in the assembly. This was nominally an act of redress through the 
tribunician power, but also enabled the office bearers to draw attention to their 
presence in national and international politics. The trial may well have been 
noticed by people in and beyond Rome. Yet, if the Senate had sympathised with 
Lucretius, while respecting his power as a general, and used its collective 
authority to suggest to the tribuni that they stop their prosecution,55 it would 
have been difficult for the latter to sustain their charges. The opening of the trial 
and their intervention in the conduct of the war, therefore, resulted not only from 
their authority, but also from senatorial approval. A similar situation is found 
after Pydna, in an episode during which the Senate instructed Q. Cassius, the 
praetor, to arrange with the tribuni that they should propose a motion regarding 
triumphs to the assembly (45.35.4).56 This further suggests the rise of the tribuni 
in the conduct of foreign affairs, by virtue of their tribunician powers, while their 
participation was largely dependent on the Senate, which strove to recover its 
collective leadership. 
One might be forgiven for thinking that these cases show that the tribuni 
were simply subordinate to the Senate. Yet, despite the scant nature of the 
evidence for the tribuni after Pydna, they intervened increasingly in foreign 
affairs, and did so independently. For instance, in 151, the consuls had difficulty 
in levying soldiers for the war in Hispania (App. Hisp. 49; Liv. Per. 48; Polyb. 35.3-
4). Indeed, Rome faced a worsening manpower shortage. Citizens were unwilling 
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to serve in the war, a situation exacerbated by the lack of opportunities to amass 
booty. The consuls enforced conscription, provoking unrest.57 At this time, the 
tribuni restrained the consuls, following complaints from the people. This equated 
to an intervention by them in both home and foreign affairs. The prevention of 
conscription was pressed in opposition to the Senate directing the war, through 
the consuls. 
It is important that, in this case of 151, the consuls and the Senate accepted 
the restrictions enforced by the tribuni. 58  This shows that their action was 
legitimate and could not be stopped, legally. But, as I argued above, the exercising 
of tribunician powers had depended previously on the guidance of the Senate. The 
situation in 151 signifies of considerable change in the relationship. For this point, 
A. E. Astin has cited the influence of public opinion as a factor.59 Certainly, many 
citizens tried to evade conscription, owing to war weariness (e.g. App. Hisp. 49; 
Polyb. 35. 4.1-8). This encouraged the tribuni to prevent the consuls from levying 
troops, since their original role was to represent the ordinary people. While the 
development of this case might be explained in basic terms, however, this is not a 
complete answer. The war in Hispania was not the first one in which citizens were 
unwilling to enlist. Indeed, the citizens refused to serve at the outset of the Second 
Macedonian War. The assembly rejected the motion, and moreover, Q. Baebius, 
the tribunus in 200, criticised those promoting the war, reflecting the opinion of 
the citizenry (Liv. 31.5-8). At that point, however, many senators exerted 
considerable pressure on him to desist. He was thus prevented from hindering the 
consul’s second motion for war before the assembly, even though Baebius could 
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have vetoed it legitimately (31.6.4-6). Public opinion was aligned with the tribuni, 
both in 200 and 151; the difference in the results suggests, however, that this 
alignment was not the defining factor that enabled the tribuni to wield their 
authority and to participate in foreign affairs. 
What, then, was the difference between the two cases? A clue can be found 
in the case of L. Scribonius Libo, the tribunus in 149. He proposed a law that the 
Lusitanians, who had surrendered but had been betrayed by Ser. Sulpicius Galba 
(mentioned in Section 1) in 150, should be liberated (Liv. Per. 49). Cato 
sympathised with this proposal, but, owing to Galba’s public conduct, considered 
above, the proposal was rejected, nevertheless. One could argue that this episode 
simply displays Cato’s private criticism of the magistrates’ misdeeds,60 or that 
Libo criticised Galba on the basis of morality alongside Cato, but in vain. Yet, it is 
noticeable that there was a division among the senators, and this enabled Libo to 
charge Galba while also participating in Rome’s decision-making of foreign affairs. 
Considering Cato’s career and huge influence,61  his validation of Libo would 
realistically result in the support of a number of senators. Indeed, if many leading 
Romans had not agreed with him, they would likely have pressured him to 
withdraw the accusation, as they had done in Baebius’ case. As a general, Galba 
could legitimately take highly destructive actions, such as destroying an entire 
tribe. The accusation could be dismissed legally. Although the court returned a 
verdict of not guilty against him, this was down to his solid defence, rather than 
any other, more nebulous, factors. The very process of opening a trial means that 
many leading Romans approved of Libo’s accusation and, in so doing, gave tacit 
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acceptance of the tribunus’ participation in foreign affairs, regardless of the 
motives of the people involved. With this in mind, the increasing ability to win 
over a number of senators, not necessarily the collective will of the Senate itself, 
was a factor in the rise of the tribuni, detached from their authority and the 
constraints of public opinion. 
This view is supported by the case of L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, the tribunus 
in 149. He succeeded in establishing a standing court for prosecuting extortion by 
the field officers, following a heated argument (Cic. Brut. 106; Off. 2.75). It created 
a procedure by which provincials could complain about Roman generals and 
governors, although the means for the recovery of estates and property seized 
were still of limited help to the alleged victims.62 Piso’s action was clearly an 
intervention into foreign affairs. It is important to note that the bill’s adoption 
apparently resulted from his successful appeal to a variety of people in and beyond 
the Senate. He debated the bill with many opponents, but managed to convince 
the majority of the people and senators. The sources do not report on his political 
friends or enemies, but I would suggest that his opponents may well have been 
those in positions of power, given the reformative character of the law about high-
ranking officers. Nevertheless, they failed to prevent Piso from legislating for the 
court and from participating in the supervision of generals, an undeniably 
important element of Roman foreign policy. His partnership with many senators, 
or their political divisions, was therefore a factor that enabled the tribunus to 
participate in foreign affairs. 
The appointment of Aemilianus as consul can also be understood by 
                                                   




noticing this pattern. He was sent to Africa and Hispania as the consul in 147 and 
134 (App. Pun. 112; Hisp. 84; Liv. Per. 51; Val.Max. 8.15.4), despite the fact that 
he was too young to stand for the office. In both cases, the tribuni cancelled the 
law for the limit temporarily in the assembly. He had pre-existing connections 
with the inhabitants in the regions. The tribuni, their supporters, and perhaps 
even Aemilianus, himself, expected him to use them as a general. 63  This is 
another example of participation in foreign affairs being undertaken by the 
tribuni, but this does not mean they, with the support of the citizens, antagonised 
other officers and the Senate directing the wars. Certainly, in both cases, mass 
emotion or the act complaining to senatorial moral authority played an important 
role among the citizens, and the tribuni came to expect its own significant 
influence.64 Yet, their motions to the assembly were also approved by the senators. 
They were pressured by citizens, but if the senators had opposed the actions of 
the tribuni, the citizens, and Aemilianus on common ground, the tribuni would 
have hesitated to push through his assumption of the consulship, and dispatch to 
Africa and Hispania, owing to the senators’ influence over sending supplies to the 
troops (cf. Polyb. 6.15.4-5). Securing some form of partnership with many senators 
was also a factor of enabling the tribuni to rise to prominence in connection with 
foreign affairs, even here. 
For all of this, though, the tribuni also seemed increasingly prepared to 
confront the Senate and other officers. In 138, they imprisoned the consuls in 
another dispute concerning the levy (Liv. Per. 55; Oxy. 55; cf. Cic. Leg. 3.20).65 
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While there are few sources about this event, the consuls appear to have been 
released quickly. Since Brutus, as one of the consuls of 138, commenced a 
campaign in Hispania during his term (Liv. Per. 55), the people concerned 
compromised in some way. Yet, given this collection of evidence, it is clear that the 
tribuni did not hesitate to use their authority against the senators, and the latter 
could do nothing to stop it. 
These cases show the rise of the tribuni in Roman foreign affairs after the 
Third Macedonian War. They were able to participate by virtue of their authority, 
and sometimes with the support the citizens and leading Romans. The Senate had 
previously manipulated tribunician power and collectively influenced the tribuni, 
but was increasingly unable to control them, possessing no legitimate method to 
prevent them from becoming more prominent in state diplomacy. The Senate 
seems to have ignored the situation. This might result partly from the fact that 
the number of tribuni who wanted to participate in foreign affairs independently 
was still negligible, across several decades. Nevertheless, in parallel with the rise 
of informal diplomacy in Rome, the collective leadership of the Senate 
comparatively waned, something observed by contemporaries. These factors are 
important in understanding the rise of Gracchus and the violence of 133. The next 
section develops these points further, focusing on his combination of informal 
diplomacy and tribunician power, its legality, and its relationship with the 
collective leadership of the Romans, and considers the role of manners within this 






Section 3: Informal Diplomacy and the Violence of 133 
 
The conflict surrounding Gracchus’ tribunate in 133 was the first violent 
struggle observed among the Romans, since the opening period of the Republic. 
This therefore represents a major turning point in Roman history. Indeed, there 
has been a considerable amount written about this event, and previous scholars 
have proposed many factors contributing to the discord. Many of their 
considerations are generally correct, but there is still one factor that has not been 
given the attention it deserves: informal diplomacy. This section aims to show that 
an analysis of the events employing this concept, and noting its relationship with 
official state powers, enables us to understand better the nature of the violence 
and its influence on Rome. 
In order to achieve this, it is first useful to indicate that there are two stages 
to the events concerning Gracchus in 133. The first one is the political struggle 
caused by his attempt to improve the conditions of ordinary citizens, and to 
recover Roman manpower, by distributing public land, previously rented at 
excessive rates.66 The disputes in this phase did not cause the violence of 133, 
though. His agrarian law negatively affected the moneyed classes and the 
senators, provoking their antipathy.67 There is little evidence to suggest, however, 
that it was his agrarian policy that made other Romans assault him.68 It could 
also be argued that the hostility of his opponents was provoked by the dismissal 
of M. Octavius in the course of enacting his legislation on agrarian reform, thus 
prompting violence. Octavius was his tribunician colleague, after all, and was 
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connected to his opponents. Octavius’ resistance to Gracchus, by use of the veto, 
and his removal from office by Gracchus’ motion, seemed both shocking to 
contemporaries (App. BC 1.11-12; Cassius Dio fr. 83.4-6; Flor. 2.2.5; Liv. Per. 58; 
Oros. 5.8.3; Plut. TGrac. 10.1-12.6).69 The legal arguments of the two tribuni over 
the agrarian law, and the questionable legitimacy of Octavius’ dismissal, were not 
settled satisfactorily.70 These certainly fuelled the anger of Gracchus’ opponents. 
However, Octavius was excluded without any formal opposition by 
contemporaries.71 The agrarian law was adopted in the assembly (App. BC 1.11-
12; Liv. Per. 58; Plut. TGrac. 9.1, 10.1-12.6, and 13.1). I would argue, then, that 
the political struggle surrounding land distribution, and other social, home affairs, 
does not explain Gracchus’ opponents later resorting to violence.72 
It is now necessary to consider the second stage of the events in 133, namely 
Gracchus’ intervention in the Attalid affair by informal diplomacy after the 
approval of his agrarian law, his attempt to gain a second tribunate, and his 
murder in the tribunician election for 132. During this period, he became aware 
of the bequest of the Attalid kingdom left by Attalos III to the Romans through 
private contact with Eudemos, the Pergamene envoy visiting Rome, and 
persuaded the assembly to devote it to realising his agrarian reform, completely 
bypassing the Senate (Flor. 2.3.3; Liv. Per. 58; Oros. 5.8.4; Plut. TGrac. 14.1-4). 
Gracchus’ primary aim might have been to increase the available land to allocate, 
and to remove any obstruction to the distribution brought forth by his opponents. 
The Senate was under their influence. They had prevented the agrarian 
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committee, led by Gracchus, from distributing land, owing to the senatorial 
control over national resources (Liv. Per. 58; Plut. TGrac. 13.2-3).73 However, I 
would argue, his motion regarding Attalos’ bequest, based on the Lex Hortensia, 
not only offered a legitimate solution to such problems, but also damaged the 
senatorial leadership, in connection with diplomacy. Indeed, the conflict between 
Gracchus and his opponents intensified (Plut. TGrac. 14.2-6), and exploded into 
violence at the tribunician election. During the confusion, many senators led by P. 
Cornelius Scipio Nasica, the pontifex maximus, murdered Gracchus (App. BC 
1.15-17; Flor. 2.2.6-7; Liv. Per. 58-9; Oros. 5.9.1-3; Plut. TGrac. 17.1-20.4). I think, 
then, that the direct and crucial factors in causing the violence were Gracchus’ 
intervention in Attalos’ bequest, and his attempt to seek re-election following it, 
although his agrarian policy had opened the struggle. The following discussion 
therefore focuses on his actions during this phase, and highlights the role of 
informal diplomacy, in connection with the tribunate, in the downward spiral 
towards violence. 
Several scholars rather pinpoint Gracchus’ intervention in the financial 
management of Attalos’ bequest as the key factor in violence.74 It was certainly 
in violation of senatorial authority, and might have provoked anger in Gracchus’ 
opponents. Yet, the agrarian law had been also connected with financial affairs 
but had been legislated without such a conflict taking place. Moreover, there are 
precedents of the tribuni participating in the distribution of national resources. 
In 194, for example, Q. Aelius Tubero proposed a motion to the popular assembly 
to build two Latin colonies, following a senatorial suggestion (Liv. 34.53.1-2).75 In 
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172, M. Lucretius proposed a bill to lease formal estates in Campania that had 
been appropriated by private individuals (42.19.1-2). He was related to C. 
Lucretius Gallus, the praetor of 171, and possibly Sp. Lucretius, that of 172.76 It 
is plausible that he was supported by his powerful family connections, and friends 
in the Senate. Leading Romans did not object to the participation of tribuni in the 
management of public land, i.e. finance. The influence of Gracchus’ intervention 
in this sphere, then, on the outbreak of the violence, should not be overestimated. 
In contrast to his intervention in finance, Gracchus’ participation in 
diplomacy, and the attempt to obtain the second tribunate, changed the situation 
completely. According to Plutarchos (TGrac. 14, esp. 2), he had private contacts 
with Eudemos, and became aware of Attalos’ bequest, persuading the assembly to 
devote it to his agrarian law while arguing that ‘(the bequest) did not belong to 
the Senate to deliberate about it (οὐδὲν ἔφη τῇ συγκλήτῳ βουλεύεσθαι 
προσήκειν).’ Given the absence of terms reminiscent of patronage, such as clientes, 
it is impossible to decide whether this contact with Eudemos occurred to secure 
clientage between the Gracchi and the Attalids,77 although Gracchus the Elder 
had connections with them, as shown in Section 1. Yet, Eudemos’ visit to Gracchus 
before senatorial sessions should be categorised as an example of informal 
diplomacy. It is significant that Gracchus did not discuss the bequest in the Senate 
but persuaded the popular assembly to use it for his agrarian law, instead. This 
was an act founded on his tribunician authority and was unquestionably 
legitimate, but he had also independently managed home and foreign affairs, 
namely contact with the Attalids and the distribution of the king’s bequest, with 
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the additional use of informal diplomacy. He effectively controlled the state of 
Rome singlehandedly, during this case. Furthermore, shortly after this, he started 
to try to obtain a second tribunate. This would have been an effective measure in 
prolonging or otherwise perpetuating his power over national and international 
politics. As we have seen in previous sections, there was no clearly defined method 
to stop informal diplomacy or the tribunician power, much less the two elements 
combined. From the perspective of Gracchus’ opponents, the struggle with him 
was no longer simply a political one over individual policies. 
Yet, in order to confirm this view, it is necessary to consider Gracchus’ sway 
over people in and beyond Rome, and to what extent such influence was noticed 
by his opponents. The combination between informal diplomacy and tribunician 
authority depended on his connection with foreigners, the support of fellow 
citizens, and at least a section of the leading Roman elite. Even if he had enjoyed 
such influence, moreover, if it had not been clear for his opponents, they would 
not have stopped him by force while taking a risk. With that in mind, this section 
now considers his support base and the extent to which it was noticed by others. 
Gracchan supporters among leading Romans will be considered first. 
According to Plutarchos (TGrac. 9.1), he was supported by Ap. Claudius Pulcher, 
his father-in-law, the consul of 143 and the censor of 136, and P. Mucius Scaevola, 
the consul of 133. This suggests their own supporters also have been favourable 
towards Gracchus, and infers both that he was not isolated from the Senate, and 
that his links would have been public knowledge. Secondly, he could exert 
influence over many fellow citizens and outsiders following his behaviour in the 
Spanish campaign led by C. Hostilius Mancinus. In 137, Mancinus’ troops 
attacked Numantia, but became trapped by the enemy. He wanted to negotiate 
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with the city to facilitate a withdrawal, but Numantia demanded to talk with 
Gracchus instead, even though the latter was only a quaestor (5-6). This was due, 
in part, to the popularity of Gracchus the Elder in Hispania. Several decades 
previously, he had given land to the inhabitants.78 The Numantians might also 
have felt that the young noble would be an easier target to manipulate. In any 
case, he was involved in the negotiation, despite lacking any authority about 
diplomacy. This was a form of informal diplomacy. His private relationship 
eventually influenced the nature of the official contact. The conclusion of a peace 
also increased his celebrity in Rome (and possibly Hispania). This personal 
connection was reinforced when the treaty made by Gracchus and Numantia was 
rejected by the Senate in 136. This decision was motivated by the senators’ 
objection to the peace being concluded in the inferior war situation. Moreover, the 
Numantians had seized booty from Mancinus’ camp (6.1-7.1). Gracchus and 
Mancinus had both apparently failed to defend Rome’s dignity. The rejection 
should have left a stain on Gracchus’ career, 79  but, instead, he obtained 
considerable support from many citizens. Mancinus’ soldiers, who had escaped 
death, thanks to the peace, and their families were grateful to Gracchus (7.1). 
This support base must have contributed to his obtaining the tribunate, and to 
his willingness to exercise its powers freely, and with the support of the Roman 
statesmen mentioned above. This situation must have been noticed by 
contemporaries. 
His connection with outsiders and his contemporaries’ notice of it are also 
corroborated by an episode of C. Gracchus, Tiberius’ younger brother (Plut. CGrac. 
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2.1-3). In c. 126, Gaius was sent to Sardinia as a quaestor under L. Aurelius 
Orestes against local rebels. Micipsa, the Numidian king, sent corn to Gaius, to 
support his draft of supplies. He does not seem to have gained Micipsa’s gratitude 
by himself. The king supported him because he was a member of the Gracchi, and 
therefore may well have curried favour with Aemilianus, Gaius’ cousin and the 
direct successor to the friendship between Africanus and Masinissa.80 The Senate 
had a great aversion towards Micipsa for this kindness towards Gaius when the 
king reported his support for Gaius to the organ. This might have resulted largely 
from its dispute with Tiberius. In any case, Ti. Gracchus may well also have been 
somehow connected with Numidia, as he was with the Attalids and Numantia. In 
light of Micipsa’s behaviour, such connections were not concealed from 
contemporaries. 
The influence held by Gracchus is also suggested by the fact that many 
friends and supporters criticised Nasica as the architect of Gracchus’ fall, shortly 
after his murder (Cic. Or. 2.285; Plut. TGrac. 21.1-4). The Senate could not 
suppress the accusations and subsequently dispatched Nasica to Asia Minor. 
While this might have been partly to deal with the emergence in the territory of 
the ex-Attalids caused by the pretender, Aristonikos,81 it is more likely a sign that 
Nasica’s assault on Gracchus could not be convincingly and legally defended. If it 
had been possible, Gracchus’ opponents would have declared Nasica’s innocence 
in court, while at the same time sending other statesman to Asia Minor. 
Furthermore, if Gracchus had been supported by many on an ad hoc basis only, 
his opponents would not have avoided facing off his supporters but rather sought 
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reconciliation with the ordinary citizens, by means of incentives, similar to the 
way in which the advocates of the Second Macedonian War had managed Baebius, 
the leader of the anti-war movement, and Africanus, his friends, and other 
citizens, by separating them from one another. Gracchus had many supporters, 
but they could not be divided so easily, and this feature was noticed by his 
opponents. 
This hypothesis is supported by some other measures taken by the Senate, 
in the aftermath of Gracchus’ murder. For instance, it sent a religious embassy to 
Enna in Sicily, based on the oracle of the Sibylline Books (Cic. Verr. 2.4.108; 
Val.Max.1.1.1c). This seems to have been a measure promoted by his opponents 
to appease Ceres for Gracchus’ violation of the laws connected to her divine power, 
specifically his perversion of the tribunician sacrosanctitas, in his dismissal of 
Octavius, and his attempt to overthrow the Republic, in order to justify religiously 
his assassination in the name of the Senate, although his name was not directly 
referred to in the proceedings.82 His opponents emphasised his ‘crime,’ from the 
religious viewpoint to contemporaries, and compensated for the antipathy of his 
supporters by exploiting the senatorial control over religious affairs. The use of 
this indirect strategy, however, suggests that it was dangerous for his opponents 
to criticise the murdered tribunus directly. Secondly, his opponents won over 
people who had supported him simply for his agrarian policy in 133, even though 
this group might not have represented the majority of his supporters. The 
committee for land distribution was maintained. P. Licinius Crassus Dives 
Mucianus succeeded Gracchus (Plut. TGrac. 21.1-3; CIL I².719).83 Mucianus was 
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one of Gracchus’ advisers when he drafted the agrarian law, and was Scaevola’s 
brother (Cic. Acad. 2.5; Plut. TGrac. 9.1). It is not clear whether Mucianus 
supported Gracchus before the latter’s assassination.84 In any case, his opponents 
reconciled with part of his senatorial supporters, and expected recipients of land. 
This strategy clearly suggests that Gracchus’ opponents had noticed the strength 
of his supporters. 
With Gracchus’ considerable influence confirmed, it is noteworthy that his 
opponents, nevertheless, stopped him by force. This suggests that he was not 
attacked simply because of their opposition to his (potentially financially 
damaging) agrarian policy, but because some other factor compelled his opponents 
to defeat him at any cost. This can be shown by analysing their attitude towards 
him. According to Plutarchos (TGrac. 19.3), on the day of trinbunal election for 
132, Nasica advocated ‘the defeat of the tyrant, (Gracchus,) to save the state (τῇ 
πόλει βοηθεῖν καὶ καταλύειν τὸν τύραννον).’ This seems to derive from a source 
written by an unnamed anti-Gracchan author,85 although the use of the term 
tyrant, here, might also appear owing to Plutarchos’ personal interest in the issue 
of tyranny and opposition to it.86 Yet, it is noticeable that Gracchus, a tribunus, 
was regarded as a man holding supreme power, and representing an enemy of the 
Republic, by his opponents. This is not a stereotypical criticism of the tribuni. 
They had been connected intermittently with home and foreign affairs, in 
competition with many senators, even before 133, but there is no evidence to 
suggest that they were labelled as tyrants. Referring to Gracchus so, then, shows 
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that his power was regarded as exceeding that normally connected to tribuni, and 
thereby really threatening his contemporary political order, by many people 
during and following his period. This perception of Gracchus provides a more 
compelling explanation for why he was so vigorously attacked by his opponents. 
This view is supported by considering the risks which the anti-Gracchans 
run during their attack on Gracchus. For instance, according to Plutarchos, Q. 
Pompeius, the consul of 141, told his contemporaries that he had seen Gracchus’ 
receipt for a crown and a royal robe, procured by Eudemos (TGrac. 14.2). While 
this seems to be a simple case of an anti-Gracchan slander,87 if Pompeius related 
Gracchus’ contact with Eudemos, and hinted at Gracchus’ alleged ambition with 
such a connection before contemporaries, it would understandably amplify the 
negative feeling towards the fallen tribunus. Meanwhile, Pompeius’ report would 
show them that Gracchus’ opponents were also capable of underhanded and 
voyeuristic actions, despite their lofty claim of defending the Republic. Some 
contemporaries would likely be disappointed in Pompeius and other anti-
Gracchans. His report, then, suggests that Gracchus’ opponents wanted to destroy 
him bare-knuckle. In addition, the assault led by Nasica, who advocated the 
defeat of a tyrant, upon Gracchus at the tribunician election was also highly risky. 
Nasica and other anti-Gracchans opened themselves to a direct counterattack by 
Gracchus’ supporters. Nasica himself bore the brunt of their criticism as well. 
Although the rhetoric of tyranny might be a Plutarchan exaggeration designed to 
highlight the danger of his rise conveniently, it remains clear that Gracchus’ 
opponents realistically decided to defeat him at all costs. 
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So, what made Gracchus’ opponents attack him? One may regard his 
attempt to obtain a second tribunate as the primary cause. Certainly, although 
there was a precedent for its repeated assumption, the case of C. Licinius Stolo in 
the fourth century, and even after him there was no law to prevent it,88 Gracchus’ 
attempt was unorthodox, nonetheless. This could be regarded as a challenge to 
the traditional political order. Indeed, he was attacked in the process of the 
election. However, C. Gracchus succeeded in assuming the tribunate in 123 and 
122 consecutively, and was killed after his failure in securing a third term. The 
significance of Tiberius’ attempt to secure a second term should not be 
overestimated. 
Considering the role of the tribunate in the events in 133 further, however, 
is useful in understanding them. The tribuni presided over the popular 
assembly.89 If they were supported by the citizens, they could easily make the 
assembly approve their bills. This situation indeed enabled Gracchus, who was 
firmly supported by the citizens, to legitimise the results of his private 
negotiations with the Attalids, bypassing the Senate. It is noticeable that this 
legislation resulted from his combination of informal diplomacy and official 
tribunician power, used with the backing of his fellow citizens against the 
collective leadership of the senators. With both factors, Gracchus effectively 
directed a matter of foreign affairs, though connected to home affairs as well, 
independently. Furthermore, as long as he was a tribunus, he could potentially 
control not only other home matters, but also other diplomatic affairs 
synthetically. If he had obtained the second tribunate, he would have prolonged 
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this political advantage for at least one more year. His pressing concern might 
have been to defend himself from accusations following his first term (App. BC 
1.13-14; Oros. 5.8.4);90 nevertheless, the repeated election of such a person would 
have presented a significant menace to the collective leadership of the Senate. 
While it consisted of the leading Romans, rich in monetary wealth and dignity, it 
had no legitimate way to stop the tribunician power and informal diplomacy, much 
less an individual who was able to use them synthetically and to prolong its 
advantage by extending his term of office. 
Gracchus’ opponents, in particular the senior senators, must have noticed 
the nature of his power. They had surely remembered the strength and the growth 
of tribunician power across the preceding three decades. They also had understood 
the influence of informal diplomacy. Nasica was a grandson of Africanus, who had 
forged many connections in Hispania, Africa, and possibly in Greece.91 Pompeius 
had been a general in Hispania for years, where a connection with the inhabitants 
could influence negotiations, as shown in Gracchus’ own case.92 Furthermore, the 
criticism of Gracchus levelled by Metellus, the consul of 143, supports this view. 
He attacked Gracchus in 133 (Plut. TGrac. 14.3), and had noticed the influence of 
informal diplomacy. He had served in the Achaian War,93 in Greece, where it was 
still actively used in many cases, such as the negotiations for release of Achaian 
hostages in 150. For such senior senators,94 the danger of a person combining 
private connections with outsiders with tribunician authority, to the collective 
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leadership of the Senate, was easily understood. 
These analyses explain why Gracchus was regarded as a menace to Rome, 
and show that his assassination in the middle of the election can be interpreted 
as a reaction to his opponents’ defeat in the political struggle. They had noticed 
that Gracchus could exploit connections with the Attalids and other outsiders, 
such as the Numantians, for himself, contravening the Senate’s collective and 
anonymous management of Roman diplomacy. They lacked any method to stop it, 
though. They had observed that Gracchus persuaded the assembly to approve his 
motion, combining his private contact with Eudemos, his tribunician power, and 
the support of the ordinary citizens, but still his opponents could not prevent him 
from bypassing the Senate, independently. Moreover, their prevention of his 
election as tribunus, on the day of violence, almost ended in failure (Plut. TGrac. 
16-18). Finally, they failed to check his continuous combination of informal 
diplomacy and the tribunician powers, through the collective dignity of the Senate, 
in the immediate prelude to the violent attack. This is confirmed in a dialogue 
between Nasica and Scaevola, the consul, in the senatorial session on the day.95 
Nasica wanted him to stop Gracchus as a tyrant (19.3), and aimed here to defeat 
him by some senatorial decree. As Baebius’ case before the Second Macedonian 
War shows, when the senators collectively opposed an action of a tribunus, much 
more under the name of the Senate, it was difficult for him to carry out his will. 
In 133, Gracchus’ opponents seemed to form the majority of the senators.96 If it 
had been a more regular situation, they would have managed to stop Gracchus 
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from developing his policy independently further, even if the senatorial decree 
would not permit his enemies to attack him directly. But Scaevola, who presided 
at the session, was a Gracchan supporter, and prevented Nasica and his associates 
from taking any action against Gracchus in the name of the Senate, for the reason 
that attacking someone without trial was illegal. On the political stage, then, his 
opponents were defeated completely. 
Meanwhile, Gracchus was, however, wrong to assume that his opponents 
would still behave as players in a political game, rather than engage in a form of 
power politics in which physical violence was also a tool. They attacked him 
without the support of the Senate, privately and yet openly. This is confirmed by 
references to those assaulting him as optimates (Liv. Per. 58), nobilitas (Flor. 
2.2.6; Oros. 5.9.1; [Vict.] Vir.Ill. 64.7), or boni (Val.Max. 3.2.17; Vell. 2.3.2). Even 
Plutarchos (TGrac. 19.3-4), who seems to use sources unfavourable to Gracchus,97 
refers to them as ‘those who wish to succour the laws (οἱ βουλόμενοι τοῖς νόμοις 
βοηθεῖν)’ without the support of ‘the chief magistrate (ὁ ἄρχων).’ Gracchus’ 
opponents acted as a political group that consisted of the majority of the senators, 
and as elites seeking to defend their collective leadership under the Republic 
privately, similar, to an extent, to the way that Gracchus had used unofficial 
channels in conducting foreign affairs. He had not prepared for this case, and the 
result was his violent death. 
This attitude of Gracchus’ opponents, promoting themselves as the 
defenders of sound, collective, Roman government, is also observed in the 
senatorial resolutions regarding Attalid affairs after Gracchus had died, and 
                                                   
97 Cf. Clark 2007: 130. 
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many of his friends in the Senate had stopped resisting his enemies. The Senate 
put all matters previously managed by him under its collective leadership, once 
again. For instance, Attalos’ will about his kingdom and the rights of the cities 
under the dynasty was accepted again by a senatorial decree (IGR IV.289).98 Five 
commissioners were sent to Asia Minor, as early as the end of 133, to organise the 
new province (Str. 14.1.38). While this might be partly to defend Nasica from the 
vengeance of Gracchus’ supporters, the annexation of the region was further 
announced in c. 132 (IGR IV.301).99 Considering that the five senators seemed to 
lack specific authority, such as imperium,100 the Senate wanted to manage the 
Attalid matters quickly and collectively, while preventing individual Romans from 
exercising leadership and concealing Gracchus’ decisions under the authority of 
the Senate. 
However, these measures erased Gracchus’ influence as such, but did not 
solve the wider problem of the lack of way to control informal diplomacy and 
tribunician power. This is suggested by the development of the management of 
Asia Minor. It was not made easy, owing to Aristonikos’ resistance (Str. 14.1.38).101 
In order to defeat him, the Senate could not help sending generals, and 
overlooking the connections that they forged with the inhabitants. For instance, 
Mucianus, mentioned above, was sent there during his consulship of 131, and 
secured the friendship of neighbouring leaders while using his mastery of all 
Greek dialects (Eutrop. 4.20; Val.Max. 8.7.6). M. Perperna, his successor, also 
                                                   
98 Mileta 1998: 50-1. 
99 Kallet-Marx 1995: 353-5 dates the decree to around 101. But traditionally it is 
regarded to have occurred in the period soon after Attalos’ death. Cf. RDGE 11; Hopp 
1977: 129-35; Rigsby 1979: 40-4. Wörrle 2000: 566-8 also supports the traditional view 
based on the analysis of the stone.  
100 Jones 2004: 469-85, esp. 484. 
101 Robinson 1954: 5-6; Adams 1980: 302-14. 
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formed connections with the cities through direct contacts, such as participating 
in their festivals (I.Priene 108.ll.223-32).102 Furthermore, M’. Aquillius was sent 
there as the consul in 129, and ordered the people in Asia Minor to call Cn. 
Domitius, one of his legati, ἀντιστρατηγός, and to treat him as a local commander, 
without any reference to senatorial approval, also apparently making private 
connections in and beyond the new territory (App. BC 1.22; Mithr. 57; I.Iasos 
612.ll.13-16).103 These were not illegal, as the actions of generals in the field, but 
enabled them to increase their own interests. The Senate sent ten commissioners 
to arrange the settlement of Asia Minor after Aristonikos’ defeat.104 This move 
might have been designed to manage the Attalid affairs under a collective 
leadership, once again. In addition, the Senatus Consultum de Agro Pergameno 
(RDGE 12) of c. 129, shows that more than fifty members of the Roman elite were 
connected with the management of Pergamene land, as the members of the 
concilium of the motion.105 Although this decree might have been made around 
the end of the second century,106  the large-scale concilium suggests that the 
Senate strove to prevent a mere few Romans from enjoying connections with the 
people in Asia Minor, after Gracchus’ murder. In many senatorial decrees before 
the 130s, the number of the members connected with a motion was around five.107 
Nevertheless, in the 120s Aquillius was accused of bribery by the people of Asia 
Minor, and of catering to them, that is to say by nurturing private contacts and 
                                                   
102 Jones 2000: 6. 
103 Marek 1988: 296-9. 
104 Kallet-Marx 1995: 109-11. 
105 Tibiletti 1957: 136-7; Dignas 2002: 115-6. For the restoration of the inscription, 
see also SEG XXXIII.986. 
106 Magie 1950: 1055 n.25; Mattingly 1972: 412-23; Di Stefano 1998: 707-48.  
107 E.g. IG IX.1².4.796 (in c. 175-160); IX.2.89 (possibly in c. 140). Cf. RDGE 4 and 9; 
Brennan 2000: 343 n.31. 
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informal diplomacy with them (App. BC 1.22; Mithr. 57). The lack of any definite 
and legitimate way to control this concept still prevented Rome from arranging 
the divide between the Senate, oriented towards maintaining collective leadership, 
and individual Romans, who hoped to make connections with outsiders and to 
increase their own interests. 
Concerning the power of the tribuni, Rome also lacked any effective 
measure, even after Gracchus’ death. This is confirmed by the actions of C. 
Papirius Carbo, who was a member of the agrarian committee during his 
tribunate, some point in the closing years of the 130s. He appealed before the 
assembly for a law legalising repeated tribunates, and that of expanding the act 
voting by secret ballot (Cic. Amic. 96; Or. 2.170; Leg. 3.35; Liv. Per. 59; Plut. CGrac. 
8.2).108 The former was rejected in the assembly following a speech of Aemilianus. 
The consecutive assumption of the tribunate, however, was not banned. C. 
Gracchus gained the office in 123 and 122. The law about secret ballot was 
approved, and made it more difficult for leading Romans to influence the citizens 
with their collective dignity, although it should be noted that, despite this voting 
reform, Roman elections did not necessarily become more democratic. 109 
Moreover, when Gaius assumed the tribunate, the leading Romans could not 
prevent him from legislating a new agrarian law, and planning to bestow 
citizenship upon the Latins, and Latin status upon the Italians, satisfying people 
in and beyond Rome, while also making contacts with them in the period, before 
he failed to obtain a third tribunate (App. BC 1.26; Cic. Cat. 1.4 and 4.13; Dom. 
102; Phil. 8.14; Diod. 34.29.1-30.1 and 39.7.4; Flor. 2.3.4-6; Liv. Per. 61; Plut. 
                                                   
108 Lea Beness 2009: 60-70. 
109 Henderson 1968: 59; Ward 2004: 111-2. 
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CGrac. 12-17).110 Furthermore, the attack on him, in 121, was carried out by the 
consul L. Opimius, under the so-called Senatus Consultum Ultimum, which was 
seemingly more sophisticated or legitimate than the attack on Tiberius earlier, 
but the fact remains that Opimius himself thought this attack upon Gaius was 
against the law forbidding the slaying of the citizens without trial (Cic. Or. 2.132). 
Its legitimacy was, therefore, ethically and legally dubious.111 Thus, even after 
133, Rome lacked any legitimate way to control the exclusive rise of the tribuni, 
just as that of those using informal diplomacy, and could not help depending on 
the last, ‘ultimate’ resort in power politics to deal with it.  
Overall, the rise of Ti. Gracchus in 133 revealed the lack of definition in the 
relationship between informal diplomacy, legality and the collective leadership of 
the Senate in the Roman Republic. An individual Roman with connections to 
outsiders, and the power to control the assembly, could legitimately (and 
democratically) direct home and foreign affairs. The Senate could be bypassed 
completely in this event. Gracchus (and his younger brother in the 120s) almost 
eternalised this power, by the repeated assumption of the tribunate, whose 
significance had risen against the waning collective leadership of the Senate. 
Leading Romans understood what was happening and felt keenly the absence of 
any way to manage it legitimately, regarding it as a menace to the political order. 
In the events of 133, some coincidences partly served to heighten the disorder; 
Attalos’ bequest is a good example. But the violence itself resulted from a general 
spread of informal diplomacy in Rome, and its ill-defined relation with the law 
and senatorial collectivity. If the contacts with outsiders through informal 
                                                   
110 Rowland 1969: 377-8; Stockton 1979: 195-8. For an interpretation of these laws, 
see Mouritsen 2006: 418-25. 
111 Mitchell 1971: 47-8; Golden 2013: 110-6.  
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channels had been strange or been controlled by legal guidelines, no individual 
would have been able to exert influence in home and foreign affairs at the same 
time, even if he had the tribunate, or any other office, and was vocally supported 
by the citizens. The development of the events and violence in 133 are explained 
consistently when this situation of governance and the senators are understood. 
I would argue, then, that the concept informal diplomacy is fundamentally 




Even after the Third Macedonian War informal diplomacy was used by the 
Romans. Although many of them strove to maintain the collective leadership of 
the senators and anonymity in diplomacy, the users of this concept gradually 
increased their influence, and other Romans had no definite method to control it. 
In parallel with this tendency of informal diplomacy, the tribuni plebis rose to 
prominence in Roman diplomacy. They wielded a power that could hinder the 
operation of other officers, and even the Senate, if they were supported by the 
ordinary citizens and some leading Romans. These two factors decreased the 
collective leadership of the senators. Gracchus’ ascendancy in 133 resulted from 
this situation. The combination between informal diplomacy and tribunician 
power enabled him to control home and foreign affairs legitimately and alone. If 
he had succeeded in holding the tribunate for a second term, he would have 
prolonged further this unusual degree of political control. As his opponents and 
the authors argued, however unfavourably, he really did enjoy an authority 
reminiscent of monarchical power. It was inconsistent with the collective 
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leadership of the Senate or the traditional Republic. But there was no legitimate 
method to control Gracchus and to prevent his accumulation of powers. His 
opponents could not help but resort to extreme measures, no matter how 
illegitimate. Yet, even after 133, they still could not find a method to solve the ill-
defined relationship between informal diplomacy, legality, and the senatorial 
collective leadership, much less prevent the appearance of similar situations, 
again. 
These discussions, combined with the results of those in the previous 
chapters, show that the concept of informal diplomacy is useful in understanding 
the development of wider Roman history, from the 200s to 133, and afterwards. 
Certainly, contemporaries did not know or use this label. But Romans and 
outsiders realistically and consciously had contacts with each other through 
channels that had no connection to official state dialogues. Although some of these 
connections could be categorised as patronage, or could be called friendship by the 
Romans, it is reasonable to treat them all as a homogenous group of diplomatic 
manners, labelling them informal diplomacy in order to contrast them with 
contacts that were constrained by legality, publicity, and legitimacy. As I have 
shown through the previous discussions, noticing the relationship between 
informal diplomacy, legality, and the desire to maintain collective leadership 
among the senators, which appeared in parallel to the spread of informal 
diplomacy, is useful in understanding Rome’s advance overseas, and the 
increasing tensions observed among the Romans. In fact, it is central to the wider 
transformation of the Roman Republic from the 200s to 133 and the beginning of 
its end. 
Meanwhile, these conclusions raise a question, namely to what extent 
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informal diplomacy was a novel development for Rome in the decades concerned. 
The preceding discussions have shown that its use spread in Roman diplomacy 
during this period, and played an important role in Rome’s advance overseas, not 
to mention the beginning of internal discord and strife. These suggest that 
diplomatic actions and ideas relating to this concept clearly appeared to the 
Romans for the first time, at the beginning of this period. This view is particularly 
supported by the results of the discussions in Chapters 1 and 2, namely the 
appearance of gift-giving in 205 and Rome’s failure in managing Greek informal 
diplomacy during the First Macedonian War. Yet, these do not necessarily mean 
that informal diplomacy had not played any role in Rome’s diplomatic practice 
and governance before the end of the third century. It is still possible that informal 
diplomacy had been present in Rome, in some other way. So, in order to consider 
its precise significance from the 200s to 133, it is now useful to consider whether 
the actions and ideas that it embraced were foreign to the Romans before the 200s. 









The final topic of this thesis is whether informal diplomacy was a new 
factor in Roman diplomatic practice from the 200s to 133. The previous chapters 
have shown the utility of this concept in studying Rome’s advance into the Greek 
world, and the changing nature of the Republic. I will now reinforce these points, 
while arguing that informal diplomacy had not played an important role in Roman 
foreign affairs before the end of the third century. 
Meanwhile, the sources before the end of the third century are much vaguer 
than those for after it. This makes it difficult to demonstrate conclusively the 
absence of informal diplomacy in Rome before the period in question. However, I 
would argue that it is still possible to observe its novelty from the 200s onwards. 
This is achieved by considering Rome’s manner of approaching outsiders before 
the period in question. This discussion therefore consists of three parts. Firstly, 
the Roman attitude to gifts from outsiders will be discussed. As shown in Chapter 
1, as far as the sources report, gift-giving was employed by Rome from 205 
onwards. Yet, there are some cases of gifts from outsiders to Roman individuals 
earlier, around the 270s. The analysis of these and the character of the sources 
suggests that Rome lacked a real sense of informal diplomacy, at that point. 
Secondly, I will demonstrate that this situation is further observed in Rome’s 
diplomatic practice during the period from 264 to 210. Rome might have 
considered public opinion within and beyond the Republic, but the Romans were 
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mainly interested in how every action was justified from the viewpoint of legality, 
namely in the official channels of managing foreign affairs. This was persuasive 
to the Romans themselves, and pro-Romans, but was much less effective against 
opponents and other outsiders. Nevertheless, Rome does not seem to have 
approached these parties either with alternative, official channels, or through 
informal contacts, even though the Romans sometimes accepted such approaches 
from outsiders. These elements strengthen the argument that informal diplomacy 
was only understood properly, and used actively, by Rome from the 200s onwards. 
Thirdly, I shall look at the period before 280 and show that there is no evidence 
that informal diplomacy played any significant role then in the diplomatic activity 
of the Republic. This is achieved by an analysis of Rome’s management of 
diplomatic conflicts during the fourth century. Through these three steps, I will 
argue that Rome neither understood nor used informal diplomacy in any fixed 
way before the end of the third century. These results effectively close the 
discussion regarding its novelty, and that of its significance within Rome, during 
the period of her expansion in the East and in the wider context of the 
transformation of the Republic. 
 
Section 1: Gifts from Outsiders 
 
I shall, now, analyse gift-giving by outsiders, and argue that in the early 
third century Rome lacked the idea of approaching outsiders through the channels 
apart from official ones, i.e. informal diplomacy. One such example occurred in 
280, during Rome’s negotiation with Pyrrhos of Epeiros. He had come to Italy to 
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support Tarentum’s resistance to Rome.1 Defeating the Romans at Herakleia, he 
sent Kineas to suggest peace. Plutarchos relates (at Pyrrh. 18.2) that this envoy 
here had contacts with ‘individual leading Romans and their families with gifts 
from the king (τοῖς δυνατοῖς, καὶ δῶρα παισὶν αὐτῶν καὶ γυναιξὶν ... παρὰ τοῦ 
βασιλέως).’ Rome regarded this as an act of bribery, and was subsequently hostile 
towards him (cf. Diod. 22.6.3). It is significant that, unlike from 205 onwards, 
Rome is not recorded as having given a gift to Kineas here, even though the nature 
of the custom is a key topic of this episode (Liv. 34.4.6; Per. 13; Plin. NH 7.88; Plut. 
Pyrrh. 18-19). Ancient writers simply treat him negatively, and praise the 
integrity of the Romans. I would argue that this suggests Rome lacked the custom 
of diplomatic gift-giving in 280. 
However, as noted in Chapter 1, the information about gifts might have 
been manipulated by the ancient authors, themselves intent on idealising the 
Early and Middle Republic. In order to analyse the cases of gifts, then, it is 
necessary to consider the possibility that the authors draw an unrealistically 
moral picture of Rome despite her actual engagement with gift-giving. It is 
difficult to deny this directly, in particular for Plutarchos, who tends to construct 
his character studies from an ethical viewpoint.2 Yet, analysing the lack of gifts 
by Rome in the context of those proposed by outsiders enables us to suggest that 
Rome had not been accustomed to both gift-giving and the art of approaching 
outsiders through unofficial channels in the period concerned. Indeed, even if 
some moralising agenda had influenced the extant texts about the case of 280, I 
would argue, if gift-giving had been commonly used by the Romans, they would 
                                                   
1 Rosenstein 2012: 38-46.  
2 Schettino 2014: 417-36. 
306 
 
likely have given something to Kineas and displayed Rome’s generosity, even 
while refusing his offer of peace and gifts, similar to the contact with Rhodes later, 
in the 160s (Liv. 44.14.5-15.8). The authors would have referred to it. It would 
have glorified Rome more to highlight this, rather than simply criticising Kineas. 
Moreover, gift-giving was an ordinary step of diplomatic contacts for at least the 
Greeks from the archaic period onwards,3 and even Rome from 205 onwards, as 
noted in Chapter 1. The lack of gifts from Rome to Kineas, who presented gifts, 
can be conversely regarded even as an example of her bad manners. If the authors 
had known Rome’s real usage of the custom, I contend that they would have 
referred to it, regardless of how they individually regarded gift-giving. Thus, the 
lack of reference to gifts in 280 suggests that Rome simply lacked the custom and 
the very concept of informal diplomacy, at that point. 
This argument is strengthened by another episode, probably of the same 
year. Pyrrhos tried to give money to Rome’s envoys, who had come to negotiate 
about prisoners, and asked their leader, C. Fabricius, to make a connection of 
hospitality (ξενία), while offering more gifts, however, Fabricius declined (App. 
Sam. 10; Plut. Mor. 194F-195A; Pyrrh. 20.1-10, esp. 1; Zonar. 8.4).4 It is worth 
noting that no similar approach was directed by Rome to Pyrrhos, or other 
Epeirotes, to make them indebted to her. This suggests again that this kind of 
contact was alien to Rome in 280. Yet, there is still a possibility that the records 
in existence result from some manipulation of information by the authors, based 
on their moralising agenda. Indeed, authors clearly treat this episode as an 
example of morality of Roman statesmen during this period. Furthermore, 
                                                   
3 Herman 1987: 78-9. 
4 StV III: Nr.467; Buszard 2005: 482-5; Canali De Rossi 2005: no.357. 
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whether the gifts from Epeiros were bribes or a token of good faith based on the 
Greek custom,5 Rome in 280 might have regarded them, specifically, as an act of 
corruption, simply because the Epeirotes were her enemies at this time, thus 
abstaining from taking any action that could be treated similarly, despite 
normally engaging in the practice. The historicity of the gifts, nevertheless, is 
generally accepted in studies concerning the bias and confusion in the sources 
that record them.6 The lack of any reference to Roman gifts here suggests that 
she lacked the custom. Otherwise, giving gifts to the Epeirotes in some reasonable 
way, connected to the senatorial decree, for example, would have glorified Rome 
more than simply refusing Epeiros’ offer, or supressing the evidence of her usage 
of gifts. There seems to be a clear shift in Rome’s attitude towards gifts and 
informal diplomacy between 280 the later 200s onwards. 
This pattern is also seen in a contact with Ptolemaios II in 273 (Dion.Hal. 
RA 20.14; cf. Val.Max. 4.3.9).7 In Egypt, Rome’s envoys were honoured with ‘gifts 
for each of them (δωρεαῖς ἰδίαις).’ They accepted, but submitted the gifts to the 
Senate when they returned home. The Senate praised them for ‘all their 
achievements (πάντων ἀγασθεῖσα τῶν ἔργων),’ and ordered them to bring the 
goods to their homes as ‘good examples to posterity (κόσμοι ἐκγόνοις).’ This 
reaction shows afresh that Rome was inexperienced in the custom of gift-giving. 
Otherwise, the Senate would have expected that some gifts would be given by the 
other party negotiating, and decided how to respond, beforehand. If the envoys 
had gone through this process, the act of simply following the rules regarding gifts 
from outsiders would hardly have been subject to so much praise. Indeed, it makes 
                                                   
5 Lefkowitz 1959: 158. 
6 Fronda 2010: 46-7. 
7 Huzar 1966: 337-46; Lampela 1998: 33-51. 
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no different, even if the gifts were actually not brought to Rome by the envoys as 
Justinus’ digest of Trogus’ work informs (at 18.2.8). According to this source, they 
left the gifts on Ptolemaios’ statue in Egypt, returning home. Trogus identifies it 
as an example of Roman ‘incorruptibility (continentia).’ Yet, it could also be 
regarded as an insult. For whatever reason, the envoys returned a token of good 
faith; nevertheless, this aspect is not explored in the digest. If Rome in 273 was 
accustomed to gifts, it is strange that Trogus and his sources only praise the 
envoys’ temperance or innocence. It is impossible to decide which information is 
accurate. In any case, Dionysios and Trogus inform us about the event, from a 
position that Rome had not thought about how to treat gifts given reasonably. One 
might argue that this inexperience results from a distortion of information, 
deliberately done to emphasise the Romans’ simple and sturdy character. Yet, in 
Trogus’ reference, the envoys behaved rather impolitely. Even in Dionysios’ work, 
they did not necessarily behave in a moral fashion. They received gifts, not bribes, 
from Ptolemaios and formed a friendship with him personally, but arbitrarily 
dissolved this relationship by submitting his gifts to the Senate. Again, moralising 
agenda might have influenced the two authors,8 but it is unreasonable to think 
they falsely depicted Rome as a state inexperienced in gift-giving customs here. 
As they relate, the Roman attitude to the practice, and to informal diplomacy, in 
273 is markedly different from that from the 200s onwards. 
There is another similar case in 278 (Gell. 1.14; Val.Max. 4.3.6). Fabricius, 
mentioned above, was visited by envoys from a Samnite state. They gave him gifts 
when they saw his humble house and mode of life. He declined on the basis that 
                                                   
8 Mehl 2011: 114-20. 
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he considered wealth to be unnecessary. Gellius and Valerius Maximus use this 
episode as proof of his continentia from the moralising agenda.9 Their works focus 
on a comparison between the incorruptible statesman and Rome’s luxurious 
neighbours during the third century, and also the Romans of their own time.10 Yet, 
Fabricius’ attitude suggests that Rome in 278 was inexperienced with gifts, 
compared with the later 200s onwards. Otherwise, even though the virtue found 
in poverty was the obvious topic here, he would likely have been drawn as a leader 
treating visitors as generously as possible, despite refusing their gifts, by the 
sources of Gellius and Maximus, and the two writers could still have regarded it 
as more suitable for proposing moralistic themes. 
A similar situation is also found in a case of c. 270, in which M’. Curius 
Dentatus, a consular senator, rejected gifts (Val.Max. 4.3.5; cf. Cic. Sen. 55-6; Plut. 
Cato Mai. 2). They were given by Samnite envoys ‘in public (publice)’ and ‘in 
friendly terms (benignis uerbis),’ just as the Senate’s approach from 205 
onwards. 11  Maximus and other authors seem reluctant to relate the event 
precisely, but prefer to show ‘an example of bravery (fortitudinis … specimen),’ 
manipulating their sources to emphasise the gift as ‘that invented for the ill of 
mankind (malo hominum excogitatum),’ as Curius puts it, again stemming from 
a moralising agenda or the image of luxury versus austerity.12 Nevertheless, if 
Rome in c. 270 really had experience of the gift-giving custom, he would surely 
have been depicted by the authors not as a man of maligning the favour of others, 
but rather as one treating the envoys as generously as possible, even while 
                                                   
9 Rosenstein 2012: 248-50. 
10 Salmon 1967: 64; Keulen 2009: 186. 
11 Salmon 1967: 276 and 282. 
12 Dench 1995: 101-2. 
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refusing their gifts, because it was more favourable to their literary moralising. 
Thus, even if moralistic agenda influenced the extant sources, Rome’s attitude to 
gifts here and in the 270s as a whole is clearly different from that from the 200s 
onwards.  
It is also noteworthy that gifts were given not only by Hellenistic diplomats, 
but by some Samnites as well. This means that the custom could be known to 
Rome, even before the 270s, since Roman contact with the Samnites had begun 
by the mid fourth century.13 It suggests that Rome’s negative attitude towards 
gifts and informal diplomacy in these cases was not a unique phenomenon in 
Roman diplomacy around the 270s, and changed from c. 270s to 205, when Roman 
gift-giving customs commenced, as far as the sources report. The gifts in the cases 
mentioned above appeared in different contexts, but simultaneously show that 
the Romans had been generally inexperienced in gift-giving in diplomatic contacts. 
One might be tempted here to doubt this argument because, for Rome, 
giving gifts might have been regarded as very different from receiving them. 
Theoretically, it was possible to give them to outsiders while declining to receive 
them. Indeed, utilitarian use of giving and receiving is sometimes observed in 
Greece.14 Furthermore, the Lex Cincia de Donis, in 204, forbade the Romans to 
receive gifts from patroni (Cic. Or. 2.286; Sen. 10; Liv. 34.4.9),15 while it did not 
restrict them from giving anything to others. The Lex Fannia in 161, alluded to 
in Chapter 1, is only connected with accommodating others, not with receiving 
entertainment. Rome clearly treated the acts of giving and receiving separately. 
                                                   
13 Forsythe 2005: 281-8. 
14 Mitchell 1997: e.g. 164-6. 
15 Kennedy 1968: 428; Zimmermann 1996: 482-4. For the political context of the law, 
see Lintott 1990: 4. 
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However, it is too difficult to decide whether this distinction was clear in the 
minds of the Romans around the 270s, owing to the sparse nature of the evidence. 
Considering the year of the establishment of the Lex Cincia, I would suggest, 
rather, that the difference between giving and receiving was recognised, late in 
the 200s, at which time the act of gift-giving by Rome appeared in the sources. 
These analyses strengthen the argument that Rome was inexperienced in 
gift-giving and approaching outsiders through informal diplomacy around and 
before the 270s. But the period from c. 270 to 205, when the first case of gift-giving 
appears in Livius’ text, is not covered by these case studies and the results, since 
there is no surviving example. Although the previous chapters demonstrated 
Rome’s relative inexperience in, and gradually increasing usage of, informal 
diplomacy from the 200s onwards, Rome might actually have understood the 
concept, even before the 200s, despite her failure during the First Macedonian 
War. In order to show the novelty of informal diplomacy for Rome from the 200s 
onwards, and its significance during the very period, I will now notice her 
diplomatic disputes after the 270s, precisely from 264 to 210, and consider 
whether some kind of informal diplomacy other than gift-giving was actually used 
by Rome at that time. 
 
Section 2: Rome and Informal Diplomacy from 264 to 210 
 
In support of the argument regarding Rome’s lack of informal diplomacy 
during the period that is not covered by our analysis of gift-giving, it is useful to 
consider Rome’s approach when faced with the hostility of outsiders. Despite their 
sketchiness, the surviving sources repeatedly report that, after the 270s, she had 
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an idea of considering not only the people on her side, but also foreigners. 
Nevertheless, Rome tended to justify each action only in official channels, such as 
legal arguments, an approach that was not necessarily reasonable or appropriate 
when liaising with outsiders. This section argues that, she had not had the idea 
of approaching such people through unofficial channels, namely informal 
diplomacy, in parallel to formal ones before the end of the third century, while 
analysing her management of diplomatic disputes after the 270s. 
As a first example, I will now focus on a discussion among the Romans at 
the beginning of the First Punic War, regarding the Republic’s decision to support 
the Mamertini in Sicily, in 264 (Liv. Per. 16; Polyb. 1.7.1-11.4, esp. 10.4; cf. Cic. 
Verr. 2.5.50 and 158-64; Plut. Pomp. 10.2).16 When the latter declared deditio, 
their surrender,17 to Rome, the Senate hesitated to accept it. They had been 
mercenaries from Campania, but had captured Messana and allied with 
rebellious Roman troops in Rhegium.18 Indeed, Rome had already punished the 
rebels. In 264, the Mamertini were also almost defeated by Hieron II of Syracuse. 
Their surrender was designed to defend themselves, with Roman support, from 
the vengeful Sicilians. If Rome protected such Mamertini, despite their being 
partners of the rebels, who had seized Rhegium, it would be regarded as ‘infidelity 
(ἁμαρτία)’ to Messana and Rhegium. Meanwhile, the Senate was also 
apprehensive about Carthage’s expansion in Sicily. If Rome refused to support the 
Mamertini, they could easily ally with Carthage, presenting a further potential 
menace to Italy. The Senate could not make a decision and therefore left it to the 
                                                   
16 Ameling 2011: 51-7. 
17 Burton 2011: e.g. 4, 128-33, 145, and 236-8. Cf. Badian 1958: 27 and 33-7; Eckstein 
1995b: 273-4. 
18 Champion 2013: 149. 
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assembly. The citizen body decided to send troops, probably motivated, to some 
extent, by the fact that Carthage had sent troops to Messana. It is important, 
however, to observe that, considering the hesitation of the Senate, Rome was not 
indifferent to the public justification of her actions before outsiders, though there 
is no sign, in this case, that the Roman state strove to convince them of the validity 
of its decision through some official tool, such as senatorial decrees, or by 
unofficial means, such as gift-giving to foreign individuals. The surviving sources, 
among whom Polybios is the most prominent, might simply have failed to notice 
such approaches. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Rome decided to support the 
Mamertini consciously, following discussion in the Senate and assembly, both 
official channels, and yet seems to have failed to manage the expected antipathy 
of outsiders, either by official or informal means. 
A similar situation can be seen in the contact between Rome and Carthage 
during the same period. The ancient authors, in this case, appear to be interested, 
predominantly, in the legal aspect of the relationship between both states. 
According to Philinos, one of Polybios’ sources, they had a treaty, and Rome’s 
dispatch of troops to Sicily in 264 contravened it. Polybios denies it, however 
(3.26.3-7), since his other sources do not support this writer. Philinos’ accuracy 
here is doubted by modern scholars, partly because he was a known pro-
Carthaginian.19 Yet, as J. Serrati argues in an analysis of the treaties between 
both states,20 Philinos’ reference to the pact in question is not a complete fiction. 
Indeed, Livius’ Periochae (at 14) reports that, by Carthage’s aid to Tarentum in 
272, ‘the treaty (between the two states) was violated (foedus violatum est),’ but 
                                                   
19 E.g. Walbank 1957: 57-8 and 354; Eckstein 1987a: 78. 
20 Serrati 2006: 120-30.  
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does not tell whether it was completely and formally nullified at that time. It is, 
now, impossible to find the cause of this divergence between Polybios, Philinos, 
and Livius, and to gauge the precise relationship between Rome and Carthage 
around the early third century.21 Nevertheless, whether or not there was an 
official treaty, Rome’s advance clearly provided a reason for outsiders to criticise 
the Republic (cf. Diod. 23.2.1). Indeed, Livius and Polybios here defend the 
Romans, and on the basis on legal arguments. These elements suggest that the 
people in Rome were convinced of Roman justice through this legal argument and 
that of the threat posed by Carthage, although this might partly result from the 
way of criticism of anti-Romans, such as Philinos. It is also noticeable that there 
is no sign that Rome strove to convince such outsiders as to the legitimacy of her 
position. She had contacts with both Carthage and Hieron, but soon attacked 
them without discussing the rationale (Polyb. 1.11.11-12).22 Other cities did not 
agree to support Rome, until she exerted military pressure on them. This image 
of Roman silence towards outsiders might partly result from the fact that Polybios 
and other writers were uninterested in the details of her approach to outsiders, 
here. Furthermore, it was almost impossible for Rome to make foreigners 
recognise her acquisition of Messana during negotiations after all. There was no 
reason for the Sicilians and Carthage to approve Rome’s advance into the island. 
But if Rome had striven to convince outsiders of her justice, or to compensate their 
opposition with some strategies like gifts, the extant sources would likely have 
referred to it, in the light of the extent of their other efforts to discuss Roman 
legitimacy with legal arguments. Rome, then, might have conceived an idea of 
                                                   
21 Cf. StV III: Nrn.438 and 466; Hoyos 1984: 402-39; 1985: 92-109; Scardigli 1991: 
152-3; Oakley 1998: 252-62. 
22 Welwei 1978: 573-87; Flach and Schraven 2007: 137-48. 
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convincing contemporaries of her righteousness, 23  but seemed incapable of 
managing those, who did not accept her arguments proposed through official 
channels, with some other formal, or informal methods, although it remains 
needless to say that we are restricted by the limitations of sources in this matter. 
Another example can be identified, dating to shortly after the end of the 
Punic War. In 238/7, the soldiers of Sardinia revolted against Carthage. They 
asked Rome to help them, just as the Mamertini had done. Again, Rome accepted 
the request, prompting Carthage to protest against the decision. Rome responded 
with a resolution of war. Polybios is critical of this course of action, and reports 
that the Romans acted without any ‘reasonable (εὔλογος)’ ‘pretext (πρόφασις)’ or 
‘cause  (αἰτία),’ but that Carthage could not help ceding Sardinia to Rome, owing 
of the former’s military weakness (3.28.1; cf. 1.88.8-12).24  
It is noticeable that Polybios criticises Rome neither from the viewpoint of 
morality nor from that of legality, but does so instead on the grounds that Rome 
lacked any discernible justification, as D. W. Baronowski points out (3.22-32).25 
Strictly speaking, pretexts were offered. Polybios, and later authors using his text, 
inform us that Rome treated the capture of Sardinia as compensation for 
Carthage’s seizure of an Italian ship, although the writers regard this as an 
unreasonable claim, because the dispute was solved before the conflict over 
Sardinia even began (App. Hisp. 4; Pun. 5 and 86; Polyb. 1.83.7-8 and 3.28.3-4; 
Zonar. 8.18). Some Latin writers observe that Sardinia was considered part of the 
spoils of war, and justified Rome’s action (Eutrop. 3.2.2; Liv. 22.54.11; Oros. 4.11.2). 
                                                   
23 Cf. Torregaray Pagola 2013: 229-45. 
24 Carey 1996: 203-7. 
25 Baronowski 1995: 17-22. 
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But the dispute occurred in 238, while the Punic War had ended in 241.26 The 
people on Rome’s side might accept these pretexts but, for those who knew the 
circumstances and had no reason to support her unconditionally, these were far 
from acceptable. 
In addition, contemporary Romans may well have proposed legal 
arguments to justify their action, although these are not referred to directly by 
the extant sources. As W. L. Carey notices, Rome supported Carthage when a 
rebellion of mercenaries broke out in Africa, the most serious crisis to strike 
Carthage after the Punic War, and nevertheless, Rome sent troops to Sardinia, 
responding to the request of soldiers who had rebelled against Carthage, in 
parallel to the incident in Africa.27 Carey explains the timing and logic of Rome’s 
decision as follows. Sardinia was occupied by the mercenaries. Rome did not 
directly exploit the rebellion in Sardinia and Africa against Carthage to occupy 
the island since she respected its ownership. But the rebellious soldiers in 
Sardinia were eventually defeated by the islanders, and nevertheless Sardinia 
was ignored by Carthage for a few years, owing to the war in Africa.28 From the 
viewpoint of Roman law, Carthage’s ownership of Sardinia had ceased here. As a 
consequence, Rome regarded her occupation of the island as reasonable, and 
opposed the objection from Carthage at this timing, from a position of legalistic 
morality. This view explains the apparent inconsistency in Rome’s attitude 
towards Carthage successfully. The lack of any reference to legal arguments in 
Polybios’ text appears to refute this (cf. 3.28.1-4), but he criticises Rome for a lack 
of legitimate cause from his viewpoint. He does not necessarily comprehend 
                                                   
26 Walbank 1957: 150. 
27 Carey 1996: 210-6 and 221-2. 
28 For more information on the rebellion in Africa, see Hoyos 2000: 369-80. 
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completely the arguments presented by Rome. He may well have omitted 
arguments that he considered unworthy of discussion, and Roman law was 
categorised into this, since her idea of ownership, not shared with the Greek states 
and Carthage, may well have been more unconvincing than the pretexts of an 
Italian ship and the trophy of the Punic War, for outsiders.  
The details surrounding Rome’s advance into Sardinia show afresh that the 
Romans did not strive to convince outsiders of their position. Otherwise, Rome 
would likely have tried to win them over by approaching them even through 
informal channels, in parallel to official arguments mentioned above. Fabius 
Pictor, who actively justifies Rome’s conduct in many cases around the end of the 
third century, would also have defended her position, even here. Considering his 
celebrity in the second century,29  Polybios would surely have referred to his 
explanation, if some reasonable cause had been proposed by Rome and 
subsequently recorded by the writer. Polybios’ criticism regarding Rome’s lack of 
any reasonable explanation for this case suggests, once again, that Rome did not 
actively court any outsiders who did not accept her official pretext, either by 
official or informal means, and that pro-Roman writers, like Pictor, could not 
completely defend this attitude of Rome. 
This tendency of Rome in managing diplomatic disputes is also suggested 
by a similar case, found later in the same decade. In 236, C. Licinius Varus, the 
consul, was ordered to conquer Corsica (Zonar. 8.18). He sent M. Claudius Clineas, 
his lieutenant, ahead with a force. But Clineas made peace with the Corsicans 
instead of attacking them. Their military strength overwhelmed that of his troops. 
                                                   
29 The publicity of Pictor is confirmed by the list of famous writers on a Sicilian 
inscription (SEG XXVI.1123). For an analysis of this epigraphy, and his stance on the 
historiography, see also Battistoni 2006: 175-7 and Dillery 2009: 78-81. 
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It is noteworthy that he negotiated as the αὐτοκράτωρ, Rome’s representative, in 
ending the war, and nevertheless, Varus considered it to be a dishonourable 
settlement, attacking and conquering Corsica. Following this, the senators ‘sent 
Claudius (Clineas) to Corsicans to divert from themselves the blame for breaking 
the compact (τὸ παρασπόνδημα ἀποπροσποιούμενοι ἔπεμψαν αὐτοῖς ἐκδιδόντες 
τὸν Κλαύδιον).’ Rome condemned his agreement as ‘shameful (turpem)’ and 
treated it as an arbitrary and unauthorised decision on his part, despite his 
position as the αὐοτκράτωρ. The Corsicans did not accept such logic and 
consequently refused to receive him as a criminal (Val.Max. 6.3.3a; cf. Cassius Dio 
12.45.1).30 In 236, Rome attempted to justify her aggressive action before people 
in and beyond her through surrendering the negotiator labelled as a false one to 
Corsica. This argument seems to have been reasonable as far as the Romans were 
concerned. This is considered to represent an example of Roman sternness and 
‘discipline (disciplina)’ by Valerius Maximus, who idealised the era of the Early 
and Middle Republic. 31  This solution, however, left the Corsicans and other 
outsiders far from satisfied. Even though Rome’s action was legally justified, from 
her perspective, the islanders had been cheated by Varus. Zonaras’ reference here 
shows that some authors disapproved of the Romans’ actions in this case, and thus 
presented the events in a negative fashion. It is clear that Rome considered it 
important to justify her foreign policy to the domestic and possibly international 
audiences through legal arguments; nevertheless, she does not seem to have 
devoted any significant effort to win over those who did not accept their narratives, 
with other strategies, such as gift-giving. 
                                                   
30 Brennan 2000: 90-1 and 283; Rich 2011: 196. 
31 Mueller 2002: 148. 
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It is also useful to notice a case of 210, around 25 years afterwards, and 
during the Second Punic War. According to Livius at 26.29.1-6 (cf. Plut. Marc. 23; 
Val.Max. 4.1.7), the Senate allotted provinciae to the consuls, and decided to 
replace M. Claudius Marcellus with M. Valerius Laevinus as the governor of Sicily, 
where the Roman control had only recently been re-established, following a 
campaign of the former. This senatorial decision resulted from an appeal from the 
Sicilian cities. Their envoys lobbied for the change of governor and ‘went round to 
the homes of senators (circumibant … senatorum domos),’ complaining about 
Marcellus’ actions in Sicily.32 It is rare in Livius’ text that an informal process 
underlying the formation of senatorial consensus can be seen.33 It is, however, 
remarkable that the senators received such private visits, effectively acts of 
informal diplomacy, considered the petition, and changed the governor, even 
though Marcellus had been due to continue in office before the envoys’ visit,34 
while the senators did not criticise him, instead letting him transfer to Italy as a 
commander against Hannibal. They defended Marcellus and his achievements, 
which must have delighted the Roman citizenry, but at the same time satisfied 
the Sicilians, who had been recently conquered and practically outsiders. 
Meanwhile, Rome only reactively managed the request of the Sicilians as far as 
her official justice and interests, i.e. her conquest, were not spoiled. Rome was 
considering the needs and interests of the people in and beyond her, as in previous 
cases, but she had not yet discovered a method and idea of actively controlling 
both domestic and international public opinion, through customs such as gift-
giving, despite accepting the informal diplomatic approach by outsiders. 
                                                   
32 Wells 2010: 230-1. 
33 Eckstein 1987a: 171-2. 
34 Stewart 1998: 147. 
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In the cases from 264 to 210, the following points should be observed. 
Firstly, Rome was interested in the opinion of outsiders, even in this period. 
Secondly, it was, nonetheless, more important for the Republic to convince the 
people on its side of its righteous position, and Rome tended to achieve this 
through official channels, in particular legal arguments. Thirdly, Rome lacked 
concepts and methods of how to win over those who did not accept her justification 
in official channels, at least in these cases. Considering the appearance of gifts 
around the 270s as well, Rome certainly observed informal diplomacy being 
carried out by outsiders, but does not seem to have used it, or even understood it, 
from 280 to 210. These results are, of course, based on the limited evidence that 
is available, and do not completely demonstrate the novelty of informal diplomacy 
for Rome from the 200s onwards. Nevertheless, many of the cases in these two 
sections were important incidents for Rome’s expansion in the western 
Mediterranean world. The lack of informal diplomacy in them, therefore, shows 
that this diplomatic concept was not significant in the Romans’ wider diplomatic 
practice, in comparison to the period of expansion into the East. Despite this, 
however, the nature of the evidence means that it is still possible to think that 
Rome, by chance, abstained from using informal diplomacy in these cases, despite 
her familiarity with it. In order to refute this possibility, I will, now, analyse 
Rome’s management of diplomatic disputes before 280. If the cases in the period 
concerned show that informal diplomacy did not play a central role even before 
280, the results enable us to confirm the peculiar significance of this concept in 





Section 3: The Date of Rome’s Encounter with Informal Diplomacy 
 
Our previous discussions have only covered Roman diplomacy after 280; 
how Rome handled the issue before that date is the subject of the present section. 
However, it is not practical to check every case from her foundation to 280, since 
the early centuries are half legendary and it is too difficult to confirm the reality 
of any event before the Gallic attack.35 Nevertheless, there are more than two 
hundred diplomatic events from that attack at the beginning of the fourth century 
to the 200s, reported in the sources.36 Analysing these cases strengthens our 
central argument regarding the significance of informal diplomacy being peculiar 
to the period from the end of the third century onwards. 
Rome’s dealings with the Gallic king Brennus, following the sack of Rome, 
offers one of the earliest examples from the fourth century. It is noteworthy that 
it follows the pattern that this chapter has already observed in previous sections. 
In 390 or 387/6, Rome was defeated and her capital was almost occupied, 37 
prompting the Republic to sue for peace. He accepted on the condition that Rome 
paid compensation. In the middle of making payment, however, M. Furius 
Camillus, the dictator, is said to have arrived with new troops, and cancelled the 
pact concluded between Brennus and Q. Sulpicius, the tribunus militum with 
                                                   
35 Cornell 1995: 399-402; Oakley 1997: 104.  
36 Canali De Rossi 2005: nos.186-381; 2007: nos.401-515. Quite a few of them can be 
confirmed by StV II: Nrn.251, 302, 316, and 326; StV III: Nrn.461-2, 466-7, 473-5, 
478-9, 483, 488, 493-4, 500, 503, 509, 521-2, 530, 534-5, 540-1, 544, and 548. 
37 According to Polybios (1.6.1-2), it happened in 387/6. Livius, however, dates it to 
390 (5.36.12). Although there is no reason to doubt the former, as Walbank 1957: 46-
7 indicates, it remains difficult to date the events conclusively. Ogilvie 1965: 719-52; 
Oakley 1997: 104-6 and 360-5. Indeed, recent studies abstain from deciding it 




consular power.38 According to the extant authors (Liv. 5.49.1-3, esp. 2; Plut. Cam. 
29.2-3), Brennus reacted furiously, but Camillus legitimised his action by pointing 
to the fact that the accord was concluded ‘by a magistrate with inferior authority 
without his order (iniussu suo ab inferioris iuris magistrate)’ after his assumption 
of the dictator, and subsequently took no notice of any protest. Brennus could not 
help withdrawing, since Rome had recovered her power. 
It is significant that Rome justified the nullification of Sulpicius’ pact on 
the pretext of an imperfection in the procedure, a factor that the authors reporting 
the events seem to have considered favourably. Ancient writers tend to gloss over 
Rome’s disgrace here with many heroic and sometimes fictional episodes, which 
seem to include the acts of Camillus (e.g. Diod. 14.116.6-7; Plut. Cam. 21).39 At 
least, the silence of Trogus (cf. Just. 43.5.8) and Polybios (at 1.6.2-3) on him 
suggests that this episode is a fiction. It is important to note, however, that 
whether this was fictitious or not, his argument (or rather that attributed to him 
by the sources) does not confute Brennus’ claim. Seemingly, Camillus cleverly 
made the king withdraw, but he had ceased attacking Rome because Sulpicius, as 
the lawful Roman representative, had sued for peace and promised to offer gold. 
Even if the legal objection proposed by Camillus was reasonable, there was no 
reason why Brennus should have suffered unilaterally from the cancellation of 
the peace. Nevertheless, this episode is favourably informed by the extant sources. 
This suggests that contemporary Romans and/or early authors and descendants 
tended to like to achieve diplomatic aims through legal arguments, but were also 
comparatively uninterested in those who did not accept them, particularly 
                                                   
38 Oakley 1997: 367-76; Golden 2013: 13-22.  
39 Ogilvie 1965: 736-7; Oakley 1997: 376-9. 
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foreigners. Otherwise, it is likely that they would have emphasised the other 
methods employed by Rome to win over such people as well. For example, for 
outsiders Brennus’ injustice in the middle of payment of indemnity by Sulpicius 
would have been more persuasive than the order of Roman magistrates as the 
reason of cancellation of the pact (Liv. 5.48.9), even if both were fictions.40 The 
current situation of the sources about the Gallic sack confirms the relative lack of 
approach by Rome before the 200s to outsiders through the channels apart from 
official ones. 
One might argue that this event is exceptional in the whole history of Rome, 
too singular to find any clue in demonstrating Rome’s typical attitude to outsiders. 
There is a similar case, though. According to Dionysios of Halikarnassos (RA 
15.10.1-2), in 327 Rome opened war against some Samnite states and sent the 
fetiales to make the declaration.41 As soon as they returned, Rome mobilised 
troops. The Samnites, however, did not recognise it as a declaration of war with 
Rome. They also had a custom of sending fetiales, and in their system, even after 
the contact with the priests, the states concerned could have negotiate further to 
avoid war.42 The Samnites were therefore attacked unexpectedly by the Roman 
forces.43 Both Rome and Dionysios’ sources, however, do not appear to have been 
                                                   
40 Luce 1971: 277-83 and 289-97. 
41  For the introduction of the priesthood and the rules the extant sources are 
inconsistent, but they were fully engaged in these duties by 362, at the latest. 
Wiedemann 1986: 478-9; Penella 1987: 233-7; Oakley 1998: 313. Moreover, according 
to Livius (7.32.1), in 343, the ritual of the priests was treated as sollemnis mos, as a 
usual method, in the process of opening hostilities. For their religious and legal 
importance in procedures connected to Roman warfare, see Rich 1976: 56-60 and 
Beard, North, and Price 1998: 26-7. 
42 The existence of the Samnite fetiales is also confirmed in the case of 322 (Liv. 
8.39.14), and their historicity is generally accepted by scholars. Salmon 1967: 145-6 
and 219. 
43 Oakley 1998: 646-9. 
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concerned regarding this discrepancy and the unfair result. This confirms the 
argument of Th. Wiedemann that the custom of employing fetiales was a 
mechanism designed to persuade the Roman populace to wage wars with a 
psychological certainty that the gods supported them.44 It is impossible to decide, 
in the absence of further evidence, whether the Samnites protested about their 
perceived injustice, and how Rome responded to it; nevertheless, the 
establishment of a set of rules of war in Rome, and her manner of using it, here 
show, once again, that the Romans were interested in approaching the people in 
and possibly beyond them by legal arguments, but were indifferent to approach 
further those who might not favour the official approach. Indeed, Dionysios, a 
Greek rhetorician of the first century, seems dissatisfied with Rome’s attitude 
here, despite his general respect for her moral qualities in earlier centuries,45 
specifically noting the unfair usage of the fetiales, and the resulting disadvantage 
that the Samnites faced. Livius, by contrast, emphasises only Rome’s fairness and 
the bellicose attitude of the Samnites here (8.22.5-23.10). 
These Roman attitudes towards people inside and beyond the Republic, and 
Rome’s methods of justification, are seen in our next case, the nullification of the 
so-called Caudine Peace (Liv. 9.4.1-5.3, 8.1-10, and 9.1-12.2). In 321, a Roman 
force was trapped in Caudium by Pontius, a leader of the Samnite states. 46 
Rome’s generals were forced to sue for peace, to avoid the complete destruction of 
the army. Although Pontius wanted to conclude a foedus aequum, an equal peace 
treaty, the generals persuaded him to accept a sponsio, a verbal engagement, as a 
step towards concluding a treaty, and successfully withdrew from the field. The 
                                                   
44 Wiedemann 1986: 481. 
45 Gabba 1991: 208-13. 
46 Horsfall 1982: 45-52; Forsythe 2005: 298-9. 
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Roman assembly rejected the pact at Caudium, though. This allegedly resulted 
from the speech of Sp. Postumius, one of the trapped generals. He argued that the 
sponsio was not made ‘by the order of the Roman people (iniussu populi),’ applied 
only to the guarantors, and could be cancelled by surrendering them to the 
Samnites (9.9.4). The Romans in the assembly approved his legal argument, while 
praising him for his ‘wisdom and services (consilio et opera)’ according to Livius 
(9.10.4). Then, the ritual to hand over Postumius and other senior officers was 
performed by the fetiales to void the pact officially. Pontius criticised it and 
refused to accept the surrender, but he could do nothing else, realistically. The 
Roman soldiers had returned home. Once again, then, Rome liked to justify her 
actions with legal arguments to both citizens and outsiders, and many 
contemporary and early and possibly later Roman descendants looked favourably 
upon these events, in light of Livius’ description. Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that Rome was unsuccessful in managing the antipathy of outsiders, lacking other 
official or unofficial tools to approach them further. 
One might question my argument here from the viewpoint of the problem 
of the historicity of this event. The defeat at Caudium as such is an accepted fact, 
though. There would be no reason for Rome to invent a fictional disgrace. 
Nevertheless, the defeat was shocking not only for contemporary Romans but also 
for their descendants, and both groups seemed to justify and glorify the actions of 
the protagonists, while adding some fictional elements.47 Indeed, many scholars 
notice this problem in the sources, and think that the rejection of the peace was a 
fiction, and it was actually concluded in 320.48 The opposition to my argument 
                                                   
47 Ash 1998: 27-44; Aston 1999: 5-32; Forsythe 2005: 299-300; Ando 2008: 494-501. 
48 E.g. Burger 1898: 24-45; Salmon 1967: 227-9; Crawford 1973: 2; Rosenstein 1986: 
230-52; Rüpke 1990: 111; Forsythe 1999: 71; Oakley 2005: 37-8. 
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based on their hypothesis is, nonetheless, not convincing, as the following 
discussion shows. This theory regarding a falsified, or fictionalised, rejection 
depends on the similarity between this incident and one of 137-6. The latter was 
triggered by the defeat of C. Hostilius Mancinus, during his consulship of 137. He 
was trapped at Numantia, and, with Ti. Gracchus, secured a peace that was 
effectively an act of capitulation. In 136, the Romans rejected the pact formed in 
such shameful conditions and surrendered Mancinus to Numantia, while 
cancelling the settlement, on the pretext that he had made ‘a disgraceful treaty 
without their authorisation (ἄνευ σφῶν αἰσχρὰς συνθήκας),’ and argued that it 
could be compensated by his surrender, reminiscent of the generals ‘having made 
similar treaties without their order (ὅμοια χωρὶς αὐτῶν συνθεμένους)’ in Rome’s 
conflict with the Samnites (App. Hisp. 83). Numantia angrily refused to receive 
Mancinus, just as Pontius did. Scholars think, then, that Rome in 136 wanted to 
cancel the pact, and invented the story about the Caudine Peace to provide a 
precedent justifying her denouncing the pact with Numantia. If this is the case, 
Rome actually accepted the Caudine Peace and stopped fighting in 320, despite 
Livius’ references to the war after that (e.g. 9.12.9-15.8 and 16.1-11).49 However, 
this theory is problematic, as T. J. Cornell has argued.50 An inscription shows 
that the consul, L. Papirius Sp.f. L.n. Cursor, celebrated a triumph over the 
Samnites in 319 (Fasti Capitolini 96).51 Furthermore, not only Livius, but also 
some other sources in the first century, inform us that the war was continued even 
after 320 (Cic. Inv.Rhet. 2.91; Diod. 19.10.1; Dion.Hal. RA 16.1.3). There is no 
reason to think that all of them were prepared to distort history, or were deceived 
                                                   
49 Salmon 1967: 228-33; Oakley 2005: 34-8. 
50 Cornell 1989: 370-1. 
51 Oakley 2005: 6 and 36-7. 
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by an invented story after the 130s, even if such an attempt was really made at 
that time.  
A case of 318 confirms the error in the view regarding the ratification of 
peace, while also strengthening the argument of Rome’s lack of informal 
diplomacy. In this year, diplomats from many Samnite states made a request for 
the ‘renewal of a treaty (de foedere renovando)’ and, after the Senate rejected it, 
they ‘importuned individual Romans (fatigassent singulos precibus)’ and obtained 
a two years’ truce (Liv. 9.20.1-3, esp. 3). Scholars recognise the historicity of the 
armistice owing to the coherency of the sources concerned, referring to the 
advantage gained by Rome in Southern Italy at that time.52 It is important to 
identify which treaty the Samnites wanted to renew. Considering the lack of any 
specific reference, it is likely that they requested renewal of the directly preceding 
arrangement. If Rome had accepted the peace in 320, they wanted her to renew 
the pact concluded by her defeat in 321.53 It is not plausible, however, that Rome 
was expected to accept it, given her increasing superiority in 318.54 The most 
likely treaty being referred to in the extant sources is that of 341. This was the 
last peace, except that of Caudium, for both peoples in 318, in which the Samnites 
had supplied a year’s pay and three months’ rations to Rome’s army in 
compensation (8.1.7-2.4).55 This fits better with Rome’s strategic advantage in 
318, and was a treaty that Rome could be expected to renew, reasonably. These 
                                                   
52 Salmon 1929: 13-18; Fronda 2006: 397-8. 
53 Cf. Crawford 1973: 2 n.10. 
54 This is indicated by Oakley 2005: 264 n.2, but he, instead, thinks that the treaty 
expected to renew was that of 354, based on the assumption of Salmon 1967: 187-93 
that it was an agreement founded on mutual respect and benefit to territorial 
interests. However, this is not consistent with the military superiority of Rome in the 
310s, either. Cf. Forsythe 2005: 283-4. 
55 Oakley 1998: 393-405. 
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factors support Cornell’s theory regarding the rejection of peace in 320, and the 
historicity of contemporary and early descendant Romans’ justification through 
legal arguments. It is also noteworthy that, in 318, the Samnite envoys forged 
private contacts with individual Romans, in their attempt to change the 
senatorial decision, and that the citizens accepted such approaches and 
compromised, to some extent, just as the senators did in 210. This is a striking 
example of informal diplomacy. Rome therefore can be seen to have observed it, 
even before the 200s, and considered the viewpoint of outsiders. Yet, just as in 210, 
Rome did not seem to recognise this kind of approach as a viable diplomatic 
method, much less its potential significance. The Republic only accepted the 
request of the envoys as far as the integrity of Rome’s laws, and the state’s other 
interests, were maintained. Rome did not seek to win over the Samnites in any 
way, whether formal or informal. This passive attitude towards outsiders is 
supported by the fact that primary Roman writers do not seem to emphasise 
Pontius’ order, to send Roman prisoners with only a single garment under the 
yoke, to justify Rome’s decision of 320 in light of the brief description of the extant 
sources (e.g. App. Sam. 8; Cassius Dio fr.36.10; Cic. Off. 3.109; Dion.Hal. RA 16.1.4; 
Flor. 1.11.11; Gell. 17.21.36; Liv. 9.4.3; Val.Max. 7.2.ext.17). This might have been 
legitimate under Roman law, but could still be regarded as unfair by people 
outside Rome.56 If contemporary Romans had been interested in winning over 
foreigners, this episode would likely have been used as an extra-legal justification 
of their rejection, in parallel to Postumius’ legal arguments and the procedures 
directed by the fetiales, and later authors would have followed such a line. 
                                                   
56 Aston 1999: 21-2. 
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Overall, even before the third century, then, Rome had observed and come 
into contact with examples of informal diplomacy. However, the Romans seem not 
to have recognised it as an appropriate diplomatic method, or at least did not use 
it by themselves, in the important events discussed here. The Republic was 
interested in public opinion, both in and beyond Rome, but any approach was 
made through the lens and language of official diplomacy, particularly legal 
arguments. Even if outsiders reacted against Roman initiatives, Rome, herself, 
does not seem to have attempted to approach such people through alternative 
channels. At least, informal diplomacy does not seem to have played an important 
role in her management of important diplomatic disputes, similar to the period 




As far as the extant sources record, the Romans had observed informal 
diplomacy, even before the First Macedonian War, but seemed neither to 
understand nor to employ it, in their contacts with outsiders. Given the nature of 
the surviving information, it is impossible to examine Rome’s diplomatic practice 
continuously, in particular the detail of contacts with foreigners through informal 
channels, unlike from the end of the third century onwards. And yet, the Romans’ 
indifference towards those who did not accept Rome’s justification of her actions 
by official measures, such as legal arguments, has been identified in this chapter, 
in addition to Rome’s ad hoc, reactive responses to acts of informal diplomacy by 
outsiders. The absence of references in our sources to the methods employed in 
this diplomatic concept, shows that it did not play an active part in her diplomacy, 
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during the period concerned. These elements support an argument emphasising 
the novelty of informal diplomacy for Rome at the close of the third century and, 
furthermore, the results built on previous chapters, emphasising its significance 
to Rome’s establishment of a hegemony in the Mediterranean world, and to the 
gradual process of change that characterised the Republic in the very period from 






This thesis has analysed Roman diplomacy mainly from the 200s to 133, 
through the lens of informal diplomacy. Now, I shall conclude by a brief summing-
up with some general consideration and future prospects. 
Focusing on the distinction between the formal and informal spheres in 
diplomatic activity reveals a gradual increase of the diversity of Rome’s contacts 
with outsiders, during the period under discussion. In fact, it becomes clear that 
Rome increasingly used channels that were not subject to formal diplomatic 
constraints, in her approach to other states. The custom of gift-giving is indicative 
of this general transformation. The giving of gifts to foreign envoys was performed 
by the Senate, as part of the official diplomatic exchange, but made the receivers 
indebted to Rome. As a result, they were more likely to act in support of her, and 
thus to become an unofficial channel through which she could approach their 
fellow citizens. This combination of formal and informal approaches in diplomacy 
was effective in creating a good impression, not only on Roman citizens and 
supporters, but also outsiders. This was more useful to Rome than simply 
declaring the legitimacy of every diplomatic action through official media, such as 
legal arguments. By defining the new concept of informal diplomacy, this thesis 
has demonstrated the value in observing whom each diplomat approached, and 
how effectively unofficial methods were used to solve diplomatic conflicts in which 
the interests of the people concerned were officially incompatible or not explicit.  
The concept of informal diplomacy has also enabled this thesis to reveal the 
rise of powerful individuals within Rome’s diplomatic practice. This resulted from 
its increasing significance. In this context, people who lacked full authority to 
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participate in diplomacy could be involved, either by their own or by foreign states, 
and such individuals could also gradually behave increasingly independently. 
This pattern sometimes amplified the influence of the individuals concerned, both 
in and beyond Rome, in parallel to their legitimate connections with official power 
or other officers of the state, as shown in the case of Africanus, for example. Once 
the participation of individuals in diplomatic actions was generally approved by 
other Romans and contemporaries, it was all too easy for such people to influence 
negotiations and the decision-making process of Rome and other states, in pursuit 
not only of her ad hoc necessities but also of their own interests. 
In an associated development, the rise of individuals within the diplomatic 
framework advanced Rome’s prominence among other states, those of the Greek 
world, in particular. The increasing significance of Roman leaders in international 
politics brought an upsurge in the number of connections between them and 
foreign states and individuals. This made it easier for Rome to control outsiders, 
by actively supporting and interacting with the foreigners connected with Rome’s 
leaders. As shown in the cases of the Achaians in the 180s, some outsiders could 
react negatively to this process, but they had no practical method to stop it 
decisively. Since Rome’s military superiority was generally recognised, it became 
impossible for any state to prevent its citizens from having contacts with the 
superpower, in pursuit of their own interests. Informal diplomacy and military 
power were thus complementary factors in Rome’s expansion. 
The rise of powerful individuals, meanwhile, also caused internal conflicts 
among the Romans. As the custom of gift-giving, and the acts of Flamininus, have 
shown, informal diplomacy functioned as part of Rome’s approach to other states, 
based initially, at least, on the tacit approval of many leading Romans, during the 
333 
 
period of Rome’s expansion into the Greek world. Roman diplomacy had been 
previously managed by the senators collectively, and this was an essential feature 
of the Roman Republic; nevertheless, the rise of Roman individuals gradually 
challenged the Senate’s control of diplomacy. The increasing influence of some 
individuals through informal diplomacy, for whatever reason, damaged the 
collective leadership of the Senate. The independent actions of individuals could 
even upset foreign powers. However, as I argued in Chapter 5, this latter tension 
disappeared as Rome’s hegemony was established, and this network of contacts 
rather helped to ensure the security of communities beyond Rome. When the rise 
of individuals caused internal struggles over state leadership, between them and 
the Senate in Rome, however, there was no such factor that acted as a release 
valve to forestall civic unrest and conflict. This worsening crisis was emphasised 
by the fact that the Senate was not the only legislative body present in Rome. 
While the senators strengthened their collective leadership during the 160s, this 
was achieved only by winning over contemporaries in and beyond Rome, and 
indirectly controlling the individuals using informal diplomacy. The position of 
informal diplomacy in Rome was poorly defined; it could be tacitly approved by 
leading Romans and outsiders in ad hoc diplomatic events, but those who 
employed informal diplomacy could still be criticised by the Senate. 
Finally, I have shown that the violence surrounding the tribunate of Ti. 
Gracchus resulted from this ill-definition of informal diplomacy within Roman 
politics. His assassination in 133 was partly brought about by a series of 
coincidences, but essentially by the tension caused by the lack of a clearly defined 
relationship between informal diplomacy, the Senate, and legal powers. Gracchus 
combined his tribunician authority and own influence over people in and beyond 
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Rome, and temporarily held the power to dominate home and foreign affairs by 
winning over the assembly, while bypassing the Senate. Many senators noticed 
the essence of his power, but possessed no legitimate method to stop him. All that 
they could do was to suppress him with violence. Through his assassination, the 
collective leadership of the Senate was preserved, but the Republic had entered a 
new phase. Leading Romans displayed their will to defend their collective 
leadership, but it was also shown that the political order could only be maintained 
though physical force, while informal diplomacy could be still used without its 
position in Roman politics being defined. The leading Romans wanted to manage 
foreign and home affairs collectively, but also to exploit informal diplomacy to 
manage ad hoc diplomatic matters and, moreover, hoped to increase their 
personal influence with its use. 
These results show that informal diplomacy is an important factor for 
understanding Rome, both during the period of expansion into the Greek world, 
and in the context of the changing political complexion of the Republic. The 
diplomatic methods embraced in this concept might have appeared in Roman 
diplomacy even before the 200s, and it should be remembered that the ancients 
did not use this term to understand diplomatic manners in the unofficial sphere 
synthetically; nevertheless, contemporaries recognised that many of the activities 
which comprise this concept played an important role in Roman diplomacy, during 
the decades concerned. I would stress, furthermore, that the increase of influence 
of informal diplomacy continued to enable individual leading Romans to rise 
which, in turn, sowed the seeds of bitter and eventually deadly struggles between 
the Romans, themselves. The lack of a way to prevent the rise of individuals and 
the consequent assassination of Gracchus, who had possessed a unique level of 
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influence in and beyond Rome in 133, were a foreshadowing of the imperators and 
the civil wars that characterised the later first century. Informal diplomacy of 
Rome therefore functioned as a tool of her expansion, in parallel to her other 
advantages, such as military strength, and was more effective than any other 
state usage of this concept. This success, however, also brought about a 
fundamental conflict among the Romans, from the middle of the second century 
onwards, even after the shocking violence of 133. In conclusion, these results of 
my study contribute not only to understanding Rome from the 200s to 133, but 
also the process by which the Republic was to collapse, in parallel with Roman 
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